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Preface 
PREFACE 
The main lesson of this thesis is that when something is at stake that is dear to them, 
people can be very obstinate, single-minded, stubborn and persistent. Moreover, the 
story in this book shows that despite its negative connotation, obstinacy may have its 
merits. As a member of a household of all stubborn and single-minded people, this 
should have come as no surprise to me. While excelling at argumentation, discussions 
at our house are a lively example of ' the limits of persuasion', but also show that these 
limits do not preclude co-operation. In fact, while it may take some time to appreciate 
that actually we are dogged and determined rather than mulish and pertinacious, it is 
this that solidifies our little union. Moreover, it was doggedness and determination 
(bordering on muhshness and pertinaciousness) that enabled me to finish this book. 
However, doggedness and determination were necessary rather than sufficient 
conditions for this book to be written. Wi thou t the support of my family, friends and 
colleagues, I could not have done it. Firstly, I want to thank my promotor, Bob 
Lieshout. I know I tried your patience, thank you for keeping faith. Moreover, thank 
you for all the red ink: the book is better because of it. I also obliged to all my 
colleagues in Nijmegen: thanks for the cups of tea, the gossip, the lunches, and the 
support. You provided a solid base of business and pleasure. I am especially grateful to 
the members of the W O I B for their time and constructive criticism. You were a tough 
crowd, but I am convinced since I could make it there. . . My dear colleagues in 
Utrecht I want to thank for the warm welcome, and for being such nice colleagues. 
Thank you for your friendly encouragements and inquiries (and the empathy 
sometimes to refrain from inquiring): you helped me keep faith. 
All my friends and family, for those of you who never understood: now you 
know what I have been doing all this time. I hope this excuses the lack of phone calls, 
birthday carts, and my absence from several social events: I will try to do better. Thijs, 
you are — beyond any doubt — my best nephew (and most funny and terribly good-
looking, of course), thanks for your technical help and the beautiful cover of this book. 
Maartje and Mathieu, thank you for being my 'paranimfs', for the advise (regarding 
the book, the festivities, and of course dress-style) and for being your 'bourgondic' 
selves. Thanks also to m u m and dad, for your down-to-earth upbringing, and teaching 
me to push back when being shoved: I may sometimes overdo it, but it ultimately 
does get me where I want to be. And of course my sisters, for all sisterly things. 
Finally, and most importantly, Edward and Luuk, I could never have done this 
without you. Thank you for putt ing up with quirky, moody, single-minded little me; 
for being my rock and my sanity, and for reminding me that there is life beyond my 
PhD. Thank you for obstinately, doggedly, and persistently being there. I love you 
both to pieces. And I solemnly promise: I will never do this again. 
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Introduction 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Traditionally, students of International Relations (IR) have been primarily concerned 
with the study of conflict. Since the mid-1970s, however, international co-operation has 
become as important a topic of analysis as conflict. Inspired by the political and 
economic effects of interstate co-operation, which are widely supposed to have been 
positive, and the fact that in Western Europe international co-operation became the 
dominant feature of interstate relations, neo-functionalists, neo-institutionahsts, 
institutional-realists and liberal intergovernmentalists have all turned their attention 
to, and attempted to explain the occurrence of peaceful co-operation between states 
(Haas, 1968; Keohane, 1984, 1988, 1993; Lieshout, 1995, 2004; Moravcsik, 1991, 
1997, 1998). Even adherents of neo-realism — who are generally pessimistic about the 
prospects of establishing durable international co-operation - have been forced to 
acknowledge that international, and especially European, co-operation has become a 
central feature of international relations (Grieco, 1993, 1995, 1996; Pedersen, 1998). 
Various research programs have been established which seek to explain the 
development and effects of interstate co-operation in different issue-areas and political 
arenas. This thesis stands in this tradition. Its ultimate goal is to contribute to the 
knowledge of why and how interstate co-operation can be established. 
In this chapter, I will first present an overview of the IR debate concerning 
international co-operation that has given rise to the central research question of this 
thesis. Some years ago, Joseph Gneco, a prominent neo-realist scholar and Robert 
Keohane, the leading neo-institutionalist author, agreed that further European 
monetary integration might provide a crucial test to determine which theoretical 
approach was better able to explain the nature and establishment of international co-
operation (cf. Baldwin, 199.3: 5). However, as will be shown in this Introduction, the 
shortcomings of both theories are exposed when they are applied to two of the major 
events in the history of European economic and monetary co-operation: the 
establishment of EMU in the 1990s, as well as the failure to do so in the 1970s. 
Moreover, the root of that failure lies in the fact that, while neo-realism and neo-
institutionalism acknowledge that the existence of a common interest amongst states 
is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for interstate co-operation, in their 
studies they have largely neglected the question of how such a convergence of interests 
comes about. As a result, their explanations of interstate co-operation in general, and 
the establishment of EMU in particular, are incomplete. 
In this thesis, an attempt will be made to fill these lacunae in the study of 
International Relations, and develop a theoretical framework within which it becomes 
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possible to explain and understand national preference-formation processes and the 
establishment of common interests. More particularly, an attempt will be made to 
answer the question of why and how a common interest between France and Germany with 
respect to European monetary unification was established in the early 1990s, while - despite 
more favourable structural conditions — it failed to materialise in the 1970s Ρ On the basis of a 
comparative case study of the 1970s and 1990s attempts to establish a European 
monetary union, it will be shown that in order to answer this question, theories of 
international politics need to take domestic politics into account, and acknowledge 
that national preference formation processes are highly political and psychological in 
nature. 
1.2 Neo-Realism and Neo-Institutionalism in Trouble: Failing to Explain EMU 
With regard to interstate co-operation, both neo-realism and neo-institutionalism 
focus on the constraints imposed by structural variables on interstate relations. Both 
theories argue that the insecurity resulting from the anarchic nature of the 
international system fosters conflict and hampers the establishment of durable co­
operation. For this reason it is only safe for states to co-operate in the international 
system when they are under the protection of a dominant power. In addition, neo-
realism claims that when the predominance of this power declines, international co­
operation will not survive for long. Neo-institutionalists are more positive about the 
possibility of co-operation outliving the decline of a hegemon. When the most 
important states participating in a co-operative venture consider it to be in their 
interest to prolong this co-operation, it may continue to exist (Keohane, 1993). 
Moreover, neo-institutionalists claim that the increased (economic) interdependence 
between states resulting from past co-operation may stimulate the continuation of co­
operation. New co-operative arrangements are however not expected to develop once 
the decline of the dominant power has set in. 
These expectations, however, are not in accordance with the two major events 
in the history of EMU. In the case of the failed plans to establish a European monetary 
union in the early 1970s, for instance, the structural conditions were quite conducive 
to co-operation. The United States was the unchallenged hegemon of the Western 
hemisphere and several European institutions, such as the Council of Ministers, 
European Commission, European Parliament and European Court had been in place for 
years. Moreover, the European member states had been engaged in economic co­
operation since the start of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, and 
extended and fortified this co-operation when they signed the Treaties for the 
European Economic Community and Euratom in 1957. Under these circumstances, 
both neo-realists and neo-institutionalists would expect an attempt at European co­
operation to succeed. However, the 1970s attempt to establish a European monetary 
union ended in failure. 
12 
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In general, both neo-realist and neo-institutionalist authors have left this 
empirical problem unaddressed, while others have tried to account for the failure in 
the 1970s by using ad hoc explanations like the disturbing effects of international 
economic events (the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, or the oil crisis of 1973— 
1974) on the bargaining process (Kruse, 1980: 77; McNamara, 1998: 106; Moravcsik, 
1998: 241; Tsoukalis, 1977: 86-90, 104-111; Verdun, 2000a: 61-4). However, as will 
be shown in this thesis, the main cause of the 1970s failure to establish EMU was 
simply that European member states had no common interest with respect to EMU to 
begin with. For this reason alone, co-operation could not be established. 
The Maastricht Treaty also poses a problem for neo-realism and neo-
institutionalism. At the time the Treaty was signed, the bipolar structure of the 
international system had just collapsed and the hegemony of the United States was 
believed to be in decline (cf. Mearsheimer, 1990; Huntington, 1996, 1988; Kennedy, 
1989). In such a situation, both neo-realism and neo-institutionalism are unable to 
account for the establishment of a new international institution; nevertheless, the 
European member states managed to establish the European Central Bank (ECB), the 
most fully fledged supranational institution to date. 
With regard to the ECB, neo-realist and neo-institutionalist authors have 
attempted to address this paradox. Joseph Grieco, for instance, has developed a voice-
opportunities thesis to explain the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty. This thesis 
states that 'if states share a common interest and undertake negotiations on rules constituting a 
udlaborative arrangement, then the weaker but still influential partners will seek to ensure that 
the rules so constructed will provide for effective voice opportunities for them and will thereby 
prevent or at least ameliorate their domination by stronger partners. ' (Grieco, 1995: 34, italics 
in original; cf. Grieco, 1993: 331). This proposition explains why France and Italy 
wanted a supranational institution like the ECB: it would help them to counter 
German dominance in monetary issues and get more control over policy decisions. 
However, it cannot explain why Germany agreed to the establishment of EMU. Being 
the dominant power within the European Monetary System, a realist would expect the 
Federal Republic to have little interest in changing the rules of the system and 
granting other states a say. Moreover, the voice-opportunities thesis does not address 
the question of how the European member states managed to establish a new 
international institution while the hegemony of the United States was on the wane. 
Robert Keohane suggests that neo-institutionalism offers a better solution to 
these empirical problems than neo-realism, and can also offer an explanation for 
Germany's interest in EMU. According to neo-institutionalism, increased 
interdependence and the provision of economic and political gains by the European 
institutions made commitment to the European Union 'an essential condition for 
Germany to be able to pursue its interests ... without unduly alarming its partners' 
(Keohane, 1993: 290). Neo-institutionalism therefore solves one of the remaining 
13 
Mapping the Road to Maastricht 
problems of neo-realism: Germany's motivation to establish EMU. But like neo-
realism, neo-institutionalism does not address the anomaly of the coincidence of the 
decline of US hegemony with the founding of che ECB. 
1.3 Common Interest as a necessary Condition for Interstate Co-operation 
In my view, the reason why neither neo-realism nor neo-institutionalism can provide 
an adequate answer in explaining the differing outcomes of efforts to create European 
monetary union in 1991 and the 1970s, is that these theories have focussed exclusively 
on the structure of the international system and its effects on the prospects for 
interstate co-operation. While theoretically both neo-realiscs and neo-institutionalists 
acknowledge the fact that the establishment of a common interest - a convergence in 
national preferences — among states is essential to explain why and how interstate co-
operation occurs, the issue has received scant attention in their studies. As a result they 
have failed to grasp the fact that in the case of EMU in the 1970s, it was the failure to 
establish a common interest between the member states rather than any structural 
variable that prevented the establishment of a European central bank, nor can they 
explain how extraordinary circumstances induced the formation of a strong European-
wide interest in monetary unification in the 1990s, which made the establishment of 
the ECB possible, even though the structural circumstances were unfavourable. It is 
this understanding that has led me to the central research question of this thesis: why 
and how was a common interest in European monetary unification established between France 
and Germany in the early 1990s, while — despite more favourable structural conditions — it 
failed to materialise in the 1970s? 
1.3-1 The Need to go Beyond the Traditional Theories of International Relations 
In order to answer this central question, we need to go beyond neo-realism and neo-
institutionalism, for these theories are simply not concerned with national preference 
formation processes or the mechanisms that may cause national preferences to 
converge. To begin with, the few neo-realist and institutionallst authors who have 
dealt with this subject, have been unable to reach a consensus on the proper status of 
the issue of national preferences and their convergence. Some authors have argued chat 
the theories treat preferences as an assumption (Grieco, 1993: 127; Keohane, 199.3: 
285; Krasner, 1978: 13; Waltz, 1979: 134), while others have claimed that 
propositions on national preferences can be deduced from the hard core of their 
theories (Jems, 1988: 325; Keohane, 1993: 295).1 
1
 Keohane is mentioned as a member of both groups because he seems to believe that, up to now, both 
theories treat preferences as a assumption, but considers it possible (and necessary) that they incorporate 
propositions about preferences in their theories. 
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If the position is taken that these theories consider state preferences as 
exogenous, they will be unable to explain why and how national preferences may 
change, and why states' preferences may differ (Clinton, 1994 33)2 As a result, they 
will be unable to shed light on the question of why national preferences may come to 
converge or diverge, and to answer questions about the establishment of a common 
interest will therefore be beyond the scope of these theories Moreover, even if the 
position is taken that certain propositions concerning the development of national 
preferences and a common interest between states can be derived from the theoretical 
hard core of neo-realism and neo-institutionalism, these approaches are still not able to 
provide an adequate answer to the central question of this thesis 
The core argument put forward by neo-realists and neo-institutionalists 
working from this perspective is that the anarchic structure of the system forces states 
to be preoccupied with maximising their security above all else states' main preference 
is their own safety However, this statement is valid only under certain circumstances 
For, 'if survival is assured, states can safely pursue other goals, such as tranquillity, 
profit, and power' (Waltz, 1979 126, my italics), and in an anarchical system, the 
survival of smaller states can be assured if they are protected by a superpower In other 
words, when power in the international system is highly concentrated (when the 
international system has a high polarity), the survival of smaller states may be assured 
and they may safely pursue other goals (Lieshout, 1995 179-181, Waltz, 1979 168) 
Thus, neo-realism and neo-institutionalism can provide an understanding of the effects 
of a system's polarity on states' preferences, for they specify the conditions under which 
security will no longer be the primary concern of states They also identify the 
structural factors that may cause the content of these preferences to vary 
Additionally, despite the fact that the core of neo-institutionalism is very 
similar to that of neo-realism, neo-institutionalists are able to shed more light on the 
nature of, and changes in national preferences, for in their eyes, the effects of anarchy 
on states' security may also be lessened by the existence of international institutions 
International institutions can influence a state's preferences in three ways Firstly, by 
supplying states with additional information and formalising agreements, institutions 
render the behaviour of other states more predictable and therefore a state's 
environment less unpredictable Secondly, by facilitating interaction and lowering 
transaction costs, institutions make co-operation relatively more attractive Finally, 
once institutions are in place, the investments that have been made (sunk costs) and 
the benefits these institutions have created, will constitute a barrier for terminating 
co-operation (Keohane, 1993 274) Overall, then, international institutions help to 
2
 The authors that perceive preferences to be exogenous in general argue that that states are driven by a 
quest for national survival (Gneco 1993 127, Keohane, 1984 240, Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991 H , 
Waltz, 1979 126, 134) 
15 
Mapping the Road to Maastricht 
turn national preferences away from survival and independence, and towards peace and 
profit and interdependence. 
Accordingly, neo-institutionalism acknowledges more circumstances under 
which goals other than security will dominate a state's national preference than neo-
realism, meaning that national preferences are expected to be slightly more variable. 
Moreover, the preferences of states involved in long-term international co-operation 
may differ from those that are not part of international organisations. However, all in 
all, even if propositions on preference formation and the development of common 
interests are derived from the theoretical hard core of neo-realism and neo-
institutionalism, their explanations of interstate co-operation remain insufficient. They 
can only explain a part of the many differences and changes in national preferences that 
can be observed in reality. Wha t is more, these theories still cannot account for the 
domestic processes involved in national preference formation and change, and therefore 
have 'no well-defined view' of the evolution of national preferences (Keohane, 1993: 
285). Due to their focus on structural causes, these theories are better-equipped to 
explain similarity and continuity than understand difference and change (Van Esch, 
2002: 57). In this thesis, I will therefore have to go beyond the traditional theories of 
international relations in my search for an answer to my central question. 
1.4 The Main Argument 
I will start by addressing two theoretical approaches that focus explicitly on the 
national preference formation process: Liberal Intergovernmentalism, as introduced by 
Andrew Moravcsik, and the Social Constructivist approach on national preferences, as 
introduced by Thomas Risse, Daniela Engelmann-Martin, Hans-Joachim Knopf and 
Klaus Röscher. Liberal Intergovernmentalism has introduced a pluralist theory on 
national preference formation, which claims that the preferences of states are grounded 
in the preferences of rational and risk-averse individuals and groups, whose primary 
motivation is the consideration of economic costs and benefits. The Social 
Constructivist scholars have made an effort to understand how national preferences 
develop by focussing on the causal power of international norms, as well as state 
identities. In Chapter 2, an overview and critical analysis of these approaches will be 
presented. It will be concluded that, while these theories do focus on the national 
preference formation process, they are based on an inadequate understanding of the 
political and psychological nature of this process. Moreover, it will be established that 
these theories provide little understanding of the mechanisms that lead to the 
convergence or divergence of national preferences. They fail to appreciate the political 
nature of these mechanisms, and overemphasise the ability of decision makers to 'learn' 
new policy ideas. All in all, these approaches cannot provide an adequate answer to the 
central question of this thesis. 
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In Chapter 3, an alternative theoretical framework is developed that is 
explicitly aimed at understanding the political and psychological mechanisms involved 
in establishing a common interest between states. It will be hypothesised that to 
explain the domestic preference formation process and the emergence of an interstate 
common interest, an understanding of central decision makers' pre-existing beliefs, as 
well as the domestic political arena is crucial. In addition, it will be argued that, while 
decision makers' pre-existing beliefs can be the deciding factor which brings about an 
interstate common interest, belief change — in the form of learning or by persuasion — 
is unlikely to occur. This leads to the — somewhat paradoxical - expectation that, 
while beliefs are crucial for understanding the content of national preferences and the 
possibility of a common interest occurring, actual changes in beliefs are rare. 
Moreover, if national preferences do undergo a transformation — thereby enabling the 
establishment of a common interest - such change is most likely to be induced by the 
exertion of power, or changes in, or of the national political system. 
In the remainder of the thesis, these propositions will be tested by comparing 
the case of the successful establishment of a common interest between France and 
Germany with respect to the development of EMU in the 1990s, with the failure to do 
so in the 1970s. In Chapter 4, the selection of these cases will be justified, and the 
research strategy used to test the hypotheses is introduced. It will be argued that a 
comparative case study in combination with process tracing is the most adequate 
strategy to test the propositions in question. The methodological technique of 
'cognitive mapping' will also be introduced. This technique will permit in-depth 
analysis of decision makers' pre-existing beliefs, and make it possible to determine 
whether or not individual decision makers were able to 'learn' new beliefs concerning 
the desirability of establishing a European economic and monetary union. 
The actual empirical part of this thesis consists of four chapters, two of which 
contain rich historical overviews of the history of EMU prior to, and in between the 
two attempts at establishing such a union (see Chapter 5 and Chapter 7). These 
overviews provide the much needed long-term framework that helps the reader to 
understand, and put into perspective the attempts to establish EMU. The two other 
chapters contain the actual cases used to test the hypotheses derived from the 
theoretical framework: Chapter 6 will deal with the failed attempt to establish a 
common interest between France and Germany on the establishment of EMU in the 
1970s, while Chapter 8 is concerned with the successful establishment of such a 
common interest in the early 1990s. 
As will be argued in the concluding Chapter 9, in the 1970s the 
establishment of EMU failed because no common interest between France and 
Germany on the question of European monetary unification was established. The 
establishment of such an interstate agreement was frustrated by the persistence of 
sceptical attitudes towards the project on the part of the dominant French and German 
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actors, President Georges Pompidou and the German financial authorities, and the 
inability of the supporters of EMU to convince these dominant actors of the value of 
EMU, or gain enough political clout to overrule them. While throughout the 1980s a 
common interest between France and Germany in European monetary unification did 
not exist, in early 1990, a shared interest in EMU between several pivotal decision 
makers did develop. This was made possible by the effect that the revolutionary 
developments in Eastern Europe had on the beliefs of the German Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl. Rather than changing his beliefs concerning European integration, the 
developments strengthened his conviction that further European unification was 
needed. This strengthening of his pre-existing beliefs made him take the future of 
Germany and Europe into his own hands, overrule domestic opposition to EMU, and 
drag the more hesitant French President along in the process. 
Overall, the empirical findings of this thesis — while not supportive of all 
propositions derived from the approach introduced in Chapter 3 - does provide 
extensive evidence for the claim that the national preference formation process is a 
highly psychological process. Moreover, central decision makers' pre-existing beliefs, 
their inability to learn, as well as the domestic political balance of power are identified 
as the main variables that can determine the establishment of a common interest in 
international co-operation. 
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2 IR THEORIES ON NATIONAL 
PREFERENCES 
2.1 Introduction 
As was argued in the introduction to this thesis, students of international relations 
(IR) traditionally did not theorise about state preferences or the reasons for their 
convergence. Neo-realism and neo-institutionalism simply presupposed the existence 
of a common interest, and focused solely on the subsequent bargaining process. 
Recently, however, several IR scholars have begun to study state preferences and have 
made attempts to upgrade statements on its formation, definition and convergence 
from assumption to hypotheses. In this chapter, I will give an overview of the two 
main contributions in this field and evaluate whether or not they are able to offer a 
theoretically and empirically satisfactory answer to the central question of this thesis. 
The first IR approach to national preferences that will be analysed in this 
chapter is the one developed by Andrew Moravcsik within the framework of his theory 
on international co-operation, Liberal Intergovernmentalism. His approach to national 
preferences posits a domestic and pluralistic view of the process of their formation, and 
puts forward a strictly rationalist and economic approach to preference definition. As 
such, it fundamentally differs from the second approach that will be analysed in this 
chapter; the moderate Social Constructivist approach developed by Risse, Engelmann-
Martin, Knopf, and Roscher. The moderate Social Constructivist School explicitly 
takes issue with - what they feel is - an overly rationalistic and materialistic approach 
to international relations put forward by the mainstream IR approaches. Furthermore, 
according to Social Constructivist scholars, their focus on the social rather than the 
material structure of international relations makes their approach particularly well 
suited to understand the definition of national preferences. While, strictly speaking, 
Social Constructivism is not a 'theory' of international relations, some Social 
Constructivists have deduced substantial theoretical and empirical claims concerning 
the definition of state preferences from the general approach. This approach will be 
analysed in depth in the second part of this chapter. 
2.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism and National Preferences 
2.2.1 Conceptualisation 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism - a theory which was developed fairly recently by 
Andrew Moravcsik and remains largely associated with his name' — addresses the 
1
 Moravcsik has introduced his theoretical framework in two articles publicised in the early 1990s 
(Moravcsik, 1991, 1993), but has been building on these initial ideas in subsequent publications 
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question why interstate co-operation in general — and European integration in 
particular - occurs.4 To do so, it disaggregates the process which leads up to interstate 
co-operation into three sequential stages: the preference formation stage, the 
negotiation stage, and the stage in which states choose whether to delegate or to pool 
common decision-making.5 Since Moravcsik treats national preference formation and 
the possible establishment of a common interest as analytically prior to the start of the 
negotiations in stage two — the analysis in this chapter will be restricted to the first 
stage of his approach. 
When speaking of'national preferences', Moravcsik refers not simply to a 
particular set of policy goals but to 'a set of underlying national objectives 
independent of any particular international negotiation to expand exports, to enhance 
security vis-à-vis a particular threat, or to realize some ideational goal' (Moravcsik, 
1998: 20). In his view, this set of underlying national objectives are like 'tastes' and 
must be distinguished from the 'strategies' and 'tactics' that actors employ, and the 
concessions they are forced to make to get their preferences realised/' Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism's definition of the national preference thus reflects the analytical 
separation of the preference formation and negotiation stage that constitutes the core 
of the approach (Moravcsik, 1997: 519; 1998: 24, 25 note 7). 
In addition, Liberal Intergovernmentalist conceptualisation of (national) 
preferences is based on what Moravcsik has called a weak rationality assumption. This 
assumption implies that preferences need not necessarily be uniform across issues, 
countries, or during long periods of time, nor need they be 'grounded in material 
incentives'. Moreover, according to Moravcsik, preferences may vary in response to 
(Moravcsik, 1995, 1997, 1999b, 1999a, 1998). As a result, the account of the theory vanes in the 
different publications When speaking of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, this thesis will therefore be 
referring to the account of the theory that has been given in his 1998 book 'The Choice for Europe Social 
Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht', the parts of his 1997 article 'Taking Preferences 
Seriously. A Liberal Theory of International Politics' explicitly devoted to developing the Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist framework (pages 513-524, 533-553), and Moravcsiks response ro the critics of 
these works, for these publications constitute a (more or less) coherent body of theory 
^ Liberal Intergovernmentalism posits that European integration can be analysed with the same theoretical 
framework that any other form of interstate co-operation can, and thus rejects the idea that is commonly 
held by students of the European Union that the European integration process is a unique event that 
requires a sui generis theory In the words of Moravcsik, Liberal Intergovernmentalism 'eschews ad hoc 
explanation and seeks instead to discover what is generahzable about EC history' (Moravcsik, 1998 2) 
5
 Moravcsik analyses the processes that occur in each of these stages through different but complementary 
(existing) theories So, rather than being a theory, Liberal Intergovernmentalism must be described as a 
theoretical framework that comprises three complementary theories, and offers a multi-causal explanation 
of interstate co-operation (Moravcsik, 1998' 19-20) 
6
 So, the concept preference as employed here does not have any bearing to what game-theorists call 
preferences Game-theoretical preferences are what Moravcsik calls 'strategies and tactics' (Moravcsik, 
1997 519) 
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changes in the 'economic, ideological, and geopolitical environment'.7 In fact, 
according to Moravcsik the weak rationality assumption - as he applies it - merely 
maintains 'that within each negotiation, domestic political systems generate a set of 
stable, weighted objectives concerning particular "states of the world'" (Moravcsik, 
1998: 23). 
2.2.2 The Content of Societal Preferences: Commercial Liberalism 
Liberal Intergovernmentalist ideas on national preferences are based on Commercial 
Liberalism, a theory of national politics whose main claim is that national preferences 
reflect the commercial interests of dominant social groups and individuals.8 These 
commercial interests are said to be grounded in the individual economic gains and 
losses that result from a particular configuration of the domestic and global market 
structure. Liberal Intergovernmentalism, however, focuses primarily on the 
consequences of one particular aspect of the international economic market structure 
for the commercial interests of societal actors: economic policy externalities.9 Like the 
economic market structure in general, these economic policy externalities may impose 
economic costs or benefits on societal actors and - as such - determine their 
commercial interests (Moravcsik, 1998: 35-8).10 
In addition, Moravcsik claims that the process by which domestic actors infer 
their commercial interests occurs 'independently of politics', which means that they 
are said to determine their preferences prior to any participation in the political realm 
(Moravcsik, 1997: 517 and note 6). Only after domestic groups and individuals have 
defined their interests, they enter the national political arena to attempt to enforce the 
7
 Both the claim that preferences may vary in response to exogenous changes in economic, ideological, and 
geopolitical environment and the claim that preferences need not be grounded in material incentives are in 
stark contrast with the logic of the Liberal Intergovernmentalist preference formation theory. As discussed 
below, this theory states that the preferences of societal actors are based solely on their micro-economic 
interests that are derived from the domestic and global economic market structure, not the ideological or 
geopolitical structures In fact, Liberal Intergovernmentalism posits that the preferences of states solely 
represent some subset of these micro-economic interests, and have no basis in the geo-political or 
ideological considerations of central decision-makers So, whereas the Liberal Intergovernmentalist 
preference formation theory does allow for changes in preferences to occur (see section 2.2 3), these can be 
contributed solely to changes in the domestic or global market structure. 
8
 For an overview of liberal thought, see (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987 13-71; Moravcsik, 1997: 525-33) 
9
 Policy externalities are the unintended consequences of the national policies of states for other states or 
their constituents. Examples of policy externalities are cross-border environmental pollution of national 
industries, the consequences of unilaterally imposed trade tariffs or restrictive regulations, or of currency 
realignments 
10
 In response to his critics, Moravcsik has suggested that - in addition to the economic rationale - his 
theory addresses the role of ideas in the formation of national preferences (Moravcsik, 1999a: 376-7). 
However, close reading of Moravcsik's original writings reveals that the theoretical core of Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism explains (individual or societal) preferences by referring solely to the objective 
economic costs and benefits that actors face 
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realisation or protection of these interests through political action. The greater the 
economic costs a domestic actor is faced with, or the more it would benefit of a policy 
change, the greater its incentive to engage in such political action (Moravcsik, 1997: 
528). 
Societal actors may prefer an unilateral adjustment of national policies to deal 
with the policy externalities that have bestowed economic costs on them, or they may 
prefer the implementation of coercive policies (like sanctions) to force foreign states to 
abandon or change the policies that are creating these negative externalities. However, 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism argues that in many instances societal actors may judge 
unilateral policies to be unable (efficiently) to deal with externalities and that coercion 
is a less profitable means to deal with policy externalities in times of more economic 
interdependence, for 'the more diversified and complex the existing transnational ties 
and production structures, the less cost-effective coercion is likely to be'. (Moravcsik, 
1997: 530). In these - increasingly reoccurring - instances, Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism expects societal actors to prefer international co-operation as a 
means to re-arrange the pattern of economic policy externalities, and to pressure their 
governments to engage in international negotiations (Moravcsik, 1998: 35). 
2.3 The Formation of the National Preference 
According to Commercial Liberalism, the national preference reflects the preferences of 
societal groups. However, the theory does not presuppose the interests of domestic 
societal actors and individuals to be harmonious, for, in general, the costs and benefits 
that the economic market structure or economic policy externalities bestow on society 
are not evenly distributed over societal actors, and their preferences are thus likely to 
differ. Those who benefit from the existing configuration of the market structure 
prefer to protect the status quo, or reinforce its effects whereas actors who stand to lose 
from the current configuration will advocate a change in one form or another. When 
both winners and losers engage in political action to satisfy their preferences, serious 
societal conflict may arise over which policies the government should adopt 
(Moravcsik, 1997: 529; 1998: 36). In other words, Commercial Liberalism predicts the 
development of a domestic cleavage between winners and losers, which means that the 
national preference cannot reflect the preferences of every citizen to the same extent. 
In fact, national preferences are said to reflect the objectives of dominant 
societal groups or individuals, whose status is determined by the relative power of 
domestic actors and the amount of access to the government that the nature of the 
political system allows them. The national political system thus constitutes 'the 
critical "transmission belt" by which the preferences and social power of individuals 
and groups are translated into state policy' (Moravcsik, 1997: 518). In other words, the 
relative political power of domestic groups and the characteristics of the national 
political system are intervening variables between the individual preferences of societal 
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actors and the national preference, and the national preference thus constitutes some 
subset of the (conflicting) domestic commercial interests of societal actors rather than 
the common economic good." 
According to Moravcsik, the national preference — in a manner similar to the 
individual preferences of societal actors - is formed 'prior to international politics', 
which means it is formed prior to any consideration of the international political 
context, or the desirability or attainability of the preferences put forward by dominant 
domestic groups in the international arena. As Moravcsik has put it; 'the phrase "a 
country A changed its preferences in response to an action by country B" is thus a 
misuse of the term as defined here' (Moravcsik, 1997: 519, note 12; 1998: 24-5).12 
Since the national preference is grounded solely in the preferences of domestic 
individuals and societal groups, international variables may enter the national 
preference only through the preferences of these actors, and are thus based solely on 
their transnational social contacts and assessment of the global market. 
2.3-1 The Impoverishment of the Pluralist Conception of National Politics 
While Liberal Intergovernmentalism is based on Commercial Liberalism, in The Choice 
for Europe Moravcsik adopts a simplified version of this theory on preference formation. 
Rather than analysing the effects of the social group's relative power and the nature of 
the national political system (the 'critical transmission belt') on the formation of the 
national preference, he simply assumes that producer-groups are - a priori - the most 
influential domestic actors because of their 'more intense, certain, and institutionally 
represented and organized interests' (Moravcsik, 1998: 36). In The Choice, national 
preferences are thus assumed to represent the preferences of domestic producers 
groups." Furthermore, Moravcsik presumes that producers exert influence on the 
national government 'solely through the peak organizations representing three broad 
" According to Moravcsik, the only constraint on the representation of the micro-economic interests of 
dominant societal groups by the state is posed by 'general demands for regulatory protection, economic 
efficiency, and fiscal responsibility' (Moravcsik, 1997: 529; 1998' 36) However, he does not specify where 
these demands may originate from, and how rhey may make their way into the national preference In my 
opinion, they cannot originate in the preferences of the weak societal groups, for their preferences are said 
not to be represented in the national preferences. Moreover, they cannot originate from the preferences of 
state institutions, for they have none The only possibility left is that Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
assumes that that these constraints are posed by the domestic or global economic structure: that it simply 
would economically be impossible to adopt policies that are in conflict with regulatory protection, 
economic efficiency, or fiscal responsibility 
12
 According to Moravcsik, this conceptualisation of the national preference allows him ro distinguish 
between the genuine preferences of states and the concessions they make during negotiations. 
" Liberal Intergovernmentahsm's conception of the state, thus, shows some resemblance with that of 
Marxists in that states are said to be the puppet of capital owners (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987 204-5, 
223) However, in contrast to Marxists, Moravcsik does not pass any moral judgement on this 
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economic sectors: industry, agriculture, and services' (Moravcsik, 1998: 36). The 
addition of these assumptions to Commercial Liberalism has three serious drawbacks. 
Firstly, by assuming that the national preference will only represent the 
preferences of producer groups, much of the domestic political system has become 
exogenous to the Liberal Intergovernmentalist analysis of national preferences. To 
begin with, the preferences, influence, and political action of all non-producer groups 
— like consumer groups, trade unions, political parties, and non-commercial interest 
groups (environment, health) — are completely ignored. Secondly, the specific character 
of national political institutions - Commercial Liberalism's 'critical transmission belt' 
— is deemed to be theoretically irrelevant. In other words, despite differences in 
electoral system (presidential or parliamentary), party system (two or multiple parties), 
or even the organisation of interest groups' access to decision-making (corporatist or 
pluralist) all domestic political systems are said to result in the same domestic power 
configuration at any time and in every issue-area: the dominance of producer groups 
(Caporaso, 1999: 162; Wallace, 1999: 156-7; Youngs, 1999: 299). Finally, the 
assumption that producers exert influence solely through peak organisations implies 
that differences in preferences amongst producers within one sector are ignored.14 All 
in all, these assumptions make the Liberal Intergovernmentalist idea of domestic 
politics 'largely apolitical' (Fioretos, 1997: 299)-
In addition, these assumptions severely limit Liberal Intergovernmentalist's 
ability to explain change and variation in national preferences (Diez, 1999: 360; 
Fioretos, 1997: 299; Scruggs, 2000:149; Van Kiel and Metten, 2000: 222). According 
to Commercial Liberalism, variations in national preferences may result from variations 
in economic market structures (which would change the individual preferences of 
domestic actors), societal power relations, and the characteristics of domestic political 
institutions. Moreover, changes in national preferences may result from changes in all 
the above-mentioned variables and from changes in the global economic structure. 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism, by contrast, distinguishes only one cause of variation — 
variation in domestic economic market structures — and two causes of change -
changes in the domestic and global market structure — (Moravcsik, 1999a: 380-1).'5 
14
 This seems curious, because exporting industrialists and exporting farmers are likely to share more 
commercial interests than export-oriented firms or farmers and firms or farmers that produce solely for the 
national market (Frieden, 1991). In fact, Moravcsik relies on these differences in trade (as opposed to 
sector) patterns to deduce producers' interests in trade- and monetary issues (see Section 2.3.1). 
15
 I do not agree with those critics who argue that Liberal Intergovernmentalism allows for no variation in 
group preferences across countries (Fioretos, 1997 299). Firstly, the theory's first causal variable - the 
domestic economic structure - may differ across states. Furthermore, LI does not presume the second 
causal variable - the international economic structure - to affect, for instance, French farmers in the same 
manner it affects German farmers However, I do agree that Liberal Intergovernmentalism 'somewhat too 
easily identifies similarities in the approaches' of the countries studied (Wallace, 1999' 157) 
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So, despite Moravcsik's statement that 'I do not assume states are unitary in 
their internal politics' (Moravcsik, 1998 22), Liberal Intergovernmentahsm cannot 
claim to be based on a genuinely pluralistic idea of domestic politics Furthermore, the 
statement that, according to Liberal Intergovernmentahsm, preferences 'need not 
necessarily be uniform across issues, countries, or long periods of time' (Moravcsik, 
1998 23) cannot disguise the fact that its assumptions introduce a serious bias against 
change and variance So, 'despite representing an improvement on realist accounts' 
(Wincott, 1995 600), Liberal Intergovernmentahsm has lost much of the added value 
that traditional liberal theories have to offer 
2 3 2 State-Society Relations The State as a Weathervane 
As indicated above, Liberal Intergovernmentahsm asserts that the national preference 
represents the preferences of dominant national societal actors who 'constantly pressure 
the central decision-makers to pursue policies consistent with their preferences' 
(Moravcsik, 1997 518) However, this statement requires an examination of the 
precise nature of the power relationship between state and society How much 
influence can state institutions or officials exert on the content of the national 
preference' Are they able to 'act as gatekeepers', or even 'call the shots' despite the 
pressures of societal groups (Wallace, 1999 156-7)> 
In general, adherents of liberal theory have invoked one of three irreconcilable 
conceptualisations of the relationship between state and society the so-called 
weathervane model, the neutral state model, and the broker state model (Dunleavy and 
O'Leary, 1987 43-54) In the weathervane model, all political power is awarded to 
society, while none is awarded to state institutions, which are depicted as inert, 
moving languidly in whichever direction the societal winds might blow them 
Government decisions, thus, reflect the constant flux and changes in the balance of 
power between societal groups and their preferences In the second model — the neutral 
state model — the state-society relationship is portrayed in a significantly different 
manner In this view the state 'balances, re-weighs and referees pressure group contests 
to protect unorganized or weakly organized groups "in the public interest'" (Dunleavy 
and O'Leary, 1987 45) The national preference is thus no longer the representation of 
the micro-economic preferences of the most powerful societal groups, but represents 
some kind of common good The final model - the broker state model - awards the 
state even more power than the neutral state model In this view, the state is 
conceptualised as an autonomous actor that may pursue its own 'non-altruistic policy 
preferences' While pressures from societal groups may constrain the actions of state 
institutions, state actors 'are also capable of manipulating the cleavages and interest 
groups in civil society, sowing division, and exploiting for their own purposes the 
cross-cutting cleavages and overlapping group memberships' (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 
25 
Mapping the Road to Maastricht 
1987: 48). In other words, in this model states are politically active and potentially 
powerful political actors (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 47-9). 
It is clear that the Liberal Intergovernmentalist view of the state-society 
relationship is an example of the weathervane model, for Moravcsik's state does not 
represent the preferences of unorganised or weakly organised groups or any kind of 
common good — as the neutral state does - nor does it have its own 'non-altruistic 
policy preferences' like the broker state. In fact, Moravcsik's state has no preferences at 
all for it 'is not an actor but a representative institution constantly subject to capture 
and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors' 
(Moravcsik, 1997: 518). In fact, in The Choice for Europe, Moravcsik completely nullifies 
the role of the state when he informs the reader that '"state" actors are treated as 
proxies for the underlying social forces' (Moravcsik, 1998: 36 note 29). 
However, when discussing the formation of national preferences concerning 
the establishment of monetary co-operation, Moravcsik suddenly claims that in issue-
areas in which producer interests are less intense and more diffuse - as in monetary 
policy - politicians may 'indulge the temptation to consider geopolitical goals' 
(Moravcsik, 1998: 7). While the idea that states will have more influence on 
determining the national preference in issue-areas where societal preferences are weak 
and diffuse is a plausible one, this statement is irreconcilable with the 
conceptualisation of the state 'as proxy for underlying social forces' (Cederman, 2000: 
171; Scharpf, 1999: 166, 168 note I).16 Moreover, this statement leads one to ask on 
what basis state actors suddenly begin acting purposively in the world, and the theory 
thus 'requires another approach to explain policy outcomes (or elements of policy 
outcomes) resulting from it (Parsons, 2000: 47).17 Furthermore, Moravcsik fails to 
grasp that the consequence of his statements is that his core weathervane model is 
simply not valid in issue-areas where producer interests are weak or diffuse (see Section 
3.4), and proceeds to analyse the formation of national preferences on the 
establishment of the EMS and EMU in the same way as the preference formation 
regarding the other grand bargains (Moravcsik, 1998: 238-31 3, 379-471). Moreover, 
"^  In terms of the different pluralist models of state-society relationships discussed above, Moravcsik shifts 
between the irreconcilable images of the state as weathervane — as invoked by the theoretical core of 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism — and the state as a broker (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987 49-54), which 
makes his theory internally inconsistent 
17
 In the cited statement, Moravcsik suggests that national politicians are motivated by geo-political 
goals', however, throughout The Chouefor Europe Moravcsik also refers to the macro-economic ideas of 
ruling governments, their regulatory and financial objectives, and their European federal ideas (Moravcsik, 
1998 49, Y!, 429) Moreover, in an earlier publication Moravcsik has claimed that 'the primary interest 
of governments is to maintain themselves in office' (Moravcsik, 1993 483) 
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he even cites these monetary cases as confirmation of his theory (Moravcsik, 1998: 
473).'" 
2.3-3 The Occurrence of a Common Interest 
In his book, Moravcsik starts by explaining that to be able to understand the 
occurrence and form of interstate co-operation, one of the questions to be answered is 
whether a common interest is present; or, as Kenneth Oye has put it, 'when you 
observe conflict, think Deadlock - the absence of mutual interest — before puzzling 
over why a mutual interest was not realized' (Moravcsik, 1997: 543). However, while 
he discusses the formation of national preferences at length, Moravcsik does not 
elaborate on how the development of common interests between states takes place. A 
'Liberal Intergovernmentalist' view on why and how common interests are established 
may, however, be derived from Li's theory on preference formation. 
To begin with. Liberal Intergovernmentalism may be characterized as a 
typical example of a Rational Choice model of preference formation. Such models share 
three characteristics. Firstly, Rational Choice approaches generally define the actors' 
ultimate values in terms of some kind of objective economic or political interest. 
Moreover, theoretically, this definition of actors' values has the status of an 
assumption, meaning that all actors are ultimately assumed to strive for this objective 
interest under all circumstances. Furthermore, these models assume that actors — given 
the constraints of the situation — strive for the maximisation of their interests 
(Steinbruner, 1974: 42). The Liberal Intergovernmentalist approach to preferences 
shares these characteristics. For, notwithstanding the fact that Moravcsik states that 
his framework 'avoids a temptation that bedevils scholarship on international relations, 
namely to assume that state preferences are fixed' (Moravcsik, 1998: 20), the central 
actors in his theory on preferences - producers — are deemed to strive for as much 
commercial benefit as possible given market conditions. 
These characteristics inform a very specific view on why and how common 
interests are established. Firstly, given the assumption that actors strive for the 
maximisation of their interests, they will engage in a rational analysis of the costs and 
benefits of the different courses of action available to them, whereupon they will select 
those courses of action that are the most rewarding or least costly to them in terms of 
their interests. In order to be able to select the most rewarding policy-preference, the 
Liberal Intergovernmentalist actor needs adequate information about how the world 
works. In fact, in their quest to maximise their interests, these actors may logically be 
'" Scharpf suggests that 'an overly strong commitment to the idea that the social sciences should produce 
general theories about empirical regularities' induces Moravcsik to ignore the deviance in these two cases 
rather than exploit them 'for the development of more reality-congruent theory through the introduction 
of analytically pertinent distinctions' (Scharpf, 1999' 166). 
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expected to seek actively new and better information and to integrate new information 
in their calculations (Alderson, 2001 : 418; Checkel, 2001: 562; Hug, 2003: 45; 
Payne, 2001: 10-1; Princen, 2002: 61-6), for this would give them a more adequate 
understanding of how the world works, and thus provide them with the means to 
optimalise their quest for the maximisation of interests (Steinbruner, 1974: 42). In 
other words, the Liberal Intergovernmentalist producer may be expected to be an 
information-sensitive as well as an information-seeking actor. This form of learning is 
often referred to as Bayesian updating (Checkel, 2001 : 561; Levy, 1994: 285). 
All in all, it may be concluded that the Liberal Intergovernmentalist approach 
to preferences implies a 'Bayesian' view of learning, that is perceiving actors to have 
the capacity to make optimal use of information, and learning to be not only 
instrumental, but also unproblematic.19 In addition, like the Bayesian model, Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism perceives learning to be an individual process driven by 
objective circumstances (Checkel, 2001: 560-1, see Section 3.3.1 on learning). 
As argued before, Liberal Intergovermentalism presumes the interests of the 
producers to be based on the economic costs and benefits they are subject to within the 
economic market structure. Preference change is induced by the individual's own 
realisation that the economic market structure has changed. Social interaction is not 
included in the model, for as Moravcsik has argued 'preferences are prior to politics'. 
By placing preference formation outside the political realm, Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism excludes the possibility that political actors may exert influence 
on each other's definition of their interests through persuasion, argumentation or 
manipulation (Stone, 2002: 305-23). This individualistic view of preference formation 
is line with the assumption of methodological individualism that many Rational 
Choice theorists adhere to (Checkel, 2001: 561). 
Notwithstanding the basic individual character of learning that is stressed by 
Rational Choice approaches, however, Moravcsik has argued that during the past 
decades, a consistent convergence between the commercial interests of dominant 
producer groups has taken place. This convergence, he argues, is a reflection of 
'fundamental trends in post-war international political economy - in particular, a fifty-
year boom in trade and investment among industrialized countries' (Moravcsik, 1998: 
3). In other words, the more economically integrated states became, the more 
favourable their attitudes towards further integration were (Moravcsik, 1998: 3).'" 
19
 For a Rational Choite approach that does acknowledge actor's inherent resistance to belief change, sec 
(Lieshout, 1995:40-7) 
J
" While this reasoning makes clear why Liberal Intergovernmentalism expects the preferences of 
producers to converge towards a common interest in policy co-ordination rather than unilateral policy 
making, it is not clear why preferences regarding the content of co-ordination - like a preference for trade 
liberalisation as opposed to protectionism, exchange rate stabilisation versus flexibility - would be 
expected to converge 
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From these statements one can derive that Moravcsik presumes that certain economic 
trends — like an increase in economic integration — has made all states come to exactly 
the same conclusion, namely that further integration is in their interests.21 Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism thus not only presumes that actors share the same ultimate 
value, but also that they share the same interpretation of how the world works In 
other words, Moravcsik presumes that the meaning of events and actors' interests are 
objectively given and will thus be perceived by actors in essentially the same manner 
All in all, it may be concluded that the Liberal Intergovernmentalist view 
perceives producers' - and therefore national — preferences to change through a form of 
learning that may be characterised as unproblematic, instrumental, individual and 
objective Moreover, learning is assumed to be brought on by changes in the actor's 
material (economic) external environment From these conclusions it may be derived 
that, according to Moravcsik, individual learning is relatively uncomplicated and will 
therefore occur relatively frequently, as frequently as significant changes in the actor's 
external environment 
2.4 Liberal Intergovernmentalism's Empirical Record 
2 4 1 Observable Conséquentes 
In The Choue for Europe, Moravcsik has derived some 'observable consequences' from his 
theory on the content and the formation of national preferences His first main 
expectation concerns the differences in the content of German and French national 
preferences on the coordination of trade and monetary policies According to his 
theory, co-ordination of trade is a means for producer groups to secure their 
commercial advantages, and their preferences will thus reflect their relative 
competitive position in the international market The more competitive the producer 
and the greater his export opportunities, the more intense his preference for trade 
liberalisation will be Less competitive producers with a smaller potential for exporting 
their products are more likely to prefer protectionism and subsidies Accordingly, we 
may also expect that that the greater the competitiveness of producers from other 
regions, the more national producers will prefer to limit liberalisation to their own 
region (Moravcsik, 1998 38-9) 
On average, the preferences of export-oriented producers may be balanced by 
those of the import-competing producers However, according to Moravcsik, in the 
industrial sector, the demands of competitive export-oriented producers are more 
likely to outweigh the contrasting demands of import-competing producers This is 
not likely to be the case in agriculture, for — in general — the costs of liberalisation are 
21
 As Gourevitch argues however, this does not necessarily follow, for 'if quite different systems can 
operate effectively, there is more than one way to be efficient Economic competitition will thus not 
produce convergence, but rewards to specialization' (Gourevitch, 2002 314) 
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more concentrated within the agricultural sector, while in the the industrial sector 
they are more widely shared by a greater number of actors; this means that farmers, 
who individually stand to lose more from liberalisation, are more likely to engage in 
political action. 
Therefore, Liberal Intergovernmentalism expects to find Germany - whose 
industrial sector, as opposed to its agricultural producers, has been (globally) 
competitive since the end of World War II — 'strongly to favor pan-European trade 
liberalization in industrial goods, with relatively open policies toward third countries, 
and to oppose agricultural trade liberalization' (Moravcsik, 1998: 41). In contrast, 
France — with its uncompetitive industrial sector, and regionally though not globally 
competitive agricultural sector - is expected to 'support agricultural trade 
liberalization within a protected preferential trading area' and to accept 'industrial 
trade liberalization with initial caution but accelerating confidence' (Moravcsik, 1998: 
41).22 
Deriving predictions regarding preferences on monetary co-operation is a 
more laborious task. Firstly, Moravcsik operationalises the preference for monetary co-
operation or monetary unification as a preference for exchange rate stabilisation,2' and 
assumes that tradable goods producers (export- and import-competing producers) are 
the 'key producer groups in exchange-rate politics' (Moravcsik, 1998: 46). 
Subsequently, he cites Jeffry A. Frieden, who has argued that — as a weak domestic 
currency will increase their competitiveness and stable exchange rates will reduce 
exchange rate risks and transaction costs - export producers will prefer a weak but 
stable domestic currency, whereas import-competing producers will prefer a low and 
flexible exchange rate which will bolster their competitiveness while allowing 
macroeconomic stimulation that may benefit them (Frieden, 1991: 440-51; 
Moravcsik, 1998: 45).21 
However, so far, this theory generates no definite predictions, since the two 
key producer groups favour contrasting exchange rate policies. To solve this, 
Moravcsik puts forward two additional arguments. Firstly, he argues that producers 
groups are likely to care more about the level of the domestic currency (low) than 
" In my eyes, the conclusion that France would accept industrial trade liberalization 'with initial caution 
but accelerating confidence' cannot be derived from Moravcsik's theoretical claims Logically, the French 
uncompetitive industrial producers must be expected plainly to reject trade liberalisation 
'* In my opinion, this operationalisation is inadequate and fails to capture the significant difference 
between an intergovernmental monetary arrangement like the EMS and the supranational EMU (see 
Section 4.5.1). 
'
4
 The Mundell-Flemming model says that it is impossible for a state to strive for more than two of the 
following goals fixed exchange rates, monetary policy oriented towards domestic goals, and freedom of 
international capital movements (the impossible trinity) Once freedom of movement for international 
capital has been established, further macro-economic stimulation is only possible in a floating exchange 
rate regime 
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about whether or not exchange rates are stable (in general economists agree that 
transaction costs or benefits are small). In other words, both export producers and 
import-competing producers are likely to prefer exchange rate stabilisation when — 
and only when — this implies that the domestic currency will be fixed at a 
competitively low level. Secondly, he argues that when exchange rates are fixed, the 
relative inflation rate in a member state determines the relative real prices of goods and 
therefore the competitiveness of producers.25 In other words, the economic costs and 
benefits of exchange rate stabilisation for dominant producer groups — and therefore 
their preference regarding exchange rate policy — largely depends on the relative 
domestic inflation rate, or on the costs of convergence towards the average 
international rate.26 As a result, Liberal Intergovernmentalism generates the 
expectation that traded goods producers in low inflation states, such as Germany, will 
prefer stabilisation of exchange rates, and that the national preference will reflect that 
preference.27 Traded goods producers in states with high inflation rates, like France on 
the other hand, are expected to prefer flexible exchange rates (Moravcsik, 1998: 38-
4l).28 
Liberal Intergovernmentalist also generates expectations concerning the 
formation of national preferences. According to Moravcsik, the theory expects that 
'economic interest groups and economic officials, along with ruling parties and chief 
executives, will take the lead in formulating policy' (Moravcsik, 1998: 50). However, 
this statement is imprecise. Logically, the theory should generate the two following 
hypotheses: first, key producer groups - through their peak organisations - will take 
>5
 If the exchange rates between France and Germany are fixed and the inflation rate in France is much 
higher than in Germany, the price of, for instance, French cereal will increase much faster than the price 
of German cereal, making French cereal relatively more expensive than German cereal This means that a 
person will be able to buy less French cereal than German cereal with the same amount of money 
-
>6
 Liberal Intergovernmentalist theory argues that without prior convergence of inflation rates, domestic 
key producers in states with high rates will not prefer exchange rate stabilisation Convergence of inflation 
rates is therefore a necessary prerequisite to exchange rate stabilisation However, once this convergence 
has taken place, no competitive advantages can be reached by exchange rate stabilisation, for currencies 
and prices in the member states will remain at the same level In other words, import-competing 
producers will no longer have an incentive to prefer exchange rate stabilisation (Moravcsik, 1998 47-8) 
In sum, in Moravcsik's model, no common interest (which is based on the preferences of export and 
import competing producers) in exchange rate stabilisation is likely to exist either prior or after the 
convergence of inflation rates 
2
 This prediction rests entirely on the assumption that German producers expect inflation rates to be 
unaffected by exchange rate stabilisation This assumption is in stark contrast with empirical evidence 
that clearly shows that German domestic actors have generally shared an intense fear that exchange rate 
co-operation with France would endanger the low German inflation rate (see Chapters 5-8) 
2a
 In addition to these expectations about the content of French and German preferences on trade and 
monetary co-operation, Liberal Intergovernmentalism expects shifts in individual and national preferences 
to follow the occurrence of major economic problems, and preferences for integration slowly to intensify 
over time with rising trade flows, capital mobility, and policy convergence (Frieden, 1991, Moravcsik, 
1998 45) 
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the lead in formulating new policy, and second, these producer groups will put 
pressure on economic officials, political parties or chief executives to implement 
policies that satisfy their commercial interest. Furthermore, evidence supporting a 
third hypothesis, stating that economic officials, political parties or chief executives 
may initiate new policies in anticipation of societal preferences and pressures, may be 
said to confirm the theory.29 
2.4-2 Empirical Evidence 
In The Choice for Europe Moravcsik uses the five 'grand bargains' in the history of 
European integration - those concerning the Rome Treaties, the Common 
Agricultural Policy, the European Monetary System, the Single European Act, and the 
European Economic and Monetary Union — to test his theoretical framework. On the 
basis of his research he comes to the conclusion that 'the five case studies strongly and 
consistently support' his explanations (Moravcsik, 1998: 4l) . , ü However, several 
scholars have questioned the validity of this conclusion. Regarding the process of 
preference formation surrounding the signing of the Rome Treaties, for instance, Jones 
remarks that 'the likely outcome absent the impact of geopolitical concerns would 
have been a trade arrangement closer to the free trade area repeatedly proposed by 
29
 In addition, the theory expects major domestic cleavages to reflect concerns about competitiveness, 
which will divide competitive from non-competitive producers on trade issues and tradable versus non-
tradable producers on monetary stabilisation. Furthermore, it predicts the discourse among chief 
executives to reflect concerns about the efficient attainment of economic objectives (Moravcsik, 1998: 27-
8, 49-50) Moravcsik also states that concerns about the inflation rate may also produce cleavages on the 
exchange rate issue in branches of government (between independent financial authorities versus those 
concerned with spending) and political parties (between those supportive of low inflation and those 
opposed to it). However, it is unclear how the preferences of non-commercial actors for the inflation rate 
translates into a preference for or against exchange rate stabilisation for neither awards them economic 
costs or benefits (since Moravcsik argues that the relative domestic inflation rate is crucial only because of 
its effects on the competitive position of producers). 
'" In the introduction to The Chouefor Europe Moravcsik claims that 'this book is based on methods which, 
while far from ideal, generate more rigorous, transparent, objective, and replicable tests of competing 
theoretical claims about European integration than have heretofore been conducted' (Moravcsik, 1998. 
10) Several scholars, however, have seriously doubted whether he actually manages to prove this 
ambitious claim Anderson, for instance, has argued that 'on closer examination, there is little to 
distinguish this book from other monographs that attempt to test theory by means of qualitative 
empirical analysis In five case study chapters spanning 386 pages, there are 917 footnotes altogether; 
about 2% contain references to internal government documents, the hardest of "hard" primary sources 
Secondary sources, not to mention political memoirs and other soft primary sources, make up the 
remaining 98%' (Jones, 2000: 108, cf. Anderson, 2000: 516, Cederman, 2000 172; Parsons, 1999, 
2000: 52-8; Van Riel and Metten, 2000: 221). In addition, Lieshout, Segers, and Van der Vleuten have 
undertaken an elaborate and thorough replication of Moravcsik's analysis of De Gaulle's agricultural 
policy and have concluded that — far from being more reliable and based on solid archival research — this 
chapter is actually based predominantly on secondary sources (Lieshout, Segers and Van der Vleuten, 
2004: 92-4, Appendix 1) and is swamped with misquotations, misreadings and incorrect references 
(Lieshout, Segers and Van der Vleuten, 2004' 95-6, Appendix 2). 
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Britain' (Jones, 2000: 108; cf. Anderson, 2000: 516; Cederman, 2000: 172; Parsons, 
1999; 2000: 52-8; Van Kiel and Metten, 2000: 221). Moreover, Lieshout, Segers and 
Van Der Vleuten have argued that 'Andrew Moravcsik's revisionist "commercial" 
interpretation of de Gaulle's European policy does not stand up under scrutiny' and 
that 'his interpretation suffers from soft sources and weak evidence' (Lieshout, Segers 
and Van der Vleuten, 2004: 116). Likewise, in this section, it will be argued that 
Moravcsik's theory on national preference formation is unable to explain adequately 
the preference formation process in the two monetary cases he has studied. For, 
notwithstanding his claim that events surrounding the establishment of both the EMS 
and EMU are 'precisely as the political economy theory predicts' (Moravcsik, 1998: 
267), several crucial decisions in the monetary realm stand in complete contradiction 
to the 'observable consequences' of the Liberal commercial model (Dyson and 
Featherstone, 1999: 14; McNamara, 1998: 33-7; Parsons, 1999). 
In the first place, many of the monetary measures that European states have 
undertaken have been inconsistent with the economic interests of those actors which 
Moravcsik considers dominant in determining the national preference: export 
producers." As stated previously, German producers — being the inhabitants of a state 
with low inflation rates'2 — should have preferred stable European currency exchange 
rates and a low rate of exchange with the Deutsche mark. However, on two occasions 
during the 1960s — one in 1961 and one in 1969 - the German government decided 
to revaluate the D-mark." Moreover, in 1971, after upward pressure on the mark - it 
was decided to relinquish the mark's fixed rates, a decision that led to an appreciation 
of the German currency, as had been expected by the central decision-makers 
responsible (Moravcsik, 1998: 267). In addition, according to Moravcsik both Helmut 
Schmidt and Helmut Kohl supported the German 'policy of tolerating controlled 
French devaluations' (Moravcsik, 1998: 257), a policy which had a highly unfavourable 
influence on the competitive position of the German producers in relation to their 
French couterparts. Finally, it remains unclear why the German government agreed to 
replace the EMS with the EMU; German producers had nothing to gain by such a 
move. Moravcsik admits that the German producers did not have any interest in the 
establishment of EMU and that he 'cannot dismiss entirely the role of geopolitical 
ideology' (Moravcsik, 1998: 388). However, this confession does not induce him to 
11
 In chis section, evidence and facts are used as Moravcsik in Chapters 4 and 6 of The Chouefor Europe 
reported them. 
,
-' Throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, West Germany had very low inflation-rates in comparison to 
the other member states Only after the re-unification in 1990, the German inflation-rates increased and 
eventually exceeded those of France. 
u
 The intense discussion preceding these decisions largely took place within the German government and 
between the government and the Bundesbank. No discussion took place between the political elite and 
producer groups. 
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pose the question of whether his model constitutes an adequate explanation of the 
national preferences concerning the establishment of EMU. 
Confronting Moravcsik's hypotheses with the French monetary policy 
decisions made during 1960s, 1970s and 1980s raises similar concerns. According to 
the Liberal Intergovernmentalist view on preference formation it may be expected that 
— since in general French inflation rates have been high - dominant French producers 
would have preferred flexible exchange rates over fixed ones, and the rate of the French 
franc to be low. However, this expectation is in stark contrast with the preferences and 
actions of all French governments since 1958. To begin with, from the 1960s to the 
1990s, successive French governments have fiercely pursued franc fort and stabile 
exchange rate policies (Howarth, 2000: 6-8).H Illustrative of the general support for 
these policy alternatives is the discussion during the 1960s of the form of the 
international monetary system. During this discussion, a coalition around Minister of 
Finance Valéry Giscard d'Estaing advocated the establishment of a European monetary 
union, while another coalition — which in 1965 gained the support of President De 
Gaulle — advocated a return to the Gold Standard (Moravcsik, 1998: 267). Both of the 
advocated monetary systems, however, are fixed exchange rate regimes. The idea of 
establishing a flexible exchange rate system did not even cross the politician's minds. 
In addition to this persistent and shared preference for fixed exchange rates, 
various French Presidents have gone to great lengths to prevent any devaluation of the 
franc, perceiving such a measure to be a sign of weakness and unbefitting a great 
nation like France. During the exchange rate crisis of 1968/9, for instance, De Gaulle 
categorically refused to devalue the franc. Moreover, he insisted that if action had to be 
taken, the Germans had to revaluate the mark (Moravcsik, 1998: 267). This stands in 
complete contradiction to the theoretical predictions put forward by Moravcsik, since a 
devaluation of the franc would have improved French producers' competitive position 
in relation to all members of the Bretton Woods system, while a revaluation of the 
mark would only have improved their competitive position in relation to their German 
colleagues (Moravcsik, 1998: 269-70). 
In addition, the 1970s French preference for economic stabilisation and 
rigueur, and the establishment of the EMS seems to be at odds with the Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist model of preference formation. From the 1970s onwards, French 
inflation rates were on the rise and should thus have strengthened French producers' 
dislike for fixed exchange rate systems." However, the Giscard government actively 
11
 The French political elite has always perceived these two issues to be highly related, for a float of the 
franc was perceived to irrevocably lead to the decrease of its value. Or as the French saying goes,f/mtuat et 
mergnur (Howarth, 2000. 6). 
" Between 1974 and 1980, French inflation-rates fluctuated between 9 259? and H 65%, while the 
German rates varied between 2.699? tot 6.96% (change in consumer prices in percentages per year, basis 
year 1995, Source IMF, Washington) 
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strived to establish a fixed exchange rate regime (Moravcsik, 1998: 267), thus 
completely ignoring the interests of French producers. In the end, Giscard even agreed 
to a highly asymmetrical interpretation of the EMS-rules, which meant that France 
had to bear the full burden of the required harmonisation of French and German 
monetary policies (Moravcsik, 1998: 267). However, despite the fact that Moravcsik 
states that the austerity policies initiated by the Giscard government were 'unpopular' 
(Moravcsik, 1998: 289), he fails to acknowledge that the French monetary policies of 
the 197()s are in stark contrast with his theoretical expectations. 
All in all, Li's expectations concerning the content of French and German 
preferences with regards to monetary policy seem to have little — if any — empirical 
validity. Moreover, a similar conclusion seems to be warranted regarding to its 
hypotheses on the formation of national preferences. According to the Liberal view on 
preference formation, producers should be expected to advocate their preferences 
actively for a certain (change in) exchange rate policies, and to pressure decision-
makers into adopting their stand on this issue. At the very least, one would expect 
decision-makers to initiate certain policies in anticipation of these producers' 
preferences and pressures. However, in The Choice for Europe, Moravcsik fails to provide 
evidence of any of these processes. In the whole book, Moravcsik only refers to one 
report written by a producers' peak organisation (the Bundesverband der Deutsche 
Industrie, BDI), and four newspaper articles in which certain producers proclaim their 
support for the establishment of EMU (Moravcsik, 1998: 381 note 9: 392-3 note 19). 
Of these publications, four date from the mid-1990s — years after the Maastricht 
Treaty had been signed - and even the fifth piece of evidence dates from after the 
release of the Delors report. As such, these publications do not constitute plausible 
evidence in support of Moravcsik's thesis that the national preferences concerning the 
establishment of EMU originate in the preferences and pressures of dominant producer 
groups. 
What is more, in the case of the EMS, Moravcsik even fails to present a single 
document, report, or publication indicating producers' preferences or support for the 
establishment of this exchange rate system, and neither in the EMS, nor in EMU case, 
has he been able to provide any evidence pertaining to his claim that producers put 
pressure on decision-makers to implement a certain policy.,6 All the evidence he comes 
up with is a single citation of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, indicating that he has 
taken the commercial consequences of his exchange rate policy on domestic producer 
groups into account." 
,6
 Moravcsik does claim that Giscard's EMS proposals 'were supported by big business', but does not refer 
to any documents or interviews to back up his claim (Moravcsik, 1998: 262). 
" In this citation, Schmidt states that 'it would be unwise to break out of the Snake; then, indeed, one 
would not have to support the others, but then one would also lose influence over the EC partners, in that 
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All in all, it may be concluded that — in the light of the above-mentioned 
theoretical difficulties and the lack of empirical support for the Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist approach to national preference - this approach is not able to 
provide an adequate answer to the central question of this thesis. Therefore, I will now 
turn to the more ideational focus on preferences adopted by a group of modernist 
Social Constructivists. 
2.5 Social Constructivism and National Interests 
2.5.1 Modernist Social Constructivism 
In contrast to Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Social Constructivism is not a theory of 
international relations. The term is used to refer to 'a metaphysical stance about the 
reality that scholars seek to know', to 'a social theory about the role of knowledge and 
knowledgeable agents in the constitution of social reality',18 as well as to a theoretical 
and empirical perspective on international relations (Adler, 2002: 96, italics in 
original). Although it may be argued that Social Constructivism's principal claims are 
made in the meta-theoretical field,39 this chapter will be confined to an evaluation of 
Social Constructivism as an approach to international relations. Moreover, since the 
ultimate goal of my thesis will be to evaluate constructivist theoretical claims both 
theoretically and empirically, it will focus solely on the claims made by the 'modernist' 
('conventional', or 'moderate') strand of constructivist theory (Adler, 2002: 97; Hopf, 
1998). These theories share foundational elements with the more radical approaches, 
but are more conventional in the area of epistemology and methodology.10 In practice, 
this means that — like mainstream IR scholars — these modernist Social Constructivists 
try to establish the empirical value of their theoretical claims, and use much of the 
same methodological instruments that 'soft positivists' do (Hopf, 1998: 181-2). 
In general, modernist Social Constructivists share three substantive theoretical 
propositions (cf. Sending, 2002: 455). First, they emphasise the explanatory power of 
social variables like norms and identities, and posit that most consequential facts in IR 
are in fact social (Adler, 2002: 100). This does not mean that they deny the 
they would pursue economic and stabilization policies which would cause their own currencies to fall' 
(Moravcsik, 1998 251) 
'" These descriptions correspond to what Guzzini has called respectively epistemological lomtrmtivism, and 
sociological comtruitwism (Guzzini, 2000: 164). 
,c;
 At the metaphysical level, Social Constructivists contest the employment of empiricism and positivism 
in social science, and renounces their three basic elements: the idea that 'data speak for themselves', the 
idea that 'social and natural science are of the same kind', and the 'model of explanation where explanatory 
hypotheses are deduced from general probabilistic laws and tested empirically' (Guzzini, 2000 164) 
10
 In addition, Hopf argues that whereas critical theorists explicitly recognise their own participation in 
the constitution of social facts, modernist constructivists ignore this fact. Furthermore, while in general 
the prime goal of modernist constructivists is the production of new knowledge and understanding, 
critical theonsrs are often more interested in human emancipation (Hopf, 199H. 181-2) 
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independent existence of material (brute) facts, or their causal power. However, they 
do argue that the material structure can only be given meaning by the social context 
through which it is interpreted (Checkel, 1998: 325-6; Guzzini, 2000: 159; Price and 
Reus-Smit, 1998: 266). In other words, the meaning of objects and events does not 
present itself as self-evident to the observer, but 'are fundamentally matters of 
interpretation' (Weides, 1996: 279).4' As Guzzini's has put it, Social Constructivists 
resist the idea of objective materialism (Guzzini, 2000: 164). 
However, left at this, this position would amount to subjective individualism: 
the stipulation that every individual may attach their own meaning to a fact or event, 
and those meanings could vary significantly (Guzzini, 2000: 164). Instead, Social 
Constructivists argue that brute facts or events are given meaning through the inter-
subjective social structure which consists of the norms, identity constructions and ideas 
that are shared by a (large) number of individuals.'12 These structures are thus shared 
and reconstituted by the collective and cannot be changed by a simple individual act of 
will. As such, individuals face these inter-subjective entities almost 'as if they were 
objective facts in the sense that they are beyond their individual personal control.43 
Secondly, Social Constructivists tend to emphasise that social facts have 
constitutive instead of causal effects. Rather than distinguishing between cause and 
effect as separate entities (before and after the causation), the constitutive variable is 
said to be a property of the dependent variable. Moreover, as opposed to a causal 
variable, the constitutive variable does not precede the dependent variable in time 
(Adler, 2002). As such, identities, for instance, are often said to imply preference, 
meaning that one's preferences lie enclosed in the nature of one's identity (Hopf, 1998: 
175).44 
41
 This line of reasoning may explain why most Social Constructivists use the term interest (that what is 
beneficial) - which in general is being associated with rational choice approaches - rather than the more 
neutral concept preferences (that what you want, whether it is beneficial to you or not), for their quarrel 
with rational choice is not over whether the choices individuals or states make are perceived by themselves 
as being beneficial, but whether they can be derived objectively. 
42
 Constructivists often draw the analogy with language to explain the meaning of the concept inter-
subjectivity. Guzzini, for instance, argues that language cannot be reduced to an objective material fact 
like a voice or sound, nor could it be awarded a subjective meaning, for if either were the case individuals 
would be able to hear each other speak, but could not understand what was being said. It would be as if 
they spoke different languages (Guzzini, 2000. 164). 
'" The individual in this social structure finds itself in a situation similar to a small firm in an oligopoly, 
or a small state in the international system- it is itself part of the system (the market, the balance of 
power) and through its existence and actions helps to reconstitute that system. However, at the same time 
it is unable to change the system by itself or prevenr it exerting an influence. 
u
 In my eyes, the most instructive example of a mutual constitutive relationship is that between the 
identity of Sesame Street's Cookie Monster and his food preference. Cookie's identity (as a cookie-lover) 
cannot be said to precede his preference for cookies in time, or vice versa. Was Cookie born as a cookie 
monster and therefore simply has a preference for cookies by nature, or was he born a regular monster and 
only became known as Cookie after his peers discovered his extraordinary food preference·* Both are 
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Finally, Social Constructivists posit that actors (agents) and structures are 
mutually constitutive. This means that the (social) structure is considered to define the 
identity and preferences of the actors; however, at the same time the structure cannot 
exist independently of the practices of actors (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 267). In 
other words, a constant process of constitutive interaction exists between agents and 
structures. Hopf illustrates this position by referring to US policy concerning 
Vietnam. He posits that due to its identity as one of the superpowers, appeasement in 
Vietnam was unimaginable to the US. Shared ideas/norms about the proper behaviour 
of great powers — actively and forcefully (re)shaping the world - prevented this. 
Instead, these shared beliefs led decision-makers to choose to intervene. However, 
through this choice 'the United States reproduced its own identity of great power', as 
well as 'perpetuated the international inter-subjective understanding of great powers as 
those states that use military power against others' (Hopf, 1998: 181-2). 
Modernist Social Constructivist theories on national interests generally focus 
on the constitutive effect of state identities or international norms on national interests 
(Finnemore, 1996; Hopf, 2002; Klotz, 1995a, 1995b; Risse, Engelmann-Martin, 
Knopf and Roscher, 1998, 1999; Risse, 2001). The remainder of this chapter will 
focus on the identity approach to national interests developed by Risse, Engelmann-
Martin, Knopf, and Roscher. Risse et al. are some of the few modernist Social 
Constructivists who use the case of EMU to test their approach. In principle, an 
author's choice of a test case should be irrelevant when selecting which theories of 
national preferences to review in this thesis. However, due to the fact that many 
modernist Social Constructivist theories are not yet fully developed, it is often remains 
unclear how the insights of these approaches might be applied to cases other than the 
ones they have studied themselves (for a similar critique on Finnemore, 1996, see 
Checkel, 1998: 332). Furthermore, as will be argued in Section 2.4.5, the explanatory 
mechanisms distinguished in the norm and identity approaches are often similar, and 
the independent variables they focus on are often more intimately related than the 
authors seem to realise. 
realistic possibilities Moreover, Cookie's identity and preference cannot exist separate from one another 
Cookie would simply not be Cookie if he would prefer soup to cookies Likewise, it is unlikely that 
Cookie would prefer Cookies if he was born a pancake monster Still, it is clear that Cookie's identity and 
his preference are not one and the same variable All in all, not only can it not be conclusively argued that 
Cookie's identity preceded his preference in time (or vice versa), the variable also cannot exist separate 
from one another Cookie's identity implies his food preference while at the same time his love for cookies 
determines his identity. The funny (and complicating) thing is, however, that if the exceptional 
circumstance would occur, that one night - for dinner - Cookie would prefer to eat soup instead of 
cookies, he still would be Cookie Monster 
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2.5.2 Identities and Preferences 
Risse et al. start their argument by claiming that explanations based solely on material 
conceptions of actor's interests cannot explain cross-national variation in the political 
elite's attitudes concerning policy alternatives.45 In their eyes, shared national 
identities rather than instrumental considerations determine elite's attitudes, since 
collective identities define 'how actors view their instrumental interests and which 
preferences are regarded as legitimate and appropriate for enacting' (Risse, 
Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1998: 12).4<' This does not mean that 'such 
broad constructs as national identities directly determine particular political behaviour 
and decisions', but the authors do argue that identities determine the range of choices 
that is open to decision-makers (Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1999: 
157). Therefore, decision-makers' preferences and decisions are based on the nature of 
their identities. 
The authors conceptualise identities as systems of self-reference by which an 
individual's place in society is defined. The central independent variable they focus on 
is a particular kind of collective identity: national identity. In their 1999 article, Risse 
et al. attribute six features to the national identity (the first five of which they share 
with other kinds of collective identities). First, they stipulate that every collective 
identity contains ideas about an individual's membership of a social group and the 
perceived common features of the individuals belonging to this group. On the basis of 
this commonness, the group forms an "imagined community" often referred to as the 
/»-group or the Wf (Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1999: 154). 
Second, collective identities incorporate a sense of difference with regard to those 
belonging to another group — the out-gToup or the other. This sense of difference with 
respect to the »»/-group often - though not necessarily - takes the form of a sense of 
superiority. The greater the perceived differences between members of the in- and out-
group in relation to the perceived differences among the members of the in-group, the 
more intense and determining the group's collective identity is (Risse, Engelmann-
Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1998: 9). Third, the authors stipulate that, since 
individuals may belong to different groups, they may also hold multiple social 
identities. According to the authors, these multiple identities are context and time-
dependent.47 It thus depends on the policy area and the historical period which 
identity is invoked (Engelmann-Martin, 2001: 4; Risse, 2001: 210). Fourth, Risse et 
^ The Liberal Intergovernmentalist approach reviewed in the first part of this chapter is a typical example 
of an approach based on a pure material conception of interests. However, Moravcsik explicitly stipulates 
that his approach is able to explain cross-national variation in national interests (Moravcsik, 1998: 38-9). 
^ In contrast to most Social Constructivists, Risse et al consistently refer to the relationship between 
identities and attitudes as causal, not constitutive. 
47
 A man from Berlin, for instance, may perceive himself as being male, a parent, a blue colour worker, a 
Berliner, a German, or a European, depending on the situation and the company he is in. 
39 
Mapping the Road to Maastricht 
al. recognise that social identities may be contested (Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf 
and Roscher, 1998: 10). 
Fifth, the authors contest the idea that identities are fluid or subject to 
frequent changes. Instead, collective identities are characterised as cognitive schémas 
that — in contrast to material interests - change only slowly and gradually. 
Furthermore, the more these cognitive schemata are institutionalised, the slower and 
more gradual they - and the preferences they 'imply' - will change (Risse, Engelmann-
Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1998: 10; 1999: 155; Risse, 2001: 201).48 However, 
according to the authors this does not mean that sudden change is impossible. In case 
of a critical juncture — an instance in which 'the amount of perceived information which 
severely contradicts given identity constructions becomes unbearable' - a fast and 
drastic change in identity is possible. Whether this change occurs 'depends on the 
learning capacities of individuals, groups, and organizations' (Risse, Engelmann-
Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1998:11). 
Sixth, the authors view the national identity as a particular kind of collective 
identity by which social groups are defined 'on the basis of mostly territorial criteria'. 
Like other social identities, this specific identity may include different components, 
which are time- and context bound. In their work, the authors focus mainly on the 
components of the national identity that concern ideas about sovereignty, the state, 
and just political and social orders (Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 
1998: 10; 1999: 155). 
In addition to their focus on 'social' variables like identity, the crucial 
difference between the authors' model and that of Moravcsik is their conception of the 
process of preference definition. As stated above, collective identities define the 
attitudes of the political elite by determining which policies are regarded as legitimate 
and appropriate for them to pursue. According to Risse et al, this conception of 
interest definition differs significantly from that put forward by Rational Choice 
approaches. Rationalist theories on the definition of national interests stipulate that 
actors adopt a logic of consequence (LoC) to establish their interests. The logic of 
consequence is a 'logic of instrumental rationality whereby actors calculate ends and 
'
H
 In their 1998 Working Paper, Risse et al. turn to historical institutionahsm and its idea of path 
dependency to explain the stickiness of identities and preferences, and argue that 'an institutional choice 
made at a "critical juncture" offering several possible choices subsequently changes the parameters in such 
a way that the next decision is likely to move in the same direction' (Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf 
and Roscher, 1998 7). This is however a significantly different argument for stickiness Furthermore, 
Risse et al subsequently explain that 'institutional decisions over time greatly increase the costs of 
adopting alternative policies which were initially possible and reduce exit options from a once-chosen 
path' (Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1998 7) This naturally is a typical Rational Choice 
argument In theit 1999 article, however, the authors stipulate that the historical institutionalist 
explanation of the stickiness of preferences 'complements rather than substitutes' their explanation (Risse, 
Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1999 153) 
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means as well as the costs and benefits of specific courses of action and then try to act 
accordingly' (Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1999: 158).49 The 
identity approach, however, posits that the idea of identity-led definition of 
preferences implies that actors use a logic of appropriateness (LoA). This means that actors 
are said to prefer certain policies because they perceive them to be the morally right for 
persons like themselves. In other words, to determine their choice of action, actors ask 
themselves: who am I (or who do I want to be), what kind of situation is this, and 
what would be the appropriate response for an actor like me (cf. March and Olson, 
1989: 23)? 
According to Risse et al, this line of reasoning does not exclude the possibility 
that actors may at times apply a logic of consequence, or that the initial definition of a 
social or national identity was the result of instrumental material interests (Risse, 
Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1998: 12; 1999: 155; Risse, 2001: 202-3). In 
fact, they stipulate that, when identities are in flux and contested, or when several 
identity constructions compete, while at the same time instrumental and material 
interests are stable and clear, interests will determine which identity constructions are 
chosen (see Table 2.1, 3ΓίΙ quadrant).'il) 
' •—^____^ Interests 
Identities ^_ 
Consensual 1 Stable 
Contested 1 Fluid 
Stable 1 Clear 
Indeterminate 
Identities < Interests 
Ambiguous 1 Indeterminate 
Identities > Interests 
Indeterminate 
Table 2.1: The Identity-Interest Γelationship,l 
When, on the other hand, interests are ambiguous, indeterminate or contested, the 
logic of appropriateness is likely to prevail and actor's identities will determine 
intetests by determining the range of policy-alternatives that identities determine are 
appropriate or legitimate (see Table 2.1, 2nd quadrant). However, the authors do argue 
that once identities are formed, they outlast instrumental interests and will continue 
to guide policy-decisions, even after these interests have vanished or changed. Finally, 
when both identities and interests are stable and uncontested, or both are contested or 
4 9
 Liberal Intergovernmentalism is a typical example of such an approach (see Section 2.2 2). 
5 0
 Because the authors have stipulated that identities are in general more stable than interests, this 
situation must be rare. In other words, logically Risse et al. must expect the use of the logic of 
appropriateness to be the rule and the use of the logic of consequence the exception. In general, identities 
should thus be expected to cause interests, not vice versa. The authors, however, fail to draw this 
conclusion. 
5 1
 The table is based on (Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1999: 158-9, and figure 1). 
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fluid, it is impossible to determine which logic dominates (see Table 2.1, Γ' and 4 th 
quadrant) (Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1999: 158-9).52 
2.53 The Europeanisation of State Identities 
In their writings. Risse et al. set out to explain elite attitudes towards European 
policies and the cross-national variation between these attitudes. They claim that over 
the last fifty years, a combination of the achievements of the European institutions, 
specific national historical memories and critical junctures have caused the 
Europeanisation of national identities. These Europeanised national identities, in turn, 
have caused a change in the attitudes of the political elites towards European 
integration. 
This does not mean, however, that a single European identity has evolved 
which has replaced the specific national identities of every political elite. According to 
the authors, the Europeanised national identities still contain distinct national 
elements. Moreover, some of these identities have become more European[ised] than 
others. Risse claims that, since the early 1950s, 5 ideal-types of (more or less) 
Europeanised national identity constructions can be distinguished: 1) the nationalist 
concept of national identity in which Europe constitutes the out-group; 2) Europe 
"from the Atlantic to the Urals", in which Europe is seen as a geographical, historical 
and cultural but not an ideological entity; 3) Europe as a "third force" which embodies 
the social democratic alternative; 4) Europe as a liberal democratic, social market 
economy; 5) Christian Europe, predominantly based on catholic values (Engelmann-
Martin, 2001: 4; Risse, 2001: 210). These constructions contain typical national 
elements, vary significantly in 'Europeanness' and enjoy different levels of 
internalisation in different countries. 
The authors claim that the degree to which a particular national identity is 
prone to become more European depends on the resonance between the 'ideas and 
identity constructions about Europe' and existing national ^επικίεβ;" or, as they have 
put it, 'new identity constructions are the more likely to impact upon and be 
incorporated in norms, consensual knowledge and collective identities, the more they 
resonate with given norms, knowledge structures and traditional identities embedded 
in political institutions and collective cultural understandings' (Risse, Engelmann-
, J
 Risse el al. stipulate that in the case of instable identities and interests 'it is almost impossible to tell 
beforehand which interests will connect with which identities and which of these connections will prevail' 
(Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1999: 158). However, in figure 1, they display the causal 
arrow as running from identities to interests and back Furthermore, they argue that they will not 
consider the situation in which identities and interests are both unstable because 'it does not apply to our 
three cases studies', only to add that perhaps in the case of France it is relevant after all (Risse, 
Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1999 158-9). 
" In their 1998 working paper, the authors refer to this mechanism as goodness of fit (Risse, Engelmann-
Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1998· 11). 
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Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1999: 156).54 Whether national norms, identities, and 
political cultures and institutions are favourable to Europeanisation is, in turn, 
primarily determined by historic events and critical junctures. The British identity, for 
instance, is said to lack almost any 'Europeanness' due to the specific national 
historical memories (which Risse traces back as far as the year 1066) and critical 
junctures (like Britain's battles with the continent, Rome, and parliament's 'hard-
fought victory over the King') that have shaped its political culture and institutions 
(Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1998: 12; Risse, 2001: 202-3). 
2.5.4 Change, Variety, and the Pivotal Role of Critical Junctures 
The authors' main aim is to explain the cross-national variations between elite 
attitudes. To do this, they focus on the effects of, and changes in the properties of 
nation states. Furthermore, by invoking the idea of critical junctures and 
Europeanisation of national identities, Risse et al. also offer an account of how 
preference change occurs. 
In their explanation of both change and variety, the concept of critical 
juncture seems to play a pivotal role. While Risse et al. stipulate that, in general, 
identities change only slowly and gradually, they do not elaborate this evolutionary 
change in national identities further. Instead, their theoretical and empirical focus 
rests almost entirely on the cases in which the Europeanisation of national identities is 
caused by the occurrence of critical junctures. Moreover, the variation in Europeanness 
of national identities, and therefore in elite attitudes, is said to be a function of the 
resonance of ideas of Europe with existing national norms, identities, and political 
cultures and institutions, which are said to be determined by historic events and 
critical junctures. Since critical junctures are thus identified as being the main 
(indirect) cause for the construction and reconstruction of, and variations in the 
national identity, they must be regarded as the primary explanatory variable of the 
theory. In contrast to what the authors stipulate, this means that the national identity 
constitutes a mere intermediate variable between the critical juncture and the elite 
attitudes. 
However, the authors fail to elaborate the concept and its effects. For instance, 
the definition of the concept that the authors provide — an instance in which the 
amount of perceived information which severely contradicts given identity 
54
 Determining che goodness-of-fit or the resonance of Europe logically implies that a single, shared 
(objective or inter-subjective) conception of Europe exists. However, it remains unclear what this 
conception would be. In fact, in their writings Risse et.al often add to the confusion by referring to ideas 
about Europe - like 'Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals'" or 'Europe as a "third force'" - as the 
already Europeanised national identity (Engelmann-Martin, 2001· 4; Risse, 2001: 210) Furthermore, 
they seem to imply that Europe can mean very different things before and after the process of 
Europeanisation 
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constructions becomes unbearable - allows the authors to categorise events as diverse 
as a world war (World War II), an anti-colonial war (Algeria), a dysfunctional national 
political system (Fourth Republic), a radical change in the European balance of power 
(German re-unification), and a (mere) policy failure (Mitterrand 1983) as a critical 
juncture that has promoted or inhibited the Europeanisation of a particular national 
identity. As a result, one cannot help being reminded of the statement by Mancur 
Olson that 'only the British have Big Ben and only the Germans eat a lot of 
sauerkraut, but it would of course be absurd to suggest that one is responsible for the 
slow British growth and the other for the fast German growth' (Olson, 1982: 10). 
In fact, the authors themselves also appear to smell trouble and admit that 'we 
do not have good theoretical tools to predict under what circumstances "critical 
junctures" are perceived challenging and changing collective identities' (Risse, 
Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1998: 8).55 In other words, they realise that 
they are unable — theoretically and empirically — to distinguish critical junctures from 
non-consequential external events. The consequences of this conclusion are, however, 
far more dramatic than the authors seem to realise. For since critical junctures are in 
fact a pivotal explanatory variable in their theory, the key to understanding elite 
attitudes (and the changes therein, or variance amongst them) lies precisely in 
understanding why certain events induce identity change while others do not. The 
failure to identify critical junctures before their effects can be identified robs the 
theory of much of its explanatory value. 
In my opinion, the answer to the question which external events constitute 
critical junctures and which do not, does not lie in the characteristics of the events 
(being major or minor), but — as the authors' own definition suggests — in the elite's 
perception of these events as constituting a challenge to their definition of the /«-group, 
the o/tf-group and their respective characteristics (see Chapter 3).56 The concept thus 
draws attention to the elite's capacity to deal with new and conflicting information, 
and the rigidity and institutional embeddedness of their cognitive schemata. Factors 
the authors themselves have mentioned as being interesting, but have not explored 
further.57 To really comprehend why identities change, vary or européanise, however, 
an analysis of these issues is vital. 
55
 In other words, they have no tools to identify why certain wars, changes in the balance of power, and 
policy failures cause a redefinition of the national identity while others do not. 
56
 This also explains why certain global events constitute critical junctures for some but not for orhers 
Furthermore, it also clarifies why the same event may cause the Europeanisation of one state's national 
identity while it may cause the nationalisation of another. 
" Several other Social Constructivist authors have made attempts to grasp these issues by investigating 
the different forms of learning and socialisation that may lead to identity or preference change (Checkel, 
1998, 1999; Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001; Finnemore, 1996, Johnston, 2001, Schimmelfenmg, 2001) 
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2.5.5 Between Determinism and Indeterminacy 
While in contrast to other modernist Social Constructivist approaches, the identity 
approach under review tries to understand variety and change rather than similarity 
and continuity, it shares with these approaches its use of the logic of appropriateness as 
central explanatory mechanism. The use of this mechanism, however, entails problems 
(cf. Hopf, 2002: 12-6; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 12-5; Risse, 2000: 2-7; Sending, 
2002: 450-2). 
One of the main problems that may be identified is the tension between the 
logic of appropriateness and individual choice. While March and Olson insist LoA is as 
much a mechanism of individual action as the LoC, Sending has convincingly argued 
that in fact acting appropriately does not leave actors much choice in any meaningful 
sense of the word (March and Olson, 1998: 952; Sending, 2002: 450-2). Because the 
logic of appropriateness assumes an actor simply to follow the course of action 
prescribed by the norm or rule, 'it programmes behaviour. Moreover, because the norm 
guiding the individual is also said to be internalised, the rule-following behaviour that 
LoA implies may not even be a conscious act (cf. Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 895). 
This makes any approach that invokes the LoA prone to determinism.58 
This threat of determinism seems to lie mainly in the constructivist 
perception of the role of norms as prescriptive rather than constraining (cf. Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 1998: 891). Risse et al. distinguish neither a prescriptive nor a 
constraining role for norms in their work. They simply state that 'norms ... are closely 
related to collective identities, since they can be regarded as standards of appropriate 
behaviour enacting given identities', without elaborating further (Risse, Engelmann-
Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1998: 8). I will argue, however, that norms are an 
indispensable part of the workings of LoA, the authors' main explanatory mechanism. 
As a result, the concept is erroneously omitted from their theoretical framework. In 
fact, I will argue that identities can only guide attitudes and behaviour through their 
close link with prescriptive norms. 
As March and Olson have put it, an actor following the logic of 
appropriateness will ask itself: 'what kind of situation is this? Who am I? How 
appropriate are different actions for me in this situation?' (March and Olson, 1989: 23, 
my italics). In other words, actors are said to prefer the policies they prefer, because 
they perceive this to be the normative right course for them (not the members of the out-
group) to take. This logic thus links an actor's self-image (identity) to the 
appropriateness of certain types of behaviour (norm) and implies that the norms that 
"' Finnemore and Sikkink acknowledge that the logic of appropriateness may result in a deterministic 
approach. However, they argue — less than convincingly - that this is not a serious problem, for 'as we 
survey the norms research that emphasizes appropriateness logic in IR, very little of it looks deterministic' 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998. 9B-4) . 
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are applicable to the in-group differ from that of the out-group.59 An actor thus 
requires knowledge of both its identity and the associated norm to determine what it 
wants and how to behave/'" Therefore, an actor's identity alone cannot in itself explain 
its preferences or behaviour.61 In contrast to what Risse et al. claim, it is thus incorrect, 
or at least imprecise, to identify identity as the independent variable that causes a 
particular preference or behaviour.62 Rather, it is the combination of identity and the 
associated norm that results in a certain attitude or course of action.6' So despite their 
focus on identities, norms are in fact a necessary component of the state identity 
approach under review. It is for this reason that — in principle — their approach cannot 
avoid the threat of being deterministic. 
There are several elements in the writings of Risse et al., however, that seem to 
address this issue. Firstly, the authors explicitly state that identities, rather than 
actually directly determining behaviour, help identify a range of appropriate 
alternatives (Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1999: 157). In other 
words, identities and the norms they imply may be consistent with several different 
policies, leaving the actor with a considerable range of alternatives to choose from. 
Secondly, Risse et al. introduce the notion of competing national identities (or 
competing aspects of a national identity). Since these identities imply different rules 
for behaviour, this also introduces some room for choice (cf. Finnemore and Sikkink, 
1998: 914). However, while these elements seem to prevent the theory from being too 
deterministic, they create the danger of rendering it indeterminate. For, how does an 
" The best illustration of this fact is the remark 'we are not that kind of people' of parents reprimanding 
their children for littering the sidewalk or displaying other inappropriate behaviour, other people may litter, 
but we do not. Finnemore and Sikkink implicitly recognise this relationship when they define a norm as 'a 
standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity' (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891). 
6 0
 Knowledge of these two elements, however, is a necessary but not sufficient condition to determine the 
proper course of action The workings of the logic of appropriateness also requires knowledge of the 
situation (Sending, 2002 447) 
6 1
 Nor in fact, can a free-floating norm, for an actor needs its identity to determine whether a particular 
norm is applicable to its in-group 
6 2
 Likewise, approaches that focus solely on norms as independent variables are also imprecise (cf. 
Finnemore, 1996, Klotz, 1995a, 1995b) 
'
Λ
 This discussion raises the question what precisely is the relationship between norms and identities 
While March and Olson seem ro suggest that the norm itself is part of the identity when stating that 
'action involves evoking an identity or role and matching the obligations of thai identity or role to a specific 
situation' (March and Olson, 1998: 951, my italics), Fearon seems to suggest that not the norm in itself 
but the act of following the norm is part of the identity, when he argues that 'one's identity is as a 
member of a particular social category, and part of the definition of that category is that all members 
follow certain norms' (Fearon's reasoning as reported in: Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998' 902). This would 
not only link identities with norms but also with behaviour Empirically, this could be a problem if- like 
Risse et al. — one aims at explaining behaviour by invoking identity Finally, Sending posits that norms 
constitute identities which means that they are highly related but separate entities (Sending, 2002 456-
7) 
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actor choose from a range of appropriate choices? Or, what would determine an actor's 
choice for behaving in accordance to one out of several competing identities? 
Leaving the first question unattended, the authors suggest that the answer to 
the second lies in the characteristics of the political system. The German emphasis on 
party discipline, for instance, or the highly centralised character of the French system 
may promote or inhibit actors advocating a competing identity from gaining 
influence.64 However, this does not explain why one actor's identity is dominated by 
one particular aspect of national identity, while that of an other actor is dominated by 
another. Moreover, neither can it explain why a particular identity construction was in 
a minority position to begin with. In other words, why does a particular identity 
construction prevail over (the numerous) possible other ones? 
In their working paper, the authors answer this question by stating that the 
dominant identity 'is much stronger among the political elites' (Risse, Engelmann-
Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1998: 26). Apparently so, but the more apt question is: 
why? In his 1997 article Which norms matter?, Jeffrey Legro has addressed this question 
— though focussing on norms and not identities - and has put forward the following 
proposition: 'the clearer, the more durable, and more widely endorsed a prescription is, 
the greater will be its impact' (Legro, 1997: 35).ή5 In her paper, Engelmann-Martin 
addresses this proposition and suggests that not 'the duration or greater specificity of 
these normative identity constructions' is the key to their dominance, but 'their 
greater communality or shared agreement' (Engelmann-Martin, 2001: 32). This 
proposition — again — appears to be highly tautological in the context of the identity-
approach under review.66 
Logically, there are two ways in which an actor may be able to determine its 
course of action when faced with a range of appropriate policy alternatives, or with 
competing identity constructions: either through the logic of appropriateness, or 
through the logic of consequence. The former requires the actor to invoke a more 
M
 This, of course, implies that actors may differ in the degree to which they have internalised the various 
aspects of the national identity, and thus shifts the level of analysis from the nation as a unitary actor to 
the sub-national level. This complicates the use of the concept national identity Moreover, it raises the 
question whether the analysis would not benefit from focussing on the identity constructions of 
competing sub-national groups instead of on competing national identities 
^ Finnemore and Sikkink argue that in the literature three kinds of conditions for domestic receptiveness 
to international norms have been put forward. Firstly, it has been argued that for norms to be influential 
there has to be a need for international legitimation. In other words, during periods of turmoil in which 
the legitimacy of elites is threatened, international norms are more likely to penetrate the national 
political arena. Secondly, it has been argued that norms held by states viewed as successful are more likely 
to spread. Finally, several authors have suggested that the intrinsic characteristics of a norm - like its 
clarity, specificity, or the level in which it makes universalistic claims - are more likely to be more widely 
adopted (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 905-9). 
6 6
 Again it is the level of analysis problem identified in note 64 that causes this tautology, for how can one 
speak of the various degrees of domestic communality of an attribute that is said to be national·1 
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universal identity or norm (one on a higher level of abstraction). This identity or norm 
could inform the actor which of the competing identities or appropriate policy 
alternatives might constitute the proper choice. For instance, when facing the 
competing German identities that Risse et al. distinguish, "Deutsche mark" and 
"Europatriotism", a more universal identity construction of, for instance, being a 
humanitarian (a person who seeks to promote the welfare of humanity by ameliorating 
pain and suffering) may cause an actor to comply with the latter rather than the former 
identity. For, while failing to comply with the former carries the risk of economic 
hardship, the Europatriotist's other - authoritarianism, militarism and anti-Semitism -
is deemed responsible for the death and suffering of millions of people.67 
The second option involves broadening the identity-approach to include the 
use of the logic of consequence. Like many other modernist Social Constructivists, 
Risse et al. 'do not suggest an "identity versus interest" account' (Risse, Engelmann-
Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1999: 157; cf. Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001; Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Klotz, 1995b, 1995a). Therefore, it 
would be possible to hypothesise that, once the range of possible policy alternatives is 
determined by means of logic of appropriateness, an actor may specify its choice 
through the logic of consequence. Likewise, an actor may instrumentally weigh up the 
costs and benefits of competing identities. However, introducing the logic of 
consequence into a Social Constructivist approach comes at a price, for accepting the 
possibility of instrumental reasoning alongside logic of appropriateness may be 
logically inconsistent with its very point of departure: the assumption that material 
objects or events only gain meaning through the social structure through which they 
are interpreted. According to this assumption, 'interests are not just "out there" 
waiting to be discovered' (Finnemore, 1996: 2), interests are defined by inter-
subjective social structures formed by norms or identities.m In other words, in this 
view actors logically have no way of knowing their interests without a sense of who 
they are, and what is appropriate. 
2.5.6 The Occurrence of a Common Interest 
Like Moravcsik, Risse et al. do not explicitly elaborate on how the development of a 
common interest between states takes place. In fact, as stated above, their main goal is 
to explain the cross-national variety — not similarity — among elite attitudes. For this 
reason, their approach differs from most other modernist Social Constructivist 
67
 This line of reasoning is similar to the universality-hypothesis concerning the impact of norms 
distinguished by Finnemore and Sikkink This hypothesis posits that 'norms making universalistic claims 
about what is good for all people in all places' may be more influential than others (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998 907) 
*" Or, as Risse et al. have argued them themselves 'collective social identities define . how actors view 
their instrumental interests' (Risse, Engelmann-Martm, Knopf and Roscher, 1998 12). 
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approaches, which focus exclusively on the effects of international inter-subjective 
social variables such as internationally shared norms. While most Social Constructivist 
approaches may thus be classified as structural theories and are better equipped to 
explain similarity and continuity of preferences, the national identity-approach put 
forward by Risse et al. has a reductionist character and may therefore be better suited to 
explain variety and change (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 894; Van Esch, 2002: 57, 
63; Waltz, 1979: Chapter 2). As a result, explaining the convergence of national 
preferences (the process towards similarity) does not belong to its natural realm. 
Although the authors have largely ignored the issue of why and how interstate 
common interests are established, they do identify processes that may lead to changes 
in the national preference. For, while Risse et al. explicitly state that they do not 
perceive identities to be fluid, they stress that identities are not written in stone. In 
fact, from their empirical work, it may be deduced that, in their eyes, critical junctures 
can occur rather frequently.69 Such changes in identities and preferences have the 
potential to induce the establishment of a common interest. 
Risse et al. distinguish two mechanisms by which national preferences can 
change: an abrupt change in the national preference following a critical juncture as 
well as an evolutionary change of identity. They fail, however, to specify the 
intervening processes by which such changes in identity and preferences are induced 
(Checkel, 2001: 557; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999: 4, see Section 4.3.1). In other 
words, they do not elaborate on how precisely a critical juncture leads to identity 
change, nor do they explain how an incremental change in identity comes about. The 
authors only state that whether or not critical junctures will affect identity - and thus 
preferences - is dependent on an actor's 'learning capacities' (Risse, Engelmann-
Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1998:11, see also Section 2.4.4). Like Moravcsik, the 
authors thus identify learning as a mechanism for preference change. However, there 
are several reasons to believe that the process they have in mind when using the 
concept learning differs significantly from the Bayesian view on learning evoked by 
Rational Choice approaches like Liberal Intergovernmentalism. 
It seems highly unlikely that Social Constructivist authors like Risse et al. 
would perceive the learning process they see as leading to identity change to be an 
instrumental process, for this would presuppose that actors would follow the logic of 
consequence instead of the logic of appropriateness. So, rather than assuming actors' 
choices to be prompted by the consequences of these choices, as adherents of the 
Bayesian model do, it is more likely that Risse et al. would presume that actors prefer 
certain policies because, given their identities, they perceive these to constitute the 
right choice for them to make. In addition to this, like most other Modernist Social 
''' They actually claim that the French national identity has changed four times during the fifty-year 
period between the start of World War II and the end of the Cold War. 
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Constructivists, Risse et al. deny that the meaning of events and actors' interests may 
be objectively given. Instead, they argue that facts and events are given meaning 
through the inter-subjective social structure; through the norms, identity constructions 
and ideas that people share. Again, this would suggest that the authors are likely to 
perceive a change in preferences to originate from some sort of social interaction with 
other actors rather than from a change in the material external environment. 
This specific view of learning is consistent with the concept of social learning 
developed within Modernist Social Constructivist literature.70 Social learning is said to 
occur 'when identities and interests are learned in response to how actors are treated by 
significant others', through and during interaction (Checkel, 1998: 344; cf. Checkel, 
2001: 561). Moreover, such interaction is expected to have an effect because the 
message has normative appeal or is persuasive (Risse, 2000), and the actor undergoing 
social learning is assumed to experience a genuine internalization of the new norms, 
identities and beliefs (Checkel, 2001: 562, see Section 3.3.1). For this reason, social 
learning is assumed to be a social, inter-subjective and non-instrumental process. 
When one relates the concept of social learning to the identity-approach developed by 
Risse et al., one may argue that this mechanism can result in evolutionary change in 
national identities, as well as provide the crucial missing link between critical junctures 
and national preference change.71 
Moreover, since social learning is assumed to be brought about by social 
interaction and a shared process of giving meaning, more than Bayesian learning it has 
the inherent capacity to induce preference convergence. Due to the presumed inter-
subjective nature of ideas, norms, and identities, actors belonging to the same in-
group are expected to share an essentially similar interpretation of facts, events, and 
their identities and preferences. Therefore, we can expect that environmental factors 
and critical events may be interpreted in essentially the same way, and are likely to 
cause actors to learn similar lessons as a result. Moreover, since the process of social 
learning itself is presumed to be an inter-subjective process in which the meaning of 
the learning process and the lesson to be learned are collectively constructed by the 
" Social Constructivists use a number of terms like complex learning, waahsatwn, persuauon and teaihing to 
refer to largely the same processes (Checkel, 1998 :}:52, 341; 2001, Finnemore, 1996, Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998: 914-5; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Moreover, others have introduced the concept 
argumentation and deliberation to reflect process in which two or more actors try to influence the identities 
and values of each other (Risse, 2000). 
71
 Critical junctures may incite certain groups or individuals to change their (normative) beliefs (or the 
saliency of certain pre-existing beliefs or norms), and actively to seek to promote national identity- and 
preference change, by inducing social learning in dominant national groups. In recent years, such 
processes have been rhe focus of several Modernist Social Constructivist studies (Finnemore, 1996; Keck 
and Sikkink, 1998, Klot^, 1995a, Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999) The literature on trans-national 
advocacy groups, in particular, focuses on the issue of how and why certain groups or actors attempt to 
induce national identity and preference change 
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interacting actors, it has the potential not only to change the learner's but also the 
teacher's perspective on life Therefore, it is to be expected that actor's preferences tend 
to converge during and after this process of social learning Finally, in Modernist 
Social Constructivist literature, few barriers (cognitive or other) for social learning are 
identified 72 Learning seems rather easy, especially when it concerns the members of 
the in-group 
If any structural social variables like internationally shared experiences, norms, 
and identity-constructions are incorporated into the social constructivist model of 
preference change - as has been done by many other Modernist Social Constructivists 
(Finnemore, 1996, Keck and Sikkink, 1998, Klotz, 1995a, Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 
1999) - the process of social learning could shed light on the question how and why 
interstate common interests are established For in addition to purely national 
identities, norms and values, one of the multiple identities of states and their 
constituents may consist of some international identity-construction or include 
internationally shared norms which make them a member of some international in-
group Moreover, interstate or transnational social learning may be spurred on by the 
existence of international or transnational co-operation, for such arrangements could 
provide a forum in which member states may deliberate and try to persuade each other 
(Checkel, 2001 554, 1998, Haas, 1992, Hanny and Wessels, 1998, Verdun, 1998a, 
1998b) Finally, social learning may be initiated by international organisations, who -
having developed autonomous preferences - may engage in the persuasion of state 
actors (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999, Finnemore, 1996, Van Esch, 2001) 
All in all, it is clear that if a more international focus is taken than that of 
Risse et al, Modernist Social Constructivist thought may provide an explanation for 
the convergence of state preferences In fact, due to its inter-subjective and social 
nature, social learning is more inducive to the establishment of a common interest 
than Bayesian learning Moreover, since Risse et al perceive critical junctures to occur 
rather frequently and few (cognitive or other) barriers for social learning are identified 
in the Modernist Social Constructivist literature, we might expect the convergence of 
preferences to be a relatively likely occurence 
2.6 Social Constructivist's Empirical Record 
2 6 1 Empirical Evidence 
Located firmly in the modernist social constructivist camp, Risse et al have set out to 
test their approach empirically with respect to — amongst others — the attitudes of the 
German, and French elites towards the 1990 attempt to establish European Economic 
2
 The work of Checkel constitutes a marked exception to this naie However, in my view his work may 
more adequately be characterised as cognitive rather than Social Constructivist (see Chapter 3) 
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and Monetary Union.73 They conclude that the explanatory value of their approach 
varies across cases, and that 'the strongest identification with Europeanness can 
probably be found among the German political elites' (Risse, Engelmann-Martin, 
Knopf and Roscher, 1998: 25-6). 
Europatriotism versus Deutsche mark patriotism 
From a rational choice point of view — the authors argue — German support for EMU 
seems strange, for the country appeared to have the most to lose by its 
implementation, standing to lose its economic and monetary dominance as well as its 
cherished and stable currency, the German mark. Furthermore, they argue that the 
lack of contention over the desirability of European monetary union amongst the 
German parties indicates that something other than a mere cost-benefit analysis must 
have accounted for the preferences of the German political elite. Therefore, Risse et al 
argue, the German att i tude can be more adequately analysed 'as a contest of competing 
identities, Europatriotism versus Deutsche Mark patriotism' (Risse, Engelmann-Martin, 
Knopf and Roscher, 1998: 3 1 , italics in original).74 
The first (aspect of the) German identity - Europatriotism — is said to have 
developed shortly after World War II in response to the horrors of the Nazi years. 
After the war, the Germans actively began to distance themselves from their own 
history and to reconstruct their national identity by turning to Europe as the 
embodiment of stability, peace and democracy (Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and 
Roscher, 1998: 25-6). In their new 'European' identity as a stable, peaceful, and 
democratic state, their own recent history fulfilled the role of the other, of the out-
group. The first post-war German Chancellor, Adenauer, actively and consciously 
initiated this identity reconstruction. By the 1960s it had spread throughout the 
German political elite. Since then, an almost unquestioned consensus has been 
established amongst the German public and political parties on the desirability of 
integration — and even fédéralisation — of Europe. According to Risse et al., EMU has 
been portrayed and perceived as an integral part (and even a symbol of) this larger 
project, or as they have put it: 
'Support for the Euro = Support for European integration 
= "good Europeanness" 
= "good Germanness" 
= Rejection of the German militarist and nationalist past' 
(Risse, Engelmann-Marcin, Knopf and Roscher, 1998: 28) 
^ Like Moravcsik, Risse et al. also analyse che British attitude towards the European Economic and 
Monetary Union. 
74
 Risse et al. speak interchangeably from these patriotisms as being 'competing identities' or different 
aspects of one identity, which of course are actually two different things (Risse, Engelmann-Martin, 
Knopf and Roscher, 1998: 25-6). 
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The second — conflicting - aspect of German post-World War II identity 
consists of what the authors have called Deutsche Mark patriotism. This term refers to a 
'particular reading of German pre-World War II history and the collective memories 
of rising inflation and the world economic crisis with its consequences for the Nazis 
coming into power' (Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1998: 26).75 This 
aspect of the German identity is shared by the German population and the financial 
elite and implies a strong interest in price stability and a hard currency. 
The preference for the establishment of EMU which is implied in the first 
aspect of the German identity is seen by some of the German political elite to violate 
the second aspect, for it implies sharing a common monetary policy making authority 
with states that assign a lower value to price stability, as well as giving up the D-mark 
(the example of a hard currency par excellence). However, according to Risse et.al., the 
former identity aspect has always been much stronger than the latter. Furthermore, 
they argue that the German institutional setting — with its emphasis on party 
discipline — makes it hard for the opponents of the mainstream identity construction 
to gain political leverage. This is shown by the fact that resistance to EMU has been 
limited and that any existing opponents 'go at great length to show that one can be a 
"good German European" and still remain sceptical vis-à-vis a single currency' (Risse, 
Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1998: 26). According to the authors, the 
existence of Deutsche mark patriotism also explains Germany's insistence on the 
establishment of a European Central Bank that would be institutionally similar to the 
Bundesbank, as well as the Stability- and Growth Pact. This insistence, the authors 
argue, had little to do with objective economic policy-making, but was a concession to 
the second aspect of the German national identity. 
From Autonomous Dirigism to Neo-Liberal Supranationalism 
As opposed to the relatively stable German identity, Risse et al. identify four changes 
in the French identity that occurred during the 20,h century. These changes were 
caused respectively by critical junctures like 'World War II and the German 
occupation', 'the war in Algeria and the ongoing crisis of the Fourth Republic', 'the 
failure of Mitterrand's economic policies in the early 1980s', and 'the end of the Cold 
War' (Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1998: 12; Risse, 2001: 202-3). 
According to the authors, the first two critical junctures resulted in a French national 
identity that was rather unfavourable to European integration, particularly to any form 
of supranational integration. Furthermore, they led the political elite to view state 
75
 The authors identify the hyperinflation of the 1930s and World War II as the only critical junctures 
that Germany has known in the 20''> century and therefore stipulate that there have not been any shifts in 
the German national identity since the foundation of the German Federal Republic. This means that they 
do not see the re-unification as being a German critical juncture, whereas this event is seen as a critical 
juncture from the French perspective (see Section 2 5.1) 
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intervention in the economy as desirable and led French monetary policy to be 
strongly Keynesian. Furthermore, this French identity implied a preference for a 
monetarist approach to monetary union as opposed to the economist approach that 
underlies the Maastricht Treaty.76 
According to Risse et.al., this identity and the resulting preferences changed 
radically with the occurrence of the third French critical juncture in 1983. When 
Mitterrand and his socialist party came to power in 1981, they adopted heavily 
Keynesian economic policies. However, by 1983 the adverse reaction of the capital 
markets, electoral losses, and disastrous economic results led the French head of state 
to redefine the course of his party and presidency drastically.77 From then on, the 
authors argue, the President 'defined the construction of the European Community as 
a central issue of his time in office'.78 This new French identity highlighted the 
common historical and cultural heritage of the European states and depicted France as 
the (future) cultural and political leader of Europe. The other in this identity 
construction was personified by the US and Japan, states with a different cultural 
heritage and perceived conflicting political and economic interests. According to the 
authors, this change in attitude towards Europe included 'a re-orientation toward neo-
hberal economics' (Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1998: 21). 
The authors admit that Mitterrand's change of heart may have been motivated 
largely by economic and political interests, and may therefore be an example of a case 
in which interests have caused an identity reconstruction (see Table 2.1, 3"' quadrant). 
However, they argue that the new identity should still be considered a major 
explanation for the change in preferences that occurred later on, for 'it assumed its own 
dynamics over time' (Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1998: 19). 
Moreover, they argue that the new identity spread to the Gaullist party, and 
subsequently determined how the entire French elite defined their interests.79 
76
 The monetarist approach argues that further European monetary integration should start with the 
implementation of monetary measures like the reduction of margins of fluctuation between the European 
currencies. These monetary measures would promote the harmonisation of the member states' economic 
policies. The economist approach — which was advocated predominantly by the German financial elite — 
posits that monetary integration is impossible without the prior harmonisation of economic policies (see 
further Section 4 5 1). 
77
 For a rather different interpretation of events, see Section 8.2 
78
 The authors even state that 'the Socialists now saw the European future in a more or less federal model 
(called "federation of nation-states "(Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1998 21) It remains 
unclear, however, how this 'federation of nation-states' differs from the concept 'L'Europe des nations' that 
the Gaullists were advocating since the late fifties and which the authors cite as an essential characteristic 
of the French European identity prior to 1983 (and that they mistakenly attribute to General De Gaulle 
instead of to his Prime minister, and arch-Gaullist Michel Debré). 
1ί
' According to the authors, these changes in the French identity were accelerated and intensified when 
Germany was reunified (it thus seems the authors meant to identify this event as the fourth critical 
juncture in recent French history instead of the 'End of the Cold War' that they have identified earlier in 
the article). Especially the fact that France hardly played any role in this event forced the French to 
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In general, the new French identity implied a more favourable attitude 
towards further European integration and the pooling of policy-making authority. 
Despite the fact that Risse et.al. admit that the original French proposal for EMU in 
1988 'was a far cry from the version adopted in the Maastricht treaty following the 
German model', they maintain that the French attitude towards further European 
monetary integration reflected the new European French identity (Risse, Engelmann-
Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1998: 20-1). This was the case, they argue, because 
whenever the French political elite 'had to choose between its support for European 
integration and its preferences on economic policies, Europe carried the day' (Risse, 
Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1998: 21).80 
2.6.2 The Reality Check 
Does this account of the origin of elite attitudes concerning EMU seem more plausible 
than that provided by Liberal Intergovernmental ism.·* At first sight, the authors do 
seem to be able to explain some general trends. In the case of the German political 
elite, for instance, it seems clear that certain normative, historically inspired reasons 
for favouring the establishment of EMU are frequently evoked. However, concurrence 
with the pro-EMU position was less widespread than the authors have us believe. In 
fact, it is quite clear that one particular part of the German political establishment — 
the financial elite - went out of their way to prevent the EMU from becoming a 
reality.81 
In the case of France, the authors admit that the evidence in favour of their 
approach is less strong. Furthermore, the proposed link between the critical junctures 
and the resulting identities and attitudes are far less plausible in this case. For, why 
exactly did World War II, German occupation, the Algerian war, and the failure of the 
Fourth Republic result in a national identity that was unfavourable to supranational 
integration, but favourable to Keynesian and dirigiste economic policymaking, and a 
'monetarist' approach to monetary policy-making? This remains entirely unclear, and 
surely there are other, more plausible explanations for these preferences. Furthermore, 
do the authors really mean to suggest that from 1983 (or even 1989) onwards, the 
French Gaullists — or even the socialists — were genuine supporters of the institution of 
a supranational Europe, or neo-liberal in their economic orientation? 
In my opinion, the proper question when reviewing the empirical record of 
the identity approach put forward by Risse et al. is not to what degree the theory fits 
abandon a central part of the old French identity: the vision of a grande et indépendante France and replace it 
with the concept of a grande et indépendante Europe under French guidance. 
*" This argument is somewhat peculiar given the earlier stipulation that the 1983 reconstruction of the 
French identity also included 'a re-orientation toward neo-liberal economics' 
81
 The President of the Bundesbank Pohl for instance, clearly opposed the establishment of EMU, and was 
in fact quite explicit about it (see Chapter 8) 
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the historical record, but whether — based on their research strategy - the authors are 
in fact able to determine the explanatory value of their theory. As was to be expected, 
the methods used by these modernist Social Constructivists to test their approach 
empirically are significantly 'softer' than those used by Moravcsik. In principle, this 
may not be a problem. However, in my eyes the authors carry the lack of rigor a notch 
too far and actually fail to design a satisfactory test for their approach. 
It is clear that, despite the fact that the authors do not make this explicit, 
their approach implies certain expectations about events in the world 'out there', the 
main ones naturally being that — in general — national identities rather than 
instrumental interests define elite attitudes towards European policy-making. In 
addition, the hypothesis can be derived that the cross-national variation in these elite 
attitudes is a function of'how much space there is for Europe' in these national 
identities (Engelmann-Martin, 2001: 5-6). Finally, the following sub-hypothesis seems 
to be important: in a situation in which interests are ambiguous and indeterminate, 
elite attitudes are determined by national identities, while instrumental interests may 
determine the content of attitudes in case of unstable and contested identity 
constructions. 
It is doubtful whether the cases chosen by the authors are suitable for studying 
these two propositions. The authors do not justify their choice, nor is it evident why 
the case of the EMU, or the German, French and British attitudes in particular, would 
be an interesting or significant case to test the identity-approach Risse et al. have put 
forward. In order to test any theory it is vital to make a clear theoretical and empirical 
distinction between the various dependent and independent variables identified in its 
hypotheses. This, however, is not one of the authors' strong points. Risse et al. fail to 
stipulate what - in their eyes — is meant by 'elite attitudes' (their main dependent 
variable), let alone operationalise this concept. They do operationalise the concept of 
'national identity' (in their eyes, their main independent variable) by deriving three 
indicators from its key features. One of the indicators they use are statements made by 
the political elite with regard to visions of the national and European political order — 
'both existing and desired ones' - as an indicator for the concept national identity 
(Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1999: 156; Engelmann-Martin, 2001: 
5-6).82 This operationalisation, however, is problematic, for an overlap seems to exist 
between this indicator and the dependent variable: elite attitudes. For, how should one 
distinguish between the political elite's existing and desired visions of the European 
political order, as voiced by the political elite, and the governmental elite's attitude 
H
-
>
 The authors distinguish two other indicators for the concept 'national identity'. The first indicator they 
distinguish concerns the ideas regarding the 'imagined community' that the state forms (the in-group), 
and its relationship with 'Europe'. The second indicator refers to the conceptions concerning the out-
group(s) and its members, and its relation to Europe 
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towards European policy-making? This imprecision makes it impossible to draw 
convincing conclusions on the hypothesis that national identities — as measured by an 
analysis of the elite's statements on Europe — inform the political elite's attitude, for it 
is hard to see how it could possibly not be the case. 
A different, but equally problematic issue arises from the third hypothesis, 
that in a situation in which interests are ambiguous and indeterminate, elite attitudes 
are determined by national identities, while instrumental interests may determine the 
content of attitudes in case of unstable and contested identity constructions. For 
despite the authors' claim that they 'do not suggest an "identity versus interest" 
account' (Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, 1999: 157; cf. Checkel and 
Moravcsik, 2001; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Klotz, 
1995a, 1995b), testing this hypothesis does require them to show that - under certain 
circumstances - actors' attitudes are inspired by the norms implied by national 
identity, rather than by mere instrumental interest. Showing the existence of a 
correlation between national identity and elite attitude - as the authors do - is 
insufficient, for as Klotz (amongst others) has convincingly argued 'individuals, for a 
wide range of reasons, may conform with norms even if they are not personally 
committed to those ideals' (Klotz, 1995b: 478). To argue plausibly that attitudes were 
genuinely identity-led, rather than interest-based, would require a deeper study of the 
process of individual actor's motivations than Risse et al. supply. Furthermore, Checkel 
has argued that to conduct such a study 'archival, memoir, or interview data would 
seem essential' (Checkel, 1998: 343-5). The authors, however, have based their account 
of the definition of elite attitudes on an analysis of newspaper articles and secondary 
literature. 
All in all, it must be concluded that the lack of methodological rigour makes 
it impossible for the authors genuinely to test their approach. In fact, the overlap 
between their dependent and one of the indicators of their independent variable 
prevents even a simple judgement on the empirical record of the approach in the 
particular case of British, German and French attitudes towards EMU. Further 
theoretical specification and a dose of methodological rigour would be needed before 
any conclusions concerning the empirical value of the identity-approach of Risse, 
Engelmann-Martin, Knopf, and Roscher could be drawn. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Both theories reviewed in this chapter address the questions of how national 
preferences are formed, defined, and why they may change, all much neglected issues 
within the study of International Relations. At the same time, their theoretical 
propositions stand in stark contrast to one another. While Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism stands in a long rationalist tradition within the discipline of 
International Relations, and emphasises the sub-national economic origin of state 
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preferences, Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf, and Roscher have built on Social 
Constructivist thought and stress the importance of national inter-subjective social 
structures in understanding the definition of national preferences. As such, the 
approaches also confront different theoretical and empirical problems. 
Theoretically, Liberal Intergovernmentalism faces some fundamental problems 
like its failure to offer a genuinely pluralist theory of domestic politics, and its meagre 
explanation of the occurrence of a common interest between states. Moreover, 
Moravcsik's last-minute attempt to introduce two mutually exclusive views of the role 
of state institutions affects the consistency of his approach. Empirically, however, the 
verdict is more severe. In fact, the discrepancy found between Li's theoretical 
expectations and many of the crucial decisions in the history of the European monetary 
co-operation practice is glaring. In addition, it has become clear that — in his chapters 
on the EMS and EMU - Moravcsik fails to provide a single piece of evidence for his 
claim that dominant producer groups determine the national preference by initiating 
policy-change, or applying direct or even structural pressure on their national 
governments to do so. 
For some, the ideational focus of the identity approach of Risse et al. may 
compare favourably with the narrow economic view on preferences put forward by 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism. However, theoretically this approach seems to be far 
less well developed, especially in its level of specification and consistency. The authors 
fail to acknowledge the pivotal role of critical junctures in their understanding of 
change and variety in elite attitudes, and to solve the (admittedly) difficult problem of 
explaining why certain external events constitute critical junctures while others do 
not. Furthermore, it has been argued that - due to its use of the logic of 
appropriateness and its reliance on the idea of competing identities — the approach 
runs the risk of facing the threat of either determinism or indeterminacy. Finally, due 
to their emphasis on the historical uniqueness of national identities and factors 
blocking or retarding the convergence of these identities, Risse et al. cannot offer an 
explanation for the establishment of common interests where none were present before. 
At first sight, the identity approach seems to fare better in empirical terms. 
However, on closer analysis the inadequate research design adopted by the authors 
forces one to conclude that it is simply not possible to pass judgement on the 
empirical record of the approach. Firstly, the theory makes insufficient distinction 
between its dependent and independent variables, and thus fails to meet a crucial 
precondition for any test. Secondly, it was argued that the material the authors used in 
their empirical investigation is unsuited for a rigourous test of their theoretical 
expectations. Overall, it must be concluded that the identity-approach would benefit 
as much from some methodological rigour as from some further theoretical 
specification prior to any empirical testing. 
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This leads to the conclusion that neither Liberal Intergovernmentalism, nor 
the identity-approach introduced by Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf, and Roscher 
offers a satisfactory answer to the theoretical and empirical questions at the forefront of 
this thesis why and how a common interest between France and Germany with respect to 
European monetary unification was established in the early 1990s, while — despite more 
favourable structural conditions — it failed to materialise in the 1970s 
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3 COMMON INTEREST: POWER AND 
COGNITION 
'To those waiting with bated breath for rheir favourite media catchphrase the "U-turn", I have 
only one thing to say. You turn if you want to. The lady's not for turning' 
-Margaret Thatcher at a Tory Party Conference, October 70'* 7980 
'The art of persuasion has its limits' 
-Jean Monnet (as quoted by Mazzmellt, 1997: 35) 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a critical overview was given of the International Relations 
(IR) theories concerned with the formation and definition of state preferences, and — to 
a much lesser extent — the occurrence of a common interest between states. The 
conclusion of this analysis was that neither theory is able to provide a satisfactory 
answer to the question of this thesis: why did a common interest arise between France 
and Germany in the late 1980s when one had failed to arise in the early 1970s? 
In order to find an answer, the two most central concepts used in this chapter 
— common interest and national preference — will first be defined. Second, an overview 
will be given of the different ways in which a common interest can come about. More 
specifically, four mechanisms will be distinguished that have the capacity to transform 
a situation from one in which national preferences of states are incompatible into one 
where they correspond. It concerns the following mechanisms: learning, persuasion, 
imposition-of-will, and turnover. It will be argued that different expectations can be 
derived concerning the significance of these mechanisms from different theories. In 
Section 3, a theoretical view on preferences will be formulated. This theoretical model 
will consist of two parts. While the first part will answer the question of how national 
preferences are formed, the second will deal with the question of how pivotal decision 
makers define their preferences. In both aspects, the model will differ significantly 
from the approaches discussed in the previous chapter. 
In contrast to Liberal Intergovernmentalism (IR) and Social Constructivism 
(SC), the model of national preference formation that will be introduced in this chapter 
may be characterised as a statist domestic politics model, meaning that national state 
institutions and officials are assumed to be autonomous and potentially very powerful 
actors in the national political arena, and that the state will not be considered to be a 
unitary actor. Furthermore, the national preference is assumed to result from a struggle 
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amongst these powerful domestic actors. The model of individual preference defimtton 
introduced will also be contrasted with both the Rational Choice model and the Social 
Constructivist model, and may most aptly be described as a cognitive model of 
preference definition. The approach is rooted in the field of political psychology, and 
leads to the conclusion that an individual's pre-existing, subjective ideas play a 
fundamental role in the process of preference definition. 
Finally, from this cognitive model several hypotheses will be derived 
regarding the importance of the different mechanisms involved in national preference 
change, and the probability of a common interest coming about. The most central 
hypothesis that may be deduced from this cognitive model is that the probability of 
preference change occurring as a result of persuasion and learning is far smaller than 
the probability of it occurring as a result of imposition-of-will or turnover. As a result, 
we may conclude that the probability that a common interest will be established is 
significantly smaller than the Liberal Intergovernmental and Social Constructivist 
model would lead us to believe. 
3.2 Preferences and Common Interests 
As was argued in the introduction to this thesis, understanding how and why common 
interests between states are established should be considered an important object of 
research in the field of IR. However, this issue has never generated much scientific 
interest. The traditional IR-theones - Neo-Realism, and Liberal Institutionalism — 
treat national preferences as exogenous to their theories and the existence of a common 
interest as a given. Moreover, more recently developed theories, like those discussed in 
the previous chapter, do not explicitly address the question of how a common interest 
between states is established. In the present chapter, an attempt will be made to shed 
more light on this neglected area in the study of International Relations. 
Due to the fact that within the field of International Relations the topic has 
been largely ignored, no generally accepted definition of a 'common interest' exists. In 
trying to come up with a definition, three issues are of importance: (1) the relationship 
between the concept and traditional IR theories; (2) the relationship between common 
interests and national preferences; and (3) the level of objectivity implied in the 
concept as well as the level of abstraction. 
Theoretically, the relevance of understanding how and why a common interest 
between states is established lies in the fact that the Neo-Realist and Liberal 
Institutionalist theories consider the existence of such a shared interest to be a 
necessary prerequisite for the establishment of interstate cooperation. The definition of 
a common interest used in this thesis will be based on this assumption. In other words, 
the term common interest will relate to a mutual interest in a policy that 'can only be 
realized through cooperation' (Keohane, 1984: 6). This means that, firstly, the concept 
interstate common interest will not refer to a situation which may be defined as harmonious; 
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a situation in which a policy proposed by one actor will 'automatically facilitate the 
attainment of others' goals' (Keohane, 1984: 51; cf. Lieshout, 1995: 68). On the 
contrary, the research in this thesis will focus exclusively on situations in which states 
are confronted with behaviour by others which has negative consequences for them, 
and as a result may develop a preference for some kind of international cooperation to 
counter these consequences (see Section 2.2.1, note 7). Secondly, although it is of 
course possible that states share a preference for unilateral actions, the focus is on 
situations in which both states prefer to coordinate their actions rather than deal with 
the externalities on their own. 
According to Keohane and Hoffmann, the concept of common interest may be 
described as a situation in which the preferences of the states concerning a particular 
form of international cooperation have become convergent (Keohane and Hoffmann, 
1991: 24). This definition of a common interest raises the question what is meant by 
the term national preference. As is indicated by the many — often implicit — differences 
of opinion and misunderstandings which characterise the literature on (national) 
preferences, no consensus-definition of the concept exists (cf. Druckman and Lupia, 
2000: 2; Frieden, 1999: 41). In fact, both the question of what constitutes a national 
preference, as well as the definition of the term preference has elicited fierce discussion 
among scholars. 
Within the literature several definitions of the word national in the concept of 
national preference may be distinguished (cf. Clinton, 1994: 25-34). The first of these 
definitions treats the nation state as a unitary actor (like the identity approach 
developed by Risse et al, see Section 2.4). This means that the nation state is treated as 
if it were a single, unitary entity that makes its own choices, and acts on the basis of a 
unitary preference. A second commonly used approach equates the national preference 
- a priori - with the preference of some influential actor within its borders, like the 
President, Government, or a dominant societal group (like Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism, see Section 2.2.4 cf. Clinton, 1994: 29-30; Krasner, 1978: ΙΟ­
Ι 3). In this chapter, neither of these approaches will be chosen. 
So, where, or in whom does the national preference reside if the nation state is 
not considered to be a unitary actor, or the national preference is not personified by a 
particular domestic actor? The answer is: nowhere and everywhere. In this chapter, the 
concept of national preference will refer to the aggregation of (often conflicting) 
preferences put forward by dominant state officials, institutions, and societal groups 
(everywhere) and, as such, it cannot be pinpointed in space (nowhere). The national 
preference is thus the outcome of a domestic political process, of a struggle amongst 
ministers, political parties, governmental departments, interest groups, corporations, 
and politically active individuals. Therefore, it may be defined as the national 'balance 
of competing interests and ideas' (Princen, 2001: 3; cf. Princen, 2002: 51-4). This 
means that to understand why a particular preference is fought for in the international 
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arena, it is essential to analyse the domestic political process, the relationships between 
influential actors (see Section 3.4), and the preferences they strive for (see Section 3.5). 
Ultimately, the focus of this chapter is the preference resulting from this domestic 
political process and subsequently put forward in the international arena (cf. Putnam, 
1988). 
The second element which defines the concept of national preference has 
stirred up even more debate amongst scholars. For, what exactly constitutes & preference? 
In order to arrive at a definition of this concept, an overview will be given of three 
issues related to this concept and the discussions aroused by them. The first issue that 
comes up when trying to define the concept of preference concerns the matter of choice. 
In this chapter, when an actor's preference is referred to, what is meant is that this 
person or entity 'can connect choices by a relationship that indicates that the person 
likes one alternative better than, or just as much as, another' (Bueno de Mesquita, 
2000: 241). In other words, a preference for a certain alternative is assumed to be 
defined in relation to other alternatives; an actor has a preference for χ over y, or the 
other way around (cf. Druckman and Lupia, 2000: 2; Frieden, 1999: 41). This implies 
that a preference can exist only if an actor has the ability to choose."5 So, for an actor to 
be able to form a preference, it should (a) have at least two options to choose from, and 
(b) the actor concerned is able to rank these options according to their desirability 
(Bueno de Mesquita, 2000: 241; Lieshout, 1995: 30).8d 
In addition to this matter of choice, the concept of preference has elicited 
much discussion about whether the term has an objective, subjective or an inter-
subjective connotation. In this chapter, the concept of preference will refer to 'an 
actor's tastes, likes, and dislikes', and as such it is assumed to be like beauty: in the eye 
of the beholder (Bueno de Mesquita, 2000: 242). In other words, preferences are 
defined as being subjective. They should be distinguished from interests (for the 
definition of the term interest as it will be used in this study, see below), which in 
their everyday meaning are generally used to refer to something that is objectively to one's 
'advantage, good or profit' (Wall, 1975: 489; cf. Connolly, 1972: 462; Kratochwill, 
1982: 5-6; Cochran, 1973: 751-2).e5 As such, an everyday claim in the name of 
^ For an overview of the different interpretations of the concept freedom ofihoue, see Section 3 ^ 1 
8 1
 Formally, for the assumption of thin rationality to hold, the requirements of both the assumption of 
asymmetry and that of negative transitivity should be fulfilled. The assumption of asymmetry holds that 
'the individual either strictly prefers Οι to 02, or 02 to 01, but not Oi to 02 arid02 to οΓ (Lieshout, 1995 30, 
italics in original). The assumption of negative transitivity means that 'if the individual knows its 
preference with respect to 01 and 02, it is also able to place the outcome associated with a third behavioral 
option oi somewhere on the ordinal scale set by 01 and 02' (Druckman and Lupia, 2000: 12; cf Hug, 
2003. 44, Lieshout, 1995 30) 
m
 To get a feel for the confusion concerning the different interpretations of the meaning of the terms 
interest and preferente that characterises the literature, see (Cochran, 1973, Connolly, 1972; Kratochwill, 
1982, Wall, 1975) Clinton sums up five different definitions of the concept interest used in the 
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interest is (implicitly) justified by a reference to the value of the 'good' (health, wealth, 
happiness, or power) that it will provide. The concept of interest, thus, has a normative 
ring - it (implicitly) contains a definition of what is 'good' — that is not present in the 
concept of preference as used in this thesis (Clinton, 1994: 24; Wall, 1975: 506-8). It 
is of course possible that actors prefer what is (commonly acknowledged to be, or 
objectively) in their interest, and indeed preferences may be based on interests; however 
in this chapter this will not — a priori — be assumed to be the case. Since this study 
merely tries to analyse why states choose certain policies over others — not what states 
ought to prefer or whether the policies they choose are beneficial to them (or their 
constituents) — its focus is on studying the convergence of preferences, not interests.86 
A third characteristic of preferences — and one that remains neglected in most 
analyses of the concept — is that the term may be used to refer to a choice on any level 
of abstraction (Princen, 2002: 36; cf. Connolly, 1972: 464). Consider, for example, 
the case of France in the mid-1960s when it was trying to decide whether it preferred 
further European monetary cooperation or a return to the Gold Standard, and finally 
opted for the second alternative (see Section 5.3.4). One could say that in the mid-
1960s, the national preference of France thus encompassed a return to the Gold 
Standard. However, at the same time one could argue just as convincingly that its 
preference was actually to retain its sovereignty, or even maximise its power. 
To solve this levels-of-abstraction problem and clarify the nature of the subject 
of the different theories on national preferences, it is crucial to specify the level of 
abstraction of the preference that one refers to (Connolly, 1972: 465). In order to do 
this, I propose to make a tentative distinction between preferences at two levels of 
abstraction; values and policy-preferences.87 The concept of value will be used to refer to 
the ultimate values which actors strive for (preferences at the highest level of 
abstraction, preferences-as-ends). These values may include subjective interests — that is, 
literature. The definition of preference used in this chapter corresponds with the third possible definition of 
the term interest that he distinguishes (Clinton, 1994. 23-4). 
The lack of clarity concerning the meaning of these two concepts also characterises parts of the work by 
Keohane on common interests In After Hegemony, for instance, he speaks of the importance of 'the 
existence of mutual interests', he also argues, however, that 'government's policies reflect the belief that they 
benefit from these ties', a statement that refers to the subjectivity of preferences (Keohane, 1984: 6 my 
italics, see also page 137) Moreover, in 1991, Keohane and Hoffmann argued that 'if policy convergence 
among major governments was so important we are left with the task of trying to explain why the 
interests of the major actors became convergent after having failed to be 'subjectively' similar for so long' 
(Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991: 24, my italics) 
H6
 As such, the concept preference may be offset against the objective conceptualisation of interests put 
forward by Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the inter-subjective view advocated by Social Constructivists 
like Risse et al (see Chapter 2). 
"
7
 Surely the distinction between two levels of abstraction is neither complete nor exhaustive, for one 
could differentiate between preferences at any level of abstraction. This would, however, almost certainly 
only contribute to the confusion (for an example of such a confusing analysis, see: Frieden, 1999: 42-5) 
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ideas which specify criteria for distinguishing what 'is perceived to be costly from that 
which is beneficial.88 However, they may also include (shared) principled beliefs; 
'normative ideas that specify criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just 
from unjust' (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 9).81·' In contrast, the term policy-preference 
(preferences-as-means) will be used in this thesis to refer to an actor's instrumental 
beliefs; beliefs concerning the best way to achieve the realisation of its values (Smith, 
1988: 21).90 As can be deduced from the above definition, policy-preferences and 
values are assumed to be connected by a causal relationship. Which policy is perceived 
by the actor as being the proper means to achieve its ends (the realisation of its values) 
is thus dependent on its causal beliefs; its (subjective) 'beliefs about cause-effect 
relationships' (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 10). 
In my eyes, it is this failure to distinguish between preferences at different 
levels of abstraction, and to specify whether one's analysis focuses on policy-preferences 
or values, which lies at the heart of the discussion between adherents of the Rational 
Choice and Social Constructivist approach to preferences. Rational Choice approaches 
— like Liberal Intergovernmental ism — assume actors' values to be fixed and universal, 
and focus on the pol icy-preferences that actors (through a logic of consequence, see 
Section 2.4.2) derive from these ultimate values. Social Constructivists like Risse et al, 
by contrast, focus on explaining the origin of, and change in precisely those ultimate 
values that adherents of the Rational Choice approach treat as given (Checkel, 1998: 
344; 2001: 561; Johnston, 2001: 491, note 8; Risse, 2002: 605).9' Seen from this 
88
 These values often are the focus of adherents of rational choice approaches. There is, however, nothing 
about rational choice approaches that precludes these models from making the assumption that actors are 
driven by idealistic motives rather than material (self) interest (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 910, 912; 
Risse, 2002. 599)· For an explanation of how altruistic behaviour can be accounted for within a rational 
choice approach, see (Lieshout, 1995. 47-50). 
89
 These values are the predominant focus of those studying the role of ideas and Social Constructivists. 
w
 Gourevitch and Pnncen make a distinction that is similar to that between values and policy-
preferences, but refer respectively to core preferences and taitns, and values at a higher level and preferences 
(Gourevitch, 2002' 313; Pnncen, 2002: 37). Furthermore, often a distinction is made between preferences-
over-outcomes and preferences-over-strategies (Risse, 2002 605, 609), terms that in my mind confuse rather 
than clarify for preference-over-srrategies — like the French preference for a return to the Gold Standard in 
the example above mentioned - are also outcomes Frieden, finally, distinguishes between three kinds of 
preferences 1 )primitivepreferemes which seem to be the equivalent to what I have called values, but which 
he (as a proper rationalist) omits from his analysis (Frieden, 1999' 45, note 3); 2)preferences' the way in 
which actors 'value different possible resulti' (Frieden, 1999· 44 my italics), and 3) strategies' 'ways to 
achieve goals given the anticipated actions of others, differential capabilities, knowledge and information, 
and other features of the setting'(Frieden, 1999 45-6) 
91
 In my opinion, the distinction between the enablmghonstraining and lonslitutmg effect of international 
institutions that is often made in the literature (Klotz, 1995b. 459-62; Risse, 2002: 597, 605-7), may 
also be carried back to the difference between values and policy-preferences The lonstituting effect of 
institutions on actor's preferences that has been the focus of Social Constructivists approaches to 
institutions refers to the effect that institutions may have on actors' valtm and the change in policy-
preferences that may result from this effect. In contrast, the enabling/'comtrawing effect that figures 
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perspective, these theories can better be regarded as complementary instead of 
competitive (Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel, 2003: 19-24). 
Distinguishing between values and policy-preferences, however, raises the 
question of which of these types of preferences need to converge in order for a common 
interest between states to come into existence (see Table 3.1). Following Ernst Haas, 
Keohane and Hoffmann have suggested that a common interest can exist even when 
actors' objectives are diverse, as long as the policies they prefer are complementary 
(Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991: 24). In other words, it is not important whether states 
strive for power, wealth, or world peace (values), as long as they all perceive a certain 
policy- such as the creation of EMU (policy-preference)- to serve whichever values 
they strive for (see Table 3.1, cell c). This means that for a common interest to be 
established, simple convergence of the actors' policy-preferences is all that is needed.92 
A common interest should thus be defined as the convergence of the actors' policy-preferences 
(see Table 3.1, shaded row) rather than a convergence of their values. 
Divergence 
iConvergence 
Divergence 
(a) Fundamental Divergence of 
Preferences 
2 
m- ( cj Q<:c:~iQI_!lll __ 9?!D_IJ)g~_In~~re~t H 
--------- -Table.3.1: Values, Policy-preferences, and the Common Interest 
3.3 From Divergence to Convergence 
Convergence 
(b) Divergence of Policy-
Preferences 
3 4 
(d) Fundamental Common 
Interest 
Common Interest 
The transition from divergent policy preferences to a common interest (see Table 3.1, 
arrows 1-4) may only occur when the policy-preference of at least one state shifts in the 
prominently in many Rational Choice analyses of institutions refers to the effect of institutions on the 
availability and costliness of the different alternatives that actors may choose from, and as such to the 
effect on their policy-preferences. Because both the enabling/constraining and constituting effects of institutions 
may result in a change in policy-preferences and thus in the establishment of a common interest (see 
Section 3.3.3), both effects are included in the theoretical and empirical parts of this thesis . 
92 In fact, when actors define their values in relative terms - for instance both states want to become the 
most powerful or most wealthy nation in the system - and the desired asset is scarce, the convergence of 
ultimate values may promote contention and conflict rather than co-operation (scarcity and a focus on 
relative gains are the two typical ingredients of zero-sum games). Moreover, even if states' values were the 
same their causal beliefs would still have to be similar for their policy-preferences to converge, and thus 
for a common interest to be established. 
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direction of the policy-preference of the other.9' The view on national preferences that 
will be developed in this chapter suggests two broad processes by which such a change 
in national preferences may come about. 
In contrast to approaches that are based on a unitary actor assumption, the 
national preference in this chapter will be considered as the outcome of a political 
struggle between the pivotal domestic actors trying to further their (conflicting) views 
on policy making. This implies that the content of the national preference is 
dependent on the way pivotal domestic actors perceive and analyse situations. 
However, as Gourevitch has noted: 'a statement of preferences by itself does not tell us 
how they are aggregated into an outcome' (Gourevitch, 2002: 311). Logically, a 
change in the national preference can thus either be the result of a change in the 
individual preferences of dominant actors (psychological change) on the one hand, or of a 
change in the configuration (composition and underlying power relations) of the set of 
actors whose preferences dominate the national preference, the ultimate decision unit 
{political change), on the other (cf. Princen, 2002: 62).94 
In this section, I will introduce three psychological mechanisms that may lead 
to national preference change through belief change on the part of the individual 
members of the ultimate decision-making unit.95 In addition, one political mechanism 
of national preference change will be introduced. Finally, it will be argued that 
expectations concerning the importance of each of these mechanisms will differ 
according to the theoretical view on the definition and formation of preferences that is 
adopted. Moreover, it will be shown that - as a result — expectations concerning the 
probability of a common interest being established, will also differ according to the 
theory of preferences adopted. 
91
 In order not to overcomplicate my argument, in this section it is assumed that only two states are 
involved in the establishment of co-operation and that the preferences of one of the states remains stable 
whilst that of the other changes. Naturally, these assumptions may not be very realistic. The set of actors 
needed to establish co-operation (the minimal contributing set, see Section 4.2.2) may be larger than two, 
and certain international events may cause the preferences of several actors to change at the same time 
(although this does not necessarily need to be a change towards the same preferences, see Section 3 5 1) 
However, while enlarged membership of the minimal contributing set and simultaneous changes in the 
states' preferences would complicate the theotetical and empitical analysis of the situation considerably -
and may in fact reduce the chances for a common interest to occur - the psychological, and political 
processes of change that may lead to a common interest (see Section 3 31 and 3 3.2) would not diverge 
from those put forward in this section 
94
 From now on, the term ultimate deitswn unit will be used to refer to this the set of actors whose 
preferences dominate the national preference. Hermann and Hermann define the term ultimate decision unit 
as the set of actors that hold 'the authority to make a decision that cannot be readily reversed' (Hermann 
and Hermann, 1989· 362). 
" These mechanisms are labelled psychological because they involve individual cognitive belief change. 
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3.3.1 Psychological Mechanisms of National Preference Change 
A common interest can be established through a change in the national preference 
caused by a change in the decision makers' policy-preferences. As indicated before, 
such an individual preference change will only lead to a change in the national 
preference if it is experienced by decision makers who are members of the UDU (Levy, 
1994: 290; Princen, 2002: 62). Furthermore, for a common interest to result from 
changes in the dominant decision makers' policy preferences, these would of course 
have to shift towards the national preference of the (future) partner state (convergence). 
A change in an individual's policy-preferences can be the result of one of three 
different psychological processes. Firstly, a change in an actor's policy-preferences can 
be the result of a change in its causal beliefs. In other words, when the actor's ideas 
concerning the relationship between cause and effect change, this changes the policy-
alternative that the actor perceives to be the most adequate means (policy) to achieve 
its ends (values).96 Secondly, an actor may experience a change in its values.97 Provided 
that the actor's causal beliefs remain unchanged, such value change can also lead to a 
change in the actor's policy-preferences and, as such, can give rise to the establishment 
of a common interest (Keohane and Nye, 1987: 749; Levy, 1994: 286; Princen, 2002: 
65-6).98 Finally, an individual's policy-preferences can change when a change takes 
place in the set of available alternatives (Princen, 2002: 62-5)." 
Causal belief change can occur to various degrees.100 Firstly, a process called 
lateral expansion can occur. This means that environmental phenomena which were 
previously excluded from the decision maker's theory on how the world works, will 
now be included (Steinbruner, 1974: 42). For instance, an actor can come to believe 
that, in addition to stimulating monetary growth, implementing a corporatist political 
system will lead to economic development. Secondly, an actor can come to believe that 
its existing causal inferences are fundamentally wrong and adopt a diametrically 
'
x
' This process occurs when a transformation from & fundamental divergence to an occasional lommon interest, or 
from a causal divergence to a fundamental common interest takes place (see Table 3.1, arrows 1 & 4). 
97
 Most scholars who study value change (or complex learning as it is sometimes referred to) only focus on 
the internalisation of^new principled beliefs (norms) (Alderson, 2001. 417, Checkel, 1998. 344, 2001: 561, 
Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 914, Keohane and Nye, 1987. 749, Levy, 1994. 286) However, as stated 
before, in this thesis value change will not be restricted to a change in normative ideas but also include 
changes in subjective interests. 
9K
 Policy-preference change due to value change occurs in case of a transformation from a fundamental 
divergence to a fundamental common interest and from a divergence of policy-preferences to a occasional common 
interest (see Table 3.1, arrows 2 & 3). 
99
 As will be discussed below, many scholars do not regard this process as a process of genuine preference 
change. 
1
"
(,
 Learning and persuasion may also result in what has been called diagnostic learning; a change in an 
actor's beliefs about the meaning of situations, events, or the preferences, intentions, or relative 
capabilities of others (Levy, 1994 285) This, however, will not lead to a change in policy-preferences 
unless combined with lateral expansion, a form of causal belief change (see below). 
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opposed causal belief. For instance, the actor may have advocated stimulating 
monetary growth in the state's quest for economic growth in the past. However, it can 
come to believe that a decrease rather than an increase in monetary growth will lead to 
economic development. Thirdly, an actor can maintain its preference for a certain 
policy, but become convinced that an increase or reduction in the proportion of the 
measure is needed to achieve the desired effect. For instance, instead of advocating a 
raise in liquidity by 2%, it now favours a rise by 10%.'01 
As may be derived from the above-mentioned definition of values, value 
change can refer both to a change in an actor's subjective interests (the actor no longer 
desires to be the most wealthy man in Europe, but rather the most powerful one), and 
a change of principled beliefs (the actor no longer strives for world peace, but rather for 
the elimination of starvation). However, value change can also involve a transition 
from a more interest-based utility function to a utility function defined largely in 
terms of principled beliefs (or vice versa). For example, an actor can come to believe 
that its original goal of becoming the wealthiest man in Europe is futile, irresponsible 
or shallow and instead dedicate its future efforts to the protection of the natural 
environment. 
Finally, external circumstances or inducements created by other actors can 
change an actor's set of available alternatives. Through the change in the actor's 
external environment or the exertion of influence by third parties, some previously 
unavailable policy alternatives can become available, while others that were available 
no longer are. Moreover, the costs and/or benefits of the available alternatives can 
change.1"2 In the subsequent section, I will distinguish three psychological 
mechanisms that may induce these different processes of policy-preference change and 
therefore may help to establish a common interest. 
3.3.2 The Convergence of National Preferences through Learning and Persuasion 
Learning and persuasion are two psychological mechanisms that may lead to a 'change 
of beliefs at the individual cognitive level' (Levy, 1994: 287), and as such they may 
induce policy-preference change through either causal belief change or value change.,"" In 
this section, these psychological processes will be specified and juxtaposed by relating 
"" In all of these cases, it is of course possible that the actor's expectations do not agree with reality, that 
objet lively speaking they are false 
l
"
2
 It is important to note that - in contrast to causal belief change and value change - what is meant 
under the heading 'change in the set of available alternatives' is an objective change The sub|ective 
perception of the availability of policy-alternatives is categorised under the heading of causal belief 
change, more particular under the heading of lateral expansion 
"
H
 Although it is possible (and maybe even likely) that - in practice - an actor's values, causal beliefs and 
its set of available alternatives change simultaneously, in this and the subsequent sections it will be 
assumed for reasons of clarity that only one of these co-determinants of a policy-preference will change at a 
time 
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them to the following four dichotomies: individual versus social; convergence versus 
divergence; consciousness versus unconsciousness; intended versus unintended.10,4 
Moreover, it will be argued that learning and persuasion relate differently to the 
processes of causal belief change and value change. 
In general, learning may be defined as 'a change of beliefs (or the degree of 
confidence in one's beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a 
result of the observation and interpretation of experience' (Levy, 1994: 283). This 
definition implies that events in the decision maker's external environment may bring 
about a learning process. This learning may result in a cognitive belief change that 
may make the establishment of a common interest between states possible. In contrast, 
persuasion refers to a situation in which A leads Β to believe something which the latter 
would not otherwise have believed (cf. Burnell and Reeve, 1984: 409). Thus in the 
case of persuasion, the critical inducement for cognitive belief change arises not from 
changes in the actor's external environment but from arguments and views put forward 
by another actor. 
In the psychological literature, the process of persuasion is often analysed in 
terms of the characteristics of the sender, the message and the receiver (Fiske and 
Taylor, 1991: 467, 479; Meadow, 1980: 99). This categorisation may also be used to 
clarify the distinction between the processes of persuasion and learning, for in contrast 
to persuasion, cognitive belief change caused by learning, crucially, is not dependent 
on the existence of a sender that has targeted the learning individual (receiver) with a 
message. Instead, learning is induced by perception of the world 'out-there' 
(Finnemore, 1996: 12; Keohane and Nye, 1987: 749; Levy, 1994: 292) and can either 
be spurred on by the individual's own realisation that the world has changed and its 
beliefs need updating or by its acknowledgment that its existing beliefs were 
inadequate (a process which does not necessarily require an actual change in the 
environment). Cognitive belief change implied in learning is thus not executed 
through or during interaction between actors. Learning is an individual process 
whereby the receiver can be characterised as an interpreter rather than a participant.105 
Persuasion on the other hand is a social process. Belief change induced by persuasion it 
is not achieved individually but occurs through and during social interaction between 
the sender and receiver (Alderson, 2001: 423; Checkel, 1998: 344; 2001: 561; Burnell 
and Reeve, 1984: 396). It is during this interaction that the sender actively tries to 
make the beliefs of the receiver concur with its own, and the receiver picks up its new 
"
, 1
 Distinguishing between these different mechanisms is necessary because different expectations 
concerning their saliency in the national preference formation process may be derived from different 
approaches (see Section 3.3.3). To be able to test these different approaches, the differences between the 
mechanisms should thus be made measurable (see Section 4.5.4). 
I 0 ,
 In essence, the term learning as defined here is similar to the idea of Bayesian updating (see Section 
2 2.6). 
71 
Mapping the Road to Maastricht 
beliefs (Johnston, 2001: 488-9).""' Rather than an observer, the receiver is a 
participant in the social interaction that is persuasion. 
This difference between learning and persuasion has important implications 
with regards to the central topic of this study, for it is precisely because of its social 
character that the process of persuasion contains a far greater potential for inducing a 
convergence in national policy preferences and thus the establishment of a common 
interest, than an individual process like learning. More precisely, provided that the 
sender and receiver involved in the persuasion process are the prospective partners in 
co-operation, persuasion can lead to a convergence in national preferences, while 
(under the assumption of subjectivity made in this thesis) learning need not do so.'07 
Learning 
Individual 
Non convergence inducing'"8 
No/Unconscious Sender 
Conscious receiver 
No Sender 
Causal belief change 
Persuasion 
Social 
Convergence inducing 
Purposeful sender 
(Un)Conscious receiver 
Sender does not hold out threats and promises 
with respect to the receiver's future position 
Causal belief AND Value change 
Table 3.2: Five dimensions of Learning and Persuasion 
The third dimension that may shed light on the precise difference between the 
processes of learning and persuasion is the issue of consciousness and intent. Despite 
the fact that learning may occur in both a conscious and unconscious fashion (Fiske 
and Taylor, 1991: 266-77), in this thesis, the focus will lie exclusively on conscious 
forms of learning. This choice was made because the unconscious forms of learning 
106
 In addition to the term persuasion, social constructivists have also used the term teaching to refer this 
process while the terms arguing and deliberation are often used to refer to the situation in which actors try 
to persuade or convince one another, processes in which senders are receivers and vice versa (Checkel, 
1998 332, 341; Finnemore, 1996, Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998· 914-5, Keck and Sikkink, 1998, Risse, 
2000). 
107
 In the literature, one special form ol learning is distinguished that does have the inherent potential to 
lead to a convergence in policy-preferences: emulation (or imitation) Emulation refers to the situation in 
which an individual becomes aware of the fact that the policies pursued by others have led to a greater 
success-rate in attaining a state-of-affairs that - seeing its values - is more desirable than the status quo 
that its own policies have brought about, and attempts to copy these policies (cf Goldsmith, 2000; 
McNamara, 1998: 152-8). So, in the case of emulation — as in the case of learning — no social interaction 
between the receiver and its role model occurs. Emulation is caused by observation, not interaction or 
participation. As such, emulation is a form of learning, not persuasion Notwithstanding this fact -
provided that the role model whose policies the actor is adopting is one of its prospected co-operation 
partners — this special form of learning has a significantly greater potential for inducing convergence than 
other forms of learning (cf Checkel, 1998 344; Haverland, 1999 25) 
"'
B
 Emulation would be convergence inducing. 
72 
Common Interest: Power and Cognition 
focussed on by some psychologists either involve the acquirement of very basic human 
skills or of skills typically used to cope with routine tasks (Fiske and Taylor, 1991: 
271-77; Rosati, 2000: 51; Steinbruner, 1974). Since political problems by definition 
involve problems for which no rule or routine exists, these unconscious forms of 
learning are irrelevant to the issues to be studied in this thesis.109 As in the case of 
learning, persuasion will also be used to refer to a conscious act on the part of (at least) 
the sender. However, the power of persuasion also has an active, a more intentional 
connotation. During the persuasion process, the sender actively and deliberately seeks 
to change the receiver's beliefs in such a way that the latter's ideas will come to 
converge with his own. In other words, the sender engages in the act of persuasion 
with the explicit aim of convincing the receiver of the value of its own ideas. 
This connotation of intentionality is not — by definition — present in the 
concept of learning. Learning implies that, after the process has been completed, the 
actor itself perceives its newly acquired ideas to be more accurate than those it 
previously held and to help it realise its ultimate values in a (subjectively) more 
effective or efficient manner (Alderson, 2001: 424; Etheredge, 1981: 77; Haverland, 
1999: 25)."° Moreover, it may be assumed that under certain circumstances actors will 
actively strive to realise their ultimate values. However, this does not necessarily imply 
that actors will also actively seek new information and consciously evaluate their 
actions and their consequences to reap the maximum benefit from their policy choices. 
Even though from a rational perspective such behaviour would seem instrumental to 
the realisation of their values, psychological research has provided ample evidence that 
actors may exhibit many characteristics — among which the strength of existing beliefs 
109
 In addition, unconscious learning raises methodological problems For the same reason, the 
psychological process of socialisation has been omitted from the analysis In terms of the various 
dimensions I have distinguished above, socialisation may be characterised as a social process in which both 
the sender and receiver may be unconscious of the message being sent and received, and are at least not 
purposely seeking to change ideas or have its ideas changed Due to its possible unconscious (and 
unintended) character as well as the fact that socialisation has been said to occur mainly in pre-adult years 
and is a long-term process, proving socialisation would require a different research-design than a study of 
learning and persuasion, and thus from the one used in this thesis (see Chapter 4) 
110
 However, as indicated, beliefs acquired through a learning-process will thus not necessarily also 
provide an 'objectively' more accurate reflection of the outside world, or help the actor to get closer to the 
realisation of its goals (Keohane and Nye, 1987: 749-50; Levy, 1994 292). It is simply assumed that 
learning induces the actor to be convinced of the increased accuracy of its beliefs regardless of the truth. 
Levy has rightly argued that making the assumption that learning would objectively result in more 
accurate beliefs would require developing a standard by which we can identify and measure the accuracy 
of learning. However even with hindsight, it is very hard to categorise beliefs on foreign policy making as 
accurate (Levy, 1994 292) For this reason, 'to insist on an accuracy criterion would either result in 
research that is less rigorous, more subjective, and more dependent on the analytical and normative biases 
of the analyst or it would paralyze analysis because of the lack of measurement standards' (Levy, 1994 
293) 
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(see Section 3.5.1) — that inhibit such readiness for cognitive belief change."1 In short, 
the processes of learning and persuasion thus differ significantly, both in the level of 
individuality by which they are characterised, and in the presumed purposefulness on 
the part of the actors involved (see Table 3.2). 
Finally, causal belief change can be the result of a process of learning as well as 
of persuasion. An actor may either pick up a significant change in the external 
environment, which induces it to change its views on how the social or material world 
works, or it may come to the realisation that the policies it had been pursuing will not 
lead to the desired effect (learning), and it may have changed its policy-preferences 
accordingly. Additionally, causal belief change can be the result of having been the 
target of persuasion. During this process the receiver may have become convinced of 
the value of the sender's vision on how the world works."2 
Unlike causal belief change, value change — that is to say a change in the ideas 
that specify criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and costly from beneficial -
cannot, by definition, result from learning (Levy, 1994: 286). Learning - as defined 
here — involves an instrumental process by which actors come to perceive their newly 
acquired beliefs as serving their goals better (more adequately, effectively or efficiently) 
than their old beliefs did. Learning implies a logic of consequence. Values, however, 
are the goals (consequences) the actor wants to realise, and — as such - are themselves 
not instrumental in achieving anything. Moreover, one value cannot be assumed to be 
better than another in the sense of being more accurate, effective or efficient, for values are 
the very standards by which we can judge if things done more accurately, effectively, 
and efficiently are better. The instrumental drive implicit in the term 'learning' is not 
present with regard to values. Value change can be achieved through a persuasion 
process, for from the receiver's perspective this form of social learning does not 
necessarily have the instrumental connotation implied in learning (see Section 2.4.6, 
Checkel, 1998: 344; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 896-8). 
3.3.3 The Dead-end Road of Distinguishing Genuine Preferences 
Both learning and persuasion, as I use the terms, involve an internalisation of new 
beliefs. This means that the adoption of new ideas through learning and persuasion is 
not presumed to be the result of the exertion of pressure on the actor, nor does the 
actor, who has learned or been persuaded, subsequently need 'to be told what to do or 
" ' Moreover, assuming actors purposely to seek for more adequate beliefs implies that one would assume 
actors to be utility-maximising individuals 
"- Whereas some authors perceive persuasion and socialisation to 'change the utility functions of other 
players to reflect some new normative commitment' (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998 914, my italics, cf 
Alderson, 2001: 417, 424), others define these as social processes that also involve 'changing attitudes 
about cause and φα1 (Checkel, 2001: 562, my italics, cf. Checkel, 1998 344, Haas, 1992. 2-7, Johnston, 
2001. 496, Verdun, 1998^ 183-5) As indicated above, I subscribe to the latter view 
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refrain from doing and no sanctions need to be applied to ensure compliance' 
(Alderson, 2001: 418; cf. Checkel, 2001: 562; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 904; 
Johnston, 2001: 496; Levy, 1994: 282; Payne, 2001: 10-1). 
Many authors reserve the concept preference exclusively for those preferences 
that result from such genuine tnternahsation of new ideas. In other words, these authors 
do not consider a policy preference that has resulted from the exertion of relational 
power — Ά has power over ß to the extent that he can get Β to do something that ß 
would not otherwise do' (Dahl, 1957: 202-203) — to be a. genuine preference (Alderson, 
2001: 418; Checkel, 2001: 562; Hug, 2003: 45; Payne, 2001: 10-1; Princen, 2002: 
61-6). Their argument for excluding this type of preference from their analyses, and 
the untenability of this argument, may best be illustrated by giving an example. 
Consider the struggle of a couple that wants to go on a second honeymoon, 
but see themselves faced with a conflict of interest. Whereas the wife envisions a week 
of energising strolls in the country, her husband prefers spending a few days relaxing 
on the beach. Now, what if the wife were to make it known to her husband that if her 
spouse persisted in his refusal to go to the country, she would file for divorce.-' And 
what if, as a result, the husband gave in? Authors who take the position that a change 
in policy preferences resulting from the exertion of relational power is not a genuine 
change in preferences argue that the wife's ultimatum did not change her husband's 
preferences. For, if the man 'could act freely', he 'would not comply' (Payne, 2001: 41; 
cf. Checkel, 2001: 562; Hug, 2003: 45-6). In my eyes, however, this position is 
untenable. Although the wife attached consequences to some of the man's options by 
uttering her threat, the man was still offered a choice between two - albeit new -
alternatives (namely honeymooning in the country whilst remaining married, or 
relaxing at the sea-side as a bachelor). The wife's restriction of her husband's set of 
available alternatives does not imply that he was not offered a choice, or rendered him 
incapable of performing the act of choosing (Lieshout, 1995: 31-2). Therefore, the man 
would still be capable of having a preference, and he free to choose (see Section 3.2). 
Moreover, the genuine preference argument does not acknowledge that the 
exertion of relational power is not the only manner in which the choices of the man in 
the example can be constrained (in which a change in the man's set of available 
alternatives can be achieved). An actor's options will always be constrained by the laws 
of nature. Building on the example of the honeymoon; maybe the husband — a fervent 
student of the Classical era - would have liked to spend his honeymoon in Athens at 
the time of Plato or Socrates. However, the physical inability of men to travel through 
time would exclude this option from his set of available alternatives. Moreover, certain 
characteristics of the husband's external environment other than the demands of his 
wife may severely constrain his choice. For instance, maybe the man would have liked 
to vacation on a tropical island, but did not have the financial means to realise this 
dream; or maybe he would have liked to travel to Afghanistan, but — given the 
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unstable political situation in that part of the world — he chose a sunny, secure beach 
holiday over this more adventurous and culturally more interesting trip. In none of 
these situations is anyone exerting relational power over the man; still his options are 
severely limited by the social or material characteristics of the external environment. 
Moreover, the man's choices are as conditioned as they were as if his wife threatened 
divorce. For instance, he could still opt to go to the tropical island, but only by 
running the risk of bankruptcy. The exclusion from the analysis of all those preferences 
that are formed under the constraints imposed by exertion of relational power seems 
therefore rather arbitrary. All the more so if one realises that there are other ways of 
constraining an actor's choices by exerting another kind of power than relational 
power. In addition to the exertion of relational power, an actor's set of available 
alternatives can also be changed or limited by the exertion of structural power: the 
capacity to 'change the institutions' and 'the rules of the game' (Krasner, 1985:14-
5)." 3 By exerting structural power, actors may change the characteristics of the 
external environment and in this manner constrain another actor's choices. 
Paradoxically, preferences formed under such conditions are in the literature generally 
interpreted as genuine preferences. A final argument that renders the genuine 
preference thesis untenable is that it can be argued that persuasion is a form of 
relational power (Burnell and Reeve, 1984; Stone, 2002: Chapter 13). In fact, the 
definition of persuasion used in this chapter is modelled after Dahl's definition of 
relational power (Burnell and Reeve, 1984: 395).1H However, as has been indicated in 
the previous section, preference change due to processes of persuasion is usually 
categorised under the heading of true preference change by the proponents of the 
genuine preference thesis (Checkel, 2001: 558-60; Risse, 2000: 16-7). 
In conclusion, when followed through to its logical end, it is clear that the 
genuine preference thesis is untenable, for it would ultimately imply that the formation of 
genuine preferences is a process that is completely detached from the actor's external 
environment or social interactions. Even if this were possible,"5 it would mean that 
the concept of genuine preference could only apply to pipe dreams like wanting to 
honeymoon in ancient Athens (Connolly, 1972: 465). Clearly, such pipe dreams are 
hardly relevant for an analysis of interactions in the international political arena. 
1
 ' ' Strange describes structural power as 'the power to shape and determine the structures of the global 
political economy within which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and 
(not least) their sciences and other professional people have to operate' (Strange, 1988: 24-5) 
1 1 4
 According to Dahl's definition of relational power A has power to the extent that he gets Β to do 
something he would not otherwise have done (Burnell and Reeve, 1984. ^95). 
"
,
 Druckman and Lupia have convincingly argued that every preference is based on information about the 
actor's external environment, even that of a newborn baby (Druckman and Lupia, 2000' 4-6) Moreover, 
every analysis of preference formation that I have encountered — be it of the Rational Choice or the Social 
Constructivist kind - has acknowledged that an actor's preferences are co-determined by information 
about, or through interaction with, the outside world. 
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So, rather than engaging in a discussion of what (changes in) genuine preferences 
are, and (arbitrarily) excluding some mechanisms of preference change from the 
analysis, a more scientifically productive strategy is simply to distinguish between the 
different processes by which a change in an individual's policy preferences can come 
about: through learning, persuasion or the exertion of relational power (which I will 
henceforth refer to as imposition-of-will). Empirical research may then allow for an 
assessment of the relevance of the different processes of change in the international 
political arena (cf. Frieden, 1991: 48)."6 
3-3-4 Convergence of National Preferences through the lmposition-of-will 
As implied earlier, a change in an actor's policy preferences can be caused by a change 
in its set of available alternatives which, in turn, may be caused by changes in the 
external environment (for instance through the exertion of structural power, or a 
relative autonomous development like technical progress). These changes may cause a 
change in an actor's policy preferences through a learning process. However, as was 
argued in the previous section, the set of alternatives available to an actor can also be 
changed by the exertion of relational power."7 Unlike the exertion of structural power, 
an attempt on the part of a sender to impose its will on a receiver is a strategy that is 
not directed at changing the receiver's external environment, but directly at the 
receiver itself. 
Whether or not an attempt at imposition-of-will will be successful is partially 
dependent on the intensity with which the preferences about the future state of the 
world are held in relation to the amount of power being exerted. The more intense the 
man's preference to go to the seaside, the more power will have to be exerted to induce 
the man to go along with his wife's preferences. Moreover, the honeymoon example 
also indicates that credibility is a vital element in any attempt to impose one's will. 
The extent to which the receiver's preferences will change depends on the receiver's 
perception how likely it is that the sender will actually be able and willing to carry out 
its threats (Lieshout and Westerheijden, 1994: 142-3; Lieshout, 1995: 58). 
116
 Even if the reader is nor convinced by my argument, this strategy is may still serve my research efforts, 
for, since a theoretical and empirical distinction between the processes of learning, persuasion, and the 
imposition-of-will will be made, the reader will still be able to juxtapose the effects of genuine belief 
change (induced by learning or persuasion) and the changes resulting from the exertion of relational 
power. 
117
 As Strange argues, neither the exertion of structural power, nor the exertion of relational power is by 
definition material (Strange, 1988. 26). In fact it is likely that in diplomatic circles (the threat of) 
exerting power by non-material means - like the distribution of social rewards like 'status, a sense of 
belonging' or of social punishments like 'shaming, shunning, exclusion, and demeaning' (Johnston, 2001. 
499; Schimmelfennig, 2001: 64-5) - is as common as the use of material inducements (or the threat 
thereof). 
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This short description of the third psychological mechanism of preference 
change demonstrates that as in the case of persuasion - a process that is seen by some 
to be a mild form of relational power (Burnell and Reeve, 1984: 393-4) - the 
imposition-of-will is realised during and through interaction between the sender and 
receiver. Therefore, and in the same way as with persuasion, the exertion of relational 
power is a social process, which implies that the imposition-of-will is likely to be more 
conducive to the convergence of the sender's and receiver's preferences, that is to say 
the establishment of a common interest, than learning (see Table 3.3). However, it is 
important to note that, while imposition-of-will is likely to induce convergence of 
preferences, its effects will be far less structural than those of the other psychological 
mechanisms of preference change. The reason for this is that, whereas the effects of 
learning and persuasion will last even after the actual processes of learning and 
persuasion have ended, the effects of the imposition-of-will strategy are limited to the 
duration of the interaction between the sender and receiver. As soon as the exertion of 
power comes to an end, the receiver's preferences will change again and any 
convergence of preference that may have been reached will evaporate. Accordingly we 
can expect that any common interest induced by imposition-of-will will be far less 
stable than that resulting from learning or persuasion. 
Learning 
Individual 
Non convergence inducing 
No/Unconscious Sender 
Conscious receiver 
N o Sender 
Causal belief change 
Persuasion 
Social 
Convergence inducing 
Purposeful sender 
(Un)conscious receiver 
Sender does not hold out 
threats and promises with 
respect to the receiver's future 
position 
Causal belief and 
Value change 
lmposition-of-Will 
Social 
Convergence inducing 
Purposeful sender 
Conscious receiver 
Sender does holds out threats 
and promises with respect to 
the receiver's future position 
Causal belief change 
Table 3-3: Five Dimensions of Learning, Persuasion, and the Imposicion-of-Will 
As for the issue of consciousness and intentionality, the concept of imposition-of-will 
may be contrasted with both persuasion and the exertion of structural power. In the 
case of exertion of relational power, unlike structural power, the sender's attempts to 
influence the receiver are always consciously made. In fact, its actions may be more 
adequately described as deliberate. For, as in the case of persuasion, influence exerted 
through imposition-of-will is explicitly intended to make the receiver act in 
accordance with the sender's wishes. However, in contrast to persuasion - when the 
receiver may be unaware of an attempt (even an successful attempt) to change its mind 
(Fiske and Taylor, 1991: 477, 501) — a receiver cannot remain oblivious to an attempt 
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made by the sender to impose its will if this attempt is to be successful. This is because 
if the receiver remains unaware of the sender's inducements or threats, then, in the 
receiver's mind, these inducements and threats are nonexistent and no motivation to 
change would exist. What is more, the receiver will not just be conscious of the power 
that is being exerted, but will be also give a calculated reaction to the actions of the 
sender. When faced with the sender's inducements, the receiver will contemplate the 
consequences of refusal to comply and the credibility of the sender's threats (see Table 
3.3). 
In my view, the association of the idea of'intent' with the concept of 
imposition-of-will results from the feature of the exertion of relational power that 
typically distinguishes the process of imposition-of-will from that of persuasion; 
namely, the fact that in case of the exertion of relational power, the sender 'deliberately 
associates himself with (or at least is implicated in) the results for Β [the receiver] of 
adopting or rejecting A's [the sender] proposals' (Burnell and Reeve 1984: 401). " 8 In 
other words, while in both cases (persuasion and imposition-of-will) the sender will 
point out the negative (or positive) consequences of the alternative that it feels is 
undesirable (or desirable), in the case of persuasion, the sender does not threaten to 
impose such adverse effects personally, nor does it claim to have control over the 
consequences of the receiver's actions (Burnell and Reeve 1984: 401, cf. Bueno de 
Mesquita 2000: 243; Lieshout 1995: 54-5; Johnston 2001: 490). It is only in the case 
of imposition-of-will that the very core of the sender's message is that it is able and 
willing to bring about the positive or negative scenarios of the future associated with 
the choices it deems (un)desirable (as indicated in the honeymoon example above, the 
wife can and will file for divorce if her husband drives off to the sea-side on their 
anniversary). " 9 Therefore, in the case of imposition-of-will the sender explicitly 
associates itself with the position in which the receiver will find itself in the future. 
1 1 8
 This does not mean that the sender is objectively 'in the position to bring about whatever is the 
substance of the inducement, be it a "carrot" or a "stick"' (Burnell and Reeve, 1984. 401) However, it 
does mean in case of an imposition-of-will that the sender holds out this prospect Moreover, for an 
attempt at imposition-of-will to succeed, this prospect will have to be credible. 
1 1 9
 Burnell and Reeve distinguish yet another difference between persuasion and the imposition-of-will. In 
their view, in contrast to persuasion, the exertion of relational power 'necessarily engages the interests of 
at least one of the parties' (Burnell and Reeve, 1984. 401). In other words, if my friend tries to talk me 
into quitting smoking, this may rightly be called 'persuasion' because — amongst others - my friends 
interests are not staked on whether I smoke or not However, such an 'objective' definition of my friend's 
preferences does not agree with the 'subjective' view taken in this chapter; the friend may feel some of his 
subjective interests being jeopardized by my smoking (for instance the subjective interest he has in 
prolonging our friendship by prolonging my life) 
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3-3.5 A Political Mechanism of National Preference Change: Turnover 
As previously indicated, the approach to the formation of national preferences 
introduced in this chapter suggests a second process that can result in national 
preference change. After all, national preference change may not only be the result of a 
change in the individual preferences of influential decision makers but also from 
turnover; a change in, or of the ultimate decision unit (UDU), the set of actors whose 
preferences dominate the national preference formation process (Levy, 1994: 299)-
When such a political change occurs and the preferences of the newly constituted or 
empowered members of the UDU differ from those of their predecessors, turnover will 
result in national preference change (Levy, 1994: 289)-
Turnover may be the result of two different kinds of political changes: a 
change in the domestic political system or of a change of the political system (Keohane 
and Nye, 1987: 749). Changes in the domestic political system are the result of the 
every-day functioning of the political system. Elections, for instance, may result in a 
change of leadership or in the inclusion of new parties in the ruling coalition (Levy, 
1994: 299). Moreover, change in the political system may result from the every-day 
'pushing and hauling' of political actors. By successfully by-passing the rules of the 
system, decision makers may colonise an issue, broaden the UDU, try and influence 
the status of the members of the UDU, or prevent other decision makers from exerting 
influence on the national preference (Hoyt, 1997: 775-81; Princen, 2002: 67). These 
changes may result in the introduction or empowerment of domestic actors with 
different preferences, and thereby change the content of the national preference. In 
contrast, a change of the political system refers to transformations in the mechanisms 
by which domestic preferences are aggregated to form the national preference. 
Examples of these are regime changes like a change from dictatorship to democracy, 
the introduction of more centralisation or decentralisation into the decision-making 
system, or structural changes in the rules governing the division of labour within the 
government. Moreover, in contrast to changes in the system, changes of the system 
have an institutional dimension. 
Change in the political system can however result in change of the political 
system. For instance, when after his Socialist Party had lost the 1986 parliamentary 
elections, French President Mitterrand decided to remain in office, a strategic move in 
the everyday 'pushing and hauling' between him and the Gaullist party leader Chirac, 
he was not simply bending the rules of the existing political system but actually 
establishing a new political precedent: co-habitation}2" 
'"" The French constitution of 1958 does not explicitly oblige the President to resign from office when his 
party loses the majority in the National Assembly Already during the Presidency of De Gaulle, there 
were discussions about the possibility that the President and the Majority in the Parliament would belong 
to a different political party. However, Mitterrand was the first actually to remain President and appoint a 
Prime Minister of a rivalling party. 
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3.3-6 Theories on National Preferences and the Mechanisms of Change 
Reviewing the different mechanisms of national preference change - learning, 
persuasion, imposition-of-will, and turnover — raises the question which of these 
mechanisms can be expected to play a role in the establishment of a common interest 
amongst nation-states. As may be derived from Chapter 2, the different approaches to 
national preferences offer fundamentally different answers to this question (Checkel, 
2001: 560). Consequently, they may also offer significantly divergent answers to the 
question of what the chances are for an interstate common interest to be established 
where none was present before. 
The Rational Choice model introduced by Andrew Moravcsik, for instance, 
assumes the substance of actors' values to be given, stable, and universal (see Section 
2.2.6). This means that the model can only cope with changes in policy preferences 
and is unable to explain policy preference changes which are the result of value change 
(see Table 3-4). Furthermore, Liberal Intergovernmentalism perceives policy preference 
change to be induced by an objective learning process stimulated by changes in the 
actor's material external environment. In this view, the difference between learning 
and persuasion — a form of social learning — is not acknowledged.121 Moreover, as was 
argued in Chapter 2, it may be concluded that Liberal Intergovernmentalists expect 
actors - in their quest for maximisation of their values — to be active in their search for 
new and better information with which to improve their understanding of how the 
world works (Hug, 2003: 44; Steinbruner, 1974: 35-6, see Section 2.2.6). An 
approach like Liberal Intergovernmentalism will expect learning processes — and 
therefore policy preference change - to be relatively easy and to occur relatively 
frequently (see Section 2.2.6). In addition, due to its objective character, the prospect 
for learning to result in a convergence of national preferences is expected to be good. 
Finally, as was argued in Chapter 2, Moravcsik does not acknowledge preference 
change induced by the imposition-of-will to be a genuine preference change (Moravcsik, 
1997: 519, see Section 2.2.1 & 2.2.3). Therefore, in the Liberal Intergovernmentalist 
view, this mechanism will not be expected to play a role in the establishment of 
interstate common interests (see Table 3.4). 
The primary concern of Modernist Social Constructivist scholars, by contrast, 
is to explain (changes in) values. This, as well as the Social Constructivists' focus on 
the inter-subjective nature of identities and preferences, points to persuasion rather 
than learning as the pivotal mechanism of national preference change. Moreover, 
Modernist Social Constructivists generally perceive cognitive belief change to be 
121
 This neglect may be the logical result of the fact that Rational Choice approaches focus on changes in 
policy-preferences, a process that may be the result of both learning and persuasion. The process that can 
only be induced by persuasion, value change, lies beyond the scope of Rational Choice theories. For these 
approaches, the difference between learning and persuasion is thus less relevant than for Social 
Constructivists 
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unproblematic. So, while values are assumed to be more stable than policy preferences, 
in the case of a critical juncture or the existence of an advocate of change, attempts at 
persuasion are deemed likely to be successful (cf. Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 914-5; 
Payne, 2001: 38-9; Risse, 2002: 620).'22 
Moreover, their focus on the inter-subjective nature of identities, norms and 
beliefs, as well as the social character of persuasion leads Social Constructivists to 
expect that preference change will lead to a shift towards convergence, and thus 
towards the establishment of a common interest. So, while Constructivism does not 
expect preferences to change as frequently as Liberal Intergovernmentalism does, when 
change occurs Social Constructivists do expect this to lead to a convergence of 
preferences. Finally, it may be concluded that, since Modernist Social Constructivists 
generally do not consider preference change induced by the exertion of relational 
power to constitute genuine preference change (Checkel, 2001: 558-60; Risse, 2000: 16-
7), imposition-of-will is not acknowledged as a mechanism of national preference 
change. 
' —-—-_____^ Theory 
Aspect •—--____ 
Explanandum 
Psychological Mechanism of 
National Preference Change 
Relative Easiness of 
Individual Policy-Preference 
Change 
Political Mechanism of 
National Preference Change 
Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism 
Policy-Preference change 
Learning 
Relatively Easy 
Turnover (in principle) 
Modernist Social 
Constructivism 
Value-change 
Persuasion 
Moderately Easy 
None 
Table 3.4: Expectations concerning National Preference Change and Convergence 
As for turnover, unitary actor models - like the identity approach introduced 
by Risse et al — are not capable of distinguishing intra-state differences in (policy) 
preferences and thus do not acknowledge this political mechanism as a cause of 
preference change.121 In contrast, this mechanism may - in principle - be 
distinguished within the pluralist approach on national preference formation that 
Moravcsik has adopted. However, due to Li's impoverishment of the pluralist 
122
 Again, the work of Checkel forms an exception to this rule 
m
 There are several modernist Social Constructivist authors that do study how intra-state processes may 
induce change in national preferences (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, Klotz, 1995b, 1995a, Risse, Ropp and 
Sikkink, 1999) However, theoretically they still emphasise national preference change through cognitive 
belief change rather than political change Empirically, however, in many cases they do report the 
occurrence of processes that in this chapter would be classified as turnover 
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conception of domestic political processes (see Section 2.2.4), Moravcsik does not 
actually distinguish this political mechanism of national preference change. 
All in all, this overview shows that to arrive at hypotheses concerning the 
significance of the different mechanisms of national preference change in establishing a 
convergence of national policy-preferences and the likelihood of such common interests 
actually coming about, it is essential to formulate a theoretical view on the formation 
and definition of national preferences. In the remainder of this chapter, such a model 
will be introduced. This model of national preference formation and definition will 
consist of two parts. The second of these parts, which will be dealt with in Section 3.5, 
will encompass a cognitive model of individual preference definition that will answer the 
question of how pivotal domestic decision makers actually define their preferences. The 
first part, which will be discussed in Section 3.4, will deal with the process of national 
preference formation, and will answer the question of which domestic actors should be 
expected to dominate the national preference formation process and how the individual 
preferences of these decision makers are aggregated into the national preference. 
Together, both parts will form an approach to preferences that differs significantly 
from the above-mentioned theories, and that will lead to different expectations 
concerning the role of the different psychological and political mechanisms of policy-
preference change and the probability of establishing a common interest between 
states where none was present before. 
3.4 The Formation of the National Preference 
As indicated, the approach to national preference formation that will be introduced in 
this section will be based on a domestic politics model, meaning that the national state is 
not assumed to be a unitary actor (cf. Bulmer, 1983). In contrast to Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism, however, this approach will not adopt a pluralist model of 
national preference formation. I will argue that this model can only give an adequate 
picture of reality under very specific circumstances, and that in the case of national 
preference formation in France and Germany concerning European monetary 
integration, these conditions are not fulfilled. On the contrary, there are several reasons 
to presume that in this case, state institutions will have a central role in the process of 
preference formation. 
3.4. i Pluralism, Statism and the Scope of Domain 
Within comparative politics, two influential approaches can be distinguished that 
focus on explaining the process of domestic policy making: pluralism and statism.12'1 
121
 Milner distinguishes four such models: the pluralist, statist, marxist and elitist models (Milner, 1992 
494). However, the marxist and elitist models show considerable resemblance to respectively the pluralist 
and statist models (see Chapter 2, note 13) 
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As indicated in Chapter 2, pluralism claims that the sum of the preferences of interests 
groups — weighted in proportion to their access to policy-making institutions — will 
shape the decision-making process and the national preference formation phase. 
According to this theory, state actors are nothing more than the representatives of the 
wishes of these interest groups, and so in effect it reduces the state to a mere 
mouthpiece of societal groups (see Section 2.2.5). Statism on the other hand, aims at 
'bringing the state back in', and argues that the state is an autonomous actor, standing 
apart from society, that strives to realise its own specific preferences (Milner, 1992: 
494;Skocpol, 1985:9-14). 
In essence, these two approaches are thus concerned with the domestic balance 
of power between state institutions and societal actors, an issue on which they advocate 
rival views. However, instead of presenting pluralism and statism as competing 'grand 
theories' on national decision-making, which apply across states, time, and issues, they 
may also be regarded as part of a broader spectrum of possible power relations between 
state and societal actors (see Figure 3.1). This spectrum ranges from the ideal-type 
situation in which the state apparatus is non-existent and society omnipotent, to the 
ideal typical dictatorship in which the state dominates domestic decision making 
entirely (Krasner, 1978: 55-61).125 The placement of the pluralist and statist approach 
within this broader framework draws an image of two middle range theories with 
different scopes of domain. This raises the question of the conditions under which 
either approach may be expected to apply (cf. Skocpol, 1985: 14). 
Whether a particular preference formation process will be more pluralist or 
statist is dependent on two conditions: the nature of the political system, and the issue 
at hand (Krasner, 1978: 58; Skocpol, 1985: 14-17). The nature of the domestic 
political system can influence the effectiveness with which state or societal actors can 
influence the national preference formation process by determining the degree of 
centralisation of decision-making, and the access of societal actors to decision-making 
structures (Risse-Kappen, 1991: 486; Van der Vleuten, 2001: 39-40, 53-4). The more 
power the rules and culture of the domestic political system award to state 
institutions, and the less access interest groups are granted to decision-making 
procedures, the more likely it is that the national preference formation will proceed in 
a 'statist' fashion. In contrast, when the political system and culture provides for a 
weak state and ample access for interest groups, national preference formation will 
occur more along the lines of the pluralist model. The extent to which decision-
making power is centralised, and the rules governing societal access to decision-
making structures may vary both between nation-states and across issue-areas. 
' ^ The concepts weak and strong used in Figure 3 1 do not refer in any way to the external power of a state 
For instance, the United States may be categorised as a (externally) powerful, but (internally) weak state. 
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Non-existent Weak Moderate Strong Dominant 
I 
State Institutions 
Pluralism ^ ^ Statism 
Societal Groups 
Î 
Dominant Strong Moderate Weak Non-existent 
Figure 3-1: The Spectrum of State-Society Power Relationships 
So, while the nature of the political system determines the effectiveness of actors' 
attempts to influence the national position, the nature of the issue at stake may 
influence societal actors' decisions about whether or not to engage in political action in 
the first place (cf. Van der Vleuten, 2001: 53-4). Whether or not actors are motivated 
to go through the trouble of pressuring their governments to realise their preferences 
depends, amongst other things, on the intensity of their preferences, 'the subjectively 
estimated probability' that their efforts will have the desired effect and the amount of 
power, wealth, or status already at the actor's disposal (Lieshout, 1995: 30, 43).126 
However, their willingness to act is also dependent on the political, economic and 
ideological costs and benefits that policy-making is expected to bestow on them. 
Moreover, policy plans that are expected to incur losses will provide a greater incentive 
to become politically active than those expected to be provide gains. 
Whether societal actors will be motivated to engage in political action will 
thus also depend on the perceived costs and benefits entailed by a given policy. 
However, in some issue-areas the costs and benefits of policy making may be more 
tangible than in others. For instance, the costs and benefits of foreign policy making 
will be more diffuse and less tangible than those of socio-economic policy making. 
Moreover, several authors have argued that in some issue-areas the consequences of 
policy making may simply be too uncertain or too difficult to grasp to induce societal 
actors to engage in political action (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 14; McNamara, 
1998: 7, 33-37; Putnam, 1988: 445). In these kinds of issue-areas, commonly known 
as complex issues-areas — it may simply be unclear who will be affected and in what 
manner. Such ambiguity 'has the potential to "depoliticize" the policy process, and 
may insulate policymakers from public scrutiny' (McNamara, 1998: 8; cf. Putnam, 
126
 Whether societal actors will be motivated to engage in political action is partially dependent on the 
expected effectiveness of their actions, and as such is related to the characteristics of the domestic political 
system (see above). 
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1988: 445 note 50). As a result, decision making in such issue-areas is likely to be 
dominated by state institutions or officials. 
In addition to the perceived absolute costs and benefits of certain policies, 
Wilson has argued that societal actors may be motivated by relative gains and losses in 
comparison to other groups or individuals. In other words, societal actors' incentive to 
engage in political action may be dependent on the distribution of the costs and 
benefits of policy-making across society (Wilson, 1973: 331). Policy alternatives that 
are perceived to burden or benefit a specific segment of society may thus provide a 
stronger incentive to initiate or influence policy making than policies that involve 
widely distributed costs or benefits. Whether or not the effects of policy making will 
be concentrated or widespread may, again, be dependent on the characteristics of the 
issue at stake. Monetary policy is, for instance, likely to involve more widely 
distributed consequences than agricultural policy-making. 
~~ -——______^ Costs 
Benefits ~~ ~______^ 
Distributed 
Concentrated 
Distributed 
a) Statist 
c) Pluralist, the national 
preference will reflect the 
preferences of potential 
beneficiaries 
Concentrated 
b) Pluralist, the national 
preference will reflect the 
preferences of disadvantaged 
groups 
d) Statist 
Table 3-5: Issue-areas and the Pluralist and Statist Scope of Domain'2 
Based on this insight, four kinds of issues may be distinguished (see Table 
3.5). In an issue-area in which both costs and benefits of policy making are widespread 
(see Table 3.5, cell a), societal actors are expected to have weaker incentives to pressure 
their government to engage in, or refrain from policy making. Consequently, the 
preference formation process on such issues will thus most likely proceed in a statist 
fashion. On the other hand, when the benefits of policy making in a certain issue-area 
are perceived to be widely distributed, but its costs concentrated, the disadvantaged 
parties are expected to engage in political action to dissuade policy makers from this 
course (see Table 3.5, cell b). For this reason, the national preference is likely to be 
dominated by the preferences of these societal groups, and the national preference 
formation process will thus take place according to the pluralist model. Likewise, 
when policy making is expected to incur costs that are widely distributed across 
127
 The table is based on· (Wilson, 1973: 332-7) 
86 
Common Interest: Power and Cognition 
society, but to provide gains for the lucky few, it will be the possible beneficiaries who 
are likely to press the government into adopting their preferred policies. Finally, when 
costs and benefits are concentrated, both the potential winners and losers will have a 
strong incentive to lobby the government to adopt their preferences. In this situation 
the conflicting nature of this lobbying will grant state institutions the space to impose 
their own preferences or to side with whichever group whose preferences agree with 
theirs. The national preference formation process may thus be expected to resemble the 
statist ideal type (Wilson, 1973: 332-7). 
3.4.2 European Monetary Co-operation and the Ultimate Decision Unit 
The theoretical framework developed in the previous section will allow for the 
formulation of expectations concerning the way in which the formation of national 
preferences regarding the establishment of the European economic and monetary union 
in France and Germany has taken place. Overall, it may be said that the political 
systems of France and Germany allow less influence for societal groups than the 
pluralist model suggests. In other words, in these states, a limited number of societal 
groups are likely to have access to the ultimate decision unit. In fact, the French 
political system and culture is often regarded a textbook example of a statist system 
(Krasner, 1978: 58-66; Risse-Kappen, 1991: 487-9, 491-2). While the German 
political system allows societal groups more access to the decision-making process, the 
relative power of German state actors should be characterised as moderate or strong 
depending on the issue at stake (see Figure 3.1).'28 Therefore, the preference formation 
process in both Germany and France may be expected to tend towards the statist ideal 
type-
Moreover, this tendency towards statism is reinforced by the characteristics of 
the monetary issue-area itself and its effects on the motivations of societal actors to 
engage in political action. Firstly, prior to its establishment, most economists expected 
both the costs and benefits of the European Economic and Monetary Union to be 
widely distributed (Gros and Thygesen, 1998: 261-310; Levitt and Lord, 2000: 14).'29 
Therefore, the national preference formation regarding this issue was expected to occur 
12
" The German system is often referred to as corporatist. However, the relevance of this classification for 
my research is unclear. The German corporatist institutional arrangements apply predominantly to socio-
economic issue-areas, not to monetary decision making. Moreover, while some authors argue that 
corporatist institutional arrangements increase the relative power of societal actors (Risse-Kappen, 1991: 
486; Van der Vleuten, 2001· 39-40, 53-4), others have argued that, whereas corporatism may increase the 
access of societal actors to the decision-making process, the risk of breaking up the institutional structure 
will keep them from bringing their full power to bear on the content of decision making (Cawson, 1978: 
186-96). 
129
 In general, the establishment of EMU was expected to result in the loss of control of monetary policy 
and the loss of the national currency, the preservation of low levels of inflation, and the elimination of 
transaction costs. 
87 
Mapping the Road to Maastricht 
along statist lines (see Table 3.5, cell a). Moreover, several authors have argued that the 
consequences of policy making in the monetary issue-area — especially those 
concerning the distributional consequences - are difficult for laymen to grasp or 
predict (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 14; McNamara, 1998: 7, 33-37). For this 
reason, the monetary issue-area may be characterised as a typical example of a complex 
issue-area. Because of the high degree of uncertainty about the costs and benefits of the 
establishment of EMU for societal groups and individuals it is unlikely that they 
would take a firm stand on the issue, and engage in political action (Dyson and 
Featherstone, 1999: 14; Putnam, 1988: 445). All in all, this would lead one to expect 
that a statist approach will provide a more adequate model of the preference formation 
process concerning the establishment of a European economic and monetary union in 
France and Germany. 
However, the conclusion that the ultimate decision-making unit will be 
dominated by state institutions needs further clarification. Different state institutions 
and officials have divergent views, as well as differing capacities to realise these 
preferences. An ultimate decision unit may have three different configurations. Firstly 
an UDU may take on ζ predominant leader configuration. In a state where the UDU has 
such a configuration, a single individual positioned at the highest level of the political 
system has the power to decide unilaterally what the national stand on an issue will be. 
In contrast, in a system in which the ultimate decision unit is a single group, the 
members of a single decision-making body - for instance the cabinet or a sub-cabinet 
group — collectively select a course of action through face-to-face interaction. While 
every individual whose concurrence is needed for upholding the decision reached has to 
be included in this group, it is not necessary for all group members to concur on the 
decision, or to have equal weight in the formation of group decisions (Hermann and 
Hermann, 1989: 366-7). Finally, the UDU may also consist of multiple autonomous 
actors. While - in contrast to the single group-UDU — everyone of these actors has veto 
powerM0 over the decision to be reached, none of the individuals, groups, or 
organisations in a multiple autonomous actor-UDU has the ability to make a decision 
on its own or force compliance on the others, nor does an overarching authoritative 
body exist (Hermann and Hermann, 1989: 364). 
1 , 0
 Hermann and Hermann speak of'ratifying power' instead of veto-power. I have chosen to use the term 
veto-power because in the preference formation phase of the decision making process, there are no formal 
ratification points. It is nevertheless possible to identify actors whose concurrence with a certain policy-
preference is essential for it to become the national stand on an issue. Moreover, the authors distinguish 
another capacity state actors may possess that would warrant their inclusion in the UDU the power to 
withhold part of the resources necessary for action, or to withhold the approval for their use. However, 
this capacity is not relevant in the preference formation phase. Moreover, they argue that actors that are 
able to initiate 'countermeasures that can seriously harm the other actors or their objectives' should be 
included in the UDU (Hermann and Hermann, 1989. 368). In my eyes, however, this criterion is too 
vague — it may be interpreted to include everyone owning a gun - to be included in my analysis. 
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Which actors are part of the ultimate decision-making unit, and the form the 
UDU will take is, again, a function of the combined effect of the characteristics of the 
issue and the political system at hand (Allison and Zelikow, 1999 155, 298-300, 
Halperm, 1974 105, Hermann and Hermann, 1989 361,363-4) Decision-making 
authority on monetary issues, may for instance have been delegated to the Minister of 
Finance in one state (predominant leader configuration) while in another state an 
independent central bank may also have a say in the matter (multiple actor 
configuration) 
Furthermore, the precise configuration of the UDU is also dependent on 
whether or not policy making in a particular issue-area is subject to European or 
international coordination or cooperation The introduction of an international or 
European dimension to issue-areas may change the relative power of (some of) the 
members of the UDU, or may broaden the set of members (Pnncen, 2002 67, cf 
Moravcsik, 1994) For instance, state actors who are responsible for European or 
international policy making within a state or who participate in the decision-making 
process at the supra-state level, will enter the national preference formation process 
and may even acquire veto-power The establishment of European institutions like the 
European Council, the Council of Ministers, and the Monetary Committee, for 
instance, may have increased the influence of the Heads of State and Government, the 
Ministers of Foreign or European affairs and certain high officials of the Ministries of 
Financial and/or Economic Affairs on monetary policy making Therefore, the 
international or European level may thus add veto-points to the national preference 
formation process (Putnam, 1988 449) 
As will be argued in Chapter 4, the French preference formation process 
concerning the establishment of European economic and monetary union, the UDU 
generally has a.predominant leader configuration with the President being the dominant 
domestic actor However, in periods of co-habitation, when the prime minister is not a 
member of the same political party (or coalition) as the President, the UDU has a 
multiple autonomous actor configuration (Hermann and Hermann, 1989 368) In 
Germany, the ultimate decision unit in the European monetary issue-area consists of 
multiple autonomous actors 
The domestic and European political system thus determine to a large extent 
which agents have a say in the national preference formation process on monetary 
issues More generally, the rules of domestic and international systems are often 
ambiguous The tasks and competencies assigned to specific institutions or actors may 
not be clearly defined, or they may overlap Therefore, it is likely that conflicts over 
participation in the preference formation process, and the distribution of competencies 
will arise (Halperm, 1974 39-40, Hollis and Smith, 1990 155-8) Moreover, actors 
are not marionettes passively following pre-ordained rules Some actors may have the 
means and the incentive to try to change, or circumvent the rules of the system with 
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the aim of bringing about a change in the composition of the ultimate decision unit or 
the power relations within the unit (see Section 3 5 4) An actor's special interest in a 
certain issue and its political skill (or the lack thereof) may gain it a place in the U D U 
despite its 'irrelevant' institutional position The inverse is also true of actors with lack 
of special interest or political skill 
3.5 A Cognitive Approach to Preference Definition 
The framework introduced in the previous section enables us to identify the set of 
actors whose preferences are likely to shape the content of the national preference 
However, the preferences of the actors that make up the ultimate decision unit also 
need to be considered While Steinbruner has rightly observed that 'in terms of 
substantive content, the perceptions, opinions, attitudes, beliefs, and assumptions of 
human beings vary so enormously over both individuals and cultural conditions that 
empirical generalizations are simply overwhelmed'(Steinbruner, 1974 95, cf Little, 
1988 48), it was nevertheless shown above that something can be said about the 
mechanisms through which preferences are (re)defined (see Section 3 3) Moreover, the 
cognitive approach to preference definition that will be introduced in this section will 
generate some hypotheses concerning the stability and strength of actors' preferences, 
the kind of political action actors will engage in to encourage the realisation of their 
preferences, and how policy preferences might converge 
3 3 1 Cognitive Theory 
In Chapter 2, two models of preference definition were distinguished the Rational 
Choice model incorporated in Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the Social 
Constructivist approach introduced by Risse et al With in Foreign Policy Analysis, 
however, an alternative model of decision making has been developed based on the 
idea that there are systematic regularities in the way the human mind works This 
Cognitive Theory stresses the importance of three interrelated psychological principles of 
decision making (Steinbruner, 1974 95) Principles that may also inform a specific 
view on the way in which decision makers define their preferences 
The first of the three principles on which Cognitive Theory is based, involves 
the idea that the mind works through an inference mechanism This means that — 
instead of simply receiving and storing the information available - the mind selects 
the information it takes in (filtering function) and infers the meaning of events on the 
basis of the views already present in memory (colouring function) (Little, 1988 47-8, 
Holsti, 1976 20, note 2, Rosati, 1995 67) An actor's image of the world is based on 
the information about the outside world on the one hand, and its pre-existing ideas -
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or belief system - on the other hand (Steinbruner, 1974: 94; Voss and Dorsey, 1992: 
8 ) . π ι 
By invoking the idea of inference as a decision-making mechanism, Cognitive 
Theory awards a pivotal role to an actor's belief system. In general, belief systems are 
said to contain an actor's empirical beliefs on the state and the functioning of the 
world, as well as its normative beliefs (Little, 1988: 49; Smith, 1988: 11; George as 
quoted in: Rosati, 1995: 66). Therefore, it will comprise the actor's causal and 
principled beliefs (see also Section 3.5.2). Moreover, cognitive theorists generally agree 
that the structure of a belief system resembles a core-periphery model, with some 
beliefs being more pivotal and significant to the actor than others (Little, 1988: 4 9 ) . n 2 
As indicated before, this belief system performs two (interrelated) functions 
(Voss and Dorsey, 1992: 9). First, it allows the individual to filter the information 
available. This is vital because as Lieshout has noted 'at any moment an infinite 
number of phenomena might be observed' (Lieshout, 1995: 7), and recording and 
processing every bit of information available would burden the mind beyond its 
capacit ies . m To prevent this the mind will only 'acquire new information, if it is able 
to relate this information to the information already at its disposal' (Lieshout, 1995: 
40). In other words, only if information seems to pertain to issues already represented 
in its belief system will the individual record it. 
The filtering function is thus based on a second function of actor's belief 
systems: the colouring function. This function implies that the mind infers the 
meaning and value of information concerning the outside world from its pre-existing 
ideas. More specifically, individuals give meaning to phenomena by drawing lateral 
and hierarchical relationships between facts and events and the empirical and normative 
ideas in their belief system (Steinbruner, 1974: 96). When inferring the meaning of 
current events and facts by drawing a hierarchical relationship, the mind groups these 
events and facts as a subordinate category under a general concept (a super-ordinate 
category) already present in the mind (Voss and Dorsey, 1992: 10). For instance, when 
certain proceedings show a similarity to the Munich conference that went down in 
1
 *' Many terms are used for similar concepts as a belief system, like image, psycho milieu, operational code, and 
wgnitive map (Little, 1988. 47, Rosati, 1995: 55-7; Smith, 1988 11, Voss and Dorsey, 1992: 5, 9) 
However, the concept belief system is the most generally used All these terms are generally distinguished 
from opinions and attitudes, which are used to describe more superficial and transitory opinions (Little, 
1988-46) 
1 , 2
 Little stipulates that a core-periphery model of belief systems is inadequate because 'some people are 
much more willing to modify and adapt their beliefs than others' (Little, 1988 49) However, the fact 
that the stability and strength may differ amongst actors does not preclude the possibility that stability 
and strength may also vary amongst the issues that actors are confronted with. In fact, in Section 3 5 2 it 
will be argued that variation across individuals and across issues is exactly what cognitive theory expects 
to find. 
' " According to Steinbruner the mind's tendency to economise is so strong that it actually 'never attends 
to most of the information it physically receives' (Steinbruner, 1974: 101). 
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history as an attempt to appease Germany, the mind may classify these proceedings 
(subordinate) as an instance of appeasement (super-ordinate).'34 As a result, the specific 
details of the current proceedings that are not consistent with the categorisation of an 
instance of appeasement will go unnoticed, and will not be remembered afterwards. 
Any future mentioning of the proceedings will first and foremost trigger the 
association with the general concept (Steinbruner, 1974: 96-7). When drawing lateral 
relationships, events are not grouped under a more general, abstract concept as in the 
case of hierarchical relationship. Rather, an analogy with a meaningful concept at the 
same level of abstraction is sought. The most common example of drawing a lateral 
relationship is the use of a mnemonic. 
By drawing these relationships between phenomena in the world and more 
general abstract concepts individuals 'impose a structure, a regularity, upon reality' 
(Lieshout, 1995: 11). Just like the reduction of the amount of information to be 
processed, such imposition of meaning on reality is vital. For, as Lieshout has argued, 
an individual who is unable 'to distinguish essentials from inessentials' would be 
condemned to the faith of the Buridan's ass. This ass 'was unable to decide which of 
two stacks of hay was more appetizing to start its meal with and, as a result, eventually 
died of hunger in the midst of plenty' (Lieshout, 1995: 8). 
It is clear that the principle of inference is intimately related to the second 
principle invoked by cognitive psychologists: the economy principle. This principle 
states that the human mind needs to reduce the use of its capacities in order to 
function. It achieves such a reduction by applying two general principles of economy: 
simplicity and stability. While simple beliefs circumvent the need for elaborate 
calculations of policy alternatives, stability prevents regular restructuring of the actor's 
belief system (Steinbruner, 1974: 111). This provides the actor with the degree of 
efficiency in processing information that it needs to make decisions. Because — due to 
its multiple, lateral and hierarchical links to other beliefs — a change in the core of the 
belief system is likely to have wider repercussions (to be more costly) than a change in 
peripheral beliefs, the mind's tendency to economise is expected to be the strongest in 
the case of core beliefs (Lieshout, 1995: 43; Rosati, 1995: 63; Steinbruner, 1974: 102-
3). 
The principle of inference and the principle of economy imply that, when an 
individual comes across information that is inconsistent with its belief system, it will 
attempt to ignore the inconsistency or devise ways to remove the inconsistency while 
upholding its pre-existing ideas, rather than adapt its belief system to include the 
m
 Actors tend to group events under super-ordinate categories based on superficial similarities, and draw 
relationships with the most recent similar event that has made an impression on them (Foong Khong, 
1992. i l , 35-7) However, generally the details of the situation may also fit a different overall concept. 
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newly received information.1,5 Whether an actor will try to remove the inconsistency 
or simply ignore the inconsistency it is faced with, is dependent on several factors. To 
begin with, the more relevant the consistency for the daily functioning of the 
individual, the greater the chance that an actor will go through the trouble to resolve 
the inconsistency. Moreover, the greater the costs (economic, political, ideological) in 
relation to the means the individual has at its disposal, and the greater the costs of 
removal in relation to the costs of denying the inconsistency, the less the actor will be 
inclined to resolve the inconsistency. Furthermore, an actor will be less inclined to 
adapt its ideas when it has invested more in the development of these ideas, and — to 
its mind — they have contributed more to the realisation of its values (Lieshout, 1995: 
43-4). 
However, under certain circumstances an actor may simply not be able to 
ignore an inconsistency between its beliefs and the actual state of the world, nor to 
devise ways to remove the inconsistency mechanisms whilst maintaining its beliefs, for 
Cognitive Theory assumes the operation of the human mind to be constrained by a 
third principle: the reality principle (Steinbruner, 1974: 100-1).1,6 This principle 
states that the human mind is not oblivious to its environment and 'that stable, 
important features of the environment impose themselves quite reliable on the mind' 
(Steinbruner, 1974: 100-1; cf. Little, 1988: 47). This means that there are limits to 
the mind's ability to preserve its established beliefs. The more straightforward the 
meaning of events, and the clearer the nature of causal relationships between actions 
and outcomes, the smaller the mind's leeway to filter out or reinterpret information, 
and the less successful its attempts to preserve its established beliefs. In other words, 
the more abstract and the more ambiguous the issue, the less influence the reality 
constraint will bring to bear on an individuals' beliefs (Lieshout, 1995: 42-3; cf. 
Hermann, 1976: 331). 
Thus, in contrast to some modernist constructivist approaches, the Cognitive 
Theory adopted in this thesis does not subscribe to the epistemologica! claim that the 
' " For an elaboration on these so-called inconsistency-management mechanisms actors use to remove the 
inconsistency between their pre-existing ideas and new information while maintaining their established 
beliefs, see (Foong Khong, 1992: 6-7; Lieshout, 1995' 41-2; Neustadt and May, 1986, Steinbruner, 
1974: 115-6; Voss and Dorsey, 1992- 12). 
" ' Like many other cogmtivists, Steinbruner distinguishes a fourth principle on which cognitive theory is 
based belief consistency (Steinbruner, 1974: 97-101; cf. Little, 1988· 50-1; Lieshout, 1995- 40-1). This 
principle implies that the mind 'operates in such a way as to keep internal belief relationships (both 
hierarchical and lateral) consistent with one another' (Steinbruner, 1974: 97). However, experiments have 
cast doubt on the empirical validity of this principle (Foong Khong, 1992: 42-3). Since the points I want 
to make in this chapter do not pertain to the internal consistency of an actor's beliefs, I have decided not 
to include this controversial principle in my description of cognitive theory. Moreover, invoking the 
principles of inference and stability leads to exactly the same expectations on the role of beliefs and 
information as the consistency principle would, namely that actors will be persistent in their ideas and ill-
inclined to absorbing information that contradicts these ideas (see below). 
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human mind operates separately from reality, or that there is simply no way of gaining 
reliable knowledge of the world out there (see Section 2.4.1). In the cognitive model, 
reality is presumed to exist independently from its interpretation. Furthermore, many 
of the world's features are presented clearly enough for individuals to perceive them in 
substantially the same way (Steinbruner, 1974: 100-101). Only in situations in which 
uncertainty is omnipresent, which is, admittedly, more often than not the case in 
foreign policy making and international relations, the meaning of a course of events 
may not be clear enough to counter the actor's tendency to see what they are expecting 
to see. 
3. .5.2 A Cognitive View on Preferences: Obstinacy and Autism 
The three psychological principles on which Cognitive Theory is based informs a view 
on preference definition that differs significantly from the way Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism and Social Constructivism perceive actors as defining their 
preferences (see Chapter 2). In contrast to both the calculating Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist actor and its rule-following Social Constructivist counterpart, 
the cognitive model posits that actors infer their policy preferences from the 
information that has been processed through their belief system: 'the information used 
in making choices ... is always shaped by wants and needs already programmed in the 
individual' (Hollis and Smith, 1990: 146). The cognitive decision maker is thus 
assumed to be theory-driven rather than data-driven (Tetlock, 1999: 336). 
A belief system has to contain at least two kinds of beliefs for actors to be able 
to derive preferences from the system. Firstly, a belief system should include the 
actor's values (see Section 3.5.1), for no decisions could be derived from the system if it 
did not contain the criteria by which to evaluate the meaning of events and 
circumstances. In addition, the actor's belief system has to contain its causal beliefs to 
be able to determine which of the many available policy alternatives will be perceived 
by the actors as furthering their values (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 14).H7 In light 
of the actor's values and causal beliefs the value of a certain piece of information is 
determined (see Table 3.6). 
Furthermore, unlike Social Constructivism, Cognitive Theory does not 
theorise about the origins of actors' values; neither, however, does it assume the 
content of their values to be fixed or universal, as Liberal Intergovernmentalism does. 
Instead, the ultimate values that actors strive for are treated as an 'empirical question, 
' " Naturally, these causal beliefs and values were themselves derived from the information processed by 
the actor at a prior moment in time The model is dynamic Processed information about the outside 
world shapes an actor's beliefs on which it bases its preferences These preferences may in turn stimulate 
political action. Regardless of the whether these actions do or do not change the world, information 
concerning the effects of these actions may be processed by the actor at a later stage and may thus lead to 
belief change. 
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not a matter of definition' (Hollis and Smith, 1990 159) Moreover, due to Cognitive 
Theory's rejection of a thick rationality assumption, the value-function of a cognitive 
actor may include principled beliefs as well as subjective interests, for actors are 
assumed to act rationally given their own subjective goals (Hollis and Smith, 1990 
145,159) 
Finally, in contrast to Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Modernist Social 
Constructivism, Cognitive Theory stresses that actors' beliefs are very strong and stable, 
when the following conditions apply reality constraint is weak, core beliefs are involved, and the 
actor has a high level of expertise and experience in the issue-area in question Because the 
inference and economy principle imply that actors derive their policy preferences 
foremost from this stable belief system rather than from "brute facts", policy 
preferences may be expected to display considerable stability So, while Cognitive 
Theory by means of the reality principle identifies information about the actor's 
(changing) external environment as the vehicle of preference change, in case the reality 
principle is weak, the very information that might induce change — the information 
which contradicts pre-existing ideas — is likely to be ignored or re-interpreted by the 
belief system In other words, in analogy with Allison's famous quote concerning the 
behaviour of state bureaucracies, it may thus be concluded that under these 
circumstances the best indicator of what an actor will prefer at t+ 1 is its preference at t 
(Allison and Zelikow, 1999 175, see Table 3 6) 
^ — ^ _ _ ^ Theory 
Aspect ^~~~~-~^-~-^ 
Explanandum 
Psychological Mechanism 
of National Preference 
Change 
Relative Easiness of 
Individual Policy-
Preference change 
Political Mechanism of 
National Preference 
Change 
Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism 
Policy-Preference 
change 
Learning 
Relatively Easy 
Turnover (in principle) 
Modernist 
Social 
Constructivism 
Value-change 
Persuasion 
Moderately Easy 
None 
Statist Cognitive 
Theory 
Policy-Preference 
change 
-Imposition-of-Will 
- Highly 
Conditioned 
Learning & 
Persuasion 
Not Easy 
Turnover 
Table 3 6 Hypotheses on National Preference Change and Establishing Common Interests 
Similar to the way in which they promote stability of policy preferences, the 
filtering and colouring functions of belief systems also induce actors to become 
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strongly convinced of the value and accuracy of their opinions. Since all information 
concerning the accuracy of beliefs and the value of the policies chosen is processed 
through the belief system, evidence of the inaccuracy of beliefs and policy failure is 
likely to be ignored, or reformulated into a success story. At the same time, any 
indication of belief accuracy and success are being amplified. In other words, negative 
feedback will simply not have the same impact on actors' beliefs as positive feedback. 
Moreover, inconsistency mechanisms may induce strong opposition to policy 
alternatives that do not correspond to actors' beliefs (see Section 3.5.1). In this light, it 
may be expected that even occasional reinforcement of beliefs is sufficient to give 
actors considerable confidence in the value of the policies they have chosen 
(Steinbruner, 1974: 113). 
According to the cognitive approach, actors' confidence in their preferences 
will therefore not be proportionate to the objective accuracy of the beliefs underlying 
their choice, or the success rate of the chosen policies (in terms of the actor's values). 
Beliefs and preferences get their strength from sources 'other than the weight of 
objective evidence' (Steinbruner, 1974: 113). More specifically, the strength of policy 
preferences seems to be a function of time and experience; the more frequently applied 
and the older the belief it is based on, the stronger the policy preference (Steinbruner, 
1974: 114).13H Accordingly, it may be hypothesised that the more knowledgeable and 
experienced an actor is in a particular field, the stronger and more stable its preferences concerning 
this field. In other words, experts are expected to be significantly more convinced of the 
value and accuracy of their policy choices than novices (Checkel, 2001:554; 1998: 478-
9; Hermann, 1976: 331; Lieshout, 1995: 43-4). 
According to Cognitive Theory, the strength and stability of actor's policy 
preferences will thus be influenced by the level of their expertise and experience in the 
field, the strength of the reality constraint, and the centrality of an issue in the actor's 
belief system. Based on different combinations of the first and second variable, foreign 
policy analysts have formulated several profiles of state officials, and have deduced 
expectations concerning the differences between the patterns of thinking displayed by 
these actors."9 
Scholars have hypothesised that the reality constraints facing high and low-
level officials differ significantly, which results in different patterns of thinking. For 
instance, officials working at the highest levels of the state bureaucracy will be 
1 . 8
 The stability of preferences is one of the determinants of their strength 
1 . 9
 Steinbruner uses three criteria to distinguish the ideal-type state officials 1) the natural information 
channels available to the official; 2) the level of organisational hierarchy at which they function, and, λ) 
the officials background. These criteria overlap, however, with two of the three variables I have 
distinguished. Steinbruner's third criterion refers to the level of expertise and experience of the actor, 
while the former two pertain to the level of uncertainty (the strength of the reality principle) that the 
actor faces 
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required to make decisions on a whole range of subjects, and these subjects may be 
classified as more abstract than those low-level officials have to deal with, and pertain 
to a larger scope of domain and time frame. Furthermore, high officials are often 
positioned at the intersection of a number of different information channels that may 
carry contradictory information. Moreover, more than low-level officials, they are in a 
position which affords them interaction with actors with very different backgrounds 
and views (Allison and Zelikow, 1999: 277; Halperin, 1974: 63,82; Steinbruner, 
1974: 124-5). All these characteristics imply that high officials are faced by higher 
levels of complexity and uncertainty. 
The uncertainty facing all high-level officials has a different effect on the 
stability and strength of the preferences oi the politicians - high-level officials with 
little expertise or experience on the issues they are faced with - than on the preferences 
of the so-called experts — high-level officials with substantial expertise.1'10 This is the 
case because the development of strong belief patterns takes time (they are the result of 
a gradual strengthening process), which according to cognitive psychologists is 
established in the first few years of a person's maturational process (Steinbruner, 1974: 
H 3 ; Meadow, 1980: 120). Because politicians often come to their jobs through 
political channels, they are generally relatively unfamiliar with the organization and its 
field of work when they assume office. Moreover, they often have too little experience 
for any beliefs concerning their new duties to have been established and strengthened. 
With no established beliefs to strengthen, the uncertainty that faces high officials 
produces preference instability, and causes politicians to lack confidence in the value of 
the policy alternatives they have chosen. As Steinbruner has put it, these novices often 
'quite literally do not know what to think' (Steinbruner, 1974: 129); a thinking 
pattern commonly referred to as uncommitted thinking (Lieshout, 1995: 152). 
As a result of their lack of ideas, these uncommitted thinkers tend to rely 
heavily on reactions from the press and public, parts of the bureaucracy and foreign 
governments and the advice of others to get a sense of an issue (Steinbruner, 1974: 
146). However, since the politician has access to diverse sources of information and 
opinion, social corroboration is too diverse to enforce a dominant belief pattern on 
his/her mind. As a consequence, "a politician will typically be seen to shift between different, 
competing belief patterns concerning the same policy problem, 'not at once, but in sequence'" 
(Steinbruner, 1974: 128-9, my italics). This pattern of uncommitted thinking may be 
strengthened by a politician's desire to gain re-election, and therefore to follow the 
M
" Generally, students of foreign policy making also distinguish a profile of officials at the lower levels of 
the government hierarchy: the zealots (see Allison and Zelikow, 1999 277, Halperin, 1974· 22-3, 
Steinbruner, 1974' 126-8). Taking the legitimacy of the organisation in which they participate into 
account, Lieshout distinguishes two different profiles of low-level officials1 the disinterested official that 
perceives the legitimacy of the organisation in which it participates to be low, and the enthusiastic official 
who anticipates that taking an active part in the organisation will benefit him (Lieshout, 1995 153). 
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whims of the general public (Allison and Zelikow, 1999: 277, 311; Halperin, 1974: 
67-72; Steinbruner, 1974: 128-9)· If this is the case, one has to look at the leader's 
external environment for vital clues concerning its policy preferences (Hermann and 
Hermann, 1989: 366). 
Quite a different thought pattern develops in experts under conditions of 
uncertainty. An official who may be characterised as an expert often 'enters public 
service from a background closely related to his new responsibilities' (Steinbruner, 
1974: 135). The belief patterns had the time to become established and strong, and for 
this reason the expert is more likely than others to display what has been called a 
theoretical thought pattern (Steinbruner, 1974: 135).141 Since beliefs are thought to be 
formed in the early years of maturity, the beliefs of the theoretical thinker typically 
reflect 'a seminal historical event, a particularly compelling image, another man of 
great persuasive power' encountered 'early in a person's professional training, or at that 
point in his career when he first becomes seriously concerned with the affairs of policy' 
(Steinbruner, 1974: 134). 
The pattern of thought of the theoretical thinker may be characterised as 
highly deductive and simple; its beliefs are organised around a single, very general 
objective, and the meaning of information is related to this objective through a chain 
of (hierarchical) inferences. Experts are expected actively to impose their beliefs on situations, 
events and actors. In order to do this, they typically apply a whole range of inconsistency 
mechanisms. In addition, their deductive reasoning causes the theoretical thinker to be 
highly introspective and intolerant of contradictory information and advice. A 
theoretical thinker therefore tends to be autistic rather than open-minded, decisive 
rather than hesitant, and usually acts quickly and with great confidence (Lieshout, 
1995: 153; Steinbruner, 1974: 131-133). Theoretical thinkers also display a great deal 
of commitment to their preferred policies and tend to surround themselves with 
advisors who share their beliefs (Hermann and Hermann, 1989: 365; Steinbruner, 
1974: 135). 
The profiles of the uncommitted and the theoretical thinker are based on the 
interaction between the actor's level of expertise and the strength of the reality 
constraint involved. However, as stated before, Cognitive Theory also expects that the 
more central the belief on which a preference is based, the stronger and more stable the preference. 
It may therefore be expected that as long as the issues at stake are not central to the 
actor's belief system, its thought pattern will be similar to that of the politician: 
predominantly uncommitted, even when the actor is experienced (Rosati, 1995: 63; 
Steinbruner, 1974: 136). 
'•" High officuls with chis thought pattern have also appropriately been called crusaders or ideologues 
(Hermann and Hermann, 1989 365, Lieshout, 1995 152-3) 
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3-5.3 Political Action 
The different thought patterns of experts and politicians may lead them to engage in 
different kinds of political action in their quest for the realisation of their preferences. 
For instance, it may be expected that the stronger the actor's preference, the less it is inclined 
to engage in bargaining. Bargaining implies a willingness on the part of actors to 
compromise in order to reach agreement on the course of action to be followed. A 
committed thinker — such as the expert striving for the realisation of a policy 
preference pertaining to their core beliefs — will be less inclined to engage in 
negotiation, and accommodation than the uncommitted thinker. Instead, this type of 
actor may be expected to 'act more independently, and will by-pass bargains which 
under analytical assumptions would appear to be obvious' (Steinbruner, 1974: 147).I42 
In addition, it may be expected that precisely those decision makers who may 
be characterised as theoretical thinkers and are thus least likely to be persuaded or 
pressured into preference change will themselves engage in persuasion or imposition-
of-will, or attempt to change the composition of the ultimate decision unit or the 
power relations within it. For the stronger an actor's preferences, and the more central those 
preferences to its belief system, the more likely it is that the actor will engage in political action in 
order to gain decision-making power over the issue. Therefore, they are likely to use active 
and persistent persuasion or pressure on others in order to make them adopt their 
views on a particular issue. They may also attempt to change or circumvent those rules 
that assign their adversaries membership of the ultimate decision unit. Moreover, these 
theoretical thinkers may try to exploit the ambiguity of the rules of the political 
system and try to redefine an issue to broaden, narrow, or change the set of actors with 
ultimate power of decision with the aim of including kindred spirits and excluding 
opponents or changing their opponents point of view (Allison and Zelikow, 1999: 
155, 298-300; Krasner, 1978: 10). Finally, actors may use their powers to shift 
decision making to a different political arena (sub-state, European, international) in 
which they have a greater say, or opinions are more favourable to their beliefs. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Cognitive Theory does not assume actors to be 
power-maximisers, under circumstances, actors are expected to be power-seekers. For, 
in order to realise one's preferences (whatever they are) one needs to be 'in the game'. 
However, Cognitive Theory stresses that an actor's search for influence is partially a 
function of the intensity of its beliefs; the stronger its beliefs, the more power-seeking the actor 
will be. It may be hypothesised that the more pivotal an issue to the actor's belief 
system, the higher its level of expertise and experience, and the weaker the reality 
constraint the actor is faced with, the more power-seeking the actor will be. 
Conversely, the cognitive actor may thus be expected to remain passive when it perceives 
the issue as being irrelevant. 
u
-' Steinbruner uses the term analytical to refer to rational choice approaches (Steinbruner, 1974: 27). 
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3.6 From Divergence to Convergence Revisited: The Cognitive View 
When the four mechanisms of national preference formation are recaptured in the light 
of the cognitive approach introduced in the previous section, it may be concluded that 
this model leads to a view on the establishment of a common interest between states 
that differs significantly from the approaches introduced in Chapter 2 (see Section 
3 3 3, and Table 3 6) The expectations with regard to the significance of learning and 
persuasion processes that may be derived from the cognitive theory are markedly less 
optimistic than those based on Liberal Intergovernmentalism or Modernist Social 
Constructivism. For, it may be argued that 'though it may be difficult co predict 
sensitivity for a single decision, it is clear that the Cognitive Theory expects to find 
over a number of decisions and decision makers much more narrowly confined 
sensitivity to new information' (Steinbruner, 1974: 123) This is due to the fact that 
Cognitive Theory presumes that actors only absorb new information or ideas when 
they relate to their pre-existing ideas. Moreover, individuals are expected to ignore or 
re-interpret information that contradicts their pre-existing ideas 
According to the cognitive view, the chance that national preference change 
occurs through learning or persuasion is thus be expected to be small Learning and 
persuasion are only likely to induce cognitive belief change when an actor has little 
expertise with regards to the issue at hand, or it concerns an issue that is not central to 
its belief system Persuasion will moreover only be successful when the propagated 
values 'resonate' with the actor's existing ideas (Checkel, 2001· 554; 1998 478-9; 
Johnston, 2001 498-9), or an advocate of change manages to frame its goals in such a 
way as to fit the decision maker's belief system (Van Esch, 2001 116-7) However, 
even under these circumstances Cognitive Theory expects only minor and 
inconsequential changes in the actor's belief system to take place All in all, it is clear 
that, from a cognitive viewpoint, the likelihood that an actor will display learning 
behaviour is significantly lower than from a Liberal Intergovernmentalist viewpoint 
Moreover, in contrast to Modernist Social Constructivism, Cognitive Theory argues 
that 'most individuals are indifferent to persuasive appeals' (Rosati, 1995' 52) It may 
thus be concluded that the probability that a change in the national preference - and 
thus the establishment of a common interest - will be the result from learning or 
persuasion will be low 
From the cognitive perspective, changes in national preferences and the establishment of a 
iommon interest therefore seem more likely to result from either imposition-of-will or turnover As 
was argued before, the probability that preference change will be induced by the 
imposition-of-will is partially dependent on the intensity of the actor's existing 
preferences It may thus be expected that the stronger and the more central the preference to 
an detision maker's belief system, the more credible and valuable the other actor's promises or 
threats will have to be in order to successfully impose its will on the decision maker 
Notwithstanding the fact that cognitive change induced by such an exertion of 
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relational power will persist only for as long as the influencing process will last (Elster, 
1982: 221), a common interest is therefore more likely to be caused by imposition-of-
will than by persuasion or learning. 
Finally, it was argued that - in addition to cognitive belief chance - political 
change may lead to changes in the national preference and therefore to the 
establishment of an interstate common interest. In fact, given the difficulties 
associated with individual belief change through learning and persuasion, turnover 
may be expected to be a relatively important mechanism of national preference change 
(cf. Checkel, 2001: 570-1; Steinbruner, 1974: 137). It may be that power is in fact an 
essential instrument for those who want to bring an interstate common interest — and 
thus co-operation — about. However, it is uncertain whether this mechanism will cause 
national preferences to convergence, and as such lead to the establishment of a 
common interest. In contrast to imposition-of-will, turnover may also lead to a 
divergence of national preferences. 
All in all, it may be concluded that the more knowledgeable and experienced 
the members of the UDU are in a particular issue-area, and the more central the issue 
to their belief system, the more likely it will be that a common interest will result 
from the imposition-of-will or turnover rather than by persuasion and learning. 
Furthermore, due to the fact that in Cognitive Theory actors are not expected to 
experience cognitive belief change through learning or persuasion and that turnover is 
not - by definition - conducive to convergence, the chances that a common interest 
will be established are expected to be smaller than on the basis of Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism and Moderate Social Constructivism. 
3.7 Conclusion and Hypotheses 
In this chapter, a theoretical model of national preferences and the establishment of 
common interests has been presented that diverges significantly from the theories 
introduced in Chapter 2. This theoretical model deals firstly with the question how 
national preferences are formed, and posited that national state actors are autonomous 
and potentially the pivotal actors in the national political arena. Moreover, the 
preferences of the state actors were not assumed to be unitary and, therefore, the 
national preference was perceived as being the result of a struggle amongst several 
powerful domestic actors. The model subsequently answered the question of how 
pivotal decision makers define their preferences. It stated that an individual's pre-
existing, subjective ideas play a fundamental role in the process of preference 
definition. In other words, it juxtaposed an inferring, highly theoretical cognitive actor 
to the calculating Liberal Intergovernmentalist and the rule-following Social 
Constructivist. In addition, the claim was made that cognitive belief change is — in 
general - difficult and rare. Finally, this theoretical model of national preferences was 
linked to the four mechanisms of national preferences change — learning, persuasion, 
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imposition-of-will, and turnover— that were introduced at the beginning of the 
chapter. It was concluded that turnover and especially imposition-of-will, rather than 
learning or persuasion, may be expected to be the more important mechanisms for 
bringing about a common interest. Finally, the following hypotheses concerning 
individual preference change, political action and the likelihood with which, and the 
mechanisms by which a common interest may come about, have been derived from the 
Statist-Cognitive Model that has been introduced in this chapter: 
1) Hypotheses concerning Individual Preference Change: 
a. The more knowledgeable and experienced an actor in a particular issue-area, 
the stronger and more stable its preferences concerning that issue. 
b. The more central to an actor's belief-system the belief on which a certain 
preference is based, the stronger and more stable that preference. 
c. The less knowledgeable and experienced an actor in a particular issue-area, 
the more likely the actor will shift between different, competing belief patterns 
concerning a policy problem, 'not at once, but in sequence'. 
d. The more knowledgeable and experienced an actor in a particular issue-area, 
the less likely that the actor changes its preferences through learning or 
persuasion. 
e. The more central to an actor's belief-system the belief on which a certain 
preference is based, the less likely the actor will 'learn' or will be persuaded to 
change this preference. 
f. The stronger and the more central the preference to an decision maker's belief 
system, the more credible and valuable the other actor's promises or threats will 
have to be to impose its will on the decision maker successfully. 
2) Hypotheses concerning Preferences and Political Action: 
a) The stronger an actor's preference, the less inclined the actor will be to engage 
in bargaining or compromising. 
b) The stronger an actor's preferences in a particular issue-area, the more likely 
the actor will be to engage in political action in order to gain decision-making 
power in this issue-area. 
c) The stronger an actor's preferences in a certain issue-area, the more power-
seeking the actor will be in that area. 
3) Hypothesis concerning National Preference Change and the Establishment 
of a Common Interest: 
a) The more stable the preferences of the members of the UDU are, the more likely 
it is that changes in national preferences and the establishment of a common 
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interest will result from either imposition-of-will or turnover, rather than 
from individual belief change induced by persuasion or learning. 
In the remainder of this thesis, these hypotheses will be tested. However, prior to the 
presentation of the research results, the research strategy will be presented in the next 
chapter. 
10? 
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4 METHODOLOGY 
'What we should like .. is a knowledge of how the process works. Merely by knowing that 'C' 
has generally been followed by 'E' is not enough.' 
- Andrew Sayer (as quoted in. Bennett and George, 1997a: 2) 
4.1 Introduction 
One of the aims of this thesis is to determine the empirical value of the statist 
cognitive approach to preferences and common interests, as introduced in the previous 
chapter. In order to do this, a comparative case study will be conducted. The cases 
which will be compared are the failed attempt to establish a common interest between 
France and Germany concerning the creation of a European economic and monetary 
union in the early 1970s, and the successful establishment of such a common interest 
in the early 1990s. 
In this chapter, the choice of these cases will be justified. It will also be argued 
that the use of a case study will have significant advantages when testing theoretical 
propositions such as those put forward in Chapter 3. Furthermore, the overall research 
strategy adopted in this thesis - which will consist of a combination of process tracing 
and cognitive mapping - will be introduced. Subsequently, the central variables - as 
identified in the hypotheses derived in Chapter 3 - will be operationalised. 
4.2 T h e Cases 
4-2.1 The Selection of Cases 
The means to test the statist cognitive model of preference formation and definition 
introduced in Chapter 3 is a comparative case study. The most frequently cited 
advantage of case studies over large-N studies is that a case study design allows for an 
in-depth analysis of certain phenomena, thus doing more justice to the complexity of 
the phenomena, and their inbeddedness in, and interaction with, their social context 
(George, 1979: 50; Swanborn, 1996: 24; Yin, 1994: 3, 13). Given the subject matter 
of this thesis — beliefs, preferences, and several distinct but difficult to distinguish 
psychological and political mechanisms of national preference change — it is clear that 
the use of case studies will have particular advantages for the study to be conducted. 
Furthermore, due to this in-depth analysis of events, in small-N research the construct 
validity of variables — the appropriateness of the operational measures for the concepts 
being studied - is often better than in large-N research (Yin, 1994: 32-8). 
More importantly, case study research has some specific advantages when 
conducting explanatory research. The main goal in explanatory research is to 
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determine the cause or causes of a particular phenomenon. As George and Bennett 
have argued, however, causality necessarily includes two aspects. Firstly, causality 
presupposes the existence of a causal effect or covariance between the independent and 
dependent variable (Bennett and George, 1997a: 2; cf. George and Bennett, 2004). It 
is widely accepted that a large-N study is the most adequate research design for 
establishing such a correlation. However, causality also presupposes the existence of a 
causal mechanism, the specific 'causal processes and intervening variables through which 
causal or explanatory variables produce causal effects' (Bennett and George, 1997a: 2). 
The psychological and political mechanisms of national preference change 
distinguished in Chapter 3, are examples of such causal mechanisms and indicate that, 
while correlations are intriguing, they should give rise to research instead of being its 
outcome (Bennett and George, 1997a: 18; cf. Swanborn, 1996: 44; Yin, 1994: 32-
S).11' To determine the precise causal mechanisms and the mix of intervening and 
independent variables that produce the causal effect, conducting a case study is the 
better choice, since it allows a more in-depth study of the phenomena. 
A case study may consist of a single case (N= 1) or of multiple cases (small-N), 
and may be combined with almost any form of data collection, be it qualitative or 
quantitative (Swanborn, 1996: 20, 22-3). In this thesis, it was decided to conduct a 
comparative case study research. Comparative case studies have the advantage that they 
provide the researcher with more information about the phenomena to be studied than 
a single case study, and better facilitate the identification of causal mechanisms (see 
Section 4.3.2). What is more, they allow for a first tentative distinction to be made 
between characteristics that are generally associated with the phenomenon of interest, 
and factors that are particular to a certain case (Swanborn, 1996: 56). More specifically, 
in this thesis a comparison will be made between two instances in which an explicit 
attempt was made to reach a common interest on the establishment of a European 
economic and monetary union: the efforts surrounding the 1970 Werner report and 
those surrounding the 1989 Delors report. 
The choice to study two instances of European integration was first of all 
made because the European institutions offer an arena conducive to learning or 
persuasion. For this reason, the chances for refuting the two hypotheses concerning the 
establishment of a common interest introduced in Chapter 3 are increased. In addition 
the choice for these particular cases of European integration was made simply because 
there are a limited number of instances in which attempts were made to arrive at a 
convergence of national preferences which resulted in differing outcomes, yet at the 
Mi
 A good example of the uneasiness many people feel with 'bare' correlations, is the controversy 
surrounding the 'closest thing we have to an empirical law in the study of international relations' (Levy as 
quoted in· Owen, 1994: 87); the democratic peace thesis. While it has been statistically established that, 
in general, liberal democratic nations do not fight wars amongst one another, the question still remains 
why' 
106 
Methodology 
same time were sufficiently similar to be used in a comparative case study. For while 
the cases to be studied in this thesis naturally differ in many ways, they are highly 
comparable in the substance on which a common interest between states was sought. 
Both cases are examples of a quest for the establishment of a European supranational 
institution, and the delegation of a significant part of member states' monetary 
authority to the European level. In fact, the Delors plan, central to the discussion 
between the pivotal decision makers of the 1990s, is almost an exact copy of the 
Werner plan, which was the focus of negotiations in the early 1970s (Scholtens, 1990). 
The matters on which central decision makers in the early 1970s were expected to 
articulate a preference, as well as the political sensitivity of the measures to be taken, 
were so comparable to those considered in the late 1990s, that they are unlikely to 
have caused the difference in outcome. 
In order to determine what caused the difference between a successful attempt 
to establish a common interest and an unsuccessful attempt, it was further necessary to 
select both a so-called 'positive' — the successful establishment of a common interest — 
and a 'negative' case — the failure to establish a common interest. The selection of a 
relevant 'negative' case may cause problems, however, as in principle numerous 
instances can be identified in which the phenomenon of interest has not occurred, but 
not all of these allow for a relevant comparison.111 Mahoney and Goertz have 
formulated two conditions a 'negative' case has to fulfil in order for a comparison with 
the positive case to be relevant. First, the two cases should be highly similar to help 
control for background features (Mahoney and Goertz, 2004: 655). Second, the 
negative case must meet what they call the 'possibility principle'. This principle states 
that in order for a comparison between a positive and a negative to generate relevant 
results, there should have existed a real possibility in the negative case for a positive 
outcome — the establishment of a common interest — to have occurred (Mahoney and 
Goertz, 2004: 658). 
Clearly, the 1970s attempt to establish EMU meets these two criteria. As 
explained above, the case is highly similar to the 1990s case, and therefore helps to 
control for background features. Moreover, in contrast to many other instances in 
which EMU was discussed, the 1970s attempt to establish a monetary union fulfils the 
'possibility principle' since it was the first time that the national states seriously 
contemplated the establishment of EMU (Mahoney and Goertz, 2004: 657-8). During 
the negotiations concerning the Werner plan, a real 'opportunity' for the 
establishment of a common interest with respect to EMU existed (Mahoney and 
Goertz, 2004: 658). In all previous instances, plans for monetary unification had not 
l
'
M
 For instance, a common interest in the establishment of EMU did not exist during the Second World 
War, or in the early 1960s, however, a comparison between either of these episodes in the history of EMU 
with the 1990s case would not have generated relevant results. 
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seriously been considered by the leaders of the member states (see Chapter 5) 
Moreover, the plans for the establishment of the EMS were strictly intergovernmental 
from the start, and therefore did not constitute an attempt to establish a common 
interest on the matter of monetary union 
Furthermore, because the aim of this thesis is to study the processes leading 
up to a convergence of national preferences, it was an advantage that in both cases 
decision making on the initial plans for the establishment of a European monetary 
union was only possible after a long and difficult process The time that elapsed and 
the many domestic and international interactions involved in this process, allowed for 
all kinds of psychological and political processes to take place, and therefore, the study 
of the different national preference convergence mechanisms identified in the 
hypotheses was possible This made studying the process of making and breaking a 
common interest feasible 
Finally, the choice of EMU makes it possible to discard two alternative 
explanations of the difference in outcome Firstly, it could be assumed that central 
decision makers who represent different states but share party affiliation will, due to 
their general agreement on ideological principles, reach a common understanding 
sooner However, in both cases, the ideological background of the French and German 
decision makers differed significantly In the 1970s, the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) was the governing party in Germany, while in France a conservative, the 
Gaullist Pompidou, occupied the Elysée Nor did German and French decision makers 
of the late 1980s share the same party affiliation At this time, the conservative Kohl 
headed a government of CDU/CSU (conservatives) and FPD (liberals), while in France 
the Socialist Party of President Mitterrand had regained its parliamentary majority, 
and consolidated the presidency Overlap in ideological affiliation cannot account for 
the different outcomes 
Naturally, the cases do differ significantly on the level of Europeamsation 
During the two decades that separate the two cases, several institutional changes took 
place in Europe, amongst which the establishment of the European Council, the 
expansion of the Community's competences into more policy areas, and the 
enlargements of 1973, 1981 and 1986 These instances of further Europeamsation had 
resulted in the 1990s in a European political system that was more fragmented and 
complex than that of the 1960s What is more, due to the rising status of the 
Bundesbank over the years (Heisenberg, 1999 39, 43), the German political system had 
become more fragmented However, this difference in the institutional lay-out of the 
national and European political systems cannot in itself account for the different 
outcomes either On the contrary, the more complex and fragmented a political 
system, the harder it would be for its members to reach agreement Therefore, the 
conclusion would follow that in the 1990s the European and German political systems 
were less conducive to reaching intra- and interstate agreements in the monetary issue-
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area than in the 1970s. Paradoxically, however, it was precisely in the early 1990s that 
a common interest was reached, whereas the attempt to come to an agreement in the 
1970s had failed. 
4-2.2 The Choice of States and State Representatives 
With regard to the countries to be studied, the choice of France and Germany was 
made on theoretical grounds (Baarda, De Goede and Teunissen, 1996: 74). In the 
literature on international relations, France and Germany are generally considered to 
constitute what is called the minimal contributing set for European integration. This 
set comprises the 'subset of members each of whose contribution is necessary to the 
production of the [collective] good' (Van de Kragt, Orbell and Dawes, 1983: 113; cf. 
Lieshout, 1993: 225-6). In other words, it is assumed that the existence of a common 
interest between these two states alone forms the necessary prerequisite for the 
establishment of European co-operation (see Section 3.2). Therefore, the preferences of 
these states are pivotal in determining the failure or success of any initiatives to 
establish further European integration, and are therefore theoretically the most 
relevant states (Van der Vleuten, 2001: 84). Despite the fact that since the late 1960s, 
several new member states have joined the European Communities, the status of 
Germany and France with respect to the 'Grand Bargains' had not changed. Even in 
the 1990s, these states constituted the axis of the Union (cf. Dinan, 1994: 91)· 
The selection of the members of the decision-making elite to be studied, 
requires a more elaborate justification. As I explained in Chapter 3, in this thesis, 
national preferences are not assumed to be that of a unitary actor. Rather, the national 
preference has been defined as the outcome of a political struggle amongst a state's 
pivotal decision makers (the members of the ultimate decision making unit, UDU). 
For this reason, it is necessary to determine precisely which actors will be characterised 
as members of the UDU in the French and German decision-making processes as far as 
the establishment of EMU is concerned. To be able to reach a conclusion on the 
assignment of decision makers to the French and German UDU, a short overview will 
be presented of the characteristics of the European monetary issue-area, the French and 
German political system, and the interaction between the national and European 
political systems. 
The European monetary issue-area is part of a state's monetary policy making 
as well as its European policy making. Both aspects influence the set of actors involved 
in the preference formation process. Firstly, preference formation on the establishment 
of a European monetary union naturally involves the monetary authorities of the state; 
for instance the Ministers of Financial and Economic Affairs, and the Presidents of the 
national Central Banks. Secondly, actors responsible for European policy making will 
naturally be part of the preference-formation process. This may involve state 
representatives in the European Council, the Councils of Ministers, EU Committees 
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(Monetary Committee and the Committee of Central Bank Governors), and Ad Hoc 
Committees (Werner and Delors Committees). The UDU may (though not 
necessarily) include Heads of State and Government, and Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
as well. Which actors are in fact included in the national preference formation 
concerning a certain issue, however, is also dependent on the national political system. 
In France, the UDU includes, first and foremost, the President. He may be 
characterised as the most powerful political actor, due to his substantial decision-
making powers across a wide range of policy areas, but in foreign and European 
decision making in particular. The President determines, for instance, the French 
position on major issues of European institutional development. The President's role in 
European affairs has further been strengthened by the establishment of the European 
Council. Additionally, within the French political system there are several institutions 
which share the President's responsibility for the co-ordination of European policy 
making. These co-ordinating institutions are supervised by the French Prime Minister. 
However, in practice any autonomous influence on the part of the Matignon is 
generally limited to periods of cohabitation. 
Another actor involved in European decision making is the French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, who has a seat in the General Affairs Council (the European Council of 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs). However, the influence of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in European economic and monetary affairs has often been successfully 
contested by the Minister of Finance, who is responsible for monetary issues and claims 
responsibility over international and European economic policy making. Moreover, the 
Minister of Finance represents France in the European Council of Economic and 
Financial Affairs (ECOFIN). This is one of the most important European Councils of 
Ministers and for a long time was considered to be the central actor in European 
monetary policy making, especially at times when the General Affairs Council was 
dealing with other major European issues. However, the role of the Minister of Finance 
was severely limited by President Giscard in the late 197()s. Some of the Ministry's 
monetary responsibilities are shared with the French Central Bank, whose President 
occupies a seat in the European Committee of Central Bank Governors. However, in 
contrast to the German central bank, until the late 1990s, the French central bank 
took its orders from politicians and its autonomous input in monetary policy-making 
was therefore modest. 
All in all, it may be concluded that - in general - the ultimate decision unit 
within the French preference formation process concerning the establishment of a 
European economic and monetary union has a.predominant leader (see Section 3.4.1) 
configuration with the President as the dominant domestic actor. In periods of 
cohabitation, however, the UDU is more likely to resemble a multiple autonomous actor 
configuration (Hermann and Hermann, 1989: 368). 
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The German political system differs significantly from the French. The 
German governmental system is characterised by a high degree of fragmentation and 
sectorisation, and the individual German ministries enjoy considerable policy-making 
autonomy Moreover, the German political system is characterised by a general lack of 
co-ordination mechanisms. This lack of co-ordination has at times meant that German 
decision making on European affairs has been fragmented or even inconsistent. The 
first actor involved in German national decision making on European monetary issues 
is the Chancellor, who is assigned the responsibility for framing governmental action 
{Richtlmienkompetenz) This allows him or her an active and directive role in any issue-
area of his or her choice. Whether the Chancellor will in fact become involved in 
decision making on European monetary issues is thus dependent on his or her personal 
interests. In general, the role of the Chancellor has been strengthened since the 
establishment of the European Council in 1974 In addition to the Chancellor, the 
German Minister of Foreign Affairs is assigned responsibility for European political 
co-operation, alongside the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry has had a Junior 
Minister for European Affairs, responsible for co-ordinating German policy on 
European integration, since 1972 During Germany's Presidency of the European 
Council, the tasks of both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Junior Minister for 
European Affairs expand significantly 
As for the German economic and financial authorities, their status differs 
significantly from their French colleagues, and has dramatically changed over time 
Until I972 the German Ministry of Economic Affairs was responsible for national 
economic and monetary policy making. However, since the transfer of the money and 
credit department from the Ministry of Economic Affairs to the Ministry of Finance by 
Helmut Schmidt in that year, the Ministry of Finance has held responsibility for 
monetary policy making and monetary co-operation (together with the Bundesbank, see 
below), and occupied the German seat in ECOFIN The Ministry of Economics retains 
only the minor task of co-ordinating routine European policy making and the 
communication between the German government and its Permanent Representative in 
Brussels 
The last — but by no means least — German financial authority involved in 
European monetary decision making is the Bundesbank. In contrast to its French 
equivalent, the German Central Bank is constitutionally independent from the 
German government, meaning that it can decide on its course of action without 
seeking advice from the government (Loedel, 1999. 44-55) Moreover, the objectives 
of the Bundesbank - which are laid down in the Bundesbank law of 1957 - differ from 
that of the government in that its primary function is the regulation of the amount of 
money in circulation with the aim to guard internal currency stability (price-stability) 
and external currency stability (stabilising the exchange rate of the DM) The Bank has 
a wide range of monetary instruments at its disposal to further these goals (Loedel, 
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1999: 10-11, 39-41). Since the mid-1970s, the status and reputation of the Bundesbank 
has significantly increased (Heisenberg, 1999: 39, 43), and as a result, so had its 
influence. 
In principle, the German UDU in the European monetary issue-area resembles 
a multiple autonomous actor configuration. Decision-making power has been shared by, 
either the Minister of Economic Affairs (until 1972), or the Minister of Financial 
Affairs (from 1972 onwards), the Bundesbank, the Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as 
the Chancellor (if he or she decides to get involved). However, in both the French and 
the German case, it should be noted that - as argued in Chapter 3 - the actual UDU 
may differ from the institutional UDU, due to an actor's special interest (or the lack 
thereof) in a certain issue, or its political skills (see Section 3.4.1). 
Taking into account the issue at stake and the institutional characteristics of 
the European and national political systems, as well as the specifics of the periods to be 
studied (no cohabitation, the status of the different actors), it has been decided to 
conduct an in-depth study of the following central decision makers: in the 1970s, the 
French President and the Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs, as well as the 
German Chancellor and the Minister of Economic Affairs; in the 1990s, the French 
President, the German Chancellor, as well as the President of the Bundesbank. 
4.3 Justification of the Research Strategy 
As explained before, I have chosen to conduct a comparative case study. This case 
study design will be complemented by the technique of process tracing, which has 
significant advantages for the central question to be answered in this thesis (see Section 
4.3.1). Moreover, process tracing may also help to reduce the many vartables, small Ν 
problem associated with case studies. 
4.3.1 The Advantages of Process Tracing in Exploratory Research 
Determining the precise causal mechanisms which led to the establishment of a 
common interest between France and Germany in the 1990s, is one of the main goals 
of this thesis. In order to do this, complementing the comparative case study design 
with process tracing is a logical decision. Process tracing is a technique explicitly 
designed to identify the 'intervening causal process' between the independent and the 
dependent variable (Bennett and George, 1997b: 25). The process tracing technique 
allows the researcher to look for the micro-laws that explain each step of the causal 
process.115 In other words, process tracing enables the researcher to test 'whether all of 
145
 As King, Keohane, and Verba have rightly observed 'an infinity of causal steps between any two links 
in the chain of causal mechanisms' can be distinguished (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 86). However, 
this does not mean that all such links should be examined. Which of these many steps should be traced is 
theoretically determined and thus depends on the research objectives and hypotheses of the study at hand 
(Bennett and George, 1997a· 10) 
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the intervening variables were consistent with the expectations of the causal theory 
under consideration and the causal mechanisms it posits' (Bennett and George, 1997a 
10, cf George and Bennett, 2004 205-232) 
The use of process tracing is especially relevant for the analysis conducted in 
this thesis for three reasons First, process tracing is an especially fruitful strategy to 
use in the study of intervening variables like preferences, motivations, intentions, and 
beliefs, or causal mechanisms like learning and persuasion (Bennett and George, 
1997a 17), since these are variables and mechanisms that are almost impossible to 
uncover using other research strategies Second, several scholars have identified 
particular major events (such as the monetary crisis of 1971, the oil crisis of 1973, the 
crisis of the French franc in 1983, and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989) as 
influencing the outcome of agreements between France and Germany on monetary 
union (Baun, 1995, 1996, Grieco, 1995, McNamara, 1998, Sandholtz, 1993, Van Riel 
and Metten, 2000, see Section 2 4 4) However, none of these scholars have 
investigated whether a link between these events and national preference change 
actually existed In other words, no-one has established whether the relationships 
between these events and changes in national preferences indeed exist or are spurious 
(George, 1979 46, Hout and Pellikaan, 1995 24, Bennett and George, 1997a 18) 
While in the literature, claims of a covanance between certain events and certain 
instances of national preference change thus have frequently been made, there has been 
a marked lack of interest in demonstrating the causal mechanisms that may link these 
events to the French or German decision makers' resolve (or lack of it) to establish a 
European economic and monetary union One of the goals of this thesis is to fill this 
lacuna in the literature and to establish whether the major events that have been 
assigned significance in the process of establishing EMU (or the failure thereof) are in 
fact linked to changes in national preferences, and if so, by which psychological or 
political (causal) mechanisms Using a case study design supplemented with process 
tracing is thus especially relevant for answering the questions posed in this thesis 
Finally, a case study design combined with process tracing enables the 
researcher to deal more effectively with equifinality, the fact that more than one causal 
path is consistent with the outcome (Bennett and George, 1997a 5, George and 
Bennett, 2004 207) In Chapter 3, three psychological and one political mechanism 
have been distinguished that can all form the link between external events and changes 
in the national preference Through process tracing, the causal chain that was actually 
responsible for a change in the national preference may be identified (George, 1979 
58) Process tracing is therefore crucial for the research in this thesis 
Naturally, there are also some difficulties associated with the use of process 
tracing Theories cannot formulate detailed explanations of all of the steps in a causal 
process (Lieshout, 1999 168-9, Lieshout and Hout, 1999 64-5) For this reason, it is 
imperative to formulate theoretical propositions about the relevant steps in the causal 
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process Moreover, these propositions and the causal mechanisms identified should be 
sufficiently specified, clearly operationalised, and mutually exclusive (see Sections 3 3 
and 4 5) If this is the case, then 'evidence that a single necessary intervening variable 
along this path was contrary to expectations strongly impugns any hypothesis whose 
causal affects rely on that causal path alone' (Bennett and George, 1997a 11) In this 
manner, the possibility for falsification is much larger than when only the inputs and 
outcomes of the process are being tested 
4 3 2 Dealing with the Many Variables, Small Ν and External Validity Problem 
Notwithstanding the fact that a comparative case study design is a good research 
strategy for this thesis, small-N studies suffer from the many variables, small-N 
problem 1 4 6 This problem arises from the mathematical law that in order to obtain a 
unique solution for equations to be simultaneously resolved, it is necessary to have the 
same number of equations as there are unknowns In other words, when a researcher 
has 3 independent variables but only 2 observations on the dependent variable, no 
single variable causing the outcome can be isolated (Bennett and George, 1997a 9, 
Swanborn, 1996 91-5) 
While this problem cannot be eliminated completely, there are a number of 
ways to reduce its effect, several of which will be used in this thesis The plausibility of 
theoretical claims based on case study research may be enhanced when 'alternative 
explanations are considered and found to be less consistent with the data' (George, 1979 57-8, 
italics in original, cf Bennett and George, 1997b 8) In other words, while 
conducting case study research, an explicit effort should be made to search for evidence 
invalidating the researcher's own theoretical view ('t Hart, 1985 480) In this thesis, 
this precept has been followed in two ways First, in Chapter 2, the evidence 
pertaining to the central hypotheses of the two most prominent explanations of the 
national preferences concerning the establishment of EMU in 1990s was reviewed 
Second, during the analysis of the chosen cases, an explicit effort will be made to 
uncover signs of individual cognitive belief change and the workings of the 
psychological mechanisms of national preference change through learning and 
persuasion, causal effects and mechanisms whose occurrence would be less in 
accordance with the theoretical model put forward in Chapter 3 (see Chapter 3, 
hypotheses Id and le, 3a) 
The second manner in which the scope of the many variables, small N-problem 
may be limited, is by increasing the number of observations on which the conclusions 
will be based (without actually increasing the number of cases) Since this will provide 
the researcher with more measurements of a phenomenon, more variables can be 
included in the analysis and the validity of the research increases (Swanborn, 1996 94-
This problem has also been referred to as the degrees of freedom problem (Swanborn, 1996 91-5) 
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5). There are several ways of doing this (Swanborn, 1996: 94-109; King, Keohane and 
Verba, 1994: 217-28; Moravcsik, 1998: 79), two of which will be used in this thesis. 
First, a researcher can increase the number of observations by distinguishing 
sub-units at a lower level of aggregation (Swanborn, 1996: 96-9). For while King, 
Keohane and Verba have defined a case study as a study encompassing a single 
observation (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 208; cf. Eckstein, 1975: 85), they also 
have rightly noted that 'one case may actually contain many potential observations' 
that are relevant to the theory under evaluation (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 
208). In other words, by disaggregating the unit of analysis (for instance the 
establishment of a common interest) into sub-units (such as changes in the French and 
German national preferences and/or the individual decision maker's preferences), a 
single case may yield many observations and allow for within-case comparisons of these 
sub-units and the causal mechanisms causing them.H7 
Second, the number of observations can be increased by deriving more 
expectations from the same theoretical model, and thereby increasing the number of 
dependent variables on which an influence can be expected (Swanborn, 1996: 103-4). 
The rationale behind this is that, when a theory is to be accepted as a plausible 
explanation of a certain phenomenon, the case should provide evidence supporting all 
hypotheses that may be derived from the theory. The more expectations derived from a 
single theory, which are empirically supported, the more valid the causal inferences 
made (Swanborn, 1996: 104). By deriving a large number of hypotheses from the 
Statist Cognitive theory concerning the establishment of common interests, as well as 
the mechanisms leading to such a common interest, a very thorough test of the theory 
was designed on the basis of only two cases (see Section 3.7). The explicit focus on 
causal mechanisms rather than causal effects, and the use of process tracing in this 
thesis (see Section 4.3.1), therefore reduces the many variables, small N-problem 
significantly. 
In addition, a strategy will be used that George and Bennett have referred to 
as structured focused comparison. The strategy is cal led focused because the researcher uses 
his or her theoretical approach to determine which variables are of interest, which cases 
should be selected (see Section 4.3.2), how the central variables should be 
operationalised (see Section 4.4.), and which data should be employed and reported in 
the study. In other words, the researcher deals 'selectively with only certain aspect of 
the historical case', the nature of these aspects being determined by the adopted 
theoretical view (George, 1979: 61-2; cf. Bennett and George, 1997b: 2; George and 
1,7
 More specifically, disaggregating the unit of analysis in this study (the establishment of a common 
interest) into sub-units (the changes in national preferences) increases rhe number of observations from 2 
(the two cases) to 4 (changes in the French and German national preference in the late 1960s and the late 
1980s). Moreover, disaggregating these sub-units (into the preferences of central decision makers) 
increases the number of observations to 7. 
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Bennett, 2004: 67-72). In addition, the strategy of structured focused comparison asks 
a set of standardised questions of each case to ensure the acquisition of comparable data 
from the cases and enable comparison (Bennett and George, 1997b: 3-4). The method 
is structured 'because it employs general questions to guide the data collection and 
analysis in that historical case', and therefore only a selection of the available data and 
information is used and reported (George, 1979: 61-2; Bennett and George, 1997b: 2). 
Again, this selection is dictated by the theoretical lens adopted by the researcher 
(George, 1979: 50-1). 
4.4 The Art of Brain Picking 
Now the selection of the case and research strategy has been justified, one issue 
remains to be dealt with. For, in order to be able to test many of the hypotheses 
introduced in Chapter 3, variables like preference and preference change have to be made 
measurable. However, when trying to study decision makers' preferences or changes in 
them, one is faced with an important methodological problem: preferences are located 
in the minds of individuals and therefore cannot be observed directly (Fiske and 
Taylor, 1991: 269; Gallhofer, Saris and Melman, 1986: 6; Axelrod, 1976b: 252). 
In principle, this problem is not insurmountable. When unable to observe the 
characteristics of variables directly, a scientist may study their observable consequences 
(King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 41). Following this line of reasoning, we can 
conclude that there will be two observable consequences of having certain particular 
preferences: the actual decisions taken on the one hand, and written or recorded 
statements on the other. In other words, when actors have different preferences, these 
differences are reflected in the decisions or statements they make. Both indicators have 
significant drawbacks (see below), but it is important to remember that without 
selecting one of them, preferences cannot be studied. 
In my opinion, when trying to answer the question of whether, to what 
degree, and in what way central decision makers' preferences have changed, studying 
statements is preferable to studying decisions. By using statements it is possible to 
distinguish policy preference from value change as well as decision makers' preferences 
concerning the different dimensions of a the establishment of EMU (see Section 4.5.1). 
This is vital for testing several of the hypotheses put forward in Chapter 3. Moreover, 
decision makers' preferences are used in this thesis ultimately to explain their decisions 
to pursue or to block the development of EMU. If decisions were used to derive 
preferences, the results of this study would risk being tautological. Therefore, the 
research strategy of this chapter will be 'to base what is being measured on what is 
being asserted' (Axelrod, 1976a: IO).1"8 
' ^ The choice to study statements rather than decisions still leaves several research strategies open For 
instance, political psychologists have often measured beliefs and cognitions in experimental settings or 
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4Λ-1 Operational Coding versus Cognitive Mapping 
Several methods have been developed for studying decision makers' worldviews and 
beliefs 'from a distance'. Two of the most highly developed methods of achieving this 
are the operational code and the cognitive map (Young and Schäfer, 1998: 65; Rosati, 
2000: 54-5).H9 These methods have some common features, namely the fact that they 
can both provide understanding of decision makers' preferences and beliefs, assist the 
investigation of the role of ideas, and allow the study of the evolution of knowledge 
and identities.'50 Both methods are also slow and laborious, requiring an interpretative 
review of data by the researcher (Verbeek, 2003: 27-30; Young and Schäfer, 1998: 71, 
75). In other respects, however, the methods differ significantly. 
The operational coding technique, for instance, relies on a set of standardised 
questions selected beforehand about certain issues (such as the individual's cognitive 
beliefs about history, international relations, power and opponents) which are 
generally deemed important in foreign policy making (Verbeek, 1990: 100-103; 2003: 
27-30; Young and Schäfer, 1998: 69-72).1" The researcher seeks to derive the subject's 
answers to these questions by studying a selection of statements made by the central 
decision maker prior to the decision-making moment. The operational code resulting 
from this analysis is used to formulate expectations about how the actor will define the 
problems it will be faced with, which alternatives it considered, and which decision it 
will take. 
The cognitive map, on the other hand, is a method for uncovering decision 
makers' beliefs. 'Beforehand no assumptions are made about the possible relevance of 
beliefs for foreign policy making' (Verbeek, 2003: 28). Instead, the concepts used to 
analyse the pivotal decision maker's cognitive beliefs are derived directly from his or 
her own assertions. Subsequently, these assertions are transformed into a graphical 
representation in which the concepts used by the actor are depicted as points and the 
through surveys (Young and Schäfer, 1998' 64; Iyengar and McGuire, 1993: 24, 31). However, since the 
events to be studied have taken place in history and many of the decision makers are unavailable or 
deceased, the requirements for these strategies can not be met in this thesis (cf. George, 1979: 49) 
"
9
 In addition to these methods, Smith mentions image-theory, the openness of belief systems, analogies, 
and the Brecher-method (Smith, 1988: 18-27) However, as Verbeek has rightly argued, the fitst three of 
these are sub-methods that are also used in other research strategies (Verbeek, 1990' 99). In addition, the 
Brecher method is not suitable to answer the central question of this thesis, because it is aimed at 
mapping the decision makers' psychological and operational environment and to determine the relative 
influence of cognitive ideas and external environment on the decision making process (Verbeek, 1990· 
100-101). Young and Schäfer mention image theory and conceptual complexity in addition to the 
operational code framework and cognitive mapping (Young and Schäfer, 1998: 68-88). However, these 
methods are not autonomous techniques either, they overlap with operational coding and cognitive 
mapping 
"
0
 Both methods are rooted in literature concerning the consistency-seeking nature of human psychology 
(Abelson, Aronson and McGuire, 1968; Festinger, 1957; Oskamp and Cameron, 1977). 
' " For an overview of the operational code categories, see (Verbeek, 2003' 29). 
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(causal) relations between these concepts as arrows. In general, cognitive maps are 
derived from the decision maker's speeches, writings and interviews which date from 
before the actual decision-making moment to be studied (Axelrod, 1976a: 6-7; 
Verbeek, 1990: 101; 2003: 28). Originally, the cognitive map was used to study how 
individuals arrive at their decisions and was aimed at devising a method to improve 
actors' decision-making skills (Axelrod, 1976a: 3; Young and Schäfer, 1998: 75). 
However, in the body of literature on cognitive mapping that has evolved over the 
years, the technique has generally been used to analyse how decision makers perceive 
policy alternatives to affect their goals, and to formulate expectations concerning 
decision makers' policy choices (Bonham, Sergeev and Parshin, 1997; Bonham and 
Shapiro, 1976, 1977; Hart, 1977). 
In this thesis, cognitive mapping is preferred over operational coding in order 
to determine decision makers' preferences and changes in them. This is due to two 
additional differences between the two techniques. Firstly, as Young and Schäfer have 
observed, 'one advantage that the cognitive map has over the operational code is its 
more discrete focus' (Young and Schäfer, 1998: 75; cf. Gallhofer, Saris and Melman, 
1986: 3-4; Rosati, 2000: 54-5). Because of the general orientation of the questions 
used to derive an operational code, such a code provides a generalised understanding of 
a decision maker's reasoning concerning a wide range of issues. Cognitive mapping, on 
the other hand, enables the researcher to limit the assertions (data) to be studied to 
those dealing with the central object to be studied.1" This enables a more thorough 
analysis of the decision maker's beliefs concerning a specific topic (Young and Schäfer, 
1998: 90). Given that the focus of this thesis is specific — the establishment of a 
European economic and monetary union - the latter approach is more appropriate. 
In addition, despite the fact that both operational coding and cognitive 
mapping subscribe to the 'core-periphery' conception of belief systems, an idea that is 
central to this study (see Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2), the two techniques define and 
operationalise the core of a belief system differently. The operational code technique 
defines the core of a belief system as consisting of those beliefs that remain stable over 
1,2
 The cognitive maps chat are used in this thesis are for this reason derived from the sections of decision 
makers' speeches that deal specifically with European economic and monetary integration (or related 
subjects, see below and note 165). As a result, the cognitive maps derived in this thesis reflect decision 
makers' beliefs concerning European monetary unification rather than their general belief system As 
stated above, this is one of the strengths of the cognitive map technique However, this also means that a 
cognitive map in itself cannot be used to determine the saliency of a decision maker's beliefs concerning 
European economic and monetary integration relative to its larger, more general beliefs. However, due to 
the fact that the choice was made to base the maps on sections of speeches with regard to European 
economic and monetary affairs rather than solely on statements concerning EMU alone, the maps also 
reflect the relations decision makers draw between concepts referring to the establishment of EMU and 
concepts referring to other, more general subjects. The cognitive maps therefore do indicate the 
relationships between decision makers' beliefs concerning European monetary unification and their more 
general beliefs. 
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time (Verbeek, 1990: 102). In other words, the core of the belief system is defined as 
being made up of those beliefs that do not change. Given the fact that in this thesis 
the relationship between the core of a decision maker's belief system and the stability 
of the beliefs constituting this core has the status of a hypothesis rather than a 
assumption (see hypotheses la and lb in Chapter 3), this definition clearly makes the 
operational code technique unsuitable for the analysis to be conducted here. This is 
because by defining core beliefs as those beliefs that do not change, the independent 
and dependent variables of these hypotheses would overlap. Cognitive mapping has no 
such drawback (for an elaboration of the definition of the core of a belief system in a 
cognitive map, see Section 4.5.5). All in all, cognitive mapping appears a more 
adequate technique for the research to be conducted in this thesis. 
4.5 Opera t ional isa t ion 
In this section, the central variables of this study will be operationalised. Firstly, the 
concept 'preference concerning the establishment of EMU' will be defined. The terms 
'common interest' and 'national preference' will then be operationalised. This is 
followed by a further introduction of the cognitive mapping technique, and an 
explanation how this technique will allow for the measurement of preference and belief 
change. The fourth subsection will deal with the mechanisms of political and 
psychological belief change, which will be measured through process tracing. Finally, 
the independent variables expertise and core beliefs will be operationalised and their 
values determined for each member of the respective UDUs. 
4.5.1 Dissecting the Common Interest in the Establishment of EMU 
In the theoretical chapter of this thesis, a common interest was defined as a 
convergence of national policy preferences on a certain issue. However, this definition 
still needs further clarification in order to make a national preference for the 
establishment of a European economic and monetary union measurable. 
It has been argued that for a common interest to come about, actors need not 
agree on the values they strive for, as long as they agree on the measures to be taken to 
realise these values. A common interest on the establishment of a European economic 
and monetary union therefore constitutes an agreement on the form of the union to be 
established, not on what goals such a union would serve. However, it remains unclear 
what exactly constitute the central characteristics of a European economic and 
monetary union, and on what exactly the French and German UDUs would have to 
agree for a common interest on this matter to come about. 
In my view, the concept European economic and monetary union may be 
disaggregated into three essential elements. First, such a union implies the existence of 
a supranational arrangement. This means that for such a union to be established, 
France and Germany will both have to opt to delegate monetary policy making 
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authority to a European central institution (a form of supranational co-operation) 
rather than to decide their monetary policies unilaterally, or within an 
intergovernmental framework. Second, the central characteristic of a monetary union is 
that the exchange rates of the member states are irrevocably fixed to one another.153 
For this reason, a common interest in a fixed exchange rate regime rather than a 
floating exchange rate arrangement should also exist. Third, for a European economic 
and monetary union to be established, some basic agreement on the path that would 
lead to such a Union must exist.154 
The agreement between France and Germany on all three dimensions 
constitutes a necessary precondition for a common interest in favour of the 
establishment of a European monetary union. A preference for a fixed exchange rate 
regime alone, for instance, does not necessarily constitute a preference for a European 
monetary union, for there are several other forms of fixed exchange rate regimes, such 
as a reserve currency system (Bretton Woods), or the Gold Standard. Strange as it may 
seem today, a preference for the return to either one of these systems was held by 
several pivotal decision makers until the late 1970s.'55 So, in order to establish 
whether a state prefers the establishment of a European monetary union over these 
other options, additional information is needed about its preference concerning the 
institutional form of co-operation. 
The essential difference in terms of institutional form between the three fixed 
exchange rate systems mentioned above is the question of control over decision 
making. In a monetary union, control over monetary policy making is delegated to a 
supranational authority. A reserve currency system such as the Bretton Woods system, 
on the other hand, allows the government or central bank issuing the anchor currency 
' " The establishment of a European monetary union does not necessarily involve the creation of a single 
currency In fact, neither the ECA-plans of 1949, nor the Werner Report of 1971 proposed the 
establishment of one (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
1M
 This operationalisation differs from that used by Moravcsik in The Choice for Europe. Moravcsik 
distinguishes only the supranational/intergovernmental and fixed/floating dimensions of EMU. Moreover, 
he analytically separates these elements, studying the preference for either fixed or floating exchange rates 
in the first stage of his theoretical framework (preference formation), and the preference for supranational 
or intergovernmental co-operation in the third phase (institutional choice) This means that the former 
preference is analysed by the liberal theory on preferences introduced by Moravcsik, whereas the latter 
preference is not The analytical separation of these issues may be the reason that Moravcsik does not make 
an explicit distinction between states' preferences concerning the establishment of the EMS and the EMU 
(Moravcsik, 1998: Chapter 4 and 6) In my view, however, a preference for the establishment of the 
European Monetary System differs significantly from a preference for the establishment of a European 
Economic and Monetary Union, for while the former is based on intergovernmental decision making, the 
latter is a supranational system. 
' " It has often been argued that systems like the Bretton Woods system, or the Gold Standard were 
economically flawed and inefficient (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1994, 507, 544-6). However, this verdict 
was already passed years before their demise (Tnffin, 1961) and did not stop policy-makers from 
endorsing them. Moreover, the same has been said of the European Economic and Monetary Union. 
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(in the case of the Bretton Woods system, the United States) to set the parameters of 
monetary policy making. So, in essence a reserve currency system is a hegemonic 
monetary system, assigning control to one member state. Finally, the Gold Standard 
can be seen as a symmetric intergovernmental monetary system. Each participating 
state retains control over its own national monetary policy, and no state is placed in a 
privileged position. 
However, if member states are unable to agree on the nature of the transition 
process which will lead towards a monetary union, such a union cannot be established. 
In the history of EMU two competing visions on the process leading up to the 
establishment of a European monetary union have emerged: the economist and the 
monetarist visions.156 Adherents of the economist vision (also called the Krönungs-
Theorie) argue that harmonisation of economic policies must precede monetary 
integration. In their view, reduced fluctuation margins between the European 
currencies can only be maintained, and economic difficulties avoided, if substantial 
differences in economic trends between the member states are prevented. This point of 
view is closely associated with an ordoliberal view on economic and monetary policy-
making. This view is characterised first and foremost by a belief in the primacy of 
price stability ('sound money'), which is the guiding principle by which all other 
policy-measures are assessed. Crucially, in the eyes of the ordoliberals there is no trade-
off between price stability on the one hand, and employment and economic growth on 
the other (Verdun, 2000b: 100). To ensure price stability, European economic and 
monetary unification must meet two requirements. First, it has to ensure that member 
states adopt stringent budgetary and fiscal policies, since expansive budgetary and 
fiscal policies overburden monetary policy, resulting in high interest rates and creating 
inflation. Moreover, budgetary deficits force states to increase levels of borrowing to 
finance these deficits, which in turn also puts upward pressure on interest rates and 
inflation. Moreover, because taking out loans causes an increase in the international 
money supply, it undermines the monetary basis of a state's currency (Krugman and 
Obstfeld, 1994: 347, 457, 371). A similar reasoning leads ordoliberals to denounce 
monetary financing of budgetary deficits. In addition, fear of inflation makes 
ordoliberals reluctant to engage in monetary co-operation with states who do not share 
their 'sound money' ideas, for as the quip attributed to the German leading economist 
Röpke goes, 'the sick may contaminate the sound' (Röpke as cited in: Dyson, 1999: 
277).,57 
1,6
 The latter vision must not be confused with the economic school of thought based on the work of 
Milton Friedman, which is generally considered as one of the founding fathers of the ordoliberal position 
157
 Tsoukahs, however, suggests that the real reason for the opposition of German financial experts to a 
monetary union were the pleas for the creation of additional credit facilities 'which would mean that 
Germany would have to finance at least part of the deficits of other countries' (Tsoukahs, 1977: 57). 
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The second ordoliberal requirement for European monetary unification is the 
independence of the future European Central Bank, as only a Central Bank that is 
constitutionally, politically and financially autonomous will guarantee that monetary 
policy making will be based on expert analysis, and the true state of the economic 
fundamentals, rather than on political or electoral considerations (Dyson, 1999 276) 
Moreover, monetary policy making authorities need to be credible (Verdun, 2000b 
100) In the eyes of the ordoliberals only an independent central bank can be fully 
reliable. Crucially, they combine these ideas concerning European economic and 
monetary unification with ardent support for the primacy of economic over political or 
geo-political considerations In other words, their 'sound' economic ideas should not 
be subordinated to political or geo-political interests. 
In contrast to the economists, adherents to the monetarist vision (also called 
Locomotiv-Theorte) advocate the early implementation of monetary measures like the 
reduction of the margins of fluctuations between European currencies According to 
monetarists, these monetary measures will automatically induce further economic 
integration because the need to maintain fixed exchange rates will force governments 
to harmonise their economic policies Therefore, there is no reason for economic 
integration to precede monetary integration The monetarist point of view is associated 
with the Keynesian approach to economic policies (Verdun, 2000b) Central to the 
ideas of the Keynesian/monetanst coalition is that they are convinced that a trade-off 
exists between price stability and economic goals like employment and economic 
growth. In their eyes, a strict fiscal and budgetary policy will prevent governments 
from using government spending to stimulate economic growth, reduce 
unemployment, or finance social security measures. Unlike the ordoliberals, 
Keynesians perceive that in certain circumstances an expansionist government policy -
if necessary funded by international credits — will be beneficial for the economy and 
the people Furthermore, monetary, budgetary and fiscal policies are often considered 
to be political instruments to be used to further political and social goals. In other 
words, in direct contrast to the ordoliberals' technical view of monetary policy, the 
Keynesian/monetanst coalition generally adhere to the primacy of the political 
In conclusion, for a common interest in the establishment of a European 
economic and monetary union to exist, both the German and the French U D U must 
simultaneously prefer the establishment of a fixed exchange rate mechanism, 
supranational integration, as well as agree on the route towards this goal A 
convergence of the preferences of France and Germany on all three of these dimensions 
is a necessary prerequisite for the establishment of a European monetary union. The 
research to be conducted in this thesis will therefore focus explicitly on decision 
makers' preferences concerning these three dimensions 
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4.5.2 Cognitive Mapping and Individual Preferences 
To analyse the preferences of the pivotal domestic actors and to monitor changes in 
these preferences, cognitive maps of their belief systems will be drawn. With these 
maps, decision maker's policy preferences, causal beliefs and values will be clearly 
demonstrated. For every decision maker two maps will be drawn. The first map will be 
derived from statements and writings made during a period preceding the decision to 
engage in the attempt to establish a European monetary union. The second map will 
be derived from statements and writings made during the period following that 
decision.158 By comparing these maps, it may be determined whether any changes in 
the decision makers' beliefs have taken place. 
Before explaining how decision makers' preferences may be established by 
using cognitive maps, the technique will be explained. In contrast to content analysis, 
which is essentially 'a counting procedure', the technique of cognitive mapping is 
specifically aimed at analyzing the relationships between the concepts that a decision 
maker uses (Axelrod, 1976a: 7). In other words, the basis of analysis in a cognitive 
map is the relationship between concepts, not the concepts themselves. This allows a 
researcher to determine whether and how decision makers link certain policy proposals 
to the values they strive for, and in this manner establish whether or not actors are in 
favour of the implementation of this policy. 
In general, cognitive maps are derived from existing statements and writings 
of policy makers. To transform these statements into maps 'the concepts a person uses 
are represented as points, and the causal links between these concepts are represented 
as arrows between these points. This gives a pictorial representation of the causal 
assertions of a person as a graph of points and arrows' (Axelrod, 1976a: 5).n9 
These arrows are attributed a sign to indicate whether the identified policy 
alternative is perceived to contribute to the realisation of a goal (value), or not, or 
whether the decision maker (explicitly) perceives the alternative to have no effect on 
the goal. For instance, German Minister Schiller's statement that 'wir leben inmitten 
einer erheblichen internationalen Preis- und Lohnwelle, die uns in unseren isolierten 
Anstrengungen um mehr Stabilität vor schwere Problemen stellt' {Bulletin des Presse-
und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung: nr. 126, 22 September 1970: 1301), indicates a 
perceived negative relationship between 'inflation abroad' {Preis- und Lohnwelle) and 
15,1
 In the 1970s case, all statements and writings on which the first cognitive maps are based date from 
prior to the Conference of The Hague. The second maps are based on statements from after the Conference 
of The Hague In the 1990s case, it was decided on the basis of the case study that the revolution in 
Eastern Europe in the summer of 1989 constituted a watershed for the three central decision makers 
studied Therefore, the first cognitive maps were based on statements and writings made before the 
publication of the Delors Report, and months before the fall of the Berlin Wall, while the second map was 
based on statements that dating from after the Summer of 1989 (see Appendix A) 
l w
 The concepts and relationships represented in the map are thus not pre-determined by the researcher, 
but represent thoughts and concepts used by the decision maker (Axelrod, 1976a: 6-7). 
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'German price stability' (Stabilität) which will be depicted by an arrow with a negative 
sign leading from the former to the latter concept (like the relation between Β and C 
in Figure 4.1).160 The ultimate result is a graphical representation of the different 
policy alternatives and goals that decision makers distinguish in their assertions, and 
the (sign of) the relationship between them (see Figure 4.1).161 
B ' ' 
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Figure 4.1: Example of a Cognitive Map 
In its original form, the method focuses exclusively on analysing the causal 
relations that decision makers presume to exist between the concepts they use 
(Axelrod, 1976b: 259-62). This is a serious limitation, particularly from a Social 
Constructivist point of view, as it excludes all normative assertions from the analysis 
(cf. Young, I996: 397). In recent years, however, the representational ability of 
cognitive mapping has been expanded to include as many as fourteen types of 
relationships between concepts (Young and Schäfer, 1998: 76). While this expansion 
of the technique assures that no information from the texts will be lost, this adaptation 
has some significant drawbacks. First, it has rendered the method less parsimonious, so 
much so that elaborate computer programs are needed to draw and analyse the 
cognitive maps, and only one or two decision makers can be studied. Secondly, the 
expansion has a serious methodological drawback, for the more types of relations are 
distinguished, the smaller the method's inter-coder reliability (Axelrod, 1976a: 8).162 
160
 For the coding rules used in deriving cognitive maps from assertions see (Bonham and Shapiro, 1986, 
Wnghtson, 1976) 
161
 In cognitive maps, the concepts used by the decision maker are depicted by a code (see Appendix C). 
l i2
 In contrast to the literature on the operational coding technique, scholars using the cognitive mapping 
technique have addressed the issue of inter-coder reliability Already in the 1976 volume edited by Robert 
Axelrod, efforts were made to come up with a formalization of the coding rules (Wnghtson, 1976: for 
later additions to the framework see, Bonham and Shapiro, 1986; Gallhofer, Saris and Melman, ^ S ó ' 8-
9). Moreover, on several occasions, scholars have investigated the level of inter-coder reliability of their 
studies and - overall - found that the use of the coding rules produced an acceptable level of inter-coder 
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For the purposes of the study to be conducted in this thesis, it is sufficient that 
relations between policies and decision makers' subjective interests, as well as their 
(shared) principled beliefs, are recorded in the maps. Any relationship drawn by the 
decision maker that may be 'viewed as equivalent, respectively, to the English 
expressions "is usefully or desirably associated with" and "is adversely or undesirably 
associated with'" should therefore be recorded and represented in the map (Lambert 
1966 quoted in: Axelrod, 1976a: S).16' 
In general, it is assumed that the most suitable sources to derive cognitive 
maps from are 'transcripts of significant decision-making moments' (Verbeek, 1990: 
101, my translation) for these are more reliable than public documents like letters, 
memo's, and autobiographies (Baarda, De Goede and Teunissen, 1996: 157; 
Moravcsik, 1998: 82-3). Furthermore, as opposed to interviews, using these existing 
sources has the advantage that the method allows for the study of preferences at a 
distance and is unobtrusive (Axelrod, 1976b: 257-9). Moreover, distortions of a 
decision maker's ideas due to hindsight, the desire to supply the reader with a more 
heroic or politically correct version of the truth, or lapses of memory can in this way be 
avoided (Baarda, De Goede and Teunissen, 1996: 157). Due to the fact that on the 
topic of this thesis primary sources were not generally available,161 the cognitive maps 
in this thesis are based on statements made by the central decision makers in writings, 
speeches, and interviews. These writings, speeches and interviews have the advantage 
that they are — generally speaking - easy to find, as often a whole series or collection of 
such documents of a certain decision maker exists. The existence of such collections of 
documents concerning a certain decision maker enables the researcher to trace the 
decision maker's beliefs over time (Hart, 1977: 117). 
When public instead of private documents are used to derive cognitive maps, 
there is an increased probability that the maps may not represent decision maker's true 
preferences. In order to deal with this problem, the maps in this study were composed 
on the basis of (extracts of) various speeches, writings, and interviews concerning the 
reliability (Axelrod, 1976a, Bonham, Sergeev and Parshin, 1997: 224-5; Hart, 1977; Young and Schäfer, 
1998). 
16
 ' Since the unit of analysis in cognitive mapping is the relationship rather than the concept, when 
analysing a text the focus is not on nouns but on verbs An analyst typically looks for the subject-verb-
object construction in the text that indicates a causal or quasi-causal relationship (Young, 1996. 397). 
ι ω
 The most interesting non-personal documents in my case are the official accounts of meetings and 
discussions between decision makers kept in government archives, or by the European Community. 
However, most of these documents are classified for 30 years (up to 60 years in the case of French 
governmental documents), although there are exceptions to this rule (cf. Ludlow, 2001) Transcripts of 
significant decision-making moments were thus not available for the 1990 case. Since comparing maps 
based on transcripts with maps that are based on public sources would render findings unreliable, it was 
decided to base all maps in this thesis on public sources. 
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establishment of a European economic and monetary union.165 Moreover, speeches, 
writings and interviews were chosen that were held in different settings, and directed 
at very different audiences (see Appendix A, for an overview of the speeches, writings 
and interviews used). This should ensure that the cognitive maps reflect decision 
makers' 'genuine' rather than 'strategic' preferences. 
Deriving preferences from cognitive maps is fairly straight-forward. In the 
map, the concept located on the right end (like concept E in Figure 4.1) constitutes 
what has been referred to as a value in Chapter 3. Any time decision makers place a 
positive evaluation on a certain value in their assertions, one may assume this value to 
have a direct positive effect on the decision maker's utility — their general and abstract 
sense of well-being — or the utility of the group or state of which they are a member 
(Hart, 1977: 119)·166 The value-concepts that are regarded as negative by the decision 
makers are marked grey in the cognitive maps (see concept F in Figure 4.1).167 To 
derive the value of a certain policy or proposal (like concept D in Figure 4.1), such as 
the establishment of a European Economic and Monetary Union, for a decision maker, 
the relation between this policy and the values distinguished in the map can be 
analysed. 
To analyse the relationship between the policy and the decision maker's 
values, the researcher has to derive all the consequent paths of a concept referring to a 
policy-proposal. For a consequent path of a certain policy to be determined, a concept 
"'
,
 Statements were selected from readily available speeches or writings that concern European policy 
making or external monetary policy making. From these sources the sections that dealt directly with 
European monetary co-operation were selected and analysed The selection of the section was based on 
content-analysis of the texts Only the sections including reference to European economic and monetary 
unification or those in which the terms 'monetary' 'co-operation' and 'European' (or any related terms like, 
unification, union, the EEC, EU, the Community or the Six) where all mentioned were analyzed In the 
sources stemming from the period before EMU was put on the political agenda (so those dating from 
before 1969, or from 197} until 1988), decision makers often did not explicitly mention the concept of 
monetary union In these texts, I have searched for sets of concepts relating to the three dimensions of 
EMU as discussed above More in particular, combinations of terms like Europe, European integration, fixed 
exchange rates, flexible exchange rates, international monetary system, European monetary system, supranational 
intergovernmental, tmtitutional organisation of Europe, European institutions, decision-making procedures, prue 
stability, finamial discipline, ECB independence, governmental expenditures, governmental budgetary defuiti, 
European!international credit facilities, employment, economic grouth, were searched for. 
166
 Due to the fact that the term utility is used predominantly by adherents of Rational Choice theory, it is 
often, and erroneously, perceived to refer by definition to decision makers' petty self-interest In this 
thesis, the concept must be conceived of as totally devoid of any normative connotation It refers to an 
individual's general well-being, however the decision maker in question may define it 
"'
7
 It is also possible to make a list of the values recorded in the map ranging from most preferred to least 
preferred using measures of their centrality and saliency (see Section 4 5 5 for an elaboration of these 
measures) However, for the purpose of this thesis this was seldom necessary, for, as became apparent 
when drawing the maps, most decision makers studied were quite consistent and straightforward in their 
preferences' a positive evaluation of, for instance, intetgovernmental co-operation was almost always 
coupled with a dislike for supranational arrangements and vice versa 
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that follows from (is 'causally' or 'quasi-causally' linked to) this policy should be 
identified, after which a concept must be identified that, in turn, is the result ofthat 
concept (in Figure 4.1, for instance, the concept D causally follows concept A, and is 
thus part of its consequent path). This procedure should be repeated until no following 
concepts may be distinguished. The resulting path, the consequent path, now links the 
policy in question to one of the decision maker's values (in Figure 4.1, for instance, the 
sequence A-D-E forms a consequent path from policy A to value E). By analysing the 
signs of the relationships that link all the concepts in the path, it may be established 
whether the policy is perceived to contribute positively or negatively to a certain 
ultimate value.168 It is by looking at this consequent path, in combination with the 
value attached by the decision maker to this specific value-concept, that we can 
determine whether the decision maker values the policy positively or negatively, and 
thus whether the actor concerned prefers its realisation or not."59 
In order to determine a decision maker's stance on one of the three aspects of 
EMU defined previously - mode of decision making, fixed or floating exchange rates, 
the nature of the process towards EMU — the value of certain concept combinations 
representing a certain consistent stance on one of the three dimensions of EMU will be 
determined (see Appendix E, Preferences on EMU-dimensions). To do this the values 
of certain policy-concepts that are indicative of the two opposing schools of thought 
(supranational versus intergovernmental, fixed versus floating exchange rates, 
monetanst/Keynesian versus economist/ordoliberal) on each of the dimensions will be 
16B
 A positive relationship between two variables means that if the value of the independent variable 
increases, the value of the dependent variable also increases A negative relationship means that if the 
value of the independent variable increases, the value of the dependent variable decreases A path between 
two variables that contains any number of zero-signs indicates that if the independent variable increase or 
decrease, no effect on the dependent variable is expected. A consequent path between two variables that 
includes only positive relationships (naturally) indicates that the variables are positively connected. A path 
that contains an uneven amount of negative relationships indicates a negative relationship between 
variables In contrast, a path that contains (in addition to any amount of positive relationships) an even 
amount of negative relationships, indicates that the variables are positively connected. This can be 
illustrated by examining the relationship some economists presume to exist between 'expansionary 
governmental policies' (independent variable), 'price stability' (intermediate variable) and 'employment' 
(dependent variable). While the individual relationships between the independent and intermediate, and 
the intermediate and dependent variables are negative (more expansion leads to less price stability, and 
more price stability leads to less employment) the resulting relationship between the independent variable 
and the dependent variable is positive: more expansions leads to less price stability which leads to more 
employment (Axelrod, 1976a· 7) 
169
 A decision maker will prefer the realisation of policies that are either linked to a positively evaluated 
value by a positive consequent path (see note 168), or one that is linked to a value that is evaluated 
negatively by a negative consequent path, while they will oppose the actualisation of policies that are 
either negatively linked to a positively evaluated value, or positively linked to a negatively evaluated 
value. Decision makers' preferences concerning a certain policy will be indeterminate when these are not 
connected (is linked by a consequent path containing one or more zero-signs) to its values, or through its 
various consequent paths is valued both positively and negatively (imbalanced paths) 
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determined. When combined, these values will give an indication of a decision maker's 
preferences concerning the three core issues involved in European economic and 
monetary unification.'70 
4.5.3 Cognitive Mapping and Preference Change 
One of the central purposes of this thesis is to determine whether the central decision 
makers experienced any preference change during the timeframe being studied, and to 
what extent such change led to the establishment of a common interest between 
France and Germany (or lack of it). To do this, decision makers' preferences are 
measured at two separate instances in time, and compared to determine the differences 
across time (Young and Schäfer, 1998: 78; cf. Heradstveit and Narvesen, 1978; 
Bonham, Shapiro and Trumble, 1979). 
However, establishing whether change has occurred by means of comparing 
cognitive maps is not as straightforward as it might first appear. The risk is that 
comparing cognitive maps at different points in time will produce unreliable results 
because if the texts used to draw up the two maps do not deal with subjects that are 
sufficiently similar, the differences in the maps caused by this incomplete overlap can 
mistakenly be interpreted as a sign of cognitive belief change. In other words, 
incomplete overlap in the source text content may render the findings unreliable 
(Young, 1996: 409). 
In order to be able to compare cognitive maps at different points in time, 
several measures have been taken to avoid such incomplete source overlap. First, rather 
than to perceive a crisis or an event as a single case, in this thesis an attempt will be 
made to establish the broader phenomenon of which such event or crisis is an instance 
of (for instance, the May 1968 crisis that Pompidou refers to, can be coded as an 
instance of large-scale political instability) and categorise these assertions under a 
broader concept (Heradstveit and Narvesen, 1978: 81). Second, the maps will be based 
upon (parts of) several speeches, writings and interviews over a short period of time 
(see Appendix A). This makes the results less likely to contain an overemphasis of a 
particular moment in time and thus reduces the risk of incomplete source overlap. The 
risk will be further limited by the fact that both the generation and analysis of data 
will explicitly focus on the three dimensions of European economic and monetary 
union mentioned above (Heradstveit and Narvesen, 1978: 81 see Section 4.5.1.). This 
means that not every relationship mentioned will be analysed, only those pertaining to 
a decision makers' preferences on the three dimensions of European economic and 
110
 For example, when a decision maker stresses the need for price stability and budgetary discipline and 
opposes the establishment of monetary integration without prior economic integration, this will indicate 
a Economist/ ordohberal stance on the issue of the development of EMU For a complete overview of the 
concepts used to determine a decision maker's stance on these three issues, see Appendix E, Preferences on 
EMU-dimensions. 
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monetary union. Thitd, the unit of analysis will not be the individual concept or 
relationship in each cognitive map but the broader preference concerning the 
dimensions of EMU that may be derived from these concepts (see Concept 
Comparisons in Appendix E). In other words, in this thesis only the stability of a 
decision maker's core beliefs (see Section 4.5.5), and the stability of its preference 
concerning the three dimensions of EMU (see below) will be determined. 
In the existing literature on this subject, comparisons of cognitive maps have 
focussed predominantly on the structural characteristics of decision makers' cognitive 
maps, such as the presence of causal cycles, the density, complexity and size of the 
maps (Hart, 1977; Young, 1996: 405-6; Van Esch, 2006; for an exception to the rule 
see: Bonham, Shapiro and Trumble, 1979). However, since these do not concern the 
content of decision makers' belief systems or changes therein, these analyses have little 
relevance for the questions to be dealt with in this thesis. In order to be able to draw 
conclusions with regard to the differences in content between maps, Young has 
developed a measure referred to as Concept Comparison}lx 
Concept Comparison enables the researcher to list the specific concepts and 
relationships that differ across maps for it indicates 'which concepts are in both maps 
and have identical relationships leading from them, which concepts are in both maps 
but have different relationships, and which concepts are unique to each structure' 
(Young, I996: 408). This measure is thus especially suited to uncover change in a 
decision maker's policy preferences, ultimate values, and causal beliefs across time. 
This Concept Comparison measure will be used to establish whether any change in a 
decision maker's core beliefs have occurred (see Section 4.5.5). The measure will also 
be applied to decision maker's beliefs concerning the three dimensions of EMU. This 
means that rather than to determine whether certain concepts are present in the two 
maps, the Concept Comparison tool will be applied to the concept combinations 
which represent a particular stance on each of the three dimensions of EMU. In this 
way, it can be determined whether an individual decision maker has experienced a 
preference change over time, and therefore whether individual belief change, or some 
political change caused the shift in the national preference concerning the 
establishment of EMU (see Preferences on EMU-dimensions in Appendix E). 
4-5.4 Measuring the Mechanisms of National Preference Change 
Establishment of a common interest can in principle be the result of psychological 
mechanisms like learning, persuasion and the imposition-of-will, or the political 
171
 Young distinguishes two other measures geared towards studying changes in the substance of beliefs 
(Young, 1996: 408). These measures will not be used in this thesis, for they focus solely on the core of the 
belief system and are able only to establish the level of change rather than whether preferences have changed 
and in what way 
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mechanism of turnover. Based on the statist cognitive preference-formation model 
introduced in Chapter 3, the proposition was put forward that belief change resulting 
from learning or persuasion is rare, and a change in national preferences — and 
therefore the establishment of a common interest — is more likely to be caused by 
turnover, or imposition-of-will. In order to test this hypothesis, a clear distinction 
among these mechanisms has to be made. In this section, the political mechanism of 
turnover will be operationalised. Moreover, applying the 4 dimensions used to define 
them in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.3.1 and Table 3.3), the psychological mechanisms of 
national preference change will be identified and operationalised. 
Turnover has been characterised as apolitical mechanism of national preference 
change. Therefore, it will not lead to individual cognitive belief change (see Table 
4.1). When comparison of the cognitive maps reveals no change (see Section 4.5.3), 
national preference change is thus likely to have been caused by turnover rather than 
by one oi the psychological mechanisms of national preference change. However, for a 
claim in favour of turnover to be plausible, there also has to be some evidence that a 
change of, or in the political system has taken place. More specifically, it may only be 
concluded that turnover has taken place when evidence is found that national 
preference change was preceded by elections, a change in government coalition, a 
change in the membership of the UDU, or a change in the status of a member of the 
UDU (see Table 4.1). 
While differentiating between turnover and the psychological mechanisms of 
national preference change is fairly straightforward, distinguishing between learning, 
persuasion and imposition-of-will is a good deal more complicated. The first way in 
which the psychological mechanisms of national preference change can be 
distinguished is by determining the level of social interaction involved in the process. 
As has already been stated, learning has been defined as an individual process, while 
persuasion and imposition-of-will can only take place through social interaction. This 
means that for a claim of persuasion or imposition-of-will to be plausible, some 
evidence of social interaction between the receiver and an advocate of a certain position 
on European economic and monetary integration prior to the occurrence of cognitive 
belief change has to be found. Furthermore, as these social mechanisms are assumed to 
cause convergence between the sender's and receiver's ideas, it has to be determined 
whether the newly acquired ideas of the receiver match those of the sender more than 
his own old ideas. 
More specifically, in this study, cognitive belief change will be attributed to 
either persuasion or imposition-of-will if the following three conditions are fulfilled. 
First, by means of process tracing, a purposeful sender must be identified. A 
purposeful sender is characterised as an actor who has made prior efforts to advocate his 
own position on the issue through public or private statements (articles, speeches, 
interviews, letters), or has identified itself as an advocate of a certain policy stand. 
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Second, documents, recollections, or public communications have been uncovered 
indicating that social interaction between the advocate and the pivotal decision maker, 
in the form of conversations, meetings, telephone-calls, letters, bilaterally or in a 
group, took place Third, comparison of the pivotal decision maker's changed 
preferences and the advocate's ideas (derived through an analysis of his own writings, 
speeches, interviews or memoirs) indicates that their ideas converge more than they 
did before the interaction took place Moreover, when cognitive belief change has been 
found, but neither a purposeful advocate nor evidence of any interaction between a 
purposeful advocate and the decision maker is found, it will be concluded that 
cognitive belief change was induced by a learning process. 
Finally, a distinction between persuasion and imposition-of-will has to be 
made As was argued in Chapter 3 (Section 3 3 1), there are two essential differences 
between persuasion and imposition-of-will First, only persuasion may result in value 
change So, if the cognitive maps indicate that value change has occurred, it can be 
concluded that the preference change was induced by persuasion (see Table 4 1) 
Second, it was argued that in case of imposition-of-will, the sender is perceived to have 
some control over the future position of the receiver 
~~ ~~—^____^ Mechanism 
Indicator ~-~-^__^ 
Belief change 
Identification of Advocate of Change 
Interaction between Advocate and 
Decision Maker 
Convergence of Cognitive Map in 
Direction of Advocate's Ideas 
Advocate holds out Threats and 
Promises with respect to the Decision 
Maker's Future Position 1 
Transaction between Advocate and 
Decision Maker 
Change of Political System 
Change in Political System 
Learning 
Yes 
No 
Persuasion 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Imposition 
-of-
Will 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Turnover 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Table 4 1· Operationahsauon of the Mechanisms of National Preference Change 
To trace the evidence pertaining to these different mechanisms, hard primary 
sources like internal government documents (reports, letters), official documents of the 
Communities, and contemporary records of deliberations will be used, as well as soft 
primary sources such as memoirs and contemporary interviews Furthermore, 
secondary sources will be used such as biographies, contemporary newspaper- and 
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magazine articles, and secondary literature. When available, different sources will be 
used to cross-check the claims made (Baarda, De Goede and Teunissen, 1996: 98-99; 
Lieshout, Segers and Van der Vleuten, 2004; Moravcsik, 1998: 82-3). 
4.5.5 Measuring the Independent Variables: Expertise and Core Beliefs 
In Chapter 3, it was argued that the extent to which a certain preference can be 
flexible is dependent on two factors: the pivotal decision maker's level of expertise, and 
the centrality of the preference within the decision maker's belief system. In this 
Section, both variables will be operationalised. 
As regards the variable of expertise, it was hypothesised that, the greater the 
level of a decision maker's expertise on a certain issue, the more stable his or her 
preferences concerning this issue (see Section 3.7, hypothesis la). To be able to 
determine whether a decision maker's preference concerning the establishment of a 
European economic and monetary union is likely to be stable or not, their level of 
expertise on European economic and monetary issue should thus be determined. 
However, a decision maker's level of expertise - and thus the stability of the sub-
preferences — on the three dimensions of EMU may differ. Therefore, it is necessary to 
determine the level of the decision maker's expertise on both foreign/European policy 
making and financial-economic issues. The level of the decision makers' expertise will 
be measured by looking at three indicators: the formal education decision makers have 
followed, their field of work in their maturational years, and their personal interest in a 
certain issue (Meadow, 1980; Rosati, 2000). Whenever decision makers have had an 
education in one of the fields, or have spent the early years of their career working in 
politics or economics, or have displayed a strong personal interest in the issue, they 
will be perceived as an expert in that field (for the specific expectations concerning the 
expertise and stability of beliefs of the decision makers' studied, see Section 4.6).172 
Concerning the second intervening variable, decision makers' core beliefs, 
hypotheses lb and le state that, the more central a certain preference within the 
cognitive system of a pivotal decision maker, the more resistant to change it will be 
(see Section 3.7). Whether or not decision makers' preferences concerning the 
establishment of a European economic and monetary union belong to the core of their 
belief system will be determined by analysing cognitive maps. As indicated above, in 
the 1970s scholars working with cognitive map technique developed a measure -
known as the centrality of a concept — to determine whether a particular concept in the 
map belongs to the core of a decision maker's belief system. '^ Some authors, however, 
'
 2
 By assigning the status of expert to any decision maker that fulfils any of these three conditions, the 
chances that hypothesis Id will be falsified will increase Therefore, this will be a hard test for the Statist 
Cognitive Theory introduced in Chapter 3 
1
 ' To determine whether its ideas regarding the establishment of a European economic and monetary 
union belong to the core of the pivotal decision makers' belief system, and thus are not expected to change 
132 
Methodology 
have questioned the construct validity of the centrality measure. For, as Verbeek has 
argued 'it cannot logically be deduced that the idea that is most linked to others will 
determine the decision-making process' (Verbeek, 1990: 102, my translation). For the 
purposes of this thesis, therefore, the choice was made to supplement this measure 
with the more recently developed one of the significance of the concepts in a decision 
maker's belief system. This measure, saliency, is based on the assumption that the more 
frequent a certain relationship or concept is mentioned by the decision maker, the 
more significant its place in their belief system (Young, 1996: 403, 407). So, when a 
relationship between two concepts is mentioned twice in the texts, this relationship is 
awarded a saliency of 2 (Young, 1996: 407). The question of which beliefs concerning 
the three dimensions of EMU belong to the core of a decision maker's belief system, if 
any, can be answered by determining the relative frequency with which these are 
mentioned by the decision maker. All concepts that attain a high enough score on 
either the centrality-measure or on the saliency-measure will be characterised as being 
part of the core of the decision makers' belief system (see Appendix D for the precise 
centrality- and saliency measures of decision makers' beliefs).m 
Since our primary interest here is to determine whether pivotal decision 
makers have changed their beliefs concerning the establishment of a European 
economic and monetary union, the focus of the analysis will be on the core-concepts 
that pertain to one or more of the three dimensions of EMU (see Section 4.5.1). 
Through analysis of the core beliefs, it can be established whether a decision maker can 
be expected to be flexible or inflexible in its preferences concerning the establishment 
of a European economic and monetary union. Moreover, it can be determined on which 
of the three dimensions a particular decision maker can be expected to be flexible or 
stable. Whether the decision makers' core beliefs are in fact stable will be determined 
by the calculation of the stability rates of the concepts that are part of the core of their 
belief systems. This stability rate is the percentage of concepts that feature in the core 
of the first map and are also present in the core of the second map (for the specific 
expectations concerning the core and stability of beliefs of the decision makers' 
studied, see Section 4.6).'75 
over time, che first map of every decision maker will be used The concepts that score 2/3 or more of the 
value of the most central concept(s) will be characterised as core-beliefs 
174
 The outcomes of the centrality and saliency measures are very consistent. While the precise placement 
of the different concepts do differ slightly when using one or the other measure, the overall ranking of 
beliefs and the dimensions of EMU are very similar 
175
 More specifically, two stability rates are calculated. Firstly, the Single Concept Stability Rate is 
determined. This indicator measures the stability of the individual concepts across the two maps. This is 
measured simply by establishing whether the exact same concept is represented in the core of the first 
map, as well as in the core of the second map Secondly the Replaced Concept Stability Rate is determined 
This indicator measures the stability of the beliefs concerning one of the three dimensions of EMU. This 
is determined by establishing whether any concepts referring to the same value on a particular dimension 
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4.6 Operational Hypotheses 
In this section, specific expectations concerning the stability of the beliefs of the 
decision makers to be studied will be derived. To do this, first the value of the two 
intervening variables, the decision makers' expertise and core beliefs, will be 
determined. A proposition will then be formulated for each decision maker regarding 
whether or not their preference concerning the establishment of a European economic 
and monetary union can be expected to change. 
With regard to the members of the French and German 1970s UDU, the 
following conclusions may be drawn (see Table 4.2).'^ First, Willy Brandt (b. 1913), 
German Chancellor from 1969 to 1974, studied history in Norway during World War 
II, and was politically active from a very early age. He joined the Marxist Sozialistische 
Arbeiterspartei (SAP) at the age of 17 because of his discontent with the passive attitude 
of SPD towards the Nazis. While undertaking international work for the Sozialistische 
Arbeiterspartei, co-ordinating foreign resistance against Hitler, he developed an interest 
in international political co-operation. This interest was reinforced by his experiences 
during World War II, which he spent in exile in Norway and Sweden, and his 
experiences as Mayor of Berlin - the most international capital of Europe - and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (Brandt, 2002). Due to his lack of education, interest and 
working experience in economic or financial fields, it may be expected that Brandt's 
beliefs concerning monetary affairs are highly flexible. His personal interest in, and 
experience with international co-operation mean that we can expect his ideas 
concerning European integration to be stable. 
Georges Pompidou (b. 1911) - President from 1969 to 1974 - was born the 
son of a primary school teacher. Berstein describes him as a 'humanist man of letters' 
due to his formal education in French and his interest in poetry and art (Berstein and 
Rioux, 2000: 18; cf. Rials, 1977: 46-62). However, although he maintained his 
lifelong interest in literature and art, his career developed in a very different direction. 
After World War II, at the age of 34, he joined De Gaulle as a member of his cabinet 
in the post-war provisional government. After the dissolution of this provisional 
government, he remained close to De Gaulle, while pursuing a career in banking 
(Berstein and Rioux, 2000: 19; cf. Rials, 1977: 65-91). He rejoined De Gaulle 
professionally after the General became President, first as the director of the General's 
of EMU (for instance supranational decision making, or fixed exchange rates) is represented in the core of 
the first and the second map (see Appendix D) 
p
' ' In the case that the indicators of the variable 'expertise' will generate an ambiguous result, the choice 
will be made to classify a decision maker as an expert As such, the expectations derived from this 
indicator will - if any - be biased towards more stability Since overall, the Statist Cognitive theory 
developed in Chapter 3 expects decision makers' beliefs to be stable, this decision increases the chances for 
finding evidence falsifying its expectations. 
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cabinet, later as his Prime Minister. So, despite the fact that he had no relevant 
education, by the time he became President, Pompidou had professional experience in 
both the political and the financial field and may therefore be considered a political as 
well as a financial expert. His preferences on all dimensions are therefore expected to 
be stable. 
Decision Maker 
Brandt 
Pompidou 
Schiller 
Giscard 
Kohl 
Mitterrand 
Pohl 
Preferences 
European Co-operation 
Stable 
Stable 
Unstable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
concerning 
Form of Exchange Rate System 
& Road to EMU 
Unstable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Unstable 
Unstable 
Stable 
Table 4.2: Decision Maker's Expertise and Hypotheses concerning Preference-stability 
Not surprisingly, the French and German Ministers of Economics (and 
Finance) of the early 1970s can both be classified as monetary experts. A professor of 
economics at the University of Hamburg from 1947 onwards, it is clear that Karl 
Schiller (1911-1994), German Minister of Economics (and later Finance) from 1966 to 
1972 had both the education and professional experience to be classified as an 
economic expert. Only when he became Minister of Economics in the Grand Coalition 
in 1966 (at the age of 55), did he become involved to any significant extent in foreign 
and European policy making. Therefore, Schiller may be classified as a monetary, but 
not a political expert. It may be expected, then, that his beliefs concerning monetary 
and economic affairs will be very stable, while those concerning political co-operation 
will be flexible. 
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (b. 1926), Minister of Economics and Finance from 
I 9 6 9 to I974 , was educated at the 'financial' grande école, the Ecole Polytechnique. After 
graduating from both the Ecole Polytechnique and the ENA, he later went to work for 
the Tresor as — amongst others things — Inspector General and Deputy Director 
(Abadie and Corcelette, 1997: 11-71; Lancel, 1974: 33-46). In 1963, at the age of 36, 
he became Minister of Economics and Finance in the first Pompidou government. 
Already in 1951, he had been elected to the Assemblée Nationale as an independent 
candidate and in 1966, after he had been replaced by Debré at the Rue de Rivoli, 
founded his own party (the Federation Nationale des Républicains Indépendants). The 
Républicains Indépendants tried to set themselves apart from the Gaullists, partly 
through their pro-European stand (Abadie and Corcelette, 1997: 113-239; Kessler, 
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1966, I968). All in all, taking into account his education, his working experience in 
politics and finance, as well as his explicit interest in European co-operation, Giscard 
may be categorised both as a political and a financial-economic expert. As a result, his 
preferences on all dimensions are expected to be stable. 
With regard to the decision makers of the 1990s, a summary of their 
education, working and personal experiences presents us with the following picture: 
Helmut Kohl (b. 1930), German Chancellor from 1982 to 1998, studied law, social 
and political science and history at the universities of Frankfurt am Main and 
Heidelberg and received a PhD in political science. However, his European outlook 
and early interest in politics is often traced back to his early childhood in the Pfalz, a 
region of Germany which borders France, and his childhood war experiences (Clough, 
1998: 27, 35; Dyson, 1998: 42-3; Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 256; Hofmann, 
1984: 24, 81). In these early years, his conviction grew — in common with many 
young people of the time — that binding Germany to Europe was essential to guarantee 
peace and security for Germany and its neighbours. In fact, as a teenager, Kohl 
reportedly took down the barriers at the German-French border near his hometown 
(Clough, 1998: 64; Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 308; Dreher, 1998: 32). Without 
Europe, it was thought, Germany would revert to its old ways (Clough, 1998: 27, 64; 
Paterson, 1998: 32). Kohl joined the CDU when he was only 16 years old (Clough, 
1998: 36; Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 308), and had a long career in regional 
politics before he became Chancellor. Kohl had no education or professional experience 
in economics. From this, it may be concluded that his beliefs concerning European 
integration will be stable, while his economic and financial beliefs will be flexible. 
François Mitterrand (b. 1916), French President from 1981 to 1995, studied 
law and political science. During World War II, he participated in the French 
Resistance and joined the UDSR {Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance). After 
the war, he became active in politics, was a member of the National Assembly and 
Senate, and Minister of Internal Affairs. He had already ran for President on several 
occasions prior to finally being elected. His interest in international and European 
Affairs, which he maintained during his entire career, dated from the mid-1940s 
(Cole, 1994: 116-7; Haywood, 1993: 270-1; Northcutt, 1992: 63-4; Tiersky, 2000: 
I63, see also Chapter 8). Mitterrand had no education or professional experience in 
economics, nor did he have any interest in the subject (Bauchard, 1986: 38; Morray, 
1997: 99; Northcutt, 1992: 77, 95). In conclusion, his beliefs concerning political co-
operation may be expected to be stable and his beliefs concerning monetary and 
economic issues to be flexible. 
Finally, the President of the Bundesbank from 1980 to 1991, Karl-Otto Pohl 
(b. I929), may be characterised as a monetary expert. Prior to his career at the 
Bundesbank, Pohl had been trained as an economist at the University of Göttingen and 
had been a research director at a prestigious institute in Munich. After a brief 
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professional detour into journalism and a career as a civil servant at several Ministries 
including the Bundeskanzleramt (BKA), he became a State Secretary (from 1972 and 
1977) at the Ministry of Finance. Moreover from 1974 until 1977, he was the 
President of the European Monetary Committee, and involved in European policy-
making. Pohl served as President of the Bundesbank from 1980 until his resignation 
late 1991 (Connolly, 1996: 85, note 11; Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 343-4). All in 
all, due to his educational background and working experience in German and 
European financial and monetary affairs, it may be expected that both his beliefs 
concerning European integration and economic and financial affairs will be stable. 
Decision 
Maker 
Brandt 
Pompidou 
Schiller 
Giscard 
Kohl 
Mitterrand 
Pohl 
Exchange Rate System 
Stable 
Stable 
Unstable 
Stable 
Unstable 
Unstable 
Stable 
Preferences Concerning 
Institutional Form 
Unstable 
Stable 
Unstable 
Stable 
Unstable 
Stable 
Stable 
Route towards EMU 
Unstable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Unstable 
Unstable 
Stable 
Table 4.3: Decision Maker's Core Beliefs and Hypotheses their Preferences-Stability 
With regard to the core of the decision makers' belief systems, it may be 
concluded that expectations derived from this intervening variable and the decision 
makers' level of expertise almost yield the same expectations (see Table 4.3). The cores 
of the first cognitive maps of Brandt and Mitterrand contain concepts referring to their 
preferred mode of decision making on the European level, but none that refer to the 
nature of the exchange rate system or their preferred route towards EMU. The cores of 
the maps of Pompidou, Giscard and Pohl contain concepts referring to all three 
dimensions of EMU. The expectations based on the core of Schiller's and Kohl's belief 
system differ from those derived from the decision makers' expertise. The core of the 
first cognitive map derived from the speeches of Schiller contains only references to his 
preferred route towards EMU, while the core of Kohl's belief system contains no 
reference to any dimension of EMU. 
4.7 Summary 
In order to be able to derive the empirical validity of the Cognitive Theory on 
preferences and common interests introduced in Chapter 3, in this chapter an overview 
of the research strategy has been presented. It was argued that the best way to test the 
hypotheses derived from this theory was through the use of a comparative case study 
juxtaposing the successful establishment of a common interest between France and 
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Germany concerning the creation of a European economic and monetary union in the 
early 1990s and the failed at tempt to do so in the early 1970s The particular research 
strategies used within this case study design — process tracing and cognitive mapping 
- were introduced Finally, the central independent and dependent variables identified 
in the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 3 were operationalised 
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5 1945-1968: A HISTORY OF DIVERGENT 
PREFERENCES 
'Perhaps as a result of their proportions, the most prominent characteristic of both the emu and 
the EMU is their inability to get off the ground' 
- D.C Kruse in-(Kruse, 1980 1) 
5.1 Introduction 
The history of the European Economic and Monetary Union goes back to the 
aftermath of World War II when, in the context of the 1949 evaluation of the 
Marshall Plan, the Americans proposed to establish a European central bank modelled 
on the American Federal Reserve System. From that time on, plans based on the 
American model became a recurring theme, principally initiated by the same limited 
group of advocates. In this chapter, which gives an historical overview of the 
endeavours to establish a European monetary union during the period from 1945 to 
1968, it will be shown that the failure of these plans may be traced back directly to the 
divergence between French and German national preferences concerning European 
monetary co-operation. 
It will also be made clear in this chapter how the typical French and German 
national preference configuration concerning European monetary unification developed 
during the years immediately after World War II. I will demonstrate that in the first 
decade after the war, France was persuaded to initiate co-operation with her German 
arch-enemy, and that, with the return of De Gaulle to French politics, the French 
preference for fixed exchange rates and intergovernmental co-operation came to 
maturity. Subsequently, I will trace the development of the characteristic domestic 
cleavage between the German foreign policy elite on the one hand, advocating above 
all else the Westbindung of Germany and the reconciliation with France, and the 
German financial elite on the other hand, spurred on by their quest for a sound and 
stable German economy. These typical French and German preference configurations 
have dominated European monetary negotiations for decades. 
5.2 American Cold War Politics and European Monetary Union 
5.2.1 Shaping the Post-War International Monetary System 
The first plan for European monetary union was developed by the American 
administrators of the Marshall Plan in the turbulent international context of the early 
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post-war years.177 In the eyes of the Americans, European monetary unification — and 
European integration in general — had the potential to provide answers to the political 
and economic problems faced by the Western world. The European states, however, 
adhered firmly to their own - very different - interpretation of the post-war 
international context and its problems. As a result, the American plans never came to 
fruition. 
In 1945, the Americans and the British established a new international 
monetary system, the Bretton Woods system, to deal with the economic problems the 
world would face after the war, and to stimulate economic growth, employment, price 
stability and free trade.178 In this international monetary system, exchange rates were 
kept within a narrow band of the dollar, and the dollar itself had a fixed value in gold. 
Moreover, the Bretton Woods Agreement stipulated that states should restore the 
convertibility of their currencies and dismantle exchange rate and trade controls 
(Krugman and Obstfeld, 1994: 535-8). However, the establishment of the Bretton 
Woods system could not protect post World War II Europe from a number of major 
economic problems. In particular, it was the pressing shortage of dollars, the Dollar 
Gap, which hampered efforts to rebuild Europe.179 To deal with this problem, the 
Europeans resorted to the establishment of bilateral intra-European trade and 
payments arrangements. These arrangements were designed to offset trade payments 
between countries in order to minimise the actual transfer of scarce dollars and gold 
between them but they were, however, only partially successful and failed to prevent 
the stagnation of trade and growth (Lieberman, 1992: 13-5). 
177
 During and before World War II, plans for a European single currency had already been developed. In 
1940, for instance, the German Reichsbank developed a plan for a 'German currency bloc' in which fixed 
exchange rates were to be introduced 'to ease the way later to a currency and customs union' (cited in. 
Marsh, 1993: H î ) . 
'
7,
' The Bretton Woods system was set up as a gold exchange standard, but from the mid-1960s on it 
actually worked like a reserve currency system (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1994 508) In this system all 
exchange rates were fixed to the US dollar, while the dollar price in gold was kept at ^5 dollar an ounce. 
To keep their currencies within the set margins of the US dollar, foreign central banks would intervene in 
dollars, while the United States would be in charge of maintaining the dollar price of gold. The obligation 
to maintain the price of gold was meant to restrain excessive US monetary growth (Krugman and 
Obstfeld, 1994· 535-8). However, due to the early convertibility of the US dollar, the strength of the US 
economy and its special position in the Bretton Woods system, the dollar soon became the principal 
reserve currency in the system (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1994 538). This asymmetrical character of the 
system allowed the US to loosen the monetary reins without causing an immediate drop in the dollar 
price of gold. This would ultimately lead to the demise of the Bretton Wood system in 1971 (Krugman 
and Obstfeld, 1994· 546-50). 
179
 The Dollar Gap was caused by the inconvertibility of all currencies except the US dollar, which 
implied imports could only be paid for in dollars, and the limited European capacity to earn dollars 
resulting from their limited export capacity The Dollar Gap induced European decision makers to hold 
on to their dollars by imposing import restrictions (Lieberman, 1992. 1 3-5). 
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In the eyes of the Americans, the economic problems that Europe faced were 
particularly pressing because of their possible geo-political consequences. They feared 
that an economically weak Europe could be drawn into the Soviet sphere of influence 
more easily, whether by force, or by the lure of the communist ideology, which was 
deemed more likely (Lieshout, 1999: 38). The economic recovery of Europe was 
therefore considered a political necessity. Moreover, to enable Europe to withstand 
communism successfully, the Americans considered an economically sound West 
German state to be indispensable. At the same time, however, it was thought that 
West German economic recovery should be kept in check to prevent a recurrence of 
German hegemony in Europe. 
American European policy was thus focused on two seemingly contradictory 
aims: the economic and military strengthening of Europe and, thus, of West Germany, 
and the prevention of the development a dominant West-German state (Lieshout, 
1999: 38). In the eyes of the Americans, however, these goals could be made 
compatible if German political and economic interests were linked to the welfare of its 
neighbouring states. In other words, by inducing the European states to engage in far-
reaching economic and political integration, both the Russian and the German threats 
could be dealt with at the same time. 
The 1947 European Recovery Program (ERP), generally known as the 
Marshall Plan, appeared to provide a solution to the pressing shortage of dollars as well 
as to offer the US an opportunity to persuade the Europeans to engage in far-reaching 
integration. In the plan, the Americans invited both the European states and the 
German occupied zones to submit recovery plans for their regions. The United States 
would provide the funds for the implementation of these plans. However, US financial 
support was not to be unconditional: in return for providing the funds, the United 
States demanded that the European states engage in supranational economic 
integration. The European states, however, had a mind of their own. While they 
naturally welcomed the prospect of a large influx of dollars to their countries, they did 
not intend to engage in any form of European integration. After almost a year of 
obstructing and dragging their feet, they convinced the Americans to accept the 
establishment of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), an 
entirely intergovernmental organisation, in exchange for the Marshall aid. 
By I 9 4 9 , the European states were economically much better off than they had 
been at the start of the Marshall Plan. The US dollars shipped to Europe had improved 
their balance-of-payments deficits as well as their payment difficulties. However, plans 
for the establishment of European integration had not fared so well. A re-evaluation of 
the Marshall Plan was in order (Colebrook, 1971; Lieshout, 1999: 59-64; Milward, 
1984: 282-3). 
141 
Mapping the Road to Maastricht 
5.2.2 How to Please US Congress 
The first post-1945 plan for the establishment of a European monetary union 
originated in the context of the 1949 re-evaluation of the Marshall plan. The planning 
office of the European Co-operation Administration (ECA), which was entrusted with 
the implementation of the Marshall plan, feared that the failure to establish genuine 
European economic integration might induce the US Congress to put an end to 
Marshall aid (Milward, 1984: 284). This was a very disturbing prospect, for the ECA 
considered the continuation of the aid more vital than ever now that the USSR had 
acquired its first nuclear bomb (European Co-operation Administration, 1949a: 240). 
A new strategy to persuade Europeans of the virtues of integration and convince 
Congress of the value of Marshall aid was needed (Hogan, 1987: 268-271). 
The ECA decided to try to persuade the Europeans to engage in monetary co-
operation, for 'before it will be possible to eliminate trade and exchange controls, there 
will be needed institutional arrangements powerful enough to make possible real co-
ordination of national monetary, fiscal and credit policies and of commercial policies' 
(European Co-operation Administration, 1949a: 241). In co-operation with economist 
Robert Triffin, economic adviser of the ECA, and the Secretary-General of the OEEC, 
Robert Marjolin, the ECA developed the first post World War II plan for a European 
monetary union (Bissell, 1996: 62). 
The plan proposed the establishment of, among other things, a European 
Central Bank modelled on the American Federal Reserve System and a Central Reserve 
and Dollar Pool to help solve the European payments problems.'"0 A central authority, 
in which the European states were to be represented, would decide on the monetary 
policies to be implemented by majority vote. According to the ECA, these institutions 
could be established 'within (say) twelve months' (European Co-operation 
Administration, 1949a: 248). Fully in line with US foreign policy, the ECA 
considered the participation of West Germany in the European monetary union 
essential, for 'left to itself, a reviving Germany will soon learn to play off the East 
against the West to its own advantage' (European Co-operation Administration, 
1949a: 239). Moreover, since the participation of the United Kingdom was deemed 
unattainable, France was considered to be 'the key' to incorporating Germany into the 
West European monetary union. 
The ECA plan was never officially proposed to the European states. When 
Paul Hoffmann, Administrator of the ERP, planned to make the proposals public in a 
speech before the OEEC in Paris on 31 October 1949, the US Secretary of State, Dean 
Acheson, warned him that the Europeans would never agree to the ECA plan because 
IH
" In the eyes of the ECA, the establishment of these institutions did 'not necessarily mean a single 
monetary unit, though the psychological value of such a symbol of unity would be substantial' (European 
Co-operation Administration, 1949a 247). 
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it would require them to transfer their monetary policy to a central European 
institution and Hoffmann therefore refrained from mentioning the ECA plans in his 
speech (Milward, 1984: 297).'81 However, Acheson's intervention did not divert the 
ECA from its policy objective (Milward, 1984: 305), and a different set of similar 
proposals was soon revealed. In these new plans, the ECA envisioned the establishment 
of a multi-speed Europe and, more specifically, the establishment of a European 
Clearings Union and a European Monetary Authority. The Clearings Union was the 
follow-up to the Central Reserve and Dollar Pool from the earlier ECA-plan, and was 
designed to facilitate interstate trade payments. The European Monetary Authority 
was essentially a European Central Bank. While only a small group of forerunners 
would immediately become a member of this European bank, all European states 
would be required to join the Clearings Union. In time, however, the Clearings Union 
would have to develop into a full-fledged monetary union as well (European Co-
operation Administration, 1949b: 253; Triffin, 1957: 173, note 9)· 
The plan for a Clearing Union was proposed to the Europeans, and eventually 
resulted in the establishment of the European Payments Union (EPU).182 The plan for 
the European Monetary Authority, however, was never officially introduced, but 
circulated within the ECA for a while after which it resurfaced in the Americans' 
internal reaction to the French Finebel plan.183 This plan proposed to establish a 
regional economic union between France, Italy and the Benelux (see Section 5.2.3). 
When in early 1950, the Finebel negotiations failed due to differences of opinion 
about the participation of Germany and the nature of co-operation, the ECA plan to 
establish a European monetary union quietly disappeared with it (Hogan, 1987: 297-
300; Milward, 1984: 306-16). 
5.2.3 The French National Preference: The Total Subordination of Germany 
It is hard to speak of a French or German preference concerning monetary unification 
during the first five years after World War II. As discussed before, the ECA plans for 
European monetary union were never officially proposed, and for the most part the 
discussion of the plans took place within ECA walls. However, it is obvious from the 
attitudes of the Europeans at the time that the US plans were far too ambitious, for the 
French fiercely resisted any form of co-operation that included the Germans. 
'*' The State Department did not share the ECA vision on European integration. In their view, the ECA 
plans were completely at odds with the preferences of the European states Furthermore, they opposed the 
overly optimistic time schedule of the plans and preferred to leave the initiative to the Europeans (Hogan, 
1987: 272; Milward, 1984 287). Reportedly, the objections of Acheson were based on the negative 
reaction of the British, who had learned of the content of the speech prematurely, and (mistakenly) feared 
being given a major part in it. 
182
 For an overview of the two-year negotiations on the EPU see: (Colebrook, 1971 128-149, Diebold, 
1952: part one, Hogan, 1987: 2 9 3 - ^ 5 , Milward, 1984: 299-334; Triffin, 1957). 
"" This plan is also referred to as the Fntalux, Benefit or Little Europe plan 
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After the war, France's foremost preoccupation was to prevent a German army 
from ever marching on Paris again. From the end of World War II until July 1949,184 
the French were in complete agreement on the strategy to prevent this: they would 
make it economically impossible for Germany to become militarily stronger than 
France (Willis, 1968: 15-25). In order to do this, the French actively tried to deprive 
Germany of coal and steel, the raw materials essential to military production, by 
advocating the internationalisation of the Ruhr. In the mean time, they tried to 
guarantee French access to these materials by promoting the economic fusion of the 
Saar with France and by exploiting the French zone of occupation (Willis, 1968: 36-
46). In addition, the French aimed to prevent the establishment of a centralised 
German government. 
The French position on European integration was fully consistent with her 
att i tude towards West Germany: France rejected any plan that would involve co-
operation with their arch enemy. She looked instead to create alliances with other 
European states as a counter-balance to Germany. The differences of opinion between 
the French and the Americans surfaced during the negotiations on the French Finebel 
plans, which proposed the establishment of a regional economic union between France, 
Italy and the Benelux states. According to the ECA, the primary aim of this union was 
the provision of effective co-ordination of national economic policies, for instance by 
'direct co-ordination through a central authority possessing adequate supranational 
powers' (Colebrook, 1971: 123, note 265). The ECA also strongly urged the inclusion 
of West Germany in the arrangement. France, however, had envisioned the union to be 
fully intergovernmental, to implement protectionist economic policies and help it 
'cope with the German problem' (Milward, 1984: 313). Because the differences of 
opinion were simply too great to overcome, the plans were eventually dropped. 
French domestic economic policy was also inspired by the French strategy 
towards Germany (Kuisel, 1981: 219), and its priority was to enable France to regain 
its political strength. In the early post-war years, the most important means to enable 
this was the Plan de Modernisation et d'Equipement written by the Commissariat General 
du Plan (CGP) under the supervision of Jean Monnet. The plan served the dual 
objective of improving the competitive position of French industry while at the same 
time protecting its producers against international and, more importantly, German 
competition. The instruments introduced by the CGP were inspired by its Keynesian 
economic views and included the modernisation of production, the nationalisation of 
important sectors of the economy and trade restrictions (Lieshout, 1999: 45; Kuisel, 
1981: 219-37). As a result, instead of perceiving European integration to be a means 
IK4
 In this four-year period, France went through ten governments The only constant factor was the 
participation of George Bidault in five and Robert Schuman in eight of these governments (Cook and 
Paxton, 1998: 117-8) 
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in a quest for free trade, as the Americans did, the French perceived it to be an 
instrument to protect their inefficient economy (Milward, 1984: 313). 
On the matter of exchange rate stabilisation, the preference for fixed exchange 
rates and a stable franc that would characterise French monetary policy in later years 
had not yet taken root. During the early post war years, the French seemed to have few 
qualms about the fact that their expansive Keynesian policies and reconstruction 
efforts were causing a large deficit in the balance of payments, a depletion of reserves, 
hyperinflation and a flight from money. In fact, between 1945 and 1949, the French 
allowed the franc to lose as much as six-sevenths of its nominal value (De Carmoy, 
1970: 78). 
One area in which the French did develop a strong preference concerned the 
international monetary system. Soon after its establishment, French policy makers 
started calling for the replacement of the Bretton Woods system. This preference was 
entirely based on the French aversion to the United States' rise to global dominance. 
The privileged position of the dollar, in particular, seemed to inform the French 
preference for a different system. The fact that the Bretton Woods was a fixed rather 
than floating exchange rate system had little to do with their aversion. During the 
early post-war years, the question of whether the desired alternative monetary system 
would be based on fixed or floating exchange rates did not seem to concern the French 
political elite. 
In September 1949, for instance, French Finance Minister Maurice Petsche 
came up with a proposal for a European payments union based on flexible exchange 
rates (Milward, 1984: 313). However, when in 1950, the Belgians suggested a return 
to the Gold Standard, a fixed exchange rate system, the French Ministry of Finance and 
the French Central Bank put their full weight behind these proposals (Milward, 1984: 
315). Monnet's planners, meanwhile, objected to this scheme, not because it implied 
fixing the exchange rates, but because they preferred bilateral arrangements to solve 
the French payments problems. In fact, they rejected the idea of floating exchange 
rates, for in their eyes these would limit their effective control of the French economy. 
In the end, Petsche failed to take a consistent stand in the discussions on the Belgian 
plan,"*5 and the Bretton Woods system remained in place for another twenty years 
(Milward, 1984: 315). 
Soon after World War II, it became clear that the economic recovery of West 
Germany was high on the American agenda. The London Agreements of 1948 
determined that the industry of the Ruhr was to remain in West-German hands, and 
that a federal West-German government would be established. For this reason, these 
agreements, already 'undoubtedly rejected all the major tenets of the French thesis' 
"" Milward suggests that Petsche had insufficient knowledge of the subject and, thus, merely followed 
the last brief given by his disagreeing advisers (Milward, 1984: 315). 
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(Willis, 1968 23) However, it was not until June 1949 - when the ratification 
debate on the Atlantic Pact forced the French to acknowledge that the international 
balance of power had changed - that the French started to reassess their policy on 
Germany and reconcile themselves to the fact that their goal of permanently 
subordinating Germany would fail in the face of the US vision of Europe (Lieshout, 
1999 38-42, Willis, 1968 55) 
While reality hit the French hard, they did not abandon their thesis on 
Germany On the contrary, the French stubbornly adhered to their old objective of 
guaranteeing French security by the economic and political subordination of Germany, 
and simply came up with a new means to realise this goal, they did, however, search 
for a means that would raise less objections with the Americans From the early 1950s 
onwards, the favoured strategy to keep West Germany subordinate was to prevent the 
Germans from developing any military capacity by bringing them under the control of 
a European institution This change in strategy gained the approval of the US and 
ultimately led to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), and the negotiations on the European Defence Community (EDC) (see Section 
5 3 4) 
5 2 4 The West German National Preference Pooled Authority beats No Authority 
To identify the West German national preference of the early post-war years proves 
even more difficult than in the French case, for in fact no German government existed 
to propagate it At the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945, the Allies had 
decided that for the time being no central German government would be installed 
Instead Germany would be divided into four zones, each to be governed by one of the 
occupying powers Moreover, no definitive provisions for the restoration of German 
authority were agreed upon It would not be until August 1949 before the West 
Germans would be allowed to elect a federal government and parliament 
At the 1948 London conference, the United States, United Kingdom and 
France agreed to create a West German state and asked the Minister-Presidents of the 
eleven West German Lander to draw up a federal constitution On 8 May 1949, a 
Parliamentary Council under the chairmanship of Konrad Adenauer agreed on the 
final text of the constitution (Basic Law), and in August 1949 the first elections for the 
Bundestag took place Then, on 20 September 1949, the first German government 
under leadership of Chancellor Adenauer was sworn in and the next day the occupying 
powers officially recognised the Federal Republic of Germany (Hanneder, 1967 13-9, 
Lieshout, 1999 45-49) 
Although the West German government was now officially installed, West 
Germany was still not a sovereign state For, at the same time as the Federal Republic 
was recognised by the western Allies, the Occupation Statute came into force and 
imposed strict limitations on the decision-making powers of the German government 
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(Willis, I968: 25-31).'"6 The first West German government set out to reduce the 
occupational costs for which it was liable, terminate the process of industrial 
dismantling, and prevent the economic fusion of the Saar with France (Willis, 1968: 
50-76). However, the political goals on Chancellor Adenauer's wtsh-list which included 
reconciliation with France, binding West Germany irrevocably to the West, and the 
equal treatment of the Federal Republic in international affairs, invariably took 
priority over these economic ones (Willis, 1968: 62-70).187 
These goals corresponded perfectly with American plans for European 
integration. Not only would Germany be (more than) willing to engage in economic, 
political, or military co-operation with France, for 'as long as it was not a sovereign 
state, [it] would have very little objection to participating in supranational European 
institutions' (Lieshout, 1999: 97, my italics). In 1949 and 1950, this positive attitude 
towards European (supranational) integration was clear from German enthusiasm to 
join Finebel (Milward, 1984: 3H), as well as in Adenauer's policy statements (Willis, 
1968: 78-9). 
As for the monetary issue-area, the Germans regained their autonomy when 
the Occupational Statute came into force (Hanrieder, 1967: 13-9; Lieshout, 1999: 45-
49). Until then the Allies had maintained strict control. One of the main economic 
problems facing Germany after the war was the increasing repudiation of the 
Reichsmark. More and more, people resorted to bartering, hampering economic activity 
and making the need for currency reorganisation painfully clear to the Germans. As 
early as 1946, the Germans started to develop proposals for such a reorganisation. 
However, the allies did not act upon German concerns until 1948, when rumours of an 
imminent currency reorganisation in the Russian zone finally led the Western Allies to 
plan a reorganisation of their own. The currency reorganisation turned out to be highly 
successful: the new West German currency, the Deutschmark, was soon considered to be 
a credible means of payment. 
In its first two years of its existence, the Federal Republic's monetary policy 
went through several changes partly because the government and the new Central 
Bank, Bank Deutscher Länder^ often disagreed on economic and monetary priorities. 
'
8
'' Firstly, the Statute stated that the supreme authority remained in the hands of the western allies and 
that the occupation would continue. Furthermore, the allies proclaimed authority over issues like 
disarmament, demilitarisation, compensations and reparations, foreign affairs and foreign trade. Only 
within these limitations was the government of the Federal Republic allowed to exercise its authority 
(Lieshout, 1999: 51). In March 1951, the Federal Republic regained authority over the conduct of its 
foreign affairs (Lieshout, 1999. 51) On 5 May 1955, the Statute was abolished. 
1B7
 Besides his task as Chancellor, Adenauer was Minister of Foreign Affairs from the inception of the 
Federal Republic of Germany to 6 June 1955 (Cook and Paxton, 1998. 121). 
""' The Bank deutscher Länder was established by the Allies in 1948 — prior to the currency reorganisation — 
as a provisional central banking institution in the Western zones. It was awarded considerable monetary 
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In I949, after a serious rise in unemployment, for instance, the banking authorities 
gave in to pressure from the government and allowed some monetary expansion 
However, within a year, the West German balance-of-payments deficits had 
undergone a dramatic increase and Germany was forced to apply for a credit of 120 
Million dollar from the EPU (Emminger, 1976 489, Hanneder, 1967 55-6, Moller, 
1976 472-3) This led the Bank to introduce a rigorous monetary policy program in 
defiance of the government's wishes (Emminger, 1976 489), forcing the government 
to resort to import restrictions 
Within two years, the West Germans managed to repay the EPU and turn the 
deficit in the German balance-of-payments into a surplus (Emminger, 1976 486-7) 
This strengthened the idea held by German financial policy makers of the time that it 
was possible simultaneously to maintain both internal equilibrium (full employment 
with price stability) and external equilibrium (equilibrium on the balance-of-
payments) in a regime of fixed exchange rates (Emminger, 1976 550) In other words, 
at that time a fixed exchange rate system was not yet seen as an obstacle to their 
central policy goal of maintaining price stability All in all, while the German 
government and the Central Bank had different economic priorities, during the 1950s 
they both perceived the Bretton Woods system of fixed currencies to be fully in line 
with West German economic policies The hesitations about such an international 
monetary system which were to be displayed by German economists in later years had 
not surfaced yet 
5.3 The European Integration Process and the Goal of Monetary Unification 
5 3 1 The first faltering steps 
By I95O, The ECA plan for European monetary union had failed, but US efforts to 
promote European integration continued In the context of the attempts to create a 
European common market, American ideas for the establishment of a European 
monetary union resurfaced 
In the spring of 1950, the French government found itself in a difficult 
position On the one hand, the Americans were urging them to come up with a plan 
for further European integration in which Germany would participate On the other 
hand, the French government knew all too well that 'any proposal which so much as 
hinted at the rehabilitation of the Federal Republic was certain to provoke a storm of 
criticism in France' (Lieshout, 1999 95) In April, the way out of this predicament 
presented itself in a plan to pool German and French coal and steel production which 
power and was safeguarded by law from political instruction In July 1957, it was replaced by the 
Bundesbank (March and Olson, 1989 142-59) 
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had secretly been drawn up by Jean Monnet.189 This pool would have to be run by a 
supranational institution in which Germany and France would be represented on equal 
terms. 
After he had failed to interest Premier Bidault, a life-long proponent of the 
old thesis on Germany, Monnet slipped the plan to Minister of Foreign affairs, Robert 
Schuman, who quickly realised that the proposal offered the government a new means 
to serve France's main foreign policy goal: depriving Germany of sole control over its 
economic and military potential (Lieshout, 1999: 96-7). On 9 May, Schuman 
persuaded the Cabinet to accept the proposal and proceeded to make it public that 
afternoon.190 The German Chancellor Adenauer had approved the plan, which seemed 
to serve most of his foreign policy goals, prior to the French Cabinet meeting (see 
Section 5.3.5). After two years of negotiations - which were hampered by internal 
divisions within both France and Germany on the subject,191 as well as the Korean 
War - the ECSC became operative on 10 August 1952. 
However, the US continued to press for further European integration. The 
outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 had strengthened the American resolve 
to promote a speedy German rearmament, which in turn led the French to come up 
with a plan to prevent this (Willis, 1968: 131). On 24 October 1950, in a speech to 
the French National Assembly, the French Premier René Pleven suggested setting up 
a European Defence Community (EDC). Decision making in de EDC would once 
again be intergovernmental and include only West German military units at the level 
of the smallest unit possible. Moreover, in contrast to the other European states, West 
Germany had to place all its armed forces at the disposal of the European army and 
therefore did not need a separate Minister of Defence or a general staff (Lieshout, 1999: 
120-1). 
The Americans, however, suspected that the plan was simply a French ploy to 
sabotage their efforts for West German rearmament and opposed the plans. When 
after long and difficult negotiations, the EDC treaty was finally signed on 27 May 
m·; p l e r r e Un, one of Monnet 's chief assistants at the Commissariat, was responsible for the economic 
sections of the plan (Willis, 1968: 84). He would be involved in later plans for European monetary 
unification. 
190
 In addition to by-passing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the preparation of his plan, Schuman 
was deliberately vague during the presentation of the plan to the Cabinet in order to gain approval 
(Lieshout, 1999' 94 , 96) Willis speaks of a 'complete' break with 'the foreign policy that since 
Richelieu's time had been based on the axiom that the weakness of Germany is the strength of France' 
(Willis, 1968: 81). As I argued in Section 5.2.3, in my opinion the plan served the same goal that France 
had been striving for since Richelieu preventing Germany from growing stronger The ECSC was simply 
another means to that end. 
1,1
 In France, the plan did not have the backing of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Finance (Lieshout, 1999 102). In Germany, Adenauer clashed with Minister of Economic Affairs, Ludwig 
Erhard, on the value of the plan. Erhard feared the ECSC would turn into an obstacle to free-trade 
(Lieshout, 1999: 103). 
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1952, the Treaty largely reflected the American rather than the French view on the 
future of Europe (Lieshout, 1999: 133): the decision-making structure would be partly 
supranational and the discriminatory provisions with respect to West Germany had 
been removed (Lieshout, 1999: 134, 139). After intense domestic discussions and a 
delay of more than two years, the French National Assembly finally refused to ratify 
the Treaty (Willis, 1968:138-45).'92 
In 1958, the standstill in the European integration process caused by the 
failure of the EDC was successfully brought to an end by the combined efforts of Jean 
Monnet, at the time President of the ECSC High Authority, Paul-Henri Spaak, the 
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Jan-Willem Beyen, the Dutch Minister of 
Foreign Affairs.19' They came up with a plan for the establishment of a common 
market and a European institution on atomic energy and introduced these plans at the 
upcoming summit of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the ECSC in Messina (Lieshout, 
1999: 150-2; Segers, 2006: Chapters 5 and 6). 
Despite initial strong opposition from France to the idea of creating a 
European common market, the ministers eventually agreed on the establishment of a 
Committee of Government Representatives under the presidency of Spaak. The Spaak 
Committee was authorised to prepare an intergovernmental conference on atomic 
energy and the creation of a European common market.191 In the proposals concerning 
the establishment of a European common market developed by the Committee, 
European 'monetary unification' was officially mentioned for the first time since the 
ECA plans.19' 
'''- In the course of these two years France had gone through four different governments, each of which 
proposed numerous amendments to the Treaty Finally, after failing to reach agreement on another set 
amendments with its fellow member states, it was the government of Pierre Mendès-France that 
submitted the Treaty to the French National Assembly on 28 August 1954 (Lieshout, 1999 135-8) 
l 9
' From September 1954 until April 1955, Monnet and Spaak had been working on a plan to establish a 
new community institution concerned with the peaceful use of nuclear energy After the lukewarm 
reception of their plan from West Germany, France and Italy, Spaak joined forces with Beyen who had 
planned to reintroduce his ideas for the institution of a European customs union to his fellow ministers 
Beyen had introduced his ideas for the economic integration of Europe for the first time in December 
1952, and again in May of 1953 in the context of the (failed) discussions on the establishment of a 
European Political Community (EPC) The plans were not received favourably, especially not by France 
(Lieshout, 1999 145) Allegedly, the discussions on the first Beyen Plan were very far-reaching and even 
covered questions like 'should Western Europe have one currency and one monetary policy'' and 'should 
monetary policy of the German central bank be imposed on the other states·1' Milward concludes 
however 'There was, of course, no intention of implementing' these ideas (Milward, 1994 191) 
l!M
 Amongst the French representatives in the Spaak Committee was Robert Marjolm, former Secretary-
General of the OEEC and involved in the ECA plan for monetary unification 
μ Λ
 The Messina Resolution had already stated that methods should be designed by the Spaak Committee 
'to make possible an adequate co-ordination of the monetary policies of the member countries so as to 
permit the creation and development of a common market' (Van Ooijen, Dekker, Lieshout and Van der 
Vleuten, 1996· 115, 116) The Spaak report however, was the first document to use the phrasing 
monetary 'unification' (Comité Intergouvernemental créé par la Conférence de Messine, 1956 74) 
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5.3-2 One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: From Spaak to Rome 
The section of the Spaak Report devoted to the establishment of a European common 
market proposed,196 amongst other things, to eliminate all obstacles to trade and 
movement of capital, and to establish a system of joint action in case a member state 
was experiencing balance-of-payments difficulties. In the chapter of the report devoted 
to common market policies, the possibility of a future European monetary union was 
discussed. This subject was deemed important because if balance-of-payments deficits 
arose, states could be tempted to devalue their currencies or impose trade restrictions, 
which could in turn lead to retaliation by the other members and the general re-
introduction of trade restrictions or competitive devaluations. Such a cycle of 
protective measures would totally undermine efforts to create a European common 
market (Comité Intergouvernemental créé par la Conférence de Messine, 1956: Titre 
II, Chapitre 4, Section 1). 
The Spaak Report proposed establishing a mechanism of mutual support to 
prevent states from reverting to these damaging policies. This mutual support 
mechanism allowed the European Commission to engage in consultations with the 
deficit state on the measures to be taken. Moreover, it could call on the other members 
to supply the deficit state with the credits that would help finance its deficit (Comité 
Intergouvernemental créé par la Conférence de Messine, 1956: Titre II, Chapitre 4, 
Section 2). In addition, the Spaak Report stated that a 'general regime of payments, ... 
or the close co-operation between the Central Banks, maybe even monetary unification 
would make it possible to cope with the problems associated with balance of payments 
difficulties 'or even solve them' (Comité Intergouvernemental créé par la Conférence de 
Messine, 1956: Titre II, Chapitre 4, Section 2, my translation and italics). In other 
words, rather than proposing its establishment, the Spaak Report merely pointed out 
that the institutions of, for instance, European monetary union could prevent the 
problems associated with balance-of-payments difficulties. However, in the end it only 
called for the 'formal and permanent' renunciation of the reinstitution of trade 
restrictions of any kind (Comité Intergouvernemental créé par la Conférence de 
Messine, 1956: Titre II, Chapitre 4, Section 2). 
According to Küsters, the contributors to the report chose not to suggest the 
establishment of a monetary union, 'weil man eine Wahrungsunion politisch für nicht 
durchsetzbar hielt' (Küsters, 1982: 177). A monetary union would require the 
adoption of a common European economic and monetary policy and therefore a 
substantial transfer of autonomy from the member states to a common community 
institution. The members of the Spaak Committee believed that the governments of 
' * On request of Spaak, Pierre Un, Head of the Economics Division of the ECSC, and one of the main 
authors of the Schuman plan, and Hans von der Groeben, a high official of the West German Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs wrote the report (Küsters, 1982: 219). 
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the Six would not be prepared to engage in such a transfer (Küsters, 1982 177) 
However, at the end of May 1956, they did accept the report as a basis for 
intergovernmental negotiations on the establishment of a European economic 
community and a community for atomic energy 
The discussions on the Treaties that were to establish the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) were 
long and difficult, partly because the French were only to be convinced of the virtues 
of the establishment of a common market with great difficulty (Küsters, 1982 221-7, 
Willis, 1968 246-51) In addition to numerous disagreements on other topics, 
discussions on European monetary integration turned out to be extremely problematic 
France was not prepared to transfer any economic or monetary policy-making 
authority to the Community, while the West German government was internally 
highly divided on the issue In fact, negotiations were so difficult that 'the mere 
obligation to co-ordinate economic policies turned out in the end to be the most that 
could in effect be achieved' (Küsters, 1982 229) 
The Treaty on the Establishment of the EEC does therefore not mention 
monetary unification, and merely proposes the establishment of a limited form of 
economic and monetary co-operation in the section on balance-of-payments policy 
(EEC Treaty, 1962 Part three, Title II, Chapter 2, Article 104-109) Article 104, for 
instance, stated that 'each Member State shall pursue the economic policy necessary to 
ensure the equilibrium of its overall balance of payments and to maintain confidence 
in its currency' In order to do so, the European governments agreed to co-ordinate 
their economic policies, establish co-ordination between their central banks (Article 
105 1), remove exchange rate controls (Article 106) and determined that each member 
state should regard its exchange rate policy as a matter of common concern (Article 
107) 
During the negotiations, however, the parties had acknowledged that by 
leaving economic policy making in the hands of the member states, they risked the 
adverse consequences of balance-of-payments difficulties already identified in the 
Spaak Report According to the French negotiators these difficulties could be 
prevented by establishing an advisory Monetary Committee authorised to handle all 
important currency matters, amongst which the extension of credit to deficit states 
The Germans, however, suspected that the French proposal was a covert attack on the 
West German reserves 197 By granting authority over the extension of credits to 
Brussels, the French would gain access to the German reserves and, thereby, a solution 
to their balance-of-payments difficulties without having to give up any economic or 
According to Küsters this was exactly what the French had in mind (Küsters, 1982 }71) 
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monetary autonomy in return (Küsters, 1982: 370-1).198 In the end, the Germans 
managed to limit the authority of the Monetary Committee. According to Article 
105.2 of the EEC Treaty, the Monetary Committee was merely authorised to keep the 
monetary and financial situation of the member states and the Community under 
review and to 'formulate opinions' on its findings (EEC Treaty, 1962: Part three, Title 
II, Chapter 2, Article 105). 
The debate on mutual financial assistance, however, resurfaced when deficit 
states such as France and Italy started to press for a mandatory and automatic support 
mechanism in case of balance-of-payments difficulties later in the negotiations. West 
Germany was, however, adamant about making such assistance dependent on the prior 
implementation of certain stringent economic measures (Küsters, 1982: 373). In the 
end, the possibility of offering assistance to other member states by means of, for 
instance, 'the granting of limited credits' was laid down in the Treaty, but it would 
remain 'subject to the agreement' of the granting state (EEC Treaty, 1962: Part three, 
Title II, Chapter 2, Article 108; Tsoukalis, 1977: 51-2). 
5.3-3 Action on Monetary Union 
After the Rome Treaties were signed, Jean Monnet asked Pierre Uri, co-author of the 
Spaak Report, and Robert Triffin, co-author of the ECA plan for monetary union, to 
develop a plan for the establishment of a European monetary union. The plan, which 
was quite similar to the ECA plan, included proposals for the establishment of a 
European Reserve Fund and the introduction of a common European currency called 
the ECU. The plan further proposed that 'au stade final, la conversion totale de leurs 
réserves en ECUs en ferait la Banque centrale Fédérale de l'union monétaire, 
économique et politique des Etats-Unis d'Europe' (Triffin, 1989: 531-2). In the two 
articles in which Triffin made these proposals public, he commented that 'an eventual 
merger of members' national currencies into a single Community currency can only be 
regarded as highly hypothetical at this stage, and should in any case be envisaged only 
as the ultimate step of a monetary integration process' (Triffin, 1961: 141). 
However, not all proponents of further European integration were so patient. 
Parts of the Uri/Triffin proposal were adopted by Monnet's 'Action Committee for the 
United States of Europe' in its declarations of November 1959 and July 1 9 6 l . w The 
declaration of November 1959 called for the establishment of a European Reserve 
|i;H
 In principle, all member states would gain access to each other's reserves. However, at that time, 
France had been running major deficits for years, whereas the West German balance-of-payments had 
been in surplus since 1951. 
'
ψ1
 The Action Committee was founded by Monnet on 13 October 1955 The purpose of the Committee 
was to promote the establishment of a United States of Europe. The Committee represented almost all 
political opinions, with the notable exception of the Gaullists and Communists, and among its members 
were numerous political leaders (Willis, 1968: 258-9). 
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Fund (Action Committee for the United States of Europe, 1969: 46), while the 
declaration of 1961 called for the establishment of a monetary union (Action 
Committee for the United States of Europe, 1969: 61). Moreover, in January 1959, the 
Economic and Financial Committee of the European Parliament called for more 
monetary co-operation, which eventually had to result in 'an organisation similar to 
that of the Federal Reserve System in the United States' (Tsoukalis, 1977: 53). 
In 1962, after the first serious European post-war exchange rate crisis of 1961 
- during which West Germany and the Netherlands had revaluated their currencies 
without consulting their European partners or the Community institutions — the 
Commission of the EEC also started calling for the establishment of a European 
monetary union. In its 1962 Action Programme for the Second Stage, it suggested 
that such a union would have to be established during the third stage of the transition 
to the European Common Market (Commission of the European Economic 
Community, 1962: Chapter VIII, Article 130, 138).200 
In the Programme, the Commission presented a number of functional 
arguments for the establishment of a monetary union. It was argued that European 
economic endeavours would be incomplete and inefficient if co-ordination of monetary 
policy was not included. Fluctuations in the exchange rates could disturb free trade 
and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).20' Moreover, a strong single European 
currency would provide an answer to the increasing vulnerability of the international 
monetary system (Commission of the European Economic Community, 1962: Chapter 
VIII, Article 130, 138). Subsequently, the Action Programme proposed that during 
the second stage of the common market, a Council of Central Bank Governors and a 
system of consultations between the member states and the Council of Central Banks 
be established (Article 133). It also proposed coordinating monetary policy with 
regard to third countries (Article 135) and to liberate capital movements (Article 137). 
These measures would not (yet) constitute an infringement of the autonomy of 
the member states. However, more provisions would have to be made to 'make it 
possible to go further, and to arrive from co-ordination at the centralisation of decision 
making' (Commission of the European Economic Community, 1962: Chapter VIII, 
Article 138), for the Programme ultimately aimed at the establishment of a fully 
fledged European monetary union in the third stage of the Common Market (Article 
138). 
2
"" The report was written by Robert Marjolm, Commissioner for Economic and Financial issues. 
•'"' The CAP determined that the European Community would buy agricultural products whenever the 
prices fell below a certain minimum level Because the support prices at which the Community would buy 
the products were specified in terms of a basket of European currencies (the European Unit of Account) a 
realignment of European exchange rates would lower the real value of the support prices for some 
countries and increase it for others (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1994· 602) 
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5.3-4 From Schuman to De Gaulle: The French U-turn on European Integration 
The Schuman Plan of May 1950 had been the embodiment of the new French thesis on 
Germany. By placing West German and French coal and steel production under a 
supranational authority, its aim was to gain economic control over Germany in order 
to guarantee the safety of France. The Pleven Plan had tried to achieve the same goal 
in a different issue-area, but there was a marked difference between the plans: while 
the Schuman Plan had proposed supranational co-operation, the Pleven Plan was 
essentially intergovernmental (Lieshout, 1999: 174). During the negotiations on the 
EDC, France's bargaining partners managed to enhance the supranational character of 
the proposal and reduce its discriminatory aspects. However, at the same time, 
domestic actors were rallying against the idea of supranational co-operation and the 
position of its proponent, Schuman, was increasingly being challenged (Willis, 1968: 
161-172; Lieshout, 1999: 174-5). When in January 1953, in yet another government 
shuffle, Schuman was replaced by the arch-intergovernmentalist Bidault, the short-
lived French tolerance for supranational solutions came to an end. Another era of 
French intergovernmentalism had begun and sealed the fate of the EDC treaty. 
During the negotiations on the Spaak Report and the Rome Treaties, it 
became clear that the French had indeed returned to their preference for 
intergovernmental co-operation. Moreover, it also became clear that the French were 
no longer — a priori — set against co-operation with their old enemy. As long as it 
concerned purely intergovernmental co-operation and served their self-interest, the 
French were willing to consider co-operation (Willis, 1968: 247-51). However, the 
French maintained their categorical refusal to transfer control of economic issues to 
Brussels and would only agree to the establishment of the supranational Commission 
after they had rendered it far less powerful (Van der Vleuten, 2001: 128). 
Wi th regard to international monetary policies, it is hard to identify a clear 
French preference. During the entire period from the Schuman Plan to the signing of 
the Rome Treaties, French monetary policy reflected the instability of the domestic 
political system. From 1950 to 1952, five successive French governments undid the 
rigorous monetary policy of Maurice Petsche. This resulted in rising inflation, which 
the governments of Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Antoine Pinay struggled 
in vain to bring under control from March 1952 until January 1953. From 1953 until 
1955, the government of Joseph Laniel and Minister of Finance Edgar Faure set out to 
stimulate production again and relaxed the tight monetary policy of Pinay, resorting 
to even more government spending after the start of the Algerian war in November 
1954. These policies caused another increase in inflation rates and further depleted 
French reserves. According to Patat, domestic monetary policy was 'non-existent' 
under the subsequent short-lived government of Guy Mollet (Patat and Lutfalla, 1990: 
162). The numerous French governments that served during these years did have one 
thing in common, however, they shared serious misgivings about the Bretton Woods 
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monetary system, although again none of them came up with any considered ideas on 
the kind of system that should replace it. 
The renewed French preference for intergovernmental co-operation displayed 
during the negotiations on the EDC and Rome Treaties, reached its culminating point 
with the investiture of General De Gaulle as Prime Minister on 1 June 1958. De 
Gaulle's preference for a united, but strictly intergovernmental Europe was derived 
from his foreign policy goals. From his first dealings with the Americans during the 
Second World War onward, he deeply resented US dominance in the world and 
Europe. His primary foreign policy goal was to build a new, more stable pluralist 
global order in which a strong united Europe, under leadership of France, would 
function as a counterweight to the superpowers, and in which France had re-
established her natural position as a great power. This united Europe would have to be 
built around the Franco-German axis to ensure a lasting peace in Europe (Kolodziej, 
1974: 22-9,42-6,241-3). 
'Indispensable to this larger design, as de Gaulle outlined, was a strong 
national French state, resting on a solvent economy' (Kolodziej, 1974: 236). For, in the 
General's mercantilist eyes, a strong economy would offer France the leverage and 
status needed to secure its national interests. The French economy would have to 
thrive again in order to serve its diplomatic goals (Schmiegelow and Schmiegelow, 
1975: 372). In December 1958, in order to prop up the French economy, De Gaulle 
appointed a group of economic experts under the guidance of Jacques Rueff, former 
Inspector of Finance, to draw up the economic plans that would render France great 
again. The Rueff program focused on reducing French inflation rates and balance-of-
payments deficit. It preached economic austerity and proposed stringent economic 
measures like strict budgetary policies, tax rises, the devaluation of the franc, and a 
modest liberalisation of trade (Gavin and Mahan, 2000: 65-6). These measures enabled 
France to implement the 1959 tariff cuts required by the Treaty of Rome. 
The General acknowledged that the EEC could aid the economic recovery 
needed for the restoration the national glory of France. Moreover, the Treaty offered 
France the chance to solve its agricultural problems (Kolodziej, 1974: 284-91). As for 
the supranational elements of the Community he resented so much, 'De Gaulle 
accommodated France to these supranational institutions ... either by emptying or 
redefining the original meaning and aims of the community charter to suit his views 
or by disregarding or dismissing [them] as inexpedient' (Kolodziej, 1974: 247-54). 
However, under no circumstances would he allow new supranational arrangements to 
develop under his regime. 
The election of De Gaulle and the foundation of the Fifth Republic brought 
France domestic political stability and a clear strategy with regard to European 
integration. In the monetary sphere, it also brought much needed coherence. Like his 
economic and monetary policy in general, De Gaulle's external monetary policy was 
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designed to serve his political goals. The strict financial and monetary orthodoxy of the 
Rueff plans was aimed at raising the franc to the status of one of the strongest 
currencies in the world, and to make it the symbol of France's economic and political 
might and independence. 
De Gaulle's monetary policy also reflected his resentment of the American 
hegemony in international monetary relations. According to De Gaulle, the Bretton 
Woods system was a hegemonic encroachment on the independence of other states, 
which allowed the Americans a privileged position, which they did not hesitate to 
abuse.202 However, during the early 1960s, the General remained undecided about an 
alternative to the existing international monetary system. As a result, the French 
verbal assaults on the monetary hegemony of the United States were of little 
consequence: France continued to comply fully with the Bretton Woods rules. In fact, 
when other European Central Banks were already exchanging their excess dollars in 
holding for gold, France was one of the few European countries that refrained from 
doing this until 1962 (Gavin and Mahan, 2000: 68). 
Jacques Rueff had no doubts about the international monetary policy France 
would have to pursue. In the spring of 1961, he began campaigning against the 
adverse effects of the US balance-of-payments deficit on the French economy.203 Rueff 
advocated the belief that 'the only way to monetary health was a return to a genuine 
gold standard or at least a devaluation of the dollar with respect to gold' (Schmiegelow 
and Schmiegelow, 1975: 375). In several letters to De Gaulle that were published in 
Le Monde early June 1961, Rueff encouraged the French President to end the dollar's 
role as an international reserve currency and to start converting the French dollar 
reserves into gold (Gavin and Mahan, 2000: 67). 
Rueff s calls for a return to gold were supported by, amongst others, Prime 
Minister Michel Debré, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maurice Couve de Murville, and 
Etienne Burin des Roziers, Secretary General of the Elysée. However, the French 
Ministry of Finance, Wilfrid Baumgartner, opposed the plans. He was a devoted 
Atlanticist and believed co-operation with the Americans to be the best policy for 
France. Prior to 1962, Baumgartner managed to balance Rueff s influence on French 
monetary policy. In fact, his influence seems to have been the main reason why France 
refrained from converting its dollar reserves into gold. However, in December 1961, 
2n2
 By 1958, the US was running a substantial balance-of-payments deficit, and the Dollar Gap of the 
early post-war years had turned into a dollar glut De Gaulle believed that the special position of the 
dollar allowed the US to shift the burden of its debt to other states and encouraged it to run deficits, for 
unlike the other members of the Bretton Woods system, the US was not obliged to settle its accounts in 
gold (Kolodziej, 1974. 184). 
^ Rueff believed that in addition to shifting the costs of their excessive deficits to others, the Americans 
were exporting inflation to France. Moreover, in his eyes, the capital outflow encouraged American 
investment in France (Gavin and Mahan, 2000: 66). 
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Baumgartner announced his resignation and from that moment on, Franco-American 
monetary relations became more strained by the day (Gavin and Mahan, 2000: 67-8). 
After the resignation of Baumgartner, De Gaulle appointed Valéry Giscard 
d'Estaing as Minister of Financial Affairs. While Giscard shared Rueffs objective of 
regaining control over the international monetary system and shielding the CAP from 
currency instability, he did not share his preference for a return to the Gold Standard 
(Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 101). Giscard feared that a return to the Gold 
Standard would allow the government to avoid the austerity measures and structural 
reforms that were necessary to strengthen the French economy (Howarth, 2000: 24). 
Moreover, he preferred a European solution to the international monetary problems. 
Although during his time as Minister of Financial Affairs, he never explicitly 
spoke out in favour of a single European currency, Giscard did in later years repeatedly 
call for such an arrangement. However, during the early 1960s, he pragmatically tried 
to navigate a middle course between pleasing the General's and his own convictions, 
while trying to limit Rueffs influence on the President. Soon after his appointment, 
Giscard started converting dollars into gold, while at the same time repaying France's 
post-war debt (Gavin and Mahan, 2000: 72; Schmiegelow and Schmiegelow, 1975: 
376-7). When on 24 October 1962 the European Commission introduced its Action 
Programme for the Second Stage, the domestic division with regard to the French 
external monetary policies, along with De Gaulle's preference for intergovernmental 
co-operation, prevented a positive French reaction. 
3.3-3 The Adenauer Era, and Us demise 
The West German preference on European integration did not change much during 
the first decade of European integration. The German Chancellor remained a staunch 
proponent of reconciliation with France, German Westbindung, and strove tirelessly for 
the Gleichberechtigung of the FDR. From this perspective it is not surprising that he 
approved of the Schumanplan immediately. The plan was fully in line with his foreign 
policy objectives and the establishment of the ECSC High Authority would render the 
International Authority for the Ruhr (IAR) - whose extensive powers over the German 
coal and steel production, consumption and export had antagonised the Germans from 
its inception — obsolete.201 In fact, the ECSC would grant the Germans more control 
over matters of coal and steel than the IAR did (Lieshout, 1999: 97-8; Willis, 1968: 
109-14). 
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 The IAR was created by the 1948 London conference, and was authorised to divide the Ruhr's coal, 
coke, and steel between German consumption and export, prevent the revival of military organisations, 
war production, and could prohibit certain types of industrial production. Relations between Germany 
and the IAR were especially poor in the period from November 1950 to December 1951 (Willis, 1968 
22, 109-14) 
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The other French initiative of the 1950s, the Pleven Plan, did not correspond 
fully with the Chancellor's preferences Everything about the plan seemed to be 
designed to keep Germany subordinated. In addition to denying the Germans equal 
treatment, the Pleven Plan provided for intergovernmental — rather than supranational 
- institutions Finally, the subject of the plan — German rearmament — was highly 
controversial within the FDR (Lieshout, 1999 121) However, the Pleven Plan would 
serve one of the Chancellor's foreign policy goals, reconciliation with France 
Moreover, its proposals were considered incompatible with the Occupation Statute 
(Lieshout, 1999' 127). In the end, Adenauer decided to defy public opinion, accept the 
Pleven Plan as the basis for negotiation, and set out to achieve equal treatment at the 
negotiating table (Lieshout, 1999' 122). 
The preferences on European co-operation displayed by the Germans during 
these early years were to persist until the beginning of the 1960s. While Adenauer 
initially did not care much for the Spaak Report and the Treaties of Rome — he 
considered the plans to be far too economically-oriented for his taste - he deemed 
economic integration to be better than no integration (Lieshout, 1999 154-5). At 
least economic integration would bring reconciliation with France and the Westbtndung 
of the German state on the basis of equal treatment a step closer 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the guidance of Adenauer's successor 
Heinrich von Brentano fully supported this political view on European integration 
However, his Minister of Economic Affairs, Erhard, was set dead against the 
establishment of a European common market In his view, economic policy should be 
based on the virtues of the free market Global free trade would, economically 
speaking, be far more beneficial to Germany than regional economic integration 
Moreover, Erhard was very distrustful of French intentions and their protectionist and 
dirigiste economic beliefs and, unlike Adenauer, was not prepared to sacrifice what he 
believed were sound economic principles for political goals or European ideals (Dyson 
and Featherstone, 1999· 274-7) 
In order to settle this dispute, Adenauer issued a policy guideline which stated 
that the interests of the FDR were best served by focussing on the promotion of 
integration between the Six, and spoke out in favour of the Spaak Report (Lieshout, 
1999 159-60). The effect of the policy guideline turned out to be short-lived and 
during the deliberations on the Rome Treaties, the internal conflicts resurfaced with a 
vengeance. However, although the Ministry of Economics had secured a prominent 
position in the negotiations on the Treaties, the final decisions were made by the heads 
of state- the French Premier Mollet and the German Chancellor In a bilateral meeting 
on November 6, 1956, Adenauer's 'determination to put political before economic 
considerations' led him to agree to several crucial concessions to the French (Willis, 
1968 248). Adenauer was still in the position to go over the head of his Minister of 
Economic Affairs. 
159 
Mapping the Road to Maastricht 
By the end of 1962, however, the domestic balance of power was shifting. 
Growing intolerance of Adenauer's authoritarian, inflexible style, and his favourable 
attitude towards France — despite De Gaulle's provocative attitude - had convinced a 
significant number of CDU/CSU members that Adenauer was no longer the right man 
to lead either the country or the CDU (Hanrieder, 1967: 206-7; Willis, 1968: 292-
313). So when in October 1962 the Commission of the EEC presented its Action 
Programme for the Second Stage, Adenauer was no longer in the position to dominate 
the West German response on the issue, which fell into the domain of his Minister of 
Economic Affairs, Erhard. Minister of Financial Affairs Rolf Dahlgriin, and member of 
the Bundesbank Board of Directors, Otto Emminger, took turns in publicly denouncing 
the plans for a monetary union. In their view, the institution of a European monetary 
union would hamper relations with the United States. Moreover, they perceived the 
establishment of a European monetary union as a threat to price stability.2'" In their 
eyes, the monetary problems the EEC was facing should be solved by market solutions. 
In short, at that time, 'the whole idea of creating a basis for a Community monetary 
system seemed to be completely alien to German politicians' (Tsoukalis, 1977: 57). 
This negative attitude towards European monetary unification reflected the 
growing aversion to irrevocably fixed exchange rates amongst the German financial 
experts. During the 1950s, they had believed that internal equilibrium (full 
employment with price stability) and external equilibrium (equilibrium on the 
balance-of-payments) could be maintained in a regime of fixed exchange rates at the 
same time (Emminger, 1976: 550). However, as time went by increased capital 
mobility and the West German balance-of-payments surplus had resulted in upward 
pressure on the D-mark. To maintain the fixed parity of the D-mark, the Germans had 
been forced to intervene heavily in the monetary markets, which disrupted their 
domestic monetary policies. As a result, policy makers came to agree that 'dass sie 
nicht gleichzeitig dem Zahlungsbilanzgleichgewicht — bei festliegende Wechselkurs — 
und dem inneren Stabilitätsziel gerecht werden konnte' (Emminger, 1976: 485).2M' 
2U
' Because the establishment of a European Monetary Union would create one European financial market, 
the volume of trade and thus the ease (cost and speed) with which it could be traded (liquidity) would 
rise. Increased liquidity could lead to an increased money supply which may cause inflation (Krugman 
and Obstfeld, 1994' 347, 457, 371) Tsoukalis, however, suggests that the real reason for the opposition 
of German financial experts to a monetary union was the creation of additional credit facilities 'which 
would mean that Germany would have to finance at least part of the deficits of other countries' (Tsoukalis, 
1977 57). 
•
!0
'' The increased capital mobility, which was partly caused by the 1958 restoration of exchange rate 
convertibility, raised the chances for exchange rate instability by creating an increase in currency 
speculation Surplus countries 'might be suspected of being in "fundamental disequilibrium" under the 
IMF Articles of Agreement", and thus ripe for a revaluation (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1994 539). 
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Moreover, more and more they came to agree with Minister Erhard that if anything 
had to give, it would be the external stability of the D-mark.2U7 
This change in attitude is evident from the events leading up to the 1961 D-
mark revaluation. In 1956 and 1957, the German government had adopted the policy 
of reducing its tariff rates and removing all restrictions on capital to bring its balance-
of-payments surplus down. This decision was made against the will of Erhard, who 
had advocated tackling the surplus and combating the import of inflation with a 
revaluation of the D-mark. The government's position of refusing to revalue the D-
mark — even when it came under strong speculative pressure throughout 1957, 1959, 
and I960 — still had the support of the majority of the board of the German central 
bank (Emminger, 1976: 495, 500-3).2"H However, by 1961, the tide was turning. 
When the Bundesbank proposed lowering interest rates to ward off speculation on the 
D-mark, Erhard and the new Minister of Finance, Franz Etzel, took action. In order to 
prevent the inflation that might result from these measures, they stepped up pressure 
on the Bundesbank and Chancellor Adenauer. In March 1961, the Chancellor and the 
board of the central bank gave in and the DM was revalued by 5 percent (Marsh, 1993: 
180-1).209 
So, while during the 1950s, the German preference on European policy was 
based consistently on foreign policy goals, the early 1960s heralded radical changes. In 
these years, the ordoliberal and Atlanticist ideas of Erhard were beginning to gain 
ground, and economic principles were no longer to be sacrificed for political goals. 
This change first affected German monetary preferences: the goal of fixed exchange 
rates was no longer considered to be fully in line with German economic interests, and 
neither were Commission plans to establish a European monetary union. While 
Adenauer did manage to conclude what should have been his 'life's triumph', the 
Franco-German Co-operation Treaty, subsequently he had to bow out and make way 
for three years of ordoliberalism and Atlanticism. 
21)1
 Letting go of the goal of irrevocably fixed exchange rates seemed the least worse scenario, for the 
scenario of running a surplus on the balance-of-payments was deemed undesirable because the excess of 
international demand for domestic products might lead to excess demand for labour, an increase in wages, 
and might cause inflation (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1994: 392). Moreover, a surplus could reflect excessive 
external borrowing by foreigners, and the lending country would run the risk of being unable to collect 
the money it was owed (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1994 527). Furthermore, the third scenario - letting go 
of the goal of price stability (internal equilibrium) - would be unthinkable to the West Germans for it 
constituted the basis of Ordo-liberal economic thought, was deeply rooted in the German public opinion, 
and had been laid down in Paragraph 3 of the 1957 Bundesbank Law (Loedel, 1999: 39) 
'"" In April 1957, Erhard vainly tried to change the mind of Bundesbank president Vocke (Emminger, 
1976 496). 
-w -j-^u
 w a s •ont 0f j ^ , , e x t r e m e l y r a r e occasions when a Bundesbank move to ease monetary policy has met 
with the disfavour of the government'(Marsh, 1993 183) 
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5.4 The 1964-1968 Standstill 
5.4.1 A Halt on Community Progress 
'The period between May 1964 and 1968 is characterised by an almost complete lack 
of progress in the monetary field at the community level' (Tsoukalis, 1977: 57). This 
monetary standstill reflected the general deterioration of the Franco-German relations 
following De Gaulle's veto of British entry into the EEC, the President's turn to gold 
and the 1965 empty chair crisis. Only after De Gaulle resigned did relations 
ameliorate (see Chapter 6). 
De Gaulle's veto of British entry into the EEC came as a surprise, especially to 
the German financial elite, who had been in favour of the accession. In response they 
refused to consider any deepening of European monetary co-operation until the veto on 
the adhesion of Britain was removed. The Bundestag ratified the Franco-German 
Treaty, but a preamble was added to the ratification law in which the French vision of 
Europe was completely rejected, and the Bundestag called on the French to remove the 
obstacles to the admission of Great Britain (Willis, 1968: 15-25). Furthermore, 
despite the fact that in 1964 it was decided to include cereal in the CAP, making the 
need for stable exchange rates even more immediate, progress in the monetary issue-
area remained almost non-existent (Willis, 1968: 15-25). 
After the negative reactions to the Programme for the Second Stage and the 
German reaction to the French veto on British membership, the Commission had 
dropped all but its most modest proposals. However, at the Council meeting of 8 May 
1964, in which the remainder of proposals were discussed, the Ministers of Finance 
diluted the Commission proposals even further. The only point agreed upon was the 
establishment of a Committee of Central Bank Governors (CCBG) with mere 
consultative and informational powers and a slight strengthening of the authority of 
the Monetary Committee. Member states also promised to consult the European 
partners prior to changing their parities, a provision already included in the Rome 
Treaties {Pb. 1206/64). 
The adoption of these modest proposals, however, seems to have inspired 
several actors to at tempt to restart the European monetary integration process. On 10 
October 1964, the Commission called for the gradual establishment of European 
monetary union (Commissie van de Europese Economische Gemeenschap, 1964: 12), 
and announced that it would start developing new detailed proposals (Le Monde, 15 
January 1965: 18; The Guardian, 18 January 1965: 9). In addition, the Dutch issued a 
proposal for the establishment of a European reserve fund, and the Italians introduced 
a plan for the development of a common currency (Tsoukalis, 1977: 58). 
Early in 1965, however, these renewed calls for European monetary unification 
were violently silenced by the press conference of the French President on 4 February. 
In this press conference, De Gaulle positioned himself squarely behind the plans of 
Rueff, Debré and Couve de Murville to re-establish the Gold Standard, attacked the 
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monetary policies of the US and announced that France would start converting its 
dollar reserves into gold (Tsoukalis, 1977: 65). This announcement, as well as the 
empty chair crisis that broke out later that year, effectively put an end to any 
community efforts to create a United States of Europe and a European monetary union. 
According to Tsoukalis, 'in the monetary field, this was coupled with a feeling of 
complacency created by the continuing surpluses of all EEC countries and a 
widespread belief, at least in the Community circles, that a de facto monetary union had 
already been achieved' (Tsoukalis, 1977: 61). This premature and ill-founded trust in 
the stability of the European economy and the monetary relations between the Six 
reflected the economic prosperity and lack of monetary upheaval in those years, which 
would last until the exchange rate crisis of 1968. 
5.4-2 The French Battle against Supranatwnalism and US Monetary Hegemony 
In the monetary issue-area, the power struggle to influence De Gaulle's definition of 
the French external monetary policy had been going on since 1961. However, by 1964 
it had widened to the international scene. Following the first international monetary 
crisis of 1963, in which France and Italy had experienced strong inflationary pressures 
and an immense flow of speculative funds had entered Germany in the expectation of a 
D-mark revaluation, the first talks on the reform of the international monetary system 
were held. These talks were set up to solve the problem of the American and British 
external deficits. During these talks, the French Minister of Finance, Giscard d'Estaing 
proposed the creation of a new international currency, the Composite Reserve Unit 
(CRU),21" which would be created and distributed in strict proportion to states' gold 
reserves. Furthermore, the CRU was to replace the dollar as international reserve 
currency and settlements between countries would only take place in gold and CRU. 
Through the creation of the CRU, Giscard intended to aid the quest against 
American monetary hegemony and provide De Gaulle with an alternative to the Rueff 
plans (Tsoukalis, 1977: 57). At the same time, the Minister of Finance, as well as 
André de Lattre, Director of the French Treasury in charge of international monetary 
affairs, were favouring the development of a common European currency.2" The 
establishment of such an arrangement would have to start with the institution of a 
Franco-German monetary union. Apart from the benefits of creating a system of 
2I
" 'Cm' is che past participle of'croire' which means 'to believe' in French. However, all representatives 
except for the French kept referring to the proposed payment unit as 'Composite Reserve Unit'. 
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 Giscard and De Lattre had a close relationship with the Directorate General for Economic and 
Monetary Affairs of the EEC (DG2), and their plans were allegedly inspired by the ideas of Robert Triffin, 
Pierre Un and Robert Marjolin who considered the idea of a European Reserve Fund a first step to the 
creation of an European Central Bank and a common currency Giscard and De Lattre justified their 
proposal for a single currency by claiming that De Gaulle and Prime Minister Pompidou supported them 
(Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 101) 
163 
Mapping the Road to Maastricht 
irrevocably fixed exchange rates for the CAP, the proposal served the goal of creating a 
strong rival currency to the dollar and sterling (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 102). 
However, Giscard's plans were disrupted by De Gaulle's February press 
conference in which the latter made clear beyond any doubt that Rueff had managed to 
win the President's ear. In a long lecture on the virtues of gold, De Gaulle stated that 
the central monetary goal of France would be a return to the Gold Standard and that 
France would start converting its dollars into gold. Allegedly, what persuaded the 
General not to follow Giscard's strategy was the lack of support of other EEC member 
states for the idea of joining forces in the talks on the reform of the international 
monetary system, and the pro-Atlantic attitude of Erhard. Moreover, in the mid-
1960s, France had obtained an exceptionally strong gold position and the increase in 
demand for gold that would result from the re-introduction of the Gold Standard 
would push up the value of gold, and thus of the French reserves (Tsoukalis, 1977: 58-
9). 
However, if his pre-existing beliefs are taken into account, the fact that De 
Gaulle rallied behind the Rueff plans rather than a European monetary arrangement 
should not come as a surprise. Like EMU and Bretton Woods, the gold standard is a 
fixed exchange rate. However, while in the Bretton Woods system, the dollar had a 
privileged position as the reserve currency, a gold standard may be characterised as a 
system that is neutral in terms of power relations: all currencies are equal. Moreover, in 
contrast to a European monetary union, which by definition would involve 
supranational decision making, a system based on gold could be managed 
intergovernmentally. So, while the crystallisation of the President's preferences on the 
issue caused a policy change, the preferences he espoused at his February press 
conference constituted a reconfirmation of, rather that a break with his pre-existing 
beliefs. 
In accordance with the French monetary policy change, Valéry Giscard 
d'Estaing was eventually removed from office in January 1966 and the arch-Gaullist 
Debré took his place as Minister of Financial Affairs.212 At the same time, De Lattre 
was moved to 'the dignified but harmless post of Deputy Governor of the Banque de 
France' (Tsoukalis, 1977: 61). In the years to come, Debré would develop this new 
French policy, dismissing the notion of a single European currency as a threat to 
French national sovereignty, advocating a rise in the price of gold, creating the largest 
Central Bank in Europe and heralding Paris as the new international monetary and 
financial capital (Tsoukalis, 1977: 58-9)· 
212
 Haifa year after his dismissal, Giscard d'Estaing started publicly proposing setting up a European 
Central Bank {Le Monde, 7 June 1966. 7). 
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5.4-3 Germany: Free trade and Atlanticism 
The election of Ludwig Erhard as Chancellor had elevated the 'Atlanticists' to a 
position from which they could determine the nation's European and monetary 
policy.21' As stated before, Erhard had always been a supporter of global 
interdependence and an open German economy. As an ordoliberal economist, he was 
convinced this would be economically the most beneficial to Germany. In addition, he 
favoured running export surpluses, for in his eyes these allowed the country to invest 
in technology, creating high employment. Regional arrangements like the EEC were, 
by definition, in conflict with these economic ideas. 
Erhard combined his liberal economic ideas with Atlanticist politics. His 
preference for cooperation with the United States was based on two considerations. 
Firstly, he allegedly felt a sense of responsibility and gratitude towards the state which 
he thought of as the 'builder and guarantor of the global economic system', and 
seemed genuinely convinced by the image of the US as the benevolent hegemon 
(Hanrieder, 1989: 244). Secondly, and more importantly, the new Chancellor was 
convinced that West German security and any chance of German re-unification were 
dependent on the good will and military power of the United States (Lieshout, 2004: 
161-4). 
In principle, the Atlanticists did not reject the idea of closer co-operation with 
France, but in their view it would only be desirable within an Atlantic framework. A 
Franco-German alliance in itself would simply not be able to provide the military 
strength needed to keep West Germany and Berlin safe from Russian aggression. 
Moreover, as far as the Atlanticists were concerned Franco-German reconciliation was 
an accomplished fact (Lieshout, 2004: 161-4). So, despite the pressure of De Gaulle 
and his West German followers, 'Erhard was inclined by preference and induced by 
circumstances to support Washington rather than Paris' (Hanrieder, 1989: 345). 
Erhard's economic and political ideas also induced him to oppose De Gaulle's 
ideas concerning a 'little Europe' and the Franco-German axis, which had led him to 
resist the establishment of the Common Market in the past. However, faced with the 
fatt accompli of the EEC's existence, he now adopted the strategy of pushing for the 
widening of the EEC as much as possible by supporting the entry of Great Britain and 
the other EFTA members.214 According to Hanrieder, Erhard's acquiescence in the 
existence of the EEC also explains the plans Erhard submitted to the Council of 
21
 ' The terms 'Atlanticists' and 'Gaullists' are generally used to describe the two factions within German 
politics that rivalled over the proper direction of German foreign policy in the late 1950s and 1960s. The 
term 'Gaullists' is used to describe the group of CDU/CSU members surrounding Adenauer and Franz 
Joseph Strauss. Erhard and Schroder were the principal Atlanticists within the CDU/CSU. Generally, the 
ideas of the SPD and FDP corresponded more with those of the latter group. 
2H
 Moreover, Britain could provide the much needed weight to balance France's influence on Community 
policy-making. 
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Ministers in 1964 These proposals called for the establishment of an EEC political 
authority, the delegation of specific legislative powers to the European Parliament, and 
the creation of an autonomous budget for the Community, thus bearing some 
resemblance to the Commission's proposal that triggered the empty chair crisis 
(Hanneder, 1989 264) However, Erhard probably never was, nor ever became a 
convinced Europeanist 
Given the new German government's ordoliberal preferences, it is not 
surprising that the Commission's proposals to establish a European monetary union 
did not fall on fertile grounds in Germany The 1964 exchange rate crisis had 
strengthened the view of many German financial decision makers that fixed exchange 
rates were no longer in the best interest of the German economy (see Section 5 3 5) 
During the crisis, the D-mark had again become the target of heavy speculation To 
keep D-mark at a fixed rate, the Bundesbank was forced to buy large amounts of dollars 
This caused the German money supply to increase and created strong inflationary 
pressures 
In the eyes of the Chancellor and the Bundesbank, the Bretton Woods system 
of fixed exchange rates had thus 'become anathema to the Federal Republic's domestic 
economic principles ' (Hanneder, 1989 280) However, the Atlanticist convictions 
that dominated German politics at that time prevented the Germans from attacking 
the system, in fact 'they helped support it' by refraining from converting their 
enormous supply of excess dollars into gold (Hanneder, 1989 280) According to 
Hanneder, the reason for this restraint was a simple quid pro quo The United States 
were supplying the Germans with security benefits in exchange for West German 
support of the Bretton Woods system (Hanneder, 1989 281) N o such vital benefits 
could have been expected in return for German support for a European system of fixed 
exchange rates Furthermore, should a monetary union come about, exchange rates 
would be irrevocably fixed, preventing the occasional re-alignments of the D-mark 
needed to reach internal and external equilibrium (see Section 5 3 5) In addition, 
according to the Erhard government, any progress in the monetary field was to be 
preceded by closer co-ordination of economic policies (Tsoukahs, 1977 68, Le Monde, 
3 March 1965 22) The harmonisation of economic policies in the member states -
naturally following the sound German economic design — were to help avoid another 
recurrence of the 1964 inflow of funds into the Federal Republic, and to prevent the 
import of inflation into Germany 
Neither were the French plans for the reorganisation of the Bretton Woods 
system welcomed by the German government, for they had the added drawback of 
antagonising the US So, when Giscard submitted his 1964 proposal to introduce the 
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CRU, the Germans sided with the Americans and opposed the plans.215 All in all, 
'Germany generally preferred, when pressed to decide, the American over the French 
monetary option' (Kolodziej, 1974: 22-9, 42-6, 241-3). 
After the Bundestag elections of September 1965, the Gaullists in the CDU 
started to seize every opportunity to undermine Erhard, and managed to paralyse the 
government completely. Moreover, the Erhard government had been increasing 
government spending and decreasing taxes, which by 1966 had led to the largest 
German balance-of-payments deficit ever. In response to these problems, the 
government decided to reverse its course and pursue a strict monetary policy, thereby 
plunging the country into a recession. When the government tried to reverse its course 
for a third time and issued a plan to increase taxes to finance the budget deficit, the 
FDP Ministers in the government resigned in protest. 
A Grand Coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD succeeded the ousted government 
on 11 November 1966 (Hanrieder, 1989: 267). In the eyes of Chancellor Kiesinger, 
the broad, reliable parliamentary majority on which the Grand Coalition was built 
should have allowed his government to put German foreign policy in order, deal 
effectively with the domestic economic crisis, and silence popular demands for stronger 
leadership.2"1 However, the Grand Coalition would prove unable to provide such 
leadership. Moreover, the lack of cohesion within the Grand Coalition proved an 
obstacle to the innovations that it planned to realise. Initially, the German attitude 
towards France improved (Hanrieder, 1989: 267). However, in the face of the 
continuing provocations by De Gaulle, a genuine improvement of the relations with 
France never materialised. In 1969, the Grand Coalition was replaced by a government 
of SPD and FDP headed by SPD leader Willy Brandt. Barely one and a half month 
after his election as Chancellor, Brandt would put European monetary unification back 
on the agenda. 
215
 Tsoukalis has suggested that the Federal Republic sided with the US on this issue partly because these 
had been reminding the Germans of the vital presence of American troops in Germany (Tsoukalis, 1977' 
68) 
'"
i
 The Grand Coalition had become possible because of the shift in ideas which the SPD had undergone 
during the decade prior to its entry into the government. After WWII, the SPD had favoured German re-
unification over Westbindung They felt that entering an alliance with Western Europe and the US would 
impede good relations with the USSR and therefore reunification Accordingly, they had fought 
membership of the ECSC, EDC, and NATO. However, by the mid-1950s, these ideas became 
increasingly out of line with reality and more and more members of the party favoured a revision of the 
party's foreign policy ideas. At the same time, the party had gone through a change in its economic 
preferences which culminated in the establishment of a new party programme in 1959 (the Bad 
Godesberg programme) In the new programme the SPD stipulated that it had cast out its old, socialist, 
ideas and now accepted the principles of the social market economy. 
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5.5 Conclus ion 
During the years 1945-1968, a small set of policy entrepreneurs made several attempts 
to establish a European monetary union However, none of these initiatives ever 
materialised At the root of this failure lay the unwillingness of, amongst others, 
France and later Germany to engage in such an endeavour and the divergence of their 
policy preferences concerning this issue In fact, it seems that during the two decades 
after World War II, the German and French national preferences drifted ever further 
apart Moreover, neither the French nor the German policy stand came any closer to 
that of the advocates of European monetary unification For this reason, none of the 
plans for a European monetary union that were introduced in this period were ever 
seriously considered by the pivotal German and French decision makers In spite of 
this, this early period in the history of EMU is significant, for the plans introduced in 
this period did continue to inspire the proposals made in later years even the 
Maastricht Treaty bore considerable resemblance to the first American plans for EMU 
Moreover, it was in this period that the typical French and German outlook regarding 
the central issues of European monetary unification emerged and crystallised 
It is clear that throughout most of this period, the French and German 
preference regarding the dimensions of EMU - European integration, exchange rate 
system and economic and monetary policies - were developing The French came out 
of World War II rejecting any co-operation with their arch-enemy, with a preference 
for strong Keynesian economic policies, and a basic aversion for the Bretton Woods 
system During the early 1950s, however, the French had to face geo-political reality 
and exchanged their balancing tactics towards Germany with a strategy of 
rapprochement Moreover, with the return of De Gaulle to politics, the typical French 
stance on European monetary integration, which would dominate negotiations on 
further European monetary integration for decades to come, emerged De Gaulle's 
thesis included the fierce rejection of the American dominated Bretton Woods system, 
a preference for fixed exchange rates and a strong franc, and a rejection of all but the 
purest forms of intergovernmental co-operation Economic and monetary policies were 
fully geared towards making France great again 
In contrast, until the early 1960s the German stance on European integration 
and exchange rate co-operation was very clear Chancellor Adenauer dominated the 
German position on foreign policy, he advocated further, and preferably, supranational 
European integration and had no objections to the Bretton Woods system Moreover, 
superseding all possible policy objectives was the Chancellor's resolve to bring about a 
reconciliation with France and bind Germany to the West In the early 1960s, 
however, the dominance and convictions of the Chancellor were increasingly 
challenged by the rise of the ordohberal coalition of the German financial authorities 
The priority of this coalition was to guarantee the stability of the German economy, 
and as a result they were wary of co-operation with states like France, for which price 
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stability was not a priority Moreover, since this German financial elite increasingly 
came to believe that price stability and fixed exchange rates could not be maintained at 
the same time, further European monetary integration was rejected Finally, in 
contrast to Adenauer and his followers, the financial elite were by no means prepared 
to subjugate sound economic policies to foreign policy goals All in all, it is clear that 
during the early 1960s, the split in German domestic politics that would dominate 
national and European negotiations on European economic and monetary integration 
in the subsequent decades came into existence 
Finally, it may be concluded from this Chapter that the influence of the 
personal beliefs of central decision makers — such as Adenauer, De Gaulle and Erhard — 
on the course of events and fate of the plans for EMU was substantial Moreover, at 
first sight it seems that the changes in the national preferences that occurred during 
this period almost all occurred as a result of a change in the domestic power relations, 
rather than changes in the belief systems of central decision makers With the possible 
exception of the 1950s turn in the French strategy towards Germany, which seems to 
have involved a causal belief change by at least some of the central French decision 
makers, changes in national preferences concerning European monetary integration 
seem to have been caused by succession of governments in France, and the shift in the 
German domestic balance of power in the 1960s 
Given the extent and longevity of the divergence in preferences concerning 
European monetary unification in the 23 year period that has been studied in this 
chapter, it is at least remarkable that at the Conference in The Hague in late 1969, 
both the German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, and the new Gaullist President, Georges 
Pompidou, introduced plans for the establishment of a European monetary union 
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6 PERSISTENT PREFERENCES AND 
POLITICAL STRUGGLES 
'When you observe conflict, think Deadlock — the abience of mutual interest - before puzzling 
over why a mutual interest was not realized' 
-Kenneth Oye as cited in (Moravcsik, 1997. 543) 
6.1 Introduction 
In the literature it is often argued that on 1 and 2 December 1969, the long-term 
disagreement between France and Germany concerning the establishment of European 
monetary co-operation (see Chapter 5) seemed to be finally resolved when the German 
Chancellor Brandt and the French President Pompidou both proposed the 
establishment of a European economic and monetary union. However, only two years 
later, this recently formed common interest was unfortunately destroyed by two of the 
most serious economic crises since World War II: the collapse of the decades-old 
Bretton Woods system, and shortly thereafter the first oil crisis.217 
In this chapter, it will be shown that the story was, in fact, rather different 
and more complicated. Although at the The Hague Summit, both Brandt and 
Pompidou introduced plans for the intensification of European monetary co-operation, 
their proposals differed significantly, in substance as well as in their scope. While the 
Chancellor envisioned a fully fledged European economic and monetary union, the 
French President's plans were far more modest and did not extend beyond 
intergovernmental co-operation. 
Furthermore, it will be argued that Brandt's The Hague Summit proposals 
constituted a break with past German European monetary policy making, and an 
extension of the Chancellor's pre-existing pro-European beliefs into the monetary 
issue-area. This extension will be traced back to the persuasive efforts of Monnet. Due 
to the fact that Brandt was for a time able to shield his plans from more critical 
domestic actors, a temporary break with the norm in the German national preference 
resulted. There is no evidence, on the other hand, that any individual belief change or 
national preference change lay at the basis of the French The Hague Summit proposals. 
In fact, as will become clear from his cognitive maps, the proposals made by the 
217
 For similar arguments that the 1969 attempt to establish a European monetary union was hampered by 
the monetary and oil crises of the early 1970s, see (Dinan, 2000: 485; 2004: 126; Dyson, 1994: 89-90; 
Levitt and Lord, 2000: 31, McNamara, 1998- 105-6; Vanthoor, 1994: 59-63; Verdun, 2000a- 62-3, 69-
70). 
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French President were solidly rooted in the Gaullist world vision he had held for years, 
and which had determined French monetary policy since the late 1950s. Moreover, 
Pompidou's preferences show no signs of change in the months following the The 
Hague Summit. 
Notwithstanding the divergence in the leaders' policy preferences, the Werner 
group - appointed to study the possibility of the establishment of a European 
monetary union and a European reserve fund - managed to come to an agreement on a 
set of proposals that, if implemented, would have amounted to the establishment of a 
fully fledged supranational European Central Bank, and a transfer of substantial 
economic and monetary decision-making powers from the national to the European 
level. This chapter will show, however, that this meeting of German and French minds 
was only possible because both the German and the French national preference on 
European monetary unification were in fact far from unitary, and that some state 
representatives — notably Brandt on the German side, and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing 
and a range of high officials on the French side — were pushing forward, while 
President Pompidou and the German financial elite were applying the brakes. In this 
respect, the 1970s quest for European economic and monetary union may perhaps 
better be characterised as an instance of national rather than aninternational political 
battle. 
However, all battles come to an end. After reading the final Werner Report, 
President Pompidou effectively straightened out his insubordinate officials, retook his 
hold on the international bargaining process, and showed the alleged 'window of 
opportunity' for EMU for the illusion it was. As a result - and more than two years 
prior to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the first oil crisis - the road to 
the European economic and monetary union was blocked. 
Finally, it will be shown that the determining factor behind this story was not 
individual cognitive belief change, for apart from Willy Brandt, who during this 
period extended his beliefs into a new issue-area, and the French President's successful 
imposition of his own will on his Minister of Economics and Finance, the preferences 
of the major actors remained very stable over time. It will be shown in this chapter 
that the changes in the national stances during the 1970s negotiations on the 
establishment of EMU were in fact caused by political changes — and more in 
particular — by the 'pushing and hauling' of some of the major players in the national 
and European decision-making process. 
The first part of this chapter will deal with the changes in national preferences 
that took place before the The Hague Summit. It will examine the plans proposed by 
Brandt and Pompidou at the Hague Conference, the origins of these plans, and how 
they related to their long-term policy beliefs. The second part of this chapter will focus 
on the debates in the Council of Ministers and the contributions of the German and 
French Ministers of Economic (and Financial) Affairs. Finally, it will be shown how 
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the hopes raised by the Werner Report were crushed by the French President, putting 
an end to any dreams of a rapid and irrevocable establishment of a true European 
Economic and Monetary Union. 
6.2 The Simmering Disagreement 
Soon after his election on 19 June 1969, Pompidou, began calling for a summit of the 
Heads of State and Government of the Six in order to bring about a rélance of the 
European integration process.218 On 1 January 1970, the Common Market would be 
established, which — according to the French President - was an event that called for a 
discussion of the future of Europe and the implementation of the remaining provisions 
of the Rome Treaties {achèvement), the initiation of new policies (approfondissement), and 
the enlargement of the Communities {élargissement) (Pompidou, 1969a: 105-6; 1969c: 
75-7; cf. Dinan, 2004: 128-135).219 
On 1 and 2 December, the proposed conference was held in The Hague under 
the presidency of the Dutch government. It is fair to say that the goal of deepening the 
Communities — under which heading the intensification of economic and monetary co-
operation was proposed — was not a priority for any of the member states. In general 
terms, France's priority at the outset had been to consolidate the financing of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP),220 while enlargement, and more specifically the 
adhesion of the United Kingdom, was the central issue concerning the remaining five 
member states (Pompidou, 1969c: 75-6, cf. Agence Europe, 15 September: 2-3, 17 
October: 2-3bis, 10 November 1969: 2-3, 2 December 1969: 2-3).221 However, all 
member states, except the Netherlands, also spoke out in favour of intensifying 
economic and monetary co-operation, though the level of intensification proposed by 
the members varied significantly (Agence Europe, 1 December 1969: 3-4ter; 2 
December 1969: 2-3). 
Georges Pompidou was the first to speak at the The Hague Summit. The 
main theme of his speech concerned the financing of CAP and his willingness to open 
negotiations with the prospective member states. However, he also briefly addressed 
the issue of deepening and stated that member states needed to 'réaliser la convergence 
des politiques économique et monétaire' (Pompidou, 1969c: 77). According to the 
French President, the need for a convergence in the member states' monetary and 
2I
* Although Pompidou repeatedly emphasised that the summit was held at his initiative, he was in fact 
pressured repeatedly by German Minister of Foreign Affairs and later Chancellor, Willy Brandt, to call for 
such a meeting (Bossuat, 2000: 357). 
219
 Pompidou referred to these three goals - completion, deepening, and enlargement - as the Triptyque. 
no
 At the end of the Summit, the French spokesman, Léo Hamon, even indicated that France was only 
willing to pursue the deepening and enlargement of the Community after measures to complete European 
integration had been implemented (Agence Europe, 2 December 1969' 4). 
221
 On 1 December, prior to the meeting of the Heads of State and Government, the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs had discussed the adhesion of Great Britain (Agence Europe, 1 December 1969: 2). 
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economic policies lay in the importance of stable exchange rates for the functioning of 
the CAP Moreover, such convergence would serve the general goal of making Europe 
'maîtresse de son propre destin' in a world divided between two superpowers 
(Pompidou, 1969c 77) However, his actual proposals for the development of a 
common economic and monetary policy were modest and vague In his speech on the 
opening day of the Summit, he merely called for the drawing up of a 'liste d'objectifs 
échelonnés précis et réalistes', and promised 'j'aurai, sur ce point, des propositions à 
faire'(Pompidou, 1969c 77) 
During the deliberations of the second day,222 Pompidou made good on his 
promise and proposed to establish a system of systematic and regular meetings of the 
Ministers of Economic and Financial Affairs 'um über die Expansion unserer 
Wirtschaft und die Harmonisierung unserer Wachstumsraten zu sprechen' {Europa-
Archiv, 25, 2 41) He also proposed to 'go beyond' the existing measures by 
establishing a reserve fund for short-term and possibly mid-term financial support 
Finally, he proposed that the member states would try to form a united front at the 
meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) If the Six could achieve these 
goals, the President added, Europe would finally be able to make 'sein ganzes Gewicht 
bei den internationalen Verhandlungen geltend' {Europa-Archiv, 25, 2 4 1 , cf Agence 
Europe, 2 December 1969 2-5) 
In contrast to the limited intensification of European economic and monetary 
integration proposed by the French President, the second speaker on the first day of 
the summit — German Chancellor Willy Brandt - envisioned the creation of a fully 
fledged economic and monetary union After addressing, amongst other things, the 
issue of the adhesion of the EFTA members, the establishment of a common foreign 
policy, co-operation on the issues of science and technology, and the further 
development of the Community institutions, he presented a detailed two-step plan for 
the establishment of EMU 
Mit der Harmonisierung der Zielvorstellungen muß in einer ersten Stufe eine 
wirksame Koordinierung der kurzfristigen Wirtschaftspolitik einhergehen Die 
Festlegung quantitativer mittelfristiger wirtschaftspolitischer Ziele ist dabei eine 
wichtige Aufgabe Wenn es uns so gelingt, eine gemeinsame Wirtschaftspolitik zu 
entwickeln, werden wir in einer zweiten Stufe die Wirtschafts- und Wahrungsunion 
verwirklichen können'(Brandt, 1969a 51) 
In addition, he stated that a European reserve fund would have to be established and 
that the German government would be ready to assist in its creation 'sobald die 
notwendigen Voraussetzungen gegeben sind'(Brandt, 1969a 51) This was a 
, 2
' Which were largely devoted to the financial arrangement of rhe CAP and the enlargement of the 
Community 
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remarkable proposal, given the history of the German stance on European monetary 
policy. 
Brandt justified his desire for further European integration by proclaiming his 
conviction that a more developed European Community would enable the 
development of a 'gesamteuropäischen Friedensordnung'. Furthermore, he also 
expressed the wish to intensify co-operation with Germany's Western partners now 
that his government was looking for 'Verständigung mit dem Osten' (Brandt, 1969a: 
47). Regarding his plans to unify the economic and monetary policies of the Six in 
particular, the Chancellor emphasised that growing economic interdependence among 
the Six was causing economic instability, and that inflationary tendencies in one 
country could easily endanger the stability of other member states. He argued that 
'diese Gefahr ist nur abzuwenden, wenn wir auf dem Wege zu einer Gemeinschaft des 
Wachstums und der Stabilität rascher vorankommen' (Brandt, 1969a: 51). 
Furthermore, in the eyes of the Chancellor, the stabilisation of European exchange 
rates was in Germany's interests (Wilkens, 2001: 388, Agence Europe, 2 December 
1969: 5). Finally, Brandt proposed the idea that the fund would constitute 'la future 
solidarité monétaire' amongst the European states (Wilkens, 2001: 388). 
During the afternoon session of the second day of the Summit, the Six briefly 
addressed the issue of economic and monetary co-operation,223 and managed to agree 
that 'within the Council ... and in close collaboration with the Commission, a plan in 
stages should be worked out during 1970 with a view to the creation of an economic 
and monetary union'. Furthermore, the final communiqué stated that the Six 'have 
agreed that the possibility should be examined of setting up a European reserve fund' 
(Conference of Heads of State and Government, 1970: 18-19). 
The most salient fact brought to light in this account of the events of 
December 1969 is, however, that unlike his German colleague, President Pompidou 
did not propose the establishment of a European economic and monetary union.224 In 
" ' That day, the deliberations were again largely devoted to the enlargement issue Allegedly, it was this 
issue that delayed the ending of the Conference by one and a half hours. During the meeting, the French 
in particular seemed to have been pleading for an intensification of monetary co-operation (Agence Europe, 
2 December 1969 2, 5) 
221
 Many students of the history of the EMU have claimed that at The Hague, Pompidou and Brandt 
concurred on the establishment of a European monetary union. Howarth, for instance, states that 
'President Georges Pompidou called for the creation of EMU' (Howarth, 2000: 26), and both Kruse and 
Rosenthal imply that all Heads of State and Government including the French supported the 
establishment of a European economic and monetary union (Howarth, 2000: 26; Kruse, 1980' 54-6; 
Rosenthal, 1975: 29). Dyson approximates the true state of affairs when claiming that 'President 
Pompidou had stressed the monetary dimension of EMU' (Dyson, 1994: 78). Only Tsoukahs has correctly 
observed that 'the initiative for an EMU did not come from President Pompidou but from Chancellor 
Brandt' (Tsoukahs, 1977. 85). However, he then goes on to conclude that 'the French President also 
seemed prepared to go beyond the positions previously held by French government', in my opinion an 
incorrect assessment (see Section 6.5.2). 
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fact, the French President's proposals were limited to the creation of a European 
reserve fund - specifically designed to help France cope with her balance-of-payments 
difficulties - and some limited and purely intergovernmental monetary measures. For 
this reason, his proposals did not go beyond any of the measures that his predecessors 
had been advocating, to no avail, during the negotiations on the Rome Treaties and 
the Barre Plan. On the other hand, the newly elected German Chancellor did propose 
the establishment of a fully fledged European economic and monetary union in his 
speech. This proposal explicitly envisioned setting up a European reserve fund in 
which, eventually, part of the German reserves was to be deposited. Brandt's The 
Hague proposals therefore did constitute a breach with past German European 
monetary policy making, for never before had the German political elite initiated or 
agreed to such far-reaching monetary proposals. 
6.3 The Origins of the The Hague Summit Proposals 
In order to understand the origins of the monetary proposals put forward by Brandt 
and Pompidou, this section will provide a closer investigation of the domestic political 
process preceding the Hague Conference, as well as the French and German leader's 
preferences concerning European, economic and monetary co-operation. 
6.3-1 The Brandt-Monnet Connection 
On 21 October 1969, approximately a month after the SPD's narrow victory in the 
Bundestag elections,22 ' Brandt was elected the first SPD Chancellor of the Federal 
Republic and leader of the SPD-FDP government. Brandt appointed his trusted SPD 
collaborator and scholar Karl Schiller as Minister of Economics, and Alex Möller as 
Minister of Finance, while the FDP chairman Walter Scheel succeeded Brandt at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One of the first actions of the new government was to 
support Pompidou's call for a European summit at which Brandt was to present his 
ground-breaking proposal for the establishment of a European economic and monetary 
union. 
There is no doubt that the new Chancellor had always been an ardent 
proponent of European integration and, for ideological reasons alone, was likely to 
support any policy that would involve further co-operation (see Section 6.3.2). 
However, the Chancellor also had some very good political reasons for supporting 
Pompidou's call for a rélance of Europe. As Brandt indicated in his speech at the Hague 
"
5
 On 28 September 1969, elections for the Bundestag were held. The SPD won 42.7% of the vote, the 
CDU/CSU 46 1% The FDP won 5.8% of the vote and therefore just barely made the 5 percent minimum 
required for representation Since the FDP and the SPD together had obtained 12 more seats than the 
CDU/CSU, the SPD and FDP felt they had a right to form the new German government and one day after 
the elections, Brandt started coalition talks with FDP leader Walter Scheel (Brandt, 199^: 248-50, Cook 
andPaxton, 1998: 199) 
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Conference, he intended to press on with the German rapprochement with Eastern 
Europe, a strategy that had been initiated under his direction by the Kiesinger 
government. There was general consensus among the German political elite that such 
a policy needed to be balanced by further binding the FRG to the EEC to ease any 
fears about a second Rapallo. Furthermore, Brandt seemed to have had less faith in the 
American pledge to secure Germany's military safety than his predecessors and may 
have been looking for a stronger alliance with France (Tsoukalis, 1977: 85). 
Still, Brandt's choice of the unification of economic and monetary policy as 
one of the vehicles for his European and foreign policy goals was not an obvious one. 
Prior to 1 December 1969, he had never envisioned economic or monetary policy 
making as a means to intensify European co-operation.226 Furthermore, the monetary 
upheaval of 1968-69, which had led to calls for further monetary co-operation in 
France and the Community institutions, had not strengthened support for European 
monetary integration in Germany. In fact, within the Ministries of Economics and 
Finance and the Bundesbank, the crisis seems to have strengthened the position of the 
supporters of a flexible exchange rate system (Tietmeyer, 1971: 412; 2002: 319; 
Werner, 1991: 122). 
So, what did prompt the Chancellor's focus on European economic and 
monetary unification as a means to further European integration? There is strong 
evidence to suggest that the monetary aspect of Brandt's The Hague proposals can be 
traced back directly to the entrepreneurship of Monnet who, prior to the The Hague 
Summit, had been bombarding Brandt with plans for a European reserve fund. In fact, 
in his memoirs, Brandt acknowledges the role of the French Europeanist, albeit in an 
understated fashion, when he explains that he was 'encouraged by Jean Monnet' to 
advance the The Hague proposals (Brandt, 1977: D.l , 269). 
As early as 9 July 1968, when Brandt was still Minister of Foreign affairs, 
Monnet had started to press him to initiate further European economic and monetary 
co-operation.227 Brandt's reaction was reticent, but Monnet persisted, sending him two 
226
 In the various speeches on European integration he gave during the years 1966-1969, Brandt 
envisioned policy making concerning issues like the adhesion of Great Britain, nuclear energy, 
technology, taxes, dispersion and processing of information, environmental taxation, oceanography, 
development of new raw materials and means of communication, meteorology, institutional change, and 
Third World policies as possible instruments for the deepening of European integration (Speeches 
reproduced in: Brandt, 1968a. 15, 18,21,48, 125-8, 130, 154, 163) The closest he ever came to 
proposing progress in economic and monetary affairs was his suggestion to further liberalise capital 
movements (Brandt, 1967· 128). 
227
 The project of a European reserve fund had been developed in Monnet's Action Committee, and 'die 
ersten schriftlich niedergelegten Entwürfe tragen die Handschrift der engen Mitarbeiter Monnets (Van 
Helmont, Kohnstamm, TrifFin, Un, Carli)' (Bossuat, 2000: 335). However, the origins of Monnet's plans 
date back to much earlier than Bosuat has suggested, for, as was shown in Chapter 5, Tnffin and Uri had 
already been involved in developing the reserve fund and monetary union plans for the ECA during the 
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memoranda on the subject of the monetary problems faced by European states.228 In 
his reply, Brandt indicated that, in his view, Monnet's plans would surely fail to 
materialise as they were invariably linked with plans for the enlargement of the 
Community, and the French were maintaining their veto against the accession of 
United Kingdom {Agence Europe, 8 July 1969: 2-3, 16 July 1969: 2-3 Bossuat, 2000: 
355). Moreover, according to Brandt, the French would resist the supranational 
element of the plan. Furthermore, he stated that 'une politique monétaire unifiée dans 
une organisation monétaire européenne ... ne peut être conduite avec succès que si elle 
peut s'appuyer sur une intégration économique très avancée' (Bossuat, 2000 : 356), a 
statement that reflected the economist views advocated by the German financial elite 
(see Section 6.4). Monnet, however, did not let the matter rest, and insisted that an 
agreement on a reserve fund could be achieved (Bossuat, 2000: 357). 
During the first months of 1969, Monnet and his primary monetary adviser 
Triffin worked privately on their plans for European monetary integration (Bossuat, 
2000: 357-8). Only after Brandt had been elected Chancellor did Monnet try to 
persuade him again by sending another two letters. In the first, sent on 21 October 
I969 , Monnet asked for a meeting and tried to convince the new Chancellor that the 
upcoming European conference in December would offer h im 'die einmalige 
Möglichkeit ... seine Partner auf direkte Weise in seinem europäischen Sinne zu 
gewinnen' (Bossuat, 2000: 360).22y In the second letter, Monnet presented a complete 
plan of action in which he proposed: 
'1 . dass Sie auf der Gipfelkonferenz vorschlagen, dass in der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft rasch ein Europäischer Reservefonds geschaffen wird, der das 
Instrument der währungspolitischen Solidarität der Länder der Gemeinschaft wäre, 2. 
dass Sie sich bereit erklären, einen Prozentsatz der gesamten deutschen 
Währungsreserven in ihn zu überführen zur gemeinsamen Verwaltung mit den 
Reserven, die die anderen Länder darin deponieren würden, 3. dass Sie eine Tagung 
der Sechs einberufen, um die technischen Modalitaten und die Organisation diese 
Fonds festzulegen' (as reproduced in: Wilkens, 1999a: 414) 
He tried to win Brandt for his cause by claiming that a European economic and 
monetary union would prove to be 'der Beginn der politischen Union', and that 
without a European reserve fund there was 'kein dauerhafter Fortschritt Möglich'. 
Furthermore, he stated that this was Brandt's chance 'um der Wel t zu zeigen, daß 
implementation of the Marshall Plan, long before the Action Committee for the United States of Europe 
was set up. 
1M
 At this time, Brandt informed Monnet that the Bundesbank was independent from the government, a 
fact that - according to Bossuat - Monnet was unaware of (Bossuat, 2000: 356) 
-'"' According to Bossuat, Monnet even sent Brandt unsolicited agenda points and declarations for the 
Hague conference (Bossuat, 2000: 361) 
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Deutschland die Lösung seiner Probleme in einer gemeinsamen und großzügigen 
Aktion sieht' (Wilkens, 1999a: 413). Finally, Monnet skilfully exploited Brandt's 
historical beliefs to convince him of the value of the proposed policy by framing the 
establishment of EMU as a means to promote sustainable peace, and by stressing the 
German historical responsibility in promoting this goal (see Section 6.3.2). 
After some hesitation,2'0 Brandt met with Jean Monnet in Bonn on 7 
November. 'Two days later, Brandt himself drew in a hand-written note the outlines 
of the monetary fund and of its function within the political framework of the 
Community' (Wilkens, 1999b: 81), and send his under-secretary for European affairs 
in the Bundeskanzleramt, Katharina Pocke, to Monnet's Action Committee to obtain 
more information about the plans on which Monnet had been working. The 
Chancellor wondered whether it would be better to establish the European reserve 
fund only after an agreement on a common economic policy was reached. Moreover, he 
also wanted Monnet's reassurance that Germany would maintain ownership of its own 
reserves. According to Bossuat, Brandt 'gab damit auch die Zweifel einiger seiner 
Fachminister wieder', doubts that they had voiced during discussions on the subject in 
the German cabinet (Bossuat, 2000: 361). These doubts had led some members of the 
German financial elite to attempt to sabotage Brandt's efforts.231 
Although in early November Brandt did not seem entirely convinced of the 
value of Monnet's plans, later that month, Monnet called Triffin and told him he was 
urgently needed in Paris, for he had finally 'convaincu le Chancelier Willy Brandt de 
présenter à la première conférence au sommet de La Haye notre proposition de créer le 
Fonds européen de réserve' (Triffin, 1989: 532). Monnet's seems to have been a correct 
assessment, for on 27 November 1969, Brandt informed Pompidou of his intention to 
present a plan for the establishment of a European reserve fund at The Hague (Bossuat, 
2000: 360; Wilkens, 1999b: 80). 
It is clear that in his The Hague proposals, Brandt did take into account some 
of the doubts that his Ministers had voiced by stressing the need for economic 
integration in his speech (Wilkens, 2001 390).2i2 At the same time, there are several 
indications that Brandt tried to keep the Ministers of Economic and Financial Affairs 
210
 According to Bossuat, Brandt hesitated meeting Monnet because he feared that Pompidou would see 
him as a mere puppet of Monnet (Bossuat, 2000: 361) 
2.1
 Triffin remembers that he was asked to supply the Chancellor with economic and statistical data about 
his own country, for 'que lui refusaient obstinément tant le Ministère allemand des Finances que la 
Bundesbank' (Triffin, 1989. 532). 
2.2
 The fact that at this stage, Brandt had not internalised the Kronungs-theory adhered to by the German 
financial elite is confirmed by his remark that with regards to the discussions between the economists and 
monetarists one should avoid 'une discussion à propos de la poule et de l'oeuf and that 'il y a une certaine 
probabilité qu'une initiative — même limitée — dans le domaine de la politique monétaire (...) entraîne 
des progress sur le chemin de la convergence en politique économique' (Brandt as quoted in: Wilkens, 
2001: 389) 
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and the Bundesbank out of the decision-making loop as much as possible during the 
months preceding the European conference. Firstly, all contact with Monnet went 
solely through Brandt and his close collaborator in European affairs, Pocke. Secondly, 
Brandt seems to have been quite successful in invoking his authority as Chancellor and 
presenting the preparations for The Hague as a 'political objective at the highest 
political level'. Moreover, he refused to reveal the details of his plans, so that 'the 
interested German Ministries could assert their objections and conditions only later' 
(Wilkens, 1999b: 81). Finally, Brandt even handled his correspondence with 
Pompidou himself'während sein eigener Aussenminister, Walter Scheel, mit dieser 
Angelegenheit nicht befasst wurde' (Bossuat, 2000: 361) .^ Aided by the privileged 
position of the Chancellor during European summits, until the December summit 
Brandt succeeded in preventing the German monetary authorities from blocking the 
presentation of his plans for European economic and monetary union. However, after 
the summit, when everything was out in the open, the Chancellor no longer controlled 
the political process surrounding his proposals (cf. Wilkens, 2001: 388). 
6.3.2 The Chancellor's Grand Foreign Policy Design 
Brandt's proposals constituted a break with past German European monetary policy 
making. However, as may be derived from the cognitive map based on Brandt's 
statements and writings from 1966 until May 1969, it merely constituted an 
extension of the Chancellor's pre-existing personal convictions into a new issue-area. 
The establishment of a European economic and monetary union fitted into the grand 
foreign policy design he had espoused for years, which may explain why Monnet 
managed to convince Brandt of the merits of his plan relatively easily. 
My analysis of the Chancellor's writings and speeches shows that Brandt had 
been a strong believer of European integration long before December 1969 (See 
Cognitive Map Brandt - 1 in Appendix B). In fact, it may be argued that European 
unification constituted the pivot in Brandt's foreign policy design.2'1 According to the 
Chancellor, European integration (and eventual unification) was a 'wesentliches 
Element' in the struggle to achieve his most central and salient foreign policy goal: the 
establishment of lasting peace (VI) (cf. Brandt, 1967: 124; 1977: I, 26l).2 , , Brandt's 
-
H
 Scheel held the same sceptic position on European monetary integration as his colleague Schiller and 
the Bundesbank council (Bossuat, 2000: 368). 
2,1
 The concept of'European unification' (E10) belongs to the core of Brandt's first cognitive map with a 
centrality and saliency of respectively 13 and 20. For the centrality and saliency measures of all concepts 
used in the maps, see Appendix D. 
235
 The concept of'Peace' belongs to the core of Brandt's belief system with a centrality of 11, and a 
saliency of 2? The relationship that Brandt draws between European integration and peace is indicated 
by the links between the 'European integration' concepts (E7, E l2 , E10, E9, E8) and 'peace' (VI) in 
Cognitive Map Brandt-1 (Appendix B). An analysis of the secondary literature on Brandt and his memoirs 
reveals that the re-unification of Germany (D2) is a goal that also features prominently in his general 
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writings and speeches invariably refer the Germany's obligation to promote sustainable 
peace in the world, and her own interest in this peace (Brandt, 1968a 
13,15,20,21,43,47,124,130,150,153,1968b 28-34,1974 499-543) He seemed to 
feel that, in view of their Na2i past, prioritising this goal was a moral duty and 
responsibility for all Germans (Brandt, 1977 I, 260) 
While Brandt rarely specified how European integration would contribute to 
the attainment of sustainable peace (hence the direct link between the concepts E10-
VI in Brandt's map), he occasionally hinted that, in his eyes, European integration 
would lead to a harmonisation of the interests of the member states (H3), which in 
turn would help to prevent any recurrence of war within the continent of Europe and 
the resulting devastation (Brandt, 1968a 22,1974 516-8) Moreover, in the eyes of 
the German Chancellor, European unification increased Europe's influence on 
international affairs (E6) and thereby helped to promote world peace (see relation E10-
E6-V1) Precisely because his goal was the prevention of another Franco-German war, 
Brandt - like Adenauer — was convinced that Franco-German reconciliation (F3) 
should be at the heart of European integration (see relation F3-E10), and that 'ohne ein 
enges und vertrauensvolle Verhältnis zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich ist die 
Europaische Friedensordnung nicht denkbar' (Brandt, 1968b 43, cf Brandt, 1968a 
21,1974 518-21,1977 1,159,261,93,417) 
Besides striving to realize such an idealistic goal as world peace, Brandt 
openly admitted that in their European policy the Germans would also 'look after their 
own interests self-assertively' (Brandt, 1977 I, 150), and that by combining member 
states' political and economic strength European integration would be commercially 
and politically beneficial to Germany (Brandt, 1968a 128, 133, 1977 150, 261), for 
economic integration would always serve the economic interests of a 'large export 
country' like Germany (Brandt, 1977 I, 152) 
With regard to the form of integration, it is clear from his cognitive map that 
Brandt was a supporter of supranational co-operation In his assertions, the German 
Chancellor explicitly distinguishes between European co-operation in its various forms 
(see concepts El 1, E7, E12, H4, H5 in Cognitive Map Brandt-l) and European 
unification in its various forms (see concepts E10, E8, E9), supporting both However, 
like Adenauer he had 'no objections to his [De Gaulle's] idea of a "Europe of 
fatherlands'" if that proved to be the lowest common denominator Given the choice, 
however, he did seem to favour European integration to come in a supranational 
package (Brand, 1993 100)236 From the speech he held in The Hague, it may be 
beliefsystem (Brandt, 1968a 13-4, 22-6, 43-7, 1968b 98-119,142-157,1974 508-9,1977 d l ,262) 
However, Brandt hardly relates this goal to his beliefs pertaining to EMU 
216
 The concepts referring to European unification outrank the concepts referring to European co-operation in 
terms of centrality and saliency (see Appendix E — Preferences on EMU-dimensions) In fact, the average 
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concluded that given his determination to proceed with rapprochement with Eastern 
Europe, Brandt considered it necessary to bind Germany irrevocably to its Western 
partners, and what better way to do this than through supranational integration? All 
in all, it was to be expected that the supranational co-operation implied in the 
establishment of a European economic and monetary union would not raise 
fundamental objections with the German Chancellor. In fact, Brandt probably valued 
the proposals partly because of this aspect. 
Apart from occasionally stressing the economic benefits of European 
integration, overall Brandt devoted little attention to economic, financial and 
monetary matters. Like most members of the SPD, by the 1960s, he had embraced free 
market thinking but maintained a sharp eye for the social consequences of market 
processes. Therefore, he prioritised the goal of economic welfare and development 
(W3) over price-stability (E3) and stated that 'economic and financial policy should 
not be a goal in itself, it should serve the attainment of social goals' (Brandt, 1977: I, 
260), a view more in line with that of the French President than with that of the 
German financial elite.2" However, generally speaking, economic and financial policy 
making never had Brandt's full attention (Brandt, 1977: I, 258), and prior to 
December 1969, he had seemed quite content to leave decision making in this issue-
area to the German financial elite. More importantly, however, in the speeches 
analysed, the only indication of preferences concerning monetary and exchange rate 
politics, or the form of the international or European monetary system, is that Brandt 
favoured a stable D-mark (D3, see Concept Comparison, Appendix E). 
6.3.3 Le Changement et la Continuité 
On 19 June 1969, Pompidou was elected as the new French President after De Gaulle 
had resigned following a defeat in a referendum on which he had staked his 
reputation.238 One day later he appointed Jacques Chaban-Delmas — long-time 
Gaullist and President of the National Assembly since 1958 — as his Prime Minister. 
The government Chaban-Delmas proceeded to form under the tight supervision of the 
new President consisted of, amongst others, the pro-European Gaullist Maurice 
Schumann as Minister of Foreign Affairs,2'9 and Giscard d'Estaing, who, for want of a 
centrahty and sahency values of the concepts indicating a preference for supranational co-operation are 8 
and 12 λ, while the intergovernmental concepts have an average value of 4.2 and 5 4 (see Appendix D) 
2 , 7
 In the statements and writing on which Brandt's first cognitive map is based, he only distinguishes 
three concepts referring to economic and monetary policy-making: 'Employment' (W2), 'Welfare' (W3), 
and Economic stability in Europe' (E3) The former two concepts, which refer to a more monetarist and 
Keynesian view on economics have an average centrahty and sahency measure of 2 and 2 5, while the 
values of the latter are both 1. 
2 1 8
 Pompidou was elected by 57.5 percent of the cast votes (Berstein and Rioux, 2000 15). 
2 , 9
 Schumann's support for European integration was well known. On 15 May 1962, Schumann had 
resigned from the Gaullist government because of a 'disagreement with General de Gaulle on basic issues 
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more suitable candidate, was asked to return to Rue de Rivoli (the residence of the 
Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs).240 The former Prime Minister, Minister of 
Economics and Finance, as well as Foreign Affairs and arch-Gaullist Debré was 
appointed Minister of Defence. 
Pompidou's election campaign, the composition of the new French 
government, as well as many of his decisions in the first year of his presidency were 
influenced by two developments in French politics. Firstly, in the last months of De 
Gaulle's government, members of the Gaullist party - the Union des Démocrates pour 
la République (UDR) - and the media had been airing doubts about whether the 
Gaullist political movement could outlive the General's departure from politics and 
whether anyone, including Pompidou, would ever be able to fill his shoes (Berstein 
and Rioux, 2000: 4; Debré, 1996: 47-8; Kolodziej, 1974: 400). Secondly, De Gaulle 
had lost the electoral essential support of the centre parties in the April referendum.2,11 
These two developments meant that Pompidou had the difficult task of bringing into 
line the two apparently irreconcilable goals of convincing the Gaullists that he would 
be true to the General's heritage, whilst distinguishing himself enough from De 
Gaulle to regain the support of the parties in the centre (Berstein and Rioux, 2000: 6-
7). Pompidou's approach to this paradox can be summed up most adequately by his 
electoral slogan: 'le changement dans la continuité'. 
Pompidou's European policies reflected his political strategy of combining 
continuity and change. His call for a rélance of European integration, together with his 
willingness to start accession negotiations with the United Kingdom, clearly 
represented a departure from De Gaulle's European policy. This change may be traced 
back to the aforementioned electoral need to regain the political backing of the centre-
right, for both the Centrists and the Independent Republicans were pro-European 
parties which had demanded l'ouverture in European affairs in return for their support 
in the European problem' (Schumann, 1962. 75, cf. Debré, 1996' 49, note 34). Schumann supported 
further European integration - and even supranational co-operation - because of the need to bind 
Germany to Western Europe, to counter the Soviet threat, and to end the US monopoly of atomic 
weapons (Schumann, 1962: 72, 74-5) In his eyes, the adhesion of the United Kingdom was vital if 
Europe was to achieve these goals (Schumann, 1962 75-7). Due to Schumann's fierce support for the 
adhesion of Britain, Debré referred to him as 'la voix de Londres' (Debré, 1996: 49, note 34). 
2111
 Giscard d'Estaing was only asked to assume the post as Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs 
after Antoine Pinay — the candidate that Giscard's Independent Républicains had put forward for the position 
- had declined (Berstein and Rioux, 2000: 21; Debré, 1996' 49) The relationship between Pompidou 
and Giscard had been strained since 1965 when Pompidou — then Prime Minister - had disagreed with 
De Gaulle over the level of monetary stringency to be introduced in the Quatrième Plan, and Giscard -
then Minister of Finance - stepped in, ready to take over the Prime Minister's task (Berstein and Rioux, 
2000: 21; Debré, 1996:49). 
241
 There had been a solidarity pact between the Independent Républicains, the Centrists and the UDR since 
1962, which had broken down over De Gaulle's plans for decentralisation, the issue which had been the 
topic of the 1969 referendum 
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(Berstein and Rioux, 2000: 11; Roussel, 1984: 312-4).242 In contrast, the President's 
stand on other aspects of European policy making — including European monetary 
policy making - represented a clear continuation of traditional Gaullist European 
policies, fully in line with the political ideas Pompidou had been espousing for years 
(see Section 6.3-4). 
The idea to propose further European monetary co-operation at the The 
Hague Summit originated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and was presented by 
Schumann as 'la Voie Royale pour faire avancer l'Europe' (Pierre-Brossolette, 2002: 
105; cf. Bernard, 2002: 129). The technical aspects of the monetary plans were 
developed by a small group of Giscard's collaborators at the Rue de Rivoli (Pierre-
Brossolette, 2002: 106). At a closed meeting on 18 November 1969 in preparation for 
the conference in The Hague, Giscard d'Estaing pleaded for the establishment of a 
currency support mechanism (reserve fund) like the one put in place by the former 
European Payment Union (see Chapter 5), and voiced support for a joint campaign 
against inflation with the Germans.2'" In addition, he advocated the removal of the 
fluctuation margins between the European currencies, for - in his eyes - this would 
lessen European dependence on the dollar and create a European 'entité distincte des 
Etats-Unis' (Bossuat, 2000: 362). Pompidou, however, maintained his more 
conservative position and expressed doubts about the plan to establish a European 
reserve fund. Furthermore, he felt that Giscard's plan to establish a single European 
currency was unrealistic (Bossuat, 2000: 362). 
At the same time as his Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance were pressing 
Pompidou to engage in closer European monetary co-operation, Brandt also began 
communicating his newly developed ideas on European economic and monetary co-
operation (Brandt, 1977:1, 266; Bossuat, 2000: 361; Wilkens, 1999b: 80; 2001: 381-
2). However, the plan that Brandt presented to the French President was not nearly as 
extensive as the program he was to present at The Hague, and did not yet contain any 
reference to a European economic and monetary union, the institutional innovations, or 
242
 Moreover, by 1969, many Gaullists - including Pompidou - had become convinced that enlargement 
could, in fact, be beneficial to France, for the economic rise of Germany seemed unstoppable and with the 
development of its Ostpolitik the Kiesinger government was beginning to claim a more prominent position 
in international politics. The accession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities could 
provide France with an ally to balance this growing German power Furthermore, it was commonly 
known that Great Britain was as averse to supranational co-operation as the Gaullists were, and therefore 
could also prove to be a useful ally in European institutional matters (Berstein and Rioux, 2000 26). 
241
 The preparation for The Hague was limited to the President, the Prime Minister, the technical 
Ministers Giscard d'Estaing, Schumann and Jacques Duhamel (Minister of Agriculture) and their closest 
collaborators, with Debré occasionally participating (Agence Europe, 18 November 1969 2 Bernard, 2002 
128). Jean-René Bernard - personal adviser to Pompidou - has stated that in these secret meetings the 
opinions appeared to be even less 'European' than those espoused during Cabinet-meetings 'où on parlait 
un peu plus pour l'Histoire', and that the most critical remarks were made by Debré (Bernard, 2002: 
128) 
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the fact that the German plan was intended to create a 'stability-minded Community' 
(Wilkens, 1999b: 80-1; cf. Wilkens, 2001: 381-2). In other words, in his letter, 
Brandt carefully avoided mentioning precisely those aspects of his plan that would run 
counter to the European and economic ideas of the French President (see Section 
6.3.4). In his reaction to Brandt's letter, Pompidou expressed his approval of the 
Chancellor's intentions and the establishment of a reserve fund, and informed him that 
his program for the conference 'differed from Brandt's only in its accentuation' 
(Wilkens, 1999b: SO).244 
It is thus clear that by the end of November 1969, influenced by the resolve of 
his own ministers and Brandt to engage in further European economic and monetary 
co-operation, Pompidou had decided to endorse the establishment of a European 
reserve fund. However, he had not allowed his Ministers to talk him into taking any 
excessively ground-breaking initiative like the creation of a single European currency, 
and - as is evident from Pompidou's The Hague speech - stuck to his own moderate 
and intergovernmental conception of Europe. In fact, apart from the sections 
concerning the accession of the United Kingdom, the President's speech was fully in 
line with the traditional Gaullist worldview that Pompidou consistently adhered to 
during his political career. 
6.5.4 Pompidou's Gaullist Heritage 
As Pompidou's first cognitive map illustrates, the President was a supporter of 
European integration (Cognitive Map Pompidou-1, Appendix B).i45 However, with 
the exception of his attitude to the enlargement of the Community, the President's 
ideas and preferences on Europe came in typical Gaullist colours. His reasons for 
supporting European integration were all associated with reinforcing the economic and 
political grandeur of France (Berstein and Rioux, 2000: 22-7; Cousté and Visine, 1974; 
Gerbet, 2001; Rials, 1977: 123-139, 166-8; Roussel, 1984: 367-375). More 
specifically, it may be concluded from his cognitive map that in the eyes of the new 
President, the establishment of a European confederation (E9) would strengthen 
211
 Brandt and the French technical Ministers were not the only actors that tried to influence the beliefs of 
the French President According to Bernard - and much to his own surprise - his notes and diaries from 
the time show that from 1969 until 1973 he met with Monnet 44 times However, in his view these 
meetings were largely inconsequential since Monnet's ideas and those held by the Elysée reflected two 
different and 'parfois contradictoires' intellectual movements (Bernard, 2002. 129). 
245
 All concepts referring to European (intergovernmental) co-operation - like 'Deepening' (D2), 
'European confederation' (E9), 'European economic co-operation' (E14) and 'European political co-
operation' (El i ) - are exclusively linked to positive ultimate values (or negatively linked to negative 
ultimate values). Moreover, the ultimate values 'European autonomous security policy' (El2) and the 
'Survival of Europe' (VI) are both valued positively by the President. 
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Europe as a whole,24'1 and would be able to provide the much needed counterweight to 
the two superpowers (see also Agence Europe, 12 June 1969: 2, Pompidou, 1975:1: 63-
91; cf. Bossuat, 2000: 369). His tendency to worry especially about France's and 
Europe's standing with regards to the United States is further illustrated by 
Pompidou's desire to maintain the independence of France and Europe (14,13), to 
establish a European autonomous security policy (El2), and his negative evaluation of 
a more Atlanticist Europe (Al). 
Kolodziej, however, has argued that ultimately Pompidou's foreign policy was 
guided by a concern for the French economy rather than its political grandeur 
(Kolodziej, 1974: 210). The research conducted in this thesis, confirms this view.247 As 
indicated in Pompidou's cognitive map, from his perspective, European co-operation 
would serve a whole range of economic purposes varying from an increase in the 
competitiveness of French business (U5) and averting economic crises and instability 
(C4) to enabling a new industrial revolution (16).248 Moreover, Kolodziej has rightly 
argued that in the French President's world view these economic goals outweighed the 
geopolitical benefits of European integration: not only did the new President 
distinguish more economic goals than geopolitical goals in his statements and 
writings, he also seemed to weigh them more heavily.249 
While Pompidou - unlike De Gaulle — defined the grandeur of France in 
economic terms, his preferences concerning the form of European integration were 
fully in line with the General's. There is no doubt that Pompidou fiercely resisted all 
supranational integration (Gerbet, 2001; Macndis, 1975: 41). This is illustrated by 
the fact that in his cognitive map all concepts referring to supranational co-operation 
are valued negatively.250 Moreover, rather than European supranational integration, the 
-
1
'' Despite its low centrality and saliency value, the goal of making Europe a superpower (E8) should be 
considered an important value in Pompidou's belief system since it is the only goal-concept to which the 
concept 'European confederation' (E9) (one of the two most central and salient concepts referring to 
European co-operation) is linked, and the centrality of the path E9-E8 amounts to 9, which is relatively 
high 
'
47
 Kolodziej has also argued that Pompidou's foreign policy making was guided by social concerns 
(Kolodziej, 1974 210) This view however is not corroborated by the research conducted in this thesis 
2I
" See the links between the concepts 'European economic co-operation' (E14) and 'increased 
competitiveness of French companies' (U5), between 'Deepening' (D2), 'Economic crisis/instability' (C4) 
and 'Loss of French gold and exchange holdings' (D4), and between 'Deepening' (D2), 'Liberalisation of 
credits and prices' (Lì), and 'New industrial revolution' (16) 
JW
 The majority ot concepts referring to European integration are indeed linked to an economic goal, 
while only European confederation' (E9) is directly linked to an explicit geopolitical goal (Europe as 
world power, E8) Moreover, the centrality of the consequent paths linking (the various forms of) 
European integration and these economic goals exceed the centrality of the path between 'European 
confederation' (E9) and 'Europe as a world-power' (E8) 
J5
" More precisely, Pompidou values the establishment of a 'European state' (El l ) negatively, and 
perceives the concept 'Political integration' (P5) to be positively related to this negative ultimate value 
Moreover, in the eyes of the President, political integration was also negatively related to the 
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new President advocated the establishment of a Confédération Européenne, a 
confederation of sovereign states (Pompidou, 1970a: 111). In Pompidou's mind, 
decision making in such a confederation would be exclusively intergovernmental 
(Pompidou, 1970b: 63-77). Like his ideas on European integration, Pompidou's 
preferences concerning the institutional form of integration, belonged to the core of 
his belief system and should thus be considered amongst his most strongly held 
beliefs.251 
At least as strong, however, were the President's preferences concerning the 
form of the international and European monetary system.252 Pompidou had shown an 
interest in, and was increasingly worried about, French and European monetary affairs 
even before his Ministers began his campaign to persuade the President to introduce 
plans for further monetary co-operation (Frank, 1995). On 8 August, for instance, he 
stated that 'dès ma prise de fonctions, j'ai considéré le problème de la monnaie comme 
le plus important et le plus urgent' (Pompidou, 1969b : 231). Despite favouring a 
certain flexibility in exchange rates, Pompidou emphasised the need for a level of 
political control over exchange rates that could not be achieved in a flexible exchange 
rate system. He was of the view that politicians should decide when the time was right 
to boost economic growth (El), welfare (W2, U2), trade relations (H4), or economic 
stability (E3) via the exchange rate instrument. Since the instrument of devaluation is 
simply unavailable in a flexible exchange rate system, such a monetary system was 
undesirable in the eyes of Pompidou.25' 
Moreover, while the President was critical of the Bretton Woods system (B2), 
it was not the fact that this monetary system was a fixed exchange rate system that led 
to this negative evaluation. According to Pompidou, the fact that Bretton Woods (B2) 
led to inflation in the US (15) was due to the special status of the dollar in the system, 
not the fact that it was a fixed exchange rate system.254 The Gold standard (Gl) — 
establishment of a European confederation (E9) of which Pompidou was a fierce advocate. Finally, 
according to Pompidou, 'Decision making by technical institutions' (Dl) would stall rather than 
stimulate 'Progress' (P6) All in all, in the President's first cognitive map, no concept can be distinguished 
that indicates a preference for supranational decision making (see Appendix E, Preferences on EMU-
dimensions) 
2,1
 Both the concepts 'Deepening' (D2, centrahty 9, sahency: 13), and 'European confederation' (E9, 
centrality 8, sahency: 13) belong to the core of Pompidou's belief system Another concept referring to 
the desired form of integration that has a relatively high centrality and sahency score is 'Independence of 
France' (14, centrality 4, sahency 7) 
•
!V
' The concept 'Effective and freely chosen devaluations' (D3) belongs to the core of his belief system 
with a centrality of 8 and a sahency of 13 (see Appendix D). 
: ! , ,
 This interpretation of Pompidou's preferences concerning the form of the exchange rate system is 
confirmed by the high value of concept 'Stable franc' (S3) in Pompidou's map (centrality: 5, sahency 6), 
which according to the President would ward off speculation (P2) and save the Banque de France from 
losing more of its gold and exchange holdings (D4), thereby avoiding another monetary crisis (Ml) 
^ See Section 6.4.3 for the economic reasoning behind this causal relationship. 
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another fixed exchange rate system but one which, unlike Bretton Woods, did not give 
any special status to a particular currency — was positively evaluated by the President 
and perceived as anti-inflationary (see relation G1-E3). 
Finally, from his assertions it may also be learned that Pompidou - like most 
Frenchmen of his generation — was a Keynesian in his economic ideas, and valued 
economic growth (El) over price stability (ES).2'5 This inclination had already become 
apparent in 1965 when, as Prime Minister of De Gaulle's second government, 
Pompidou did not agree with the strict financial policies De Gaulle wanted to 
introduce, and refused to develop the requested plan (Roussel, 1984: 241). Pompidou's 
Keynesian economic ideas seemed to have been strengthened by the events of May 
1968. From that time on, he believed that strict economic policies would lead to social 
upheaval (Frank, 2002: 310). In his eyes economic and financial policies could not, and 
should not be separated from their social consequences (Agence Europe, 16 June 1969: 
1). 
It may be concluded, thus, that the plans for a European Reserve fund as 
voiced in The Hague were fully consistent with the preferences concerning European 
integration and the international monetary system that the French President had held 
for years: purely intergovernmental integration and involving some form of fixed 
exchange rate system. 
6.4 Disagreement in the Council 
After the The Hague Summit, the resolution adopted by the Heads of State and 
Government, which proposed an investigation into the possibility of establishing a 
European economic and monetary union and a European reserve fund, was handed over 
to the Council of Ministers. In its capacity as Council Ministers of Economic and 
Financial affairs (ECOFIN), the Council was charged with translating these abstract 
goals into specific plans. From the very first exchange of views, a divide between the 
economists, including the German and Dutch Ministers, and monetarists, represented by 
the French, Belgians and the European Commission, characterised the Council 
discussions. 
6.4-1 The Economist-Monetarist Divide, Part 1 
In Paris on 23 and 24 February 1970, the ECOFIN officially discussed the final 
communiqué of the Hague Conference in Paris for the first time.256 Prior to this 
2,5
 The average centrality and saliency measures of the concepts indicating a more Keynesian view on 
economics are 4 5 and 5.25, while those of the ordoliberal concepts are respectively 3 and 3. 
•
!56
 The meetings of the ECOFIN were usually attended by the Governors of the Central Banks, Raymond 
Barre, the Vice-President of the EEC Commission in charge of economic and monetary affairs, and the 
Chairmen of the various specialized European Committees (Rosenthal, 1975: 121). Due to the fact that -
at that time — the German government included both a Minister of Economic and a Minister of Financial 
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meeting, the German, French, Belgian and Luxembourg Ministers had each submitted 
a plan for establishing European economic and monetary union or European reserve 
funds (Snoy d'Oppuers, 1970; Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, 1970; Werner, 1970; 
cf. Werner, 1991: 122-3).257 As can be expected, given the economist-monetarist 
divide, the various plans espoused very different ideas on the priority of economic and 
monetary measures and the timing of institutional measures.258 
The four-stage plan submitted by the German Minister of Economics, which 
bore his personal signature, constituted a typical example of the economist strategy to 
EMU and emphasised the need for a (relatively) early extension of powers for the 
Community's institutions.2'9 Further monetary integration or even unification was not 
opposed, but stringent conditions were formulated for its establishment. Most 
importantly, the Minister stipulated that economic integration would have to precede 
monetary integration and that a substantial transfer of the national policy making 
capacity to the community level was to take place. 
As a result, the plan mainly elaborated the first — preparatory - phase which 
was to lay the basis for the harmonisation of the member states' economic and 
monetary policies and the measures proposed were predominantly of an economic 
nature (Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, 1970: Art. Ill, phase 1). The German Minister 
also envisaged some monetary measures to be taken in this preparatory stage, such as a 
short-term support mechanism (Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, 1970: Art III, phase 
1: 4). However, these monetary measures went no further than those already proposed 
in the Barre Report and the economic measures dominated.260 
The subsequent three stages envisioned in the Schiller plan contained far less 
economic measures than the first. The second phase in particular was largely devoid of 
either new economic or monetary measures. According to the German Minister, in this 
phase, member states would have to start preparations for the institutional measures of 
the subsequent two stages (Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, 1970: Art III, phase 2). In 
Affairs, Germany could in principle be represented by two Ministers in the ECOFIN. However, most of 
the time, the German Minister of Financial affairs, Alex Moller, let his colleague Karl Schiller do the 
honours (Frankfurther Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 October 1969 2) 
2,7
 An unofficial exchange of views had already taken place on 27 January. At that time, Giscard d'Estaing 
had submitted his plan. The plan, however, was referred ro the Monetary Committee and discussion on it 
was postponed until the meeting of 2^ and 24 February. 
25H
 The Germans, supported by the Italians and the Dutch, stressed the importance of early economic 
harmonisation and institutional innovation The French, supported by the Belgians, Luxembourgians, and 
the Commission - which submitted a plan on 4 March - prioritised the introduction of monetary policies 
and opposed early institutional measures (Commissie van de Europese Economische Gemeenschappen, 
1970; cf. Agence Europe, 24 February 1970: 4-4bis, Werner, 1991: 123). 
259
 According to Agence Europe, the plan Schiller submitted had the full backing of Brandt (Agence Europe, 
23 February 1970: 3). 
260
 In fact, Schiller's proposals concerning the medium-term support mechanism even stop short of those 
proposed by Barre in 1968. 
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stage three, the first institutional measures would be introduced and a significant 
'Einbau von kommumtären Elementen would take place. Moreover, the first substantial 
monetary measures would be implemented. From this phase on, decisions 'in wichtigen 
Bereichen der Wirtschafts-, Finanz- und Währungspolitik' were to be taken by majority 
vote (Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, 1970: Art III, phase 3: 1.3). A step-by-step 
transition to 'a kind of Federal Reserve System, a narrowing of the fluctuation margins 
governing exchange rates between the European currencies, and the development of 
the medium-term support system into a reserve fund were also to take place in this 
third phase (Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, 1970: Art III, phase 3: 2.1, 2.2, 2.4). 
Finally, in the fourth phase, the European economic and monetary union was to be 
completed. In this stage, the necessary extension of the community institutions and 
the transfer of all necessary authority concerning the short-term economic, financial 
and monetary policy making to the community institutions was to be achieved. 
Furthermore, the CGCB was to develop into a European Central Bank, and exchange 
rates between the European currencies were to be fixed (Bundesminister für 
Wirtschaft, 1970: Art III, phase 4: 1-4). 
In addition to laying out these four stages, the German Minister also set out 
some conditions for the development of a European economic and monetary union 
indicative of his economist preoccupations. He stated that the whole project of 
establishing the union was not to be completed prior to 1980, and also made clear that 
the (monetary) measures proposed were only to be implemented after the national 
governments had agreed that the (economic) requirements of the preceding stages had 
been fulfilled (Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, 1970: Art. II). 
During an informal discussion in the ECOFIN on 27 January, Giscard had 
also submitted a four-step plan for the establishment of a European economic and 
monetary union. This plan was drawn up by the Direction du Trésor.26' The content of 
this plan was in stark contrast to the Schiller plan. The plan proposed that the 
medium-term support mechanism — the establishment of which the Schiller plan had 
foreseen for late in the second stage — be introduced at the start of the first phase. 
According to the French this was necessary in order to help the member states cope 
with the insecurities of the changing international monetary system (Bussière, 2002: 
367-8). The establishment of the support mechanism constituted the first step towards 
the early institution of a European Reserve Fund, a measure that Schiller foresaw only 
in the third stage. {Agence Europe, 27 January 1970: 3, Bussière, 2002: 367). 
Furthermore, unlike the Schiller Plan, the French plan did not provide for any 
significant economic measures until late in the integration process. Liberalisation of 
the financial markets, for instance, was only to be implemented in the third phase, and 
the common management of economic policies 'y compris en matière budgétaire, 
61
 On discussions of the plan in the Monetary Committee, see (Bussière, 2002 367-9) 
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financière et sociale' was to occur in the final phase (Bussiere, 2002: 369). AH in all, 
the road leading to the establishment of a single currency in the end stage contrasted 
strongly with that proposed by the German Minister of Economics. According to the 
French, the establishment of the medium-term support mechanism was to be a 
precondition for any co-ordination of economic policies. In other words, the French 
plan was every bit as monetarist as the Schiller plan was economist; or as Bussiere has 
put it, to the Direction du Trésor 'l'approche monétaire serait "le fil d'Ariane de 
l'integration économique'" (Bussiere, 2002: 369). 
However, while during the Council discussions on 24 February, Schiller stood 
truly fiercely behind his proposals, Giscard - who was acting as the chairman to the 
meeting — kept his options open. In fact, at some instances during the discussion, his 
contributions seemed to be greatly at odds with the strongly monetarist proposals 
drawn up by the French Treasury. Giscard stated, for instance, that France was 
favourably disposed towards a 'synthèse' of the monetary and economic schools of 
thought, and voiced the belief that a precipitous attempt to establish fixed parities 
between European currencies and a failure to harmonise member states' economic 
policies would result in 'une situation de crise très grave' (Agence Europe, 25 February 
1970: 1). In other words, the French Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs was 
espousing exactly the same worries as his economist German colleague. 
Notwithstanding the moderate stand advocated by Giscard, the Ministers of 
Economic and Financial Affairs were unable to formulate a compromise. The 
disagreement concerning the timing and sequence of the measures to be taken in the 
intermediate stages apparent in the different plans had not been solved. To further the 
project, the ECOFIN recommended that the Council of Ministers create an Ad Hoc 
Committee dedicated to developing the various proposals into one coherent plan for 
the establishment of a European monetary union (cf. Agence Europe, 24 February 1970: 
4bis). 
The ECOFIN proposed that the Ad Hoc Committee would consist of the 
Presidents of the five economic Community Committees, a representative of 
Luxembourg, and a representative of the Commission (Agence Europe, 24 February 
1970: 4-4bis).262 During the Council of Ministers, on 6 March 1970, the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs adopted this proposal and invited the Luxembourg President and 
Minister of Finance, Pierre Werner, as President.26 ' The Committee's first report was 
to be submitted before the end of May 1970. 
'
6i
 At that time, these Committees included the Monetary Committee, the Committee of Governors of 
Central Banks, the Medium-Term Economic Policy Committee, the Short-Term Economic policy 
Committee, and the Budget Policy Committee. Luxembourg was the only member state that did not 
occupy a Presidency of any of these Community Committees 
^ According to Pierre Werner, the Belgian Minister of Finance, Baron Snoy, had approached him on 25 
February to ask him on behalf of himself and Giscard d'Estaing to accept the Presidency of the group 
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The establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee and its membership had been 
proposed by Schiller during the ECOFIN deliberations.264 According to Bernard 
Molitor, director at the Directorate General of Economics and Finance (DGII), this was 
remarkable because prior to the ECOFIN meeting, the German government had 
decided that in the event of failure to come to an agreement, the dossier was to be 
referred to COREPER (Molitor, 2002: HO).265 Schiller may have decided to disregard 
his cabinet's decision in order to maintain control over the process and ensure the 
outcome corresponded with his policy preferences. Because Schiller's State Secretary, 
Schöllhorn, was President of the Medium-Term Economic Policy Committee, the Ad 
Hoc Committee was more directly linked to Schiller than COREPER, which would 
have taken its instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, 
according to Werner, the composition of the group: 'dénote de la part des 
Gouvernements une approche de très grande prudence' and 'garantir un examen 
multilatéral sur toutes les incidences de l'union recherchée, obliger les membres du 
groupe à faire le tour complet de la question', which would have suited the economist 
Schiller well (Werner, 1991: 116). 
6.4.2 Schiller's Quest for Price-stability 
Overall, Schiller's plan and his subsequent behaviour reflected the beliefs about 
economic and European policy making he had been espousing for some years (see 
Cognitive Map Schiller-1). Although the establishment of a monetary union was not a 
goal that Schiller had ever prioritised - it was clearly something which was forced 
upon him by Brandt's The Hague Conference initiative - he was not by definition 
opposed to it.266 In his view, the establishment of a European economic and monetary 
union was one of several ways to deal with the unstable international monetary system 
of the late 1960s and early 1970s, and under certain conditions Schiller was willing to 
go along with it. However, within the German Ministry of Economic affairs, the 
creation of EMU was not considered to be the only feasible - and certainly not 
necessarily the most desirable — method of dealing with international monetary 
because 'ils y voyaient l'avantage que le pouvoir politique y était ainsi représenté et mettaient tette 
structure en parallèle avec le comité Spaak qui avait rédigé le Traité de Rome' (Werner, 1991' 116-7) 
1(Λ
 Originally, Schiller had proposed that along wich the Presidents of the Community Committees, its 
Vice Presidents would take seat in the Ad Hoc Committee (Agence Europe, 24 February 1970. 4bis) 
^ Molitor recalls that the plan to establish the Ad Hoc Committee found its origin in Commission 
circles According to him, Barre felt that the difference of opinion between the Ministers was too 
substantial for the dossier to be referred to COREPER and asked the Belgian Minister Snoy to see to it 
that the plan was referred to an Ad Hoc Committee 'pour faciliter le chemin de cette innovation' 
However, as Baron Snoy did not propose such a step during the first round of discussions, Schiller 
apparently beat him to it (Molitor, 2002 109). It remains unclear, however, whether Schiller knew of 
Barre's intentions and if he did, how he learned of them 
2
''
<
' None of the three dimensions of EMU show up in the core of his first cognitive map (see Appendix E, 
Preferences on EMU-dimensions) 
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pressures. In fact, at the Ministry the merits of the establishment of a flexible exchange 
rate system were also being discussed (Tietmeyer, 1971: 412; 2002: 319; Werner, 
1991: 122). 
Schiller's attitude towards the form of the exchange rate system was similar to 
that held within his Ministry. For, not only were his ideas concerning this issue not 
central to his belief system, it also appears that he was indifferent with respect to the 
debate about floating versus flexible exchange rates.267 His evaluation of the Bretton 
Woods (fixed exchange rate) system (B2) appears to have been highly ambiguous. On 
the one hand, the Minister felt that the establishment of the system had enabled the 
Post-war expansion of trade (see relation B2-P8) and production (see relation B2-P9), 
but on the other, it had also allowed the UK and US to run large balance-of-payments 
deficits (see relation B2-B4),268 which in his view had indirectly caused inflation in 
Germany (P6). Moreover, Schiller opposed the French idea of re-establishing the Gold 
standard (G3), which like Bretton Woods was a fixed exchange rate system. The 
Minister was convinced that - due to its negative effect on international liquidity -
the re-establishment of the gold standard would cause deflation (D3) and a crisis in 
world trade (W4). It must be concluded, then, that during the 1960s Schiller 
apparently had no objections to fixed exchange rates in principle, but that his support 
for any kind of exchange rate system was dependent on the specific technical 
characteristics of the particular system being proposed, and the effects it would have 
on other, more central goals. 
Schiller's preferences concerning European integration show a similarly 
ambiguous pattern. Again, the Minister did not seem to hold any objections against 
further European integration in principle. In fact, on occasions he explicitly spoke out 
in favour of European economic and political integration {Agence Europe: 13 February 
I969). In his eyes, a united Europe could serve economic and political goals like the 
establishment of peace (relation E7-V3), more effective and efficient policy making 
(E7-I2), increased economic and social welfare (E7-W3), economic growth (E8-E2), as 
well as the harmonisation of the European economies (D1-H2). In fact, as early as 
I963, Schiller had argued that all plans to ward off inflation would come to naught if 
267
 The cencrality and saliency rare of rhe concepr indicaring a preference for fixed exchange rates 
('Exchange rate modifications in all states', W3) is higher than the values of the concept indicating a 
preference for floating exchange rates (the negatively evaluated concept 'Gold Standard', G3). However, as 
argued below the evaluations of these concepts seem to be associated with other characteristics than with 
whether they concern fixed or floating exchange rates. 
268
 The idea that the Bretton Woods systems allows certain states to run large balance of payments deficits 
was shared by the French President and Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs. For a detailed 
explanation of the reasoning behind this causal relation, see Secrion 6.4.3. 
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all European member states continued to pursue their own autonomous, unco-
ordinated economic policies.269 
However, Schiller saw a similar set of benefits resulting from more 
international co-operation and it appears that the German Minister of Economic Affairs 
was largely indifferent to whether further co-operation came in the form of more 
European or more international co-operation.270 In the eyes of the German Minister, 
the two options seem to have been largely interchangeable. In fact, he often used the 
terms European co-operation and international co-operation interchangeably within a 
single sentence, stating for instance that 'wir brauchen vielmehr eine Europäische oder 
internationale Koordinierung oder Harmonisierung der nationale Konjunktur- und 
Beschäftigungspolitiken' (Schiller, 1964: 163). Furthermore, in the eyes of the 
Minister, both further international and European co-ordination would contribute to 
his central goal of price stability (see relations I4-P6 and E8-P6, Schiller, 1964: 163). 
With regard to the form of European integration, were it to be established, Schiller, 
like most members of the German political and financial elite, had a preference for 
supranational co-operation.271 
The prioritisation of economic integration over monetary integration reflected 
in the Schiller plan and the conditions the Minister attached to monetary integration 
were fully in line with Schiller's vision on economic policy making as laid down in 
many of his writings and speeches. As a social democrat, Schiller was concerned with 
the issue of economic growth (E2), a goal that was central to the better part of his 
writings (Schiller, 1964; 1965: 676-7; 1968).272 However, even in the early 1960s, his 
writings show that he, like many in the German economic and financial elite, was first 
and foremost preoccupied with maintaining price stability (Schiller, 1964: 22, 78-9, 
269
 Schiller did not make any meaningful distinction between intergovernmental and supranational forms 
of integration. 
270
 Schiller distinguishes three concepts in the assertions researched that refer to international co-operation 
'International co-operation' (17), 'International co-ordination of employment policy' (14), and 
'International co-ordination of money and fiscal policy' (15). On average these concepts are as central and 
salient to his belief system as the concepts referring to European integration (see Appendix D). In fact, the 
concepts 'International co-ordination of employment policy' (14) and 'European coordinanon of 
employment policy' (E8), as well as 'International co-ordination of money and fiscal policy' (15), and 
'European coordination of monetary and fiscal instruments' (E9) score exacrly the same on centrality and 
saliency measures (respectively 3, } and 2, 2) 
271
 In his first cognitive map, only one concept may be distinguished that refers to supranational co-
operation ('European unification', E7) In terms of saliency and centrality it however outranks the two 
concepts ('European coordination of employment policy', E8 and European coordination of monetary & 
fiscal instruments', E9) referring to intergovernmental integration (see Appendix E, Preferences on EMU-
dimensions) 
211
 Just as it was for Brandt, the issue of reunification was important to Schiller (Schiller, 1964, 1965. 
671-}), but largely unrelated to EMU. 
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163, 218; 1965: 676-7; 1968: 9, 12).273 After the monetary upheaval of 1968, this 
preoccupation seemed to have grown even stronger (Marsh, 1993: 187-9, Agence 
Europe, 12 May 1969: 9, Europe Notes Rapides, no 258, June 1969). 
During the negotiations on the Hague Summit final Communiqué, it was this 
fear of inflation that inspired the Minister's economist strategy and made him refuse to 
go along with French proposals to establish a European reserve fund early on in the 
economic integration process. In his view, a European reserve fund could tempt the 
European partners to run an even larger balance-of-payments deficit, which would in 
turn increase the money supply, causing inflation. The granting of any credits or the 
installation of any monetary support mechanisms would therefore have to be combined 
with economic measures to prevent balance of payments deficits (Schiller, 1964: 163). 
The Minister's criterion for assessing any plans for further European integration in 
general, and European economic and monetary unification in particular, seems to be 
how the specific technical aspects of these plans would relate to his central goal of 
maintaining price stability. 
In summary, it is clear that Schiller's conception of the German interest 
differed in significant ways from the German Chancellor's. Unlike Brandt, who 
seemed to support European integration in whatever shape or form and as an end in 
itself, the German Minister of Economics supported European integration and fixed 
exchange rates only insofar these measures would serve his primary economic objective 
of maintaining price stability, and in the Minister's mind, a monetarist approach to 
establishing European economic and monetary union simply did not fulfil that 
condition. 
6.4.3 The German Beliefs of the French Minister 
In contrast to the Schiller Plan, the French proposals presented to the ECOFIN on 27 
January do not appear to be entirely consistent with the ideas of the French Minister of 
Financial and Economic Affairs. This may be due to the fact that Giscard's support for 
the establishment of European monetary union was not shared by many of the high 
officials within his Ministry. The author of the French plan - the director of the Trésor, 
René Larre — in particular is said to have opposed the creation of a single European 
currency (Bossuat, 2002: 173-4; Bussière in: Comité pour l'Histoire Economique et 
Financière de la France, 2002: 348; Pierre-Brossolette, 2002: 106-8). 
As early as 1966, two years before the subject would appear on the public and 
political agenda, Giscard d'Estaing had publicly called for the establishment of a 
" ' Schiller distinguishes two concepts that refer to price stability in the assertions on which his first 
cognitive map is base' 'Price stability in the world' (P5) and 'Price stability in Germany' (P6) The latter 
concept is part of the core of his belief system. Overall, these concepts rank far higher than the concepts 
indicating a more Keynesian outlook on economics (see Appendix E, Preferences on EMU-dimensions) 
terms of centrality (an average of 5 versus 2.8) and sahency (an average of 7.8 versus 3.8). 
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European central bank that would manage a part of the member states' monetary 
reserves. In his eyes, this central bank would eventually enable the creation of a single 
European currency {Le Monde, 7 June 1966: 8, cf. Kessler, 1966: 945). In the years that 
followed, Giscard regularly repeated his call for the creation of a 'Union Monétaire 
Européenne', a European central bank, and a single European currency (Interview with 
Giscard d'Estaing in: Communauté Européenne, April 1969: 17-9, on: 
www.ena.lu/mce.cfm, Agence Europe, 6 March, 1969: 2, 25 March 1969: 2-3; 31 March 
1969: 2).21A 
Giscard d'Estaing's preference for the establishment of European monetary 
union is based both on his general support for further European integration, and his 
ideas concerning economic and monetary policy-making. Although, as Kessler has 
rightly noted, 'le problème européen offre à Giscard d'Estaing l'occasion de se situer de 
façon plus précise par rapport à l'U.N.R.' (Kessler, 1966: 945), the Minister's support 
for further European integration has been too consistent to be purely strategic. In 
1958, Giscard had voted in favour of the ratification of the Rome Treaties in the 
Assemblée Nationale (Todd, 1977: 129)· Moreover, six months before the The Hague 
Conference, he called for a new 'Messina Summit' at which the enlargement of the 
Community and the reinforcement of its institutions should be decided {Agence Europe, 
14 March 1969: 2; 25 March 1969: 2). In addition, in 1969 his party collectively 
joined Monnet's Action Committee {Agence Europe, 13 March 1969: 2), and demanded 
an 'ouverture' on the European issue in return for their participation in the Pompidou 
government. In later years, Giscard also played an initiating role in the establishment 
of the European Council and the EMS, and continued to advocate further European 
integration even after his Presidency (Kessler, 1966: 945, note 27, cf. Agence Europe, 25 
march 1969: 2, See Chapter 7). This preference is also reflected in the cognitive map 
derived from his statements and writings from prior to the Conference of The 
Hague.275 
While Giscard's stand on further European integration in general is thus clear, 
his stand on the community's institutional design is more ambiguous. On the one 
hand, the Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs consistently advocated the 
" ' All these aspects of Giscard's monetary plans are subsumed under the concept 'European 
currency/EMU' (E2), which is part of the core of his belief system 
2 5
 Apart from the concepts 'European currency' (E2) and 'European integration' (E6), which were part of 
the core of the French Minister's belief system, eight other concepts that refer to European integration 
may be distinguished in his first cognitive map. These include the concepts 'Completion of European 
integration' (CI), 'Completion of the internal market (1968)' (C2); 'Europe of alliances' (Ei); 
'Harmonisation of fiscal and social policies' (HI); 'Speedy introduction of majority rule' (S3), 'Universal 
suffrage in European Parliament' (S4), 'Anti-national supranational Europe' (S7). All of these concepts, 
with the notable exception of those concepts (other than 'European currency') referring to supranational 
co-operation (see below), are valued positively. Some of these also rank relatively high in terms of 
centrality and saliency (See Appendix D). 
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establishment of a European central bank, a supranational institution. On the other 
hand, however, he pleaded for the preservation of member states' national sovereignty 
in all his proposals for further non-monetary integration {Le Monde, 1 Juni 1966: 8, 
Kessler, 1966: 945, cf. Agence Europe, 25 March 1969: 2). Additionally, he strongly 
opposed both the establishment of universal suffrage for the European Parliament and 
the introduction of majority rule in the Community's decision making (see concepts 
S3 and S4 in Cognitive Map Giscard-1). Giscard also regularly fulminated against the 
proponents of European political unification and the establishment of a federal Europe, 
calling them Utopians. According to Giscard, the fédéralisation of Europe advocated by 
these groups was 'contre nos intérêts vitaux' (Kessler, 1966: 945). 
Overall, Giscard justified both his preference for further European co-
operation and his quest for the establishment of a single currency by stressing the 
political and geopolitical advantages of further European economic and monetary 
integration {Le Monde, 7 June 1966: 8). In his eyes 'c'est dans le cadre d'institutions 
européennes que nos pays peuvent le mieux exercer ensemble leur souveraineté et 
sauvegarder la forme moderne de leur indépendance' {Agence Europe, 25 March 1969: 
2). More specifically, in his opinion European integration helped to establish Europe as 
a world power (see relation E6-E4), while the creation of a single European currency 
would lead to an increased use of European currencies in financial transactions (E2-
A2), and the development of the single currency into a world reserve currency 
comparable to the dollar (E2-E5). 
Giscard's preference for further monetary integration was rooted in his belief 
that the Bretton Woods system was dysfunctional. In his eyes, an international 
monetary system had to benefit all of its members in a similar way, promote economic 
stability (counter inflation and deflation), and generate sufficient (but not excess) 
liquidity to finance the growth of the international economy and the increase in world 
trade (Giscard d'Estaing, 1965: 20). Already at the early 1960s, Giscard had concluded 
that the Bretton Woods system did not fulfil these criteria. As he saw it, the most 
important drawback of the system was that it allowed the United States to run balance 
of payments deficits (U2) without having to face any adverse consequences (Ul),276 
resulting in inflation in the US as well as in the credit states (see relation U2- II) 
(Giscard d'Estaing, 1965: 20-22).277 
27
'' Because the value of the dollar in gold was fixed, it could not depreciate despite increases in the US 
money supply Moreover, due to the fact that the dollar was thus 'as good as gold' (in principle one could 
exchange one's dollars for gold at any moment in time), the US could finance their deficits by increasing 
their money supply (printing money) (Giscard d'Estaing, 1965 21-2; Tnffin, 1957: 289-94). 
277
 According to Giscard, the central banks of the deficit countries lent the inflowing dollars on the 
private market This increased the internal money supply and therefore caused inflation (Giscard 
d'Estaing, 1965 8-9). 
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The establishment of European monetary union was thus a means of helping 
member states face the uncertainties resulting from the dysfunctional international 
monetary system. Furthermore, according to Giscard, every step towards the 
establishment of a monetary union 'contribuerait à décourager la spéculation et à 
consolider notre monnaie' (Agence Europe, 25 March 1969: 2). Given his analysis of the 
Bretton Woods system, Giscard's pleas for basing the new European monetary system 
on gold (E7) are understandable. For, the scarcity of gold would pose a natural limit on 
the extent of a state's balance-of-payments deficit and the international money supply. 
It would therefore lower inflation, one of the Minister's most central concerns (see 
below). 
The French Minister's analysis of the international monetary system thus 
indicates that, like his German colleague, the concept of price stability was central to 
his vision of economic policy.278 This corresponds with his consistent pleas for a 'lutte 
contre l'inflation' during the French government's preparations for the Conference of 
The Hague, and during the January 1970 ECOFIN. In addition, Giscard also regularly 
pleaded for the further development of European economic policy-making, in 
particular with regard to fiscal policies (see concepts HI , Al , cf. Le Monde, 7 June 
1966: 8, Kessler, 1966: 945). In this respect, Giscard's economic and monetary 
worldview appears to be ordoliberal in nature.279 
Ostensibly, this 'German' view on economic and monetary policy seems at 
odds with Giscard's consistent pleas for the early establishment of European monetary 
union, for these pleas are typically associated with a 'monetarist' position. In contrast 
to the German financial elite, however, the French minister did not consider his 
concerns for price stability to be inconsistent with his pleas for the establishment of a 
single currency.28" The conclusion may therefore be drawn that Giscard cannot be 
considered a pure 'economist', but rather a proponent of'parallelism' between 
economic and monetary integration. 
Overall, the preferences of the Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs on 
the three dimensions of EMU differed significantly from those of President Pompidou. 
In fact, on certain issues there seems to have been more common ground between 
Giscard d'Estaing and Schiller and between Brandt and Pompidou than between the 
technical ministers and their political leaders. Since, in addition to this, both Schiller 
and Giscard successfully obtained a dominant position during the negotiations on 
2
 * The concept 'Inflation' (II) belongs to the core of Giscard's belief system with a centrality and saliency 
of 5 The second concept refernnj; to price stability — the 'Stability of world economy' (S5) - also ranks 
high with a centrality and saliency of 4 (see Appendix D). 
J7
'
;
 The average value of the ordoliberal concept in terms of centrality and saliency are much higher than 
those of the Keynesian concepts (6 and 9 5 versus 1 5 and 1 5) 
2HI>
 See the lack of any link between the concepts referring to inflation (II, S5) and the establishment of 
EMU (E2) in his cognitive map 
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EMU, the conclusion may indeed be warranted that 'among the Ministers, Mr. Schiller 
and Mr. Giscard d'Estaing played a highly individual role in their country's politics 
and in European Community affairs' (Rosenthal, 1975: 123), a role that turned out to 
be highly significant for the course, though not necessarily the outcome, of the 1970s 
quest for the establishment of EMU. 
6.5 The Studies of the Werner Group: Inter- and Intrastate Disagreements 
Notwithstanding the fact that the members of the Werner group were appointed to 
the Committee by virtue of their roles as Chairmen of their respective Community 
Committees, both Kruse and Tsoukahs have argued that their contributions reflected 
their respective governments' stances on the issue (Kruse, 1980: 59; Tsoukalis, 1977: 
91). However, given the obvious lack of agreement amongst the members of the 
German and French political elite, this statement is untenable. In fact, Jean-René 
Bernard - the personal advisor of President Pompidou — has even voiced the opinion 
that 'notre gouvernement n'était pas représenté' in the Werner Committee (Bernard, 
2002: 131). This remark may be the result of the fact that the French representative 
Bernard Clappier - Vice-President of the Banque de France - and his assistant Jean-
Michel Bloch-Lainé (Inspecteur Général des Finances') were more directly linked to Rue de 
Rivoli than to the Elysée.m Furthermore, Clappier's pro-European stand was well-
known, as he had been one of the few officials involved in the launch of the Schuman 
Plan in early 1950 (Bloch-Lainé, 2002: 126; Ludlow, 1982: 19). 
Likewise, the German representatives in the Werner Group were more closely 
linked to the Minister of Economics than to the other members of the government. 
The chairman of the Medium-Term Economic Policy Committee, Schöllhorn, was a 
Junior Minister, and his collaborator Hans Tietmeyer a high official at the Ministry of 
Economics. It is also clear that both men had the same - or possibly even stronger -
economist ideas as Schiller (Bloch-Lainé, 2002: 126; Tietmeyer, 1971: 409-13; 2002: 
322-3; Werner, 1991: 124). This may partly explain the fact that after The Hague, 
Brandt lost control over the negotiation process (Bossuat, 2000: 368). All in all, the 
economist-monetarist divide, as well as the institutional disagreements that had 
troubled the negotiations on the ECOFIN, continued on in the Werner Committee. 
6.3.1 The Economist-Monetarist Divide, Part 2 
Despite the hope that the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee would resolve the 
disagreements that had prevented any progress during the Council meetings of early 
1970, Werner was forced with hindsight to conclude that 'les premiers tours de table 
annonçaient les couleurs. Il y aurait du début jusqu'à la fin une lutte intellectuelle 
281
 The Banque de Trance is parr of rhe French Trésor, which is part of the Ministry of Economics and 
Finance. 
199 
Mapping the Road to Maastricht 
entre monétaristes et économistes' (Werner, 1991: 123). The battle raged primarily 
between Schöllhorn and Tietmeyer on one side, who consistently pleaded for the prior 
convergence of economic policies, and Clappier and Bloch-Lainé on the other, who 
defended the monetarist thesis (Tietmeyer, 1971: 415-8; 2002: 322-7; Werner, 1991: 
124). Despite the fact that - according to Werner - the discussions were 'émaillées de 
controverses, voire même de tel ou tel incidents', at the end of the fifth meeting the 
Werner group succeeded in drafting an interim report to present to the Council of 
Ministers and the Commission (Commissie van de Europese Economische 
Gemeenschappen, 1970; Werner, 1991: 125).282 However, given the fundamental 
disagreements amongst the Committee members, agreement had been possible only 
'by deferring the contentious issues' (Kruse, 1980: 71). 
In fact, the Werner group was no nearer to an agreement about any of the 
contentious issues than the ECOFIN had been in February. Concerning the measures 
to be taken in the intermediate stages, for instance, the interim report stated that 
'certain members of the Working Party feel that whatever else is done the Community 
should also, in the first stage, be given an independent exchange system', whereas 'the 
other members of the Working Party feel that neither an institutional reduction of the 
bands nor the creation of an exchange stabilization fund are desirable in the first stage' 
(Commissie van de Europese Economische Gemeenschappen, 1970: Art. V).2,H In 
addition, prior to the submission of the Interim Report, discussion of the institutional 
shape of the proposed economic and monetary union was largely avoided. The report 
argued that a transfer of national responsibilities to the community would be necessary 
and that this would require a modification of the Rome Treaty, and increased 
democratic control (Commissie van de Europese Economische Gemeenschappen, 1970: 
Art. HI: 10). However, it also concluded that 'the Working Party prefers not to 
submit detailed proposals at the present time as to the form the various Community 
agencies should take' (Commissie van de Europese Economische Gemeenschappen, 
1970: Art. HI). 
Despite the fact that the deliberations had produced no new compromises and 
the group had avoided taking a political stand, the report seems to be slightly more in 
line with the Schiller Plan than with the plan put forward by the French. It adopted 
most of the economic measures proposed in the Schiller Plan, while the proposed 
monetary measures were limited to, amongst other things, the maintenance of the 
current fluctuation-margins, and the establishment of a common European 
representation in the IMF and other international organisations (Commissie van de 
Europese Economische Gemeenschappen, 1970: Art. V: 14). In addition, Clappier and 
'"
2
 The report was submitted to the Council and the Commission according to schedule on 22 May 1970 
^ For a detaded elaboration of the currency stabilisation fund envisioned by the first group see 
(Commissie van de Europese Economische Gemeenschappen, 1970 Annex 4) 
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Bloch-Lamé had agreed that - along the way — a modification of the Rome Treaty was 
necessary and that the new institutional framework had to include some sort of 
democratic control (Commissie van de Europese Economische Gemeenschappen, 1970 
Art II 10), conditions which had not been included in the French plan 
On 29 May 1970, the Ministers of Economic and Financial Affairs met to 
discuss the Werner interim report, but were unable to decide between the various 
alternatives it presented on the crucial matter of the balance that ought to be struck 
between economic and monetary measures Schiller vehemently opposed the 
introduction of a reserve fund, as well as the narrowing of intra-European currency 
fluctuation margins in the first stage of the establishment of EMU, measures that 
Giscard and the Snoy d'Oppuers, were advocating (Kruse, 1980, Rosenthal, 1975 
108, Werner, 1991 127)2M According to Rosenthal, Schiller was wary about the 
introduction of such a fund, for it would simply use the Bundesbank reserves to prop 
up weak EEC currencies, particularly the French franc' The French Minister justified 
his monetarist stand by arguing that a European monetary union could function as an 
alternative pole to the US and the dollar, which in his eyes was vital for the future of 
the world monetary system (Rosenthal, 1975 108) All in all, again there was little 
prospect of reaching a compromise 
During the subsequent joint Council of the Ministers of Foreign and 
Economic and Financial Affairs on 9 June 1970, the decision-making process remained 
deadlocked However, the Ministers did unanimously agree to adopt the conclusions of 
the Werner Interim Report, which included the proposal to refrain from adopting any 
measures that would allow for the flexibihsation of the margins of fluctuation, and to 
engage in a transfer of national authority so that the 'main economic policy decisions 
will be taken at the community level' {Pb 1970, C 136/19, cf Tietmeyer, 2002 327, 
Werner, 1991 128) In addition, the Council renewed the mandate of the Werner 
group, and instructed it to seek the advice of the Committee of Governors of the 
Central Banks on specific monetary matters Meanwhile in France, the first signs of 
governmental unease with the whole endeavour became manifest when the Minister of 
Defence, Debre, publicly denounced any European supranational initiatives (Agence 
Europe, 29 June 1970 1) 
As the Werner group went back to work, its Chairman asked Baron Ansiaux, 
Chairman of the CGCB (and - in this capacity - also member of the Werner group), 
for advice on the technical and economic aspects of the monetary measures being 
discussed (Committee of Experts presided over by Baron Ansiaux, 1970 Annex 1) 
The list of detailed questions the Ad Hoc Committee put together, primarily 
2iM
 A few days after the interim report was finished, Monner had already warned Werner not to press for a 
decision on the reserve fund as Brandt had given him the impression that il η y aurait pas d unanimité a 
cet egard (Werner, 1991 125) 
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concerned the narrowing of the intra-European fluctuation margins and the 
establishment of a reserve fund foreseen by the monetarists in the Committee. In other 
words, it concerned the major bones of contention which persisted among the 
members of the Werner group and the Council of Ministers (Committee of Experts 
presided over by Baron Ansiaux, 1970: Annex 2). The CGCB appointed a committee 
of experts under the chairmanship of Baron Ansiaux to address these questions 
(Committee of Experts presided over by Baron Ansiaux, 1970: Annex 3)-285 
As opposed to the interim report of the Werner group, the Ansiaux Report 
did take a position on some of the more contentious issues.286 Firstly, it argued that 
the introduction of a single currency, or even the fixing of the exchange rates between 
the European currencies in the first stage was 'premature' (Committee of Experts 
presided over by Baron Ansiaux, 1970: Art. II). Instead, the report proposed to reduce 
the margins of fluctuation between the European currencies from 1.5 to 1.2 percent 
while leaving the margins vis-à-vis the dollar untouched.2"7 Secondly, the Ansiaux 
Committee agreed that the early establishment of a reserve fund was unnecessary; it 
took the view that the national central banks had enough reserves to cover the 
interventions that would be needed in order to stabilise member states' currencies in 
the new exchange rate system (Committee of Experts presided over by Baron Ansiaux, 
1970: Art VII, 1). Finally, the report proposed the establishment of an 'agent' that 
would implement the decisions of the national central banks, and that was to evolve 
into a genuine European central bank in the last stage of EMU (Committee of Experts 
presided over by Baron Ansiaux, 1970: Art. Vili, C2, Fourth phase).288 
All in all, the Ansiaux-report awarded significant decision-making power to 
the national Central Banks and (the Committee of) their Presidents. Furthermore, 
despite the fact that Chancellor Brandt had urged the President of the Bundesbank, 
Karl Klasen, to consider the French position (Wilkens, 2001: 392), the Ansiaux 
JB5
 The committee consisted of two officials of the Central Banks of each of the member states as well as a 
representative of the Commission. The group did not include any representatives of the Luxembourg 
central bank, because it had none. Since the establishment of the Belgian-Luxembourg monetary union in 
19^5, the Belgian central bank had been performing the necessary tasks. With an eye on the functions to 
be fulfilled by the national central banks in EMU, on 1 July 1998 — at the same time the ECB was 
established - the central bank of Luxembourg was created. 
286
 The Ansiaux Report was finalised 1 August 1970, and submitted to the Werner group more than a 
month before it was approved by the CGCB as a whole In fact, it was approved only two days before 15 
October when the Werner Final Report - which was based on the Ansiaux Report - was submitted to the 
Council and Commission (Agence Europe, 21 October 1970 4) Apart from the Ansiaux Report, Werner 
received a report on the establishment of an exchange rate stabilisation fund from Monnet, which was 
drawn up by Tnffm (Werner, 1991: 128). 
ml
 This would effectively create what later became known as 'the snake in the tunnel' (see Chapter 7) 
2B8
 The Ansiaux Report explicitly mentions a disagreement between the representatives of one central 
bank and the other four with regard to whether (eventually) to abolish the intra-commumtanan margins 
of fluctuations step by step or at once (Committee of Experts presided over by Baron Ansiaux, 1970 Art 
IV) 
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Report was highly economist in substance and therefore at odds with the strong 
monetarist stand that its Chairman had been advocating during the discussions in the 
Werner group. 
6.5.2 The Final Report 
While the Ansiaux group was preparing its findings, discussions in the Werner group 
continued.289 Although the deliberations now included for the first time the 
institutional aspects of the establishment of EMU, the timing of the narrowing of the 
intra-European fluctuation margins and the establishment of the reserve fund 
remained the main topics of discussion (Werner, 1991: 128-9). Notwithstanding the 
fact that the Council of Ministers had resolved not to make use of any provisions that 
would allow the flexibilisation of the European margins of fluctuation, the German 
and Dutch members occasionally argued in favour of flexible exchange rates {Agence 
Europe, 10 September 1970, Tietmeyer, 2002: 323-4; Werner, 1991: 129).290 
Furthermore, Schöllhorn refused to give any ground at all on the issue of the reserve 
fund. In fear of producing a report that 'ne prévoyant aucune innovation monétaire 
pendant les trois premières années' and which would be a 'complètement abstraction' 
of his previous initiative concerning monetary co-operation, Werner stepped up the 
pressure on the economists to compromise (Werner, 1991: 130). However, by 8 
October the group had managed to produce a coherent end report which reflected the 
economist Schiller Plan and Ansiaux Report more than any of the other plans that had 
been submitted to the Council of Ministers in early 1970. 
Despite Werner's remark that 'le rapport intérimaire retrace déjà le concept 
général du rapport final' (Werner, 1991: 126), the Final Report differed significantly 
from the earlier report in its propositions concerning the timing and extent of the 
narrowing of the intra-European fluctuation margins and the institutional innovations 
it proposed (Commission of the European Communities, 1970).29' The Werner group 
made the far-reaching proposal of establishing a 'community system for the central 
banks' as well as a 'centre for decision for economic policy' (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1970: Art. III). The proposed Community System of Central 
Banks was to make decisions on internal monetary matters like the money supply, 
2m
 In the Werner group, Ansiaux advocated the early establishment of a reserve fund (Werner, 1991: 
B0) 
2,0
 At the IMF meeting in September 1970, Germany and The Netherlands did in fact advocate the 
flexibilisation of the Bretton Woods system. The negative reaction of the French to these proposals 
indicates that when the crunch came, the French prioritised maintaining fixed exchange rates over their 
desire to counter American monetary hegemony (Europe Doiuments nr. 669, Agence Europe, 22 September 
1970) 
291
 The introduction of the Final Report (Section I) as well as the sections concerning EMU's point of 
departure (Section II), foundations (Section IV) the end stage (Section III) were an exact copy of the 
Interim Report (Commission of the European Communities, 1970· Art. I). 
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interest rates, and the granting of credits. Furthermore, the Central Banks were to 
intervene when necessary on the capital markets and manage the monetary reserves of 
the Community (Commission of the European Communities, 1970: Art. III). It was 
further thought that the Centre for Decision of Economic Policy would become a fully 
fledged supranational decision-making body and come to have 'a decisive influence 
over the general economic policy of the Community' through its influence on national 
budgets (Commission of the European Communities, 1970: Art. III). According to the 
report, these institutional changes required a modification of the Rome Treaties. 
Additionally, the report explicitly called for a transfer of authority from the national 
parliaments to the European Parliament (Commission of the European Communities, 
1970: Art. III). 
The Final Report also reiterated the decision of the Council of Ministers not to 
'avail itself in foreign exchange relations between member countries of any provisions 
allowing greater flexibility in the international foreign exchange system' (Commission 
of the European Communities, 1970: Art. V). In addition, it adopted the proposals put 
forward by the Ansiaux group for the provisional reduction of the intra-European 
margins of fluctuation and proposed that, if these reductions proved successful, the 
new margins could be officially instated. However, the report concluded that 'only at 
the moment of transition to the final stage will autonomous parity adjustments be 
totally excluded' (Commission of the European Communities, 1970: Art. VI). Finally, 
it was agreed that during the first phase, credit facilities would not be extended. 
Concerning the reserve fund, the final report merely stated that it was necessary 'to 
undertake a study in depth of the conditions of creation and operation, and of the 
statutes of the "European fund for monetary co-operation'" (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1970: Art. V). The possible establishment of such a fund was 
to take place some time during the second phase, and eventually, the fund was to 
manage the short and medium-term support mechanism and the monetary reserves 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1970: VI). 
All in all, the Werner Final Report was significantly more in line with the 
German stance, as voiced in the Schiller Plan, than with the French plan.292 It adopted 
most of Schiller's measures for the first stage and postponed the monetary measures 
favoured by the French, such as the establishment of a reserve fund and the medium-
term support mechanism, until the second phase. Moreover, the proposed reduction of 
the intra-European margins of fluctuation was modest and only provisional. In 
addition, the report adopted the German plans for the establishment of supranational 
2
'
w
 Both the Ansiaux Report and the Werner Final Report show a remarkable resemblance with the 
Bundesbank's sceptical and highly economist vision on the establishment of a European economic and 
monetary union as espoused by its President, Klasen, in a lecture held on 16 June 1970 
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decision-making bodies in both the monetary and economic issue-areas, and increased 
democratic control. 
6.6 The Crushing of Hopes 
6.6.1 The Reality-Check 
Reactions to the Werner Report in Bonn and Paris differed enormously. The German 
political elite was invariably very supportive of the plan (Wilkens, 2001: 392). 
According to Schiller, the Werner plan rightly argued 'that an economic and monetary 
union cannot be achieved unilaterally simply by unification of monetary techniques' 
(Rosenthal, 1975: 103, note 4). In addition, he welcomed the fact that the plan 
foresaw not only monetary co-ordination, but also proposed the early implementation 
of substantial economic and financial co-ordination (Agence Europe, 21 October 1970: 2, 
Rosenthal, 1975: 103, note 4). However, he did stress that 'we will only reach our 
final goal when we — I repeat - will not jeopardise the fundamental principle of 
stability' {Handelingen van het Europees Parlement, 18 November 1970: 132, my 
translation), and voiced the hope that the future European Central Bank would be as 
politically independent as the Bundesbank.1^'' 
Given the economist tendencies of the Werner Group's final report, a positive 
reaction from the German Minister was to be expected. However, the Werner Report 
was 'weit entfernt von der Politik Monnets und Brandts bzw. den im Dezember in 
Den Haag gefassten Beschlüssen' (Bossuat, 2000: 369). Despite this fact, Brandt 
reacted enthusiastically and stated that the significance of the Werner Plan for the 
European integration process 'ne pourra guère être surestimée' (Wilkens, 2001: 392). 
For, as long as an agreement with the French was reached and European integration 
was furthered, the German Chancellor seemed to have reconciled himself to the 
economist route to EMU advocated by the technical Ministers and the Bundesbank (see 
Cognitive Map-2 Brandt). Given the influential position of the financial elite, any 
other design would domestically simply not have been feasible. In a speech to the 
Bundestag on the 6 November 1970, Brandt spoke out in favour of the Werner plan 
and stated that 'die Bundesregierung ist jedenfalls bereit, diese Weg zu gehen und sich 
mit ihren Partnern ein zeitliches Ziel für die Durchführung der notwendigen 
Aufgaben zu setzen' (Brandt, 1970: 238). It thus seems that Brandt underwent 
another change in his preferences, this time in the direction of the ideas espoused by 
the German financial authorities. 
This conclusion is confirmed by a comparison of the cognitive map based on 
Brandt's statements and writings after the Conference of The Hague and Brandt's first 
cognitive map. Such a comparison indicates that Brandt's preference for European 
Ä
" The day before Schiller's speech in the European Parliament, Schiller had met with the Zentralbankrat 
of the Bundesbank and agreed on this position (Wilkens, 2001: 392). 
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(supranational) integration and the form of the international monetary system 
remained stable over time, while his ideas concerning economic policy changed (see 
Appendix E, Preferences on EMU-dimensions). 
It is evident from Brandt's second cognitive map, that during the years after 
the Conference of The Hague, the Chancellor remained highly supportive of European 
integration in general. Moreover, he remained a supporter of supranational 
integration.294 However, on certain specific subjects his preferences did change. With 
regard to the form of the international exchange rate system, for instance, Brandt 
seems to have started to contemplate at least the benefits of a floating D-mark (F2).295 
While the Chancellor positively evaluated the concept of a flexible exchange rate, in 
his view, there was no inconsistency between a floating D-mark and his support for the 
establishment of a fixed exchange rate system like the EMU. In his eyes, a period of 
floating would facilitate the establishment of EMU (see relation F2-E5). In fact, in a 
letter to Pompidou sent in May 1971, Brandt justified the flexibilisation of the D-
mark's margins of fluctuation by arguing that this was a necessary step towards 
reaching 'une meilleure stabilité' between the European currencies. This argument was 
consistent with the beliefs held at the Ministry of Economics and by some members of 
Bundesbank (see Section 6.6.4). 
There is additional evidence in his second cognitive map that suggests that 
Brandt's views had been influenced by the financial elite. Brandt incorporated many of 
the ordoliberal reservations concerning EMU into his belief system. For instance, 
Brandt started to voice his support for parallelism between economic and monetary 
integration (El), perceiving it as a means of furthering the establishment of European 
economic and monetary union (E5). Moreover, in contrast to in his first map in which 
he valued the Keynesian goal 'welfare' (W3) over the ordoliberal goal of'price 
stability' (E3), in the second map he values the ordoliberal ideas slightly more highly 
than the Keynesian view on economics.2'x' Overall, it may thus be concluded that 
Brandt's beliefs became more economist and more ordoliberal. So, when on 26 
October, the Werner report was presented to the European Council of Ministers (with 
294
 Brandt still evaluates all the concepts referring to supranational European integration positively 
Moreover, the saliency and centrality measures of the concepts indicate that Brandt still preferred 
supranational co-operation over intergovernmental co-operation On average, he still evaluates the 
supranational concepts more positively than those referring to intergovernmental co-operation in terms of 
centrality and saliency (6.5 and 9 3 versus 3.5 and λ). Moreover, in the speeches and writings on which 
the second map is based, Brandt again distinguishes more concepts referring to supranational than 
intergovernmental co-operation. 
^ The D-mark was floated in May 1971. 
2 9 6
 Another significant difference between the two maps is that the concept 'peace' (VI) is no longer 
present in the second map. Since his concept was the most central value in his first map, this is not in 
accordance with hypothesis Id (see Appendix E, Stability of Map-1 Core Beliefs). The difference may, 
however, be due to incomplete source-overlap (see Section 4.5 3) 
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both the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Ministers of Economic and Financial 
Affairs present), the favourable reaction of the German representative, Minister Moller, 
may for the first time be interpreted as representative of the entire German 
government (Agence Europe, 26 October 1970 3) 
Meanwhile in France, the reactions to the Werner Final Report were 
predominantly negative (Wilkens, 2001 393) Both the press and the political elite 
voiced doubts about the supranational character of the report (Rosenthal, 1975 109, 
Tietmeyer, 1971 417,2002 327, Werner, 1991 131) In the National Assembly, the 
brother-in-law of De Gaulle and member of UDR, Vendroux, asked Schumann 'si le 
Gouvernement compte prendre en considération le programme Werner qui propose 
l'abandon progressif des souverainetés nationales au profit d'une autorité 
communautaire ressemblant a un super-pouvoir fédéral', and whether the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs intended to inform his European partners that the proposals put 
forward in the Werner Plan were totally unacceptable to the French government 
(Agence Europe, 21 October 1970 2, Handelingen van het Europees Parlement, 18 
November 1970 119-20) In his reply, Schumann left no doubt about his stance on 
the Werner Report, stating that 'nous n'accepterons ni la direction, ni la surenchère' 
In his opinion, there were two dangers involved in the proposed measures The French 
government could be tempted 'à remettre en cause un acquis communautaire', while 
the proposed far-reaching institutional measures amounted to 'd'avance à la 
Communauté les traits d'un super-Etat' (Handelingen van het Europees Parlement, 18 
November 1970 119-20) 
Schumann's negative conclusions were shared by the Commission, which on 
30 October, submitted an alternative plan for the establishment of a European 
monetary union The Commission proposals differed significantly from the Werner 
plan on several of the issues that were being criticised in France It rejected outright 
the establishment of a Centre for the Decision of Economic Policy (Commissie van de 
Europese Economische Gemeenschap, 1970 Art II) Moreover, the Commission saw 
no need to establish new community institutions, for in its eyes the existing 
institutions were well-equipped to perform all necessary tasks In addition, the 
Commission plan advocated the tightening of the intra-European fluctuation margins 
and the establishment of European Fund for Monetary Co-operation at an early stage 
(Commissie van de Europese Economische Gemeenschap, 1970 Art III), and for this 
reason was far less economist than the Werner Report Finally, in contrast to the 
Werner group, the Commission was not in favour of any amendment to the Treaty of 
Rome, or any increase in democratic control (Commissie van de Europese Economische 
Gemeenschap, 1970 Art IV) 
The reactions in Bonn and Pans to the Commission's plans were again in 
complete contrast to one another This time the French were supportive and the 
Germans were largely negative The Germans were especially concerned about the 
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omission of the institutional aspects and the references to the goal of creating a 
European area of stability (Agence Europe, 6, 16 and 23 November 1970, Tietmeyer, 
2002: 328; Werner, 1991: 135). Moreover, Schiller and the Bundesbank criticised the 
Commission report for not guaranteeing parallel progress in the economic and 
monetary issue area, and for being incompatible with the independence of the 
Bundesbank (Bernholtz, 1999: 748-9). In France, Schumann discussed the Commission 
proposals in the National Assembly on 5 November 1970, and Stated that they seemed 
to take account of many of the French concerns {Agence Europe, 6 November 1970: 4). 
Moreover, in the November European Council of Ministers, Schumann finally made 
the French government's position clear. He voiced his approval for the Commission 
plans, and categorically refused to discuss any institutional measures, and stated that it 
would be absurd to discuss amending the Treaty of Rome while the enlargement of the 
Community was still pending. In his eyes, the Six should simply get back to business 
as usual and start implementing the proposed measures of the first stage (Agence Europe, 
23 November 1970: 5, Werner, 1991: 136). 
6.6.2 Preferences and Power: the Sub-State Level 
Several authors have noted the difference between the French reaction to the Werner 
Interim Report — whose conclusions were adopted without any discussion by 
Schumann and Giscard d'Estaing at the June Council meeting — and the Final Report 
(Bossuat, 2000: 274; Rosenthal, 1975: 122-3; Tietmeyer, 2002: 327). Rosenthal even 
speaks of a 'sudden' change, and has suggested that a shift in the attitudes of the Elysée 
had taken place as a result of a 'push ... from the extreme Gaullist wing in France', or 
'the influence of the British application for membership in the Community' 
(Rosenthal, 1975: 122-3). In my opinion, however, there was no 'sudden' change in 
the preferences of the Elysée. 
Firstly, a closer look reveals that Pompidou's reaction to the Final Report of 
the Werner group was entirely consistent with the ideas he had espoused prior to and 
during the The Hague Summit (see Sections 6.2 and 6.3.4). When confronted with 
the Werner Final Report, Pompidou reacted furiously (Bernard, 2002: 130; Bossuat, 
1999: 386; 2000: 372; Frank, 2002: 310; Werner, 1991: 132; Wilkens, 2001: 393). 
His anger seems primarily to have been fuelled by the institutional innovations 
proposed in the report. When reading the sections concerned, he commented that 
'c'est à croire qu'on a agité le chiffon rouge devant nous pour savoir si nous étions des 
veaux ou des taureaux' (Bossuat, 1999 : 386; 2000: 372; Bernard, 2002: 130; cf. 
Werner, 1991: 131; Wilkens, 2001: 393). Moreover, in a conseil restreinte of the French 
cabinet on 9 December, Pompidou indicated that he would be prepared to accept some 
form of European monetary integration and a reduction of the European margins of 
fluctuation, for this would enable Europe to counterbalance the political weight of the 
United States. However, he added that 'il n'y aura une Europe que si les transferts de 
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pouvoirs se font des gouvernements au Conseil des ministres des Communautés' 
(Bossuat, 2000: 274; cf. Bossuat, 1999: 386). In addition, Pompidou was appalled by 
the proposals to extend the competencies of the European Parliament, and establish a 
European agency for economic decision making. The idea of transferring French 
national budgetary powers to the European level was particularly unacceptable to the 
French President (Frank, 2002: 310; cf. Bossuat, 2000: 372, 4).297 
In addition, a comparison of Pompidou's first cognitive map with the map 
that was derived from statements made by the President during the years 1970-1972 
provides further evidence that Pompidou had not diverged from his original, 
intergovernmental ideas on European monetary co-operation.298 From the first 
cognitive map, it was concluded that Pompidou had a strong preference for fixed 
exchange rates and stressed the need for politicians to have political control over the 
instrument of exchange rates.299 From Pompidou's second map, it is clear that these 
remained important issues, for Pompidou continued to stress the need to protect the 
franc against speculation (P2) and a concerted defence against the inflow of capital 
(C2). More importantly, however, Pompidou still strongly preferred a system of fixed 
exchange rates, which he perceived as having a positive effect on Europe's power in the 
world (E8), and as contributing to the establishment of a European monetary zone 
(E10). Moreover, in the President's view, fixed exchange rates (Fl) would contribute to 
his most central concept: European confederalism. Finally, as in the set of assertions 
used to derive his first map from, at no time did Pompidou refer to floating exchange 
rates. All in all, this leads to the conclusion that his preferences concerning the form of 
the international monetary system did not change.'ου In addition to this, Pompidou's 
preferences concerning the road to European integration remained stable. During the 
years following the Conference of The Hague, his economic ideas remained essentially 
Keynesian.'01 
-"'
7
 According to Frank, what angered the President most was the fact that when budgetary powers were 
transferred to the European level, the Community would be able to force France to follow a strict 
budgetary policy According to Pompidou, 'pour un pays comme la France, les incidences sociales de cette 
rigueur pourraient être difficiles à gérer' (Frank, 2002 310) Frank has therefore concluded that for 
Pompidou 'Mai 68 n'est pas loin' (Frank, 2002: 310). It is clear that ordoliberalism was 
298
 Pompidou has a stable belief system. His concept-stability rate amounts to 57% (Appendix E, Stability 
of Map-1 Core Beliefs). 
299
 The concept that was part of the core of his first cognitive map, Effective and freely chosen 
devaluations' (D3), was not part of his second map, nor were the concepts 'Stable franc' (S3) and 'Bretton 
Woods' (B2). This may easily be explained by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in August 1971 
Moreover, these concepts were substituted for the concept 'Fixed exchange rates' (Fl). 
,
™ In fact, his support for fixed exchange rates became stronger The average centrality and saliency rates 
of the concepts referring to such a system increased from 3.8 and 5.25 to 10.7 and 18.3 (see Appendix E, 
Preferences on EMU-dimension). 
,01
 In his second cognitive map, three Keynesian concepts may be distinguished, 'Economic growth' (El), 
'European mutual financial assistance' (E5), and 'Increased credit facilities' (II), while only one ordoliberal 
concept is present ('Economic stability/no inflation', E3). While the former outrank the latter only in 
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Given the discussion about whether or not a 'sudden' change in the French 
national preference occurred, it is especially interesting to analyse Pompidou's 
preferences concerning European integration, and the institutional form that this 
might take. From the first map, it was concluded that Pompidou favoured future 
European monetary integration, but had a strictly intergovernmental view on 
European integration. The second cognitive map indicates that indeed Pompidou 
remained a fierce opponent of supranational integration. He evaluated the concepts 
'European state' (El l) and 'Single currency' (SI) negatively, while he positively valued 
the intergovernmental concepts 'European monetary zone' (E10, relation I2-E10) and 
'European confederation' (E9). In fact, from the second map it may be derived that his 
preference for purely intergovernmental decision making grew even stronger.'02 
Pompidou voiced his aversion to supranational co-operation frequently and 
openly during the years 1970 and 1971. On 14 April 1970, for instance, he stated in 
an interview that 'je crois que c'est, en effet, par les Etats qu'on peut faire l'Europe, 
que l'Europe peut être une association d'Etats qui, petit à petit, mettraient en commun 
leur politique' (Pompidou, 1970b : 66). Subsequently, at a press conference on 2 July 
1970, he explained that in his eyes further European monetary co-ordination would be 
desirable, as this would reinforce the economic power of Europe vis-à-vis the United 
States. However, he added that 'il y a un long chemin à parcourir, un très long 
chemin'. Furthermore, he went on to advocate the reinforcement of intergovernmental 
consultations, while consistently referring to a European confederation (Pompidou, 
1970a: 110-1). Later, in a meeting with Brandt on 3 July 1970, Pompidou explicitly 
rejected the idea of creating a single currency 'car il ne faut pas s'amuser à de tels rêves' 
(Bossuat, 2000: 370). 
AU this clearly indicates that Pompidou did not change his preference 
concerning the establishment of the European economic and monetary union during 
the year 1970 (see Appendix E, Preferences on EMU-dimensions). However, this raises 
the question of why the French reacted so differently to the Werner Interim Report 
and the Final Report. In my opinion, the discrepancy between the reaction to these 
reports may be explained 'par le fait que les conceptions divergeaient au sein du 
gouvernement français' (Tietmeyer, 2002: 327; cf. Bossuat, 2000: 274), and the 
extraordinary domestic and European decision-making procedures that allowed the 
average centrality rates, the fact that the ordoliberal concepts are outnumbered in combination with the 
additional evidence supplied in the case-study seems to warrant the conclusion that Pompidou's belief 
remained essentially Keynesian 
,
"
2
 The average centrality and sahency values of the concepts referring to intergovernmental co-operation 
grew from 3.8 and 5 6 to 7 and 11.9 (4 9 and 7.1 if the concept 'European monetary zone' (E10) is 
omitted) 
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preferences of these key French decision-makers temporarily to overrule those of 
President P o m p i d o u . w 
As indicated above, Schumann, Giscard, and the French negotiators on the 
Werner Committee all were convinced Europeanists, and therefore inclined to support 
more far-reaching plans for European integration. Moreover, several sources indicate 
that Pompidou held Schumann and Giscard responsible for the unacceptable content 
of the Final Report, and 'à ce qu'il paraît, demanda des explications aux membres 
français du groupe' (Werner, 1991: 132; cf. Comité pour l'Histoire Economique et 
Financière de la France, 2002: 347). This evidence, together with the fact that the 
substance of the Werner Report seems to have taken the French President by surprise, 
indicate that — contrary to what might be expected given the centralised structure of 
the French political system — Pompidou had lost sight of the Werner group's 
discussions and failed to control the French contributions within the Werner 
Committee. 
A closer look at the events of 1970 reveals that four factors may have 
contributed to the unusual situation in which the French President - despite his 
central position in the French preference formation process — had lost his grip on the 
process determining the French national preference. Firstly, during the decision-
making process, Pompidou was surrounded by Europeanists like Giscard, Schumann 
and the French representatives on the Werner Committee. Since Pompidou was 
preoccupied with the other items that had been on the The Hague agenda, such as the 
financing of the CAP and the enlargement, he had put Bernard in charge of keeping 
track of the discussions of the Werner Committee. However, the President's personal 
adviser also was a strong proponent of the establishment of EMU (Bossuat, 1995). 
Secondly, the decision-making process on the The Hague resolution diverged from 
standard operating procedure. Instead of referring the deliberations to COREPER - as 
was customary — ECOFIN decided to establish the 'Ad Hoc' Werner Committee. Due 
to its composition, the Frenchmen on the group were more directly linked to the Rue 
de Rivoli than the Elysée. Thirdly, the representatives on the Werner group did not 
officially represent their governments, but the European Committees over which they 
presided. Finally, the famous French co-ordinating mechanism in European affairs (see 
Chapter 3) seems to have been inoperative, for according to Jean-René Bernard 'en 
effet, quoique le SGCI soit au centre de la détermination et de l'exécution des positions 
françaises en matière européenne, il ne m'est jamais apparu que, s'agissant des 
questions monétaires, il jouait un rôle important ' (Bernard, 2002: 127). AU in all, this 
"" Moreover, the provisions in the Interim Report concerning the institutional changes were much vaguer 
than those adopted in the Final Report. From Pompidou's point of view, the conclusions of the Interim 
Report would certainly have been provocative too, but to a lesser extent than those of the Final Report. 
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put a group of European advocates at the very centre of the French decision-making 
process with regards to the EMU project. 
6.6.3 The President Restores Order 
The French President's remarkable loss of control over the EMU negotiations, 
however, turned out to be temporary. When, in November 1970, Pompidou was 
confronted with the results of the deliberations of the Werner group, he intervened. 
On 9 December 1970, during the conseil restreinte of the French Cabinet, he simply 
forbade his Ministers to adopt the Werner Final Report during the coming Council of 
Ministers of the European Community. In fact, they were even instructed to obstruct 
any decision concerning the transfer to the second stage of EMU and any amendment 
of the Rome Treaties and warned not to surrender any French national sovereignty to 
the European central bank (Bossuat, 1999: 387; 2000: 274). 
Aided by the fact that after the submission of the Final Report of the Werner 
Group, decision making at the European level returned to normality, Pompidou's 
intervention successfully re-established his control over the French national preference. 
In the subsequent COREPER meetings on the Werner report, the French 
representative forcefully resisted all those proposals which had invoked Pompidou's 
wrath, thereby confounding his European colleagues (Note a l'attention de MM. les 
membres de la Commission, 12 December 1970 / Le projet de texte du Comité des 
Représentants Permanents, 9/10 December 1970 in: BAC 3/78, no. 38, 1970-1971; 
Projet de texte, 11 December 1970, in: BAC 20/1979 no. 37, ^ O ) . ' 0 1 Moreover, 
during the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 14 December 1970, Giscard and 
Schumann followed the President's instructions: they categorically refused to discuss 
the measures to be taken in the second and third stage of the road to EMU and 
rejected outright all those institutional measures foreseen in the Werner Final Report 
(Agence Europe, 14 and 15 December 1970, Tietmeyer, 2002: 328; Werner, 1991: 136). 
Giscard even argued that the Werner Report espoused an excessively liberal 
concept of economic policy making, which would render economic development 
uncontrollable. Moreover, repeating the words of the President, he stated that 'si l'on 
veut que les Etats continuent d'exister, il faut une approche confédérale du problème' 
(Bossuat, 2000: 274). These assertions are remarkable, because there is no evidence 
dating from any time prior to December 1970 that Giscard had referred to the EMU 
"
M
 During the meetings of the COREPER on 9 and 10 December 1970, the French delegation refused to 
refer to the agreement as a 'decision' (opting instead for the - legally non-binding — formulation 
'resolution'), the adoption of the conclusions of the Werner Interim Report, the irreversible character of 
the agreements, any transfer of national competences to the community level, the transfer from the first to 
the second and third stage, and the establishment of any democratic control over the economic and 
monetary decision-making authorities (Le projet de texte du Comité des Représentants Permanents, 9/10 
December 1970 in BAC 3/78, no 38, 1970-1971) 
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project in a negative manner. In fact, in the years prior to the institution of the 
Werner Committee, the French Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs had proven 
himself an ardent proponent of the establishment of European monetary union. It is 
therefore likely that this 'reversal' in Giscard's position was in fact simple posturing 
which had been necessitated by Pompidou's angry outburst. A conclusion also voiced 
by Bussière - who has remarked that 'Valéry Giscard d'Estaing à l'automne 1970 
considère que mettre en avant les aspects institutionnels, c'est agiter "le chiffon rouge", 
et qu'il n'est pas opportun de mettre ces aspects pour l'instant sur le devant de la scène' 
(Comité pour l'Histoire Économique et Financière de la France, 2002: 348). 
A comparison of Giscard's first and second cognitive map indeed suggests that 
during the 1960s and 1970s (and arguably thereafter, see Chapter 7) Giscard 'ne 
changera pas d'approche: L'Europe, il en est convaincu, se fera par la monnaie' 
(Weinachter, 2001: see Appendix E, Preferences on EMU-dimensions).'05 In his second 
map, three concepts may be distinguished that refer to European monetary unification 
(see concepts A3, E2, E9) all of which are valued positively. More specifically, Giscard 
believed European monetary unification to serve the geopolitical goal of making Paris 
an international financial centre (P2),,06 and the elimination of one of the major 
drawbacks the of the Bretton Woods system, namely the unfair division of costs and 
benefits of the functioning of the international monetary system (Ul). The Minister's 
support for European integration in general also remained the same. In fact, two of the 
concepts referring to European integration that were part of the core of his first map, 
resurface in the core of his second map. Moreover, in his second map, no less than 
eleven concepts referring to European integration may be distinguished, which overall 
were valued positively (the exceptions being the concepts 'Joint float of EEC 
currencies' (Jl) and 'Collective European revaluation' (C4), see below). In addition, all 
concepts referring to a blockade or dissolution of European integration (like 'Disunion 
amongst EEC members', D2, 'French boycott of the community institutions', F4, and 
'Break in EMU discussions', B2) were valued negatively. 
As for his preferred mode of decision making, it seems that Giscard's 
preferences remained as ambiguous as they were prior the The Hague Summit. Next to 
his support for supranational co-operation in the monetary realm (see concepts A3, E2, 
E9), he distinguished five concepts referring to purely intergovernmental co-operation, 
and, like the concepts referring to European monetary unification, he valued these 
positively. Moreover, as had been the case prior to the Conference of The Hague, 
"" In fact, like his President, the core of Giscard's belief system was very stable, reaching a single concept 
stability-rate of 60% and a replaced concept stability-rate of 80% (see Appendix E, Stability of Map-1 
Core Beliefs) 
,lM
' Compare the concepts 'Ample use of European currencies in the banking system' (A2), 'European 
currency becoming a world currency' (E5) that were perceived by Giscard to be the result of the 
establishment of EMU in his first cognitive map. 
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Giscard's support for supranational decision making was exclusively limited to the 
monetary issue-area (see Appendix E, Preferences on EMU-dimensions). 
With regard to the second dimension of European economic and monetary 
unification - the form of the international exchange rate system — the evidence points 
unequivocally towards the conclusion that Giscard remained a staunch supporter of 
fixed exchange rates during the years following the summit of The Hague. All 
concepts he distinguished that referred to fixed exchange rates (A3, E2, F8, Rl) were 
valued positively, whereas all concepts referring to floating exchange rates (A4, F2, F3, 
Tl) were valued negatively. What is more, even those policy alternatives involving 
floating between European currencies (en bloc) and the currencies of third countries 
only (Jl, C4) were rejected by the French Minister.,ü7 In his view, floating exchange 
rates would hamper European integration (though not France's commitment to EEC, 
see relation F2-F4),3'm and result in inflation (see relation F3-A4-I1), while a European 
joint float (Jl) would lead to a collective European revaluation (C4), which would in 
turn lead to deflation (D3), unemployment (H2), and hamper economic expansion 
(El).'09 Finally, as indicated by the analysis of Giscard's second cognitive map, his 
economic ideas remained more ordoliberal than Keynesian."0 
Overall, this analysis supports the view that Giscard did not experience a 
'genuine' change in preferences. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that Schumann 
drew the same conclusion. For, according to Agence Europe, although it had been agreed 
that the European Ministers of Foreign Affairs would only attend the first part of the 
meeting, Schumann 'aurait refusé de quitter la salle de réunion où demeurait un 
Giscard d'Estaing détendu mais plus effacé que d'habitude, "tant que les questions 
intitutionnelles ne seront pas réglées'" {Agence Europe, 15 December 1970: 1). 
In sum, due to Pompidou's December intervention, during the Council 
meeting of 14 December, the French representatives found themselves diametrically 
opposed to their partners. After twelve hours of negotiating in vain, the meeting was 
suspended without setting a date for a subsequent meeting. ," The decision not to 
"'
7
 As in his first cognitive map - and in addition to concepts referring to European integration - the 
concept referring to the form of the international monetary system (Fi) belongs to the core of Giscard's 
second map (see appendix D). 
,
"
H
 See relations F2-B2, T1-E2, A4-A5, A4-A6, F3-E2 and F3-B2 in cognitive map Giscard-2 
,<
'
9
 In contrast to Brandt and the German financial elite, Giscard did feel that floating the national 
currency (Tl) jeopardised the establishment of EMU, and went out of his way to emphasise that - if it 
was up to him — the floating of the franc (which was decided upon on 19 January 1974, see Chapter 7) 
would be temporary, lasting six months at the most (Europa-Anhw, 29, 8/1974: 178-9) 
"" The average value of the ordoliberal concepts is lower in the second map than in the first in terms of 
centrahty and sahency (3 and 2 5 versus 6 and 9 5). However, they still outrank the Keynesian concepts, 
which — as in the first map — have an average value of 1.5 and 1.5 
,
" According to Schumann, the postponement of a decision until the next year was due to merely 
technical reasons However, during the press conference after the meeting, Schiller stated that the German 
Presidency had rejected the proposition put forward by a number of delegations to stop the clock before 
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prolong the meeting meant that the Ministers failed to complete the task they had 
been charged with at the The Hague Conference to come up with a plan for the 
establishment in stages of a European economic and monetary union during the year 
1910 (Agence Europe, 15 December 1970: 5, Werner, 1991: 136). 
6.6.4 The Maximum Possible 
Even before the French, who on 1 January assumed the Presidency of the Community, 
had selected a new date to convene the Council of Ministers, some feeble attempts 
were made to resolve the deadlock. Early January, Werner tried to reconcile the 
opposing parties, and the EMU project featured high on the agenda of COREPER 
(Agence Europe, 15 January 1971: 2, Werner, 1991: 136). Then, on 11 January 1971 
during an ECOFIN meeting in Arnhem, the Ministers of Economic and Financial 
Affairs engaged in an informal discussion of the subject (Agence Europe, 12 January 
1971: 3). Many contentious issues featured on the agenda amongst which the 
adaptation of the Community institutions, the level of democratic control, the role of 
the Central Banks and the degree of political independence they should enjoy, the 
specific transfer of decision-making authority to Community institutions, the 
transition to the second and third phase of the process and the status of the Treaties of 
Rome in the integration process (Note a l'attention de MM. les Membres de la 
Commission, 23 Januari 1971, in: BAC 3/1978, no 38, 1970-1971; cf. Agence Europe, 
21 Januari 1971: 4-6). Since the meeting remained deadlocked, these matters were left 
to be resolved at the highest political level (Tietmeyer, 2002: 328). 
During the bi-annual Franco-German meeting of 25 January 1971, a 
compromise was finally reached. During this meeting, which was largely devoted to 
the monetary project, it became clear that the Germans faced the choice of either 
accepting a trajectory towards monetary integration without any assurances that 
progress in the later phases would be made on the institutional issue or economic 
integration, or abandoning the project altogether. This became clear when, during a 
discussion with Brandt, Pompidou stipulated that under no circumstances would he 
agree to the establishment of supranational institutions."2 He went on to state that 
any loss of national political control over monetary policy making would be 
unacceptable and that in his view the Central Banks would have to be subordinate to 
midnight, because they were of the opinion that those responsible for the meeting's failure should now 
take the responsibility for reconciling the European partners. Given the fact that on 1 January, France 
would assume the Presidency of the Council, there was no doubt about who the Germans considered to be 
responsible for the failure 
,12
 During a press conference on 21 January Pompidou had already voiced this stance (Pompidou, 1971b) 
After the Summit, the President explicitly expressed the same opinion again (Pompidou, 1971a. 158). 
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the Council of Ministers at all times (Brandt, 1977: I, 282; Tietmeyer, 2002: 329).Μ3 
For now, Pompidou stated, France would only agree to start a first phase of three years 
that would merely include the narrowing of the intra-European fluctuation margins 
and an automatic support mechanism for weaker currencies. However, the President 
was confident that Schiller would never agree to this proposal (Bossuat, 1999: 387; 
2000: 375; Brandt, 1977:1, 282). 
It turned out that the President was right. Schiller was unwilling to agree 
unconditionally to Pompidou's proposals. He insisted that the Franco-German 
compromise on EMU must include a safety clause (clause de prudence) which would 
guarantee that — in future stages — progress on economic and institutional matters 
would keep pace with the monetary innovations (Tietmeyer, 2002: 329-30; Werner, 
1991: ^ ό ) . " 4 The clause stated that the monetary measures to be implemented 
during the first phase, such as the reduction of the margins of currency fluctuation, co­
ordinated intervention on the currency markets, the creation of a short-term support 
mechanism and, possibly, the creation of a European Reserve fund, would be valid for 
a limited period of four years only. If, at the end of this period, member states reached 
an agreement on the transition from the first to a second stage, and this second stage 
entailed sufficient economic and institutional progress, then the measures were to be 
prolonged. According to Rosenthal, the clause enabled a compromise between the 
Germans and French because it avoided 'immediate formal undertakings on moving on 
to later stages (satisfying France), removing the automatic element from the monetary 
measures if insufficient progress was made in co-ordinating economic policies (German 
fear)' (Rosenthal, 1975: 111, note 19), and thus reconciled the minimum demands of 
the most sceptical vetoplayers of both states. Moreover, it shows that Schiller had 
maintained his pre-existing beliefs concerning the form of European economic and 
monetary integration, a conclusion supported by the comparison of the two cognitive 
maps of the German Minister of Economics. 
Overall, the comparison between his cognitive maps shows that Schiller's 
belief system is relatively stable. As in his first map, none of the dimensions of EMU 
are particularly central to his belief system. Moreover, price stability remains Schiller's 
most salient goal (see Appendix D ) . m As for what form the international monetary 
system should take, it was concluded from his first map, that Schiller had no strong 
, 1 ,
 With this statement the French President explicitly took issue with the German Ministers Scheel and 
Schiller, who - during the meeting - had advocated the establishment of a politically independent 
European Central Bank (Bossuat, 1999 387; 2000 374-5). 
,
" The German Minister was so adamant about his demand that in his memoirs Brandt concluded that 
Schiller had 'fallen in love' with the clause de prudence (Brandt, 1977: I, 282). 
,
" In the second map, in addition to the concepts 'Price stability in the world' (P5) and 'Price stability in 
Germany' (P6) are mentioned but also 'Inflation in the EEC' (B) - which has taken the place of P6 in the 
core of his belief system (centrality 10, saliency H) — and'German focus on price stability in EMU 
negotiations' (Gl). So if anything, his beliefs concerning this issue would have grown stronger. 
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preference concerning this issue, and from the second map, it may be conlcuded that 
he remained ambivalent on this point. On the one hand, he favoured the establishment 
of European economic and monetary union (E4), albeit under strict conditions (see 
below). But equally, the Minister also saw the advantages of floating exchange rates 
(Wilkens, 2001: 395). More specifically, he also favoured flexibility in the margins of 
currency fluctuation in relation to third countries (F2).3"' In other words, the favoured 
international exchange rate system of the German Minister may have been a system of 
a European 'joint float' (which in the spring of 1971 he did actually propose, albeit to 
no avail). Such a joint float would in Schiller's view lead to an improved position for 
the European currencies (see relation F2-I1), and foster the establishment of EMU (see 
relation F2-E4). 
As for the possible establishment of EMU, the economist ideas of the German 
Minister remained as strong as ever during the years 1970-1971. The concepts of 
'parallelism' (PI), as well as the 'clause de prudence' (CI) belong to the core of his second 
cognitive map, and according to Schiller, exerted a beneficial pressure (Bl) on the 
member states which enabled the establishment of EMU (E4). Moreover, he also 
valued the concept's 'financial discipline' (Fl) and 'no automatic transfer to subsequent 
stages' (Al) positively. All in all, then, no change in the Minister's beliefs had taken 
place.517 
During the Council of Ministers on 8 and 9 February,"8 agreement was 
reached on a resolution (as opposed to a — legally binding — decision) concerning the 
establishment of an economic and monetary union {Agence Europe, 9 February 1971: 3, 
Rosenthal, 1975: 111). However, this resolution was a mere shadow of Brandt's 
original plan and bore no resemblance to the Werner Final Report. In fact, it may be 
argued that the introduction to the resolution — in which the conclusions of the 
Werner Interim Report were cited - constituted the most innovative part of the 
agreement. 
The institutional section in particular was filled with platitudes and 
reservations. It was stipulated, for example, that the Community had to be assigned 
,16
 On average, the concepts indicating a preference for fixed exchange rates outrank the concepts referring 
to floating exchange rates in terms of centrality and sahency (10 and 11.5 versus 3 and 1). However, if the 
concept 'Establishment of EMU' (E4) is omitted, the concepts referring to a floating system outrank those 
referring to a fixed system (3 and 1 versus 1 and 1) 
117
 However, Schiller's evaluation of European integration in general seems to have become slightly more 
positive, for in the second map the concept 'Further European integration' (F4) is positively linked to 
Schiller's central value 'Price stability' (P5, P6), while, in the eyes of the Minister 'Deepening' (Dl) would 
further the 'Normalisation of East-West German relationship' (Nl) However, in comparison to the other 
decision makers, again the map is relatively low on European concepts (which is remarkable given the fact 
that sections containing such concepts were specifically searched for). As for the form of European 
integration, from the second map, it may be derived that Schiller's preference for supranational co-
operation grew stronger 
"
, ,
 The resolution was officially adopted on 22 March 1971. 
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the 'powers and responsibilities' that enabled it to 'organise the administration of the 
union' and to take the 'required' economic decisions The decision about which 
'powers and responsibilities' were assigned to the community level and which would 
remain at the national level was to be 'in accordance with the requirements for the 
cohesion of the union and the efficiency of Community action' (Council of the 
European Economic Community, 1971 Art I 3) The only proposal made by the 
Werner Group that was adopted, was the establishment of some form of democratic 
control on European economic and monetary decision making by the European 
Parliament (Council of the European Economic Community, 1971 Art I 3) 
The majority of the resolution was devoted to the plans for the first stage 
These plans entailed, amongst other things, relatively uncontested economic measures 
such as the strengthened co-ordination of short-term economic policy-making 
(Council of the European Economic Community, 1971 Art III 1), the harmonisation 
of certain fiscal instruments (Council of the European Economic Community, 1971 
Art HI 2), and the stimulation of free capital movement (Council of the European 
Economic Community, 1971 Art III 3) In addition, in this section of the resolution, 
some monetary measures - such as strengthening the co-ordination of monetary and 
credit policies — as well as the provisional reduction of the European margins of 
fluctuations were proposed (Council of the European Economic Community, 1971 
Art III 5,7) Furthermore, in accordance with French demands, it was decided that 
the community would slowly try to establish a common representation in its monetary 
relations with third parties (Council of the European Economic Community, 1971 
Art III 6), and a study was to be conducted on the transfer of competences to, and the 
institutional form of the proposed European Fund for Monetary Co-operation (Council 
of the European Economic Community, 1971 Art III 8) Finally, with reference to 
Schiller's clause de prudence, the resolution called for a strict parallelism between 
monetary and economic innovations (Council of the European Economic Community, 
1971 Art III 9) 
Although the set of proposals in this 'Kompromiß des Kompromisses' 
(Tietmeyer, 1971 419) could by no means qualify as the plan for the establishment of 
a European economic and monetary union called for in the Conclusions of the The 
Hague Conference, and elicited bitter reactions from many of the member states' 
representatives, the resolution of 9 February 1971 did reflect the political reality of the 
day (Agence Europe, 10 February 1971 8) Given the policy preferences of the dominant 
French and German domestic actors the resolution constituted according to Schiller 
'the maximum possible under the present circumstances (Agence Europe, 10 February 
1971 8) 
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6.7 Epilogue 
Even the minimal agreement laid down in the resolution of 9 February was not 
honoured by the member states. In March 1971, the central bank governors agreed 
that the narrowing of the intra-EEC fluctuation margins from 0.75 to 0.60 percent — 
as stated in the Council resolution - would come into effect in June. However, in May 
1971, a monetary crisis hit Europe. Huge inflows of liquidity induced the German 
government to take unilateral action and allow the D-mark to float freely. In response, 
the French blocked further negotiations on the EMU project until the crisis was over. 
When on 15 August 1971, the American President Nixon announced his decision to 
terminate the dollar's convertibility into gold - thereby formally ending the Bretton 
Woods system — 'the Six faced the crisis completely disunited' (Tsoukalis, 1977: 115). 
France refused to revalue the franc and began to advocate a two-tier market system and 
more stringent capital controls, while the Germans stuck to floating. 
After the Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971 - which set the 
fluctuation margins between the dollar and other currencies to 2.25 percent and 
restored some sense of international monetary order — France and Germany 
recommenced discussions on a European monetary system. In February 1972, 
Pompidou and Brandt agreed to tighten the European fluctuation margins to the 
percentage foreseen in the Council resolution of 1971. After the other member states 
had agreed to the Franco-German proposal, on 10 April 1972 'the snake in the tunnel' 
came into existence.,I9 
Anticipating the end of the first stage of European economic and monetary 
union on 31 December 1973, the Commission submitted a report on the progress of 
the first stage to the Council.12" The plan proposed few new measures. When in June 
1973, the report was discussed in the Council, both France and Germany opposed the 
transition to the second stage of EMU. France stipulated that the pound and lira must 
first re-enter the snake, while Germany demanded more progress on the co-ordination 
of economic policies. According to Tsoukalis 'there was an element of absurdity in all 
this. No national government was prepared to admit in public that the creation of an 
EMU by 1980 was not a feasible objective. Discussions dragged on, with the policy of 
each country being determined by short-term considerations' (Tsoukalis, 1977: 151). 
Finally, the Six agreed that the community would pass on to 'a' second stage on the 
first of January 1974, but the agreement contained almost no concrete measures. 
In fact, when on 1 January 1974, 'a' second stage of EMU commenced, five of 
the nine European currencies were floating jointly while the others were floating 
"'' The name 'snake in the tunnel' refers to the new European monetary arrangement in which the 
European currencies could fluctuate amongst themselves (snake) but could not break out of the 2.25% 
margins with the Dollar (tunnel). When on 19 March 1973 it was decided to let the dollar float, the 
European monetary arrangement lost its tunnel 
120
 The report was submitted to the Council on 30 April 1973. 
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independently, a far cry from a stable — let alone fixed — exchange rate regime. 
Moreover, at that time more limitations on capital movements existed than were 
present during the 1960s. At the Pans summit in December 1974, the Heads of State 
and Government did pay some lip service to the goal of EMU, but adopted neither a 
timetable nor any concrete measures In March 1975, a study group set up by the 
Commission under the chairmanship of Marjolin concluded that the Community was 
no nearer to EMU than it had been in 1969 In fact, the report concluded that 'if there 
has been any movement it has been backward' (Study Group 'Economic and Monetary 
Union 1980', 1975-4) 
6.8 Conclusion: Stable Preferences and Political Activism 
In this chapter, I have shown that - despite some claims to the contrary - the year 
1969 did not introduce a period of common interest between Germany and France 
concerning the establishment of a European economic and monetary union. Rather, 
the period from the The Hague Summit until the signing of the resolution of 1971 is 
more adequately characterised as a period of national preference in flux A flux induced 
predominantly, albeit not exclusively, by the pushing and hauling amongst German 
and French central decision makers striving to realise their personal and divergent 
policy-preferences. 
When Brandt entered office, there was no sign that the German national 
stance would change. While the German Chancellor had some profound ideas on 
European integration — perceiving it as a panacea for all German and European 
ailments — European monetary and financial relations were not part of his belief 
system However, under the influence of Monnet, Brandt developed a preference for 
European monetary unification as a means to further European integration The newly 
elected German Chancellor proposed to establish a fully fledged European economic 
and monetary union and envisioned setting up a European reserve fund in which, 
eventually, part of the German reserves would be placed. For this reason, Brandt's The 
Hague proposals did constitute a breach with past German European monetary policy 
making. 
This individual belief change resulted in a burst of political activism on the 
part of the Chancellor with the goal of putting European monetary unification on the 
European political agenda In this quest he successfully, but only temporarily, 
managed to circumvent domestic opposition to his far-reaching ideas, for after the 
summit , when the Council of Ministers took over the negotiations, the Chancellor lost 
control over the German national position It has become clear that the German 
financial elite — and especially the German Minister of Economics Schiller — 
successfully regained and maintained their control over the German national 
preference on European economic and monetary integration As a result, the 
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subsequent German input into the European negotiations reflected the cautious and 
economist stand of the German financial authorities. 
Schiller's stance on the issue was based on the ordoliberal economic and 
monetary ideas he had been espousing for some years, and that — by the 1970s — had 
become typical for the German financial elite. In fact, Schiller had no precisely defined 
preferences concerning any dimension of European monetary unification; his 
evaluation of all plans concerning European monetary integration seemed to have been 
weighted predominantly according to their effect on price stability. These ideas led the 
German Minister of Economics actively to attempt to regain control of the German 
national position on further European monetary integration and to qualify the 
proposals made by Brandt. It has been shown that after The Hague, these attempts 
were successful and that Schiller - in co-operation with the Bundesbank - managed to 
divert the German national preference away from Brandt's position and to put his own 
imprint on the Werner Report and the February 1971 resolution. All in all, it may be 
concluded that Schiller's beliefs concerning economic and financial policy making 
remained very stable and consistently informed his stand on the establishment of 
European economic and monetary union, from his initial objections to Brandt's plans, 
through the negotiations of the Werner Committee, until his introduction of the clause 
de prudence into the February 1971 resolution. 
Under the influence of the successful activism of the German financial elite, 
Brandt resigned himself to the fact that he could not dictate the German national 
preference in this matter and seems to have undergone yet another belief change, albeit 
a modest one. For, by 1971, his belief system shows a slight resemblance with the 
economist and more cautious beliefs advocated by the German financial authorities. As 
a result, by the time the Werner Final Report was published, the German national 
preference had stabilised and returned to normality. Overall, the conclusion seems 
warranted that the story of the German national preference change during the period 
1969-1971 was as much one of political struggle and activism as one of individual 
cognitive belief change. 
The French case, by contrast, does not involve such influence of individual 
cognitive belief change, but is more adequately characterised as a story of political 
pushing and hauling amongst domestic political actors harbouring divergent 
preferences on European monetary unification. The first, and one of the most 
surprising, conclusions of this case is that — in contrast to his German colleague - at 
no time during the Conference in The Hague did President Pompidou propose to set 
up a European economic and monetary union. In fact, the proposals made by the 
French President were solidly rooted in the 'Gaullist' and purely intergovernmental 
world view he had held for years, and which had determined French monetary policy 
since the late 1950s. The attempts to persuade the French President made by his pro-
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European Ministers had had no effect, unlike the efforts made by Brandt's ministers to 
persuade their leader. 
Moreover, it has been shown in this chapter that Pompidou's preferences 
remained highly stable in the months following the Hague Summit. However, this 
raises the question of how the Werner Committee was able to come up with a 
consistent and very extensive set of proposals for the establishment of a European 
economic and monetary union, and why the French reaction to the Werner Interim 
Report differed so much from the reaction to the Final Report. In contrast to most 
accounts of these events, it was concluded that rather than individual cognitive belief 
change, the cause lay in the fact that Pompidou was surrounded by Europeanists who 
actively and, to some extent, autonomously attempted to realise their preferences in 
the European political arena, and the fact that, after the Hague Summit, the decision-
making process diverged from the standard operating procedure, put t ing these 
Europeanists at the centre of the domestic and European negotiating process. 
The extraordinary circumstance of the French President losing control over the 
negotiations proved temporary, however. When, in November 1970, Pompidou was 
confronted with the results of the deliberations of the Werner group, he restored the 
French domestic hierarchy. His intervention seems to have been so effective that it 
even induced EMU-protagonist Giscard d'Estaing to criticise and — in accordance with 
the President's instructions — to torpedo his long nurtured dream of establishing 
European monetary union, a change of heart that seems to have been induced by pure 
strategic considerations (resulting from Pompidou's outburst of anger upon reading 
the Werner Final Report) rather than by 'genuine' cognitive belief change. 
Overall, we may conclude that, contrary to what many accounts of the 1970s 
at tempt to establish a European economic and monetary union would have us believe, 
no common interest between France and Germany existed at the Hague Summit, since 
— despite his use of the term monetary union - the French President staunchly opposed 
any form of supranational co-operation. There is reason to believe that, if Chancellor 
Brandt had been able to gain control over the German national preference for a longer 
period of time, he would have been willing to agree to the Presidents' purely 
intergovernmental plans for European monetary integration. In the long-term such 
purely intergovernmental agreement might have given rise to further European 
monetary integration. However, once the German financial elite regained control over 
the German national preference in this matter, such a compromise was unthinkable. 
Conversely, it was equally unthinkable for Pompidou to agree to the highly economist 
and supranational proposals for EMU that might have been acceptable to the German 
Minister of Economics and the Bundesbank. A 1970s common interest on the 
establishment of a genuinely supranational European economic and monetary union 
would thus only have been possible following either a radical cognitive believe change 
on the part of the French President, or the German financial elite, or a political change 
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in or of the French political system to enable decision making on this issue to be 
dominated in the long term by the pro-European officials surrounding the President. 
During the years 1970-1971, neither one of these eventualities materialised. 
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The EMS was not, however, an embryo EMU . . it did not provide the EEC with a unified 
monetary policy or with a EEC central monetary authority 
-Sima Lteberman (Lieberman, 1992: 116) 
Planning for a new European monetary system only became practical politics when the German 
chancellor decided that the moment was opportune for a new initiative and when the French 
president was released from political captivity 
-Peter Ludlow (Ludlow, 1982-61) 
7.1 Introduction 
By the mid-1970s, the EMU project was in shatters. Even the watered-down 
agreement of March 1971 had not been respected and it had proved impossible for the 
European countries to maintain even the slightest degree of exchange rate stability. 
Nobody could have predicted that within half a decade, from these ashes, the phoenix 
of European monetary integration would rise again. A phoenix, however, that had shed 
all its supranational feathers. Again, it was the combined efforts of a German 
Chancellor and a French President that started the train rolling. However, it required 
some moderation of supranational ambitions, a solid political power-base, some sly 
political manoeuvring and — most importantly of all - a unique meeting of minds to 
drag the European Monetary System over the finish line. 
7.2 The Lingering Failure of the EMU Project 
7.2.7 The Ashes 
When in April 1978, the German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, presented his 
proposal for further monetary co-operation to the French President, Valéry Giscard 
d'Estaing, the European monetary integration projects lay in ruins. After President 
Pompidou had crushed all hopes for the establishment of a European monetary union 
in January 1971, the member states agreed on a plan for the first stage in development 
towards EMU. The decisions of February and March 1971 led to the establishment of 
the Snake-in-the-tunnel, which limited the margins of fluctuation between the European 
currencies. However, the central objective of this arrangement — the stabilisation of the 
European exchange rates - was never fulfilled. The British pound, Danish krone and 
Italian lira were pushed out of the Snake during the exchange rate crises of 1972, and 
'(Ludlow, 1982: 250) 
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1973 and the French government was forced to pull back the franc in January 1974.122 
What remained was a fixed exchange rate mechanism between the currencies of the 
Benelux, the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish crone and the D-mark (an arrangement 
also referred to as the Mini-Snake). 
Moreover, given the economic power relations between the members, the 
exchange rate policies underlying the Mini-Snake were determined first and foremost 
by the German financial authorities. The German monetary policy - which was still 
based on the economist and ordoliberal ideas that informed the German contributions 
to the Werner Report — and the exchange rate of the D-mark were closely followed by 
the other members. The Mini-Snake did not have a mid-term financial support 
mechanism, for according to the German financial elite this would only delay the 
implementation of the necessary economic measures, when budgetary problems were 
to arise. In their eyes, a system of fixed exchange rates had to be based on the co-
ordination of economic policies (Kruse, 1980: 221-2; Tsoukalis, 1977: 157). In 
addition, in accordance with ordoliberal views, the first goal served by the Mini-Snake 
was the guaranteeing of price stability. 
Although the Snake's remaining members favoured the return of the other 
EEC member states to the mechanism, they were not prepared to compromise the 
monetary rigour of the mechanism to enable this. In the autumn of 1974, for instance, 
a plan for increased flexibility of exchange rates between the Snake currencies and the 
dollar, along with an increase in the credit facilities available to Snake members, was 
proposed by the French Minister of Finance, Fourcade, but rejected by the members of 
the Snake. This French plan had been aimed at facilitating the franc's return to the 
Snake (Kruse, 1980: 222). 
Eventually, the French government managed to return the franc to the Snake 
at the exact rate at which it had been withdrawn. This was achieved by an 
improvement in the French balance-of-payments situation rather than any loosening 
of the Snake's provisions. However, an expansive economic policy and an extreme 
drought caused the French balance-of-payments and price stability — and therefore the 
value of the franc — to come under pressure again (Gros and Thygesen, 1998: 18; 
Kruse, 1980: 229)- There was another wave of speculation, and on 15 March 1976 the 
French government withdrew the franc from the system for the second time, ending all 
hopes for the Snake to develop into a genuine European exchange rate system. 
122
 At its establishment in April 1972, Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux took part in the Snake On 
1 May of the same year, Great-Britain and Denmark joined the arrangement and Norway became 
associated to the mechanism later that month. Less than two months after their accession, Great-Britain 
and Denmark left the Snake after a wave of speculation While Denmark rejoined in October 1972, the 
British pound was never to return to the mechanism. On H February 1973, the lire was pushed out of the 
Snake while, one month later, Sweden became an associated member As stated above, France left the 
Snake for the first time on 19 January 1974 
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On the matter of the financial assistance mechanisms to be incorporated into 
the European Monetary Co-operation Fund, some progress was made in the mid-
1970s. In April 1973, the Fund was established. Gros and Thygesen have noted, 
however, that the Fund played a negligible role in European monetary policy: 'for the 
following twenty years the board of the Fund met formally for a few minutes each 
month in Basle after the meeting of the Committee of Central Bank Governors' (Gros 
and Thygesen, 1998: 21).'^ In addition, a new mechanism for medium-term financial 
assistance was added to the existing the financial support mechanisms. The European 
mechanisms, however, were hardly ever used: it took one and a half years before they 
were called upon for the first time by Italy (Kruse, 1980: 234-6; Tsoukalis, 1977: 157, 
Pb. 1976, L 131/7). In spite of the fact that most other member states used the 
financial assistance provided by other organisations, in 1977, it was agreed that the 
quota of the short and medium-term support mechanisms was to be increased. This 
increase was accompanied by the establishment of stricter conditions for the use of the 
mechanism (Kruse, 1980: 240; Ludlow, 1982: 45; Europese Raad, 1977). 
7.2.2 Trains to Nowhere Land 
The general malaise that had occurred after the blocking of the Werner plan by 
President Pompidou did not, however, deter the supporters of a united Europe from 
attempting to revive the EMU project. In June 1975 for instance, the Commission -
always in favour of further integration — presented a report in which it proposed the 
introduction of a new common currency, the Europa. In this proposal the Commission 
argued against the phased transition to narrower margins of fluctuation and the focus 
on the harmonisation of national economic policies that were proposed in the Werner 
plan. In its own alternative strategy, the Commission proposed that in the first phases 
of the development of European monetary union, the Europa would function as a mere 
reserve currency and would be used only for the official operations of the European and 
national central banks. In a later stage, the member states' reserves would be pooled 
and the European margins of fluctuation narrowed to enable the new European 
currency to function as a genuine intervention currency. Only in the last phase would 
the Europa also be available for private use and thus assume the character of a real 
parallel currency issued and managed by a European central bank (Dyson, 1994: 87; 
Tsoukalis, 1977: 161-2). 
In November of the same year, this plan was followed by what is know as the 
All Saints Day Manifesto, a plan written by nine prominent European economists that 
,21
 They suggest that the central banks willingly prevented an effective functioning of the Fund, because 
they felt that the fact that the Fund was subordinated to the (political) ECOFIN violated the powers of 
the CCBG (Gros and Thygesen, 1998. 20-1) 
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was similar in content to the Commission proposal (Tsoukalis, 1977: 164, note 22)."'* 
This proposal also called for the introduction of a parallel European currency. In 
contrast to the Commission Plan, however, the Manifesto plan wanted to allow private 
use of the Europa at an earlier stage. Ultimately, the economists argued, the reliability 
and stability of the common currency would inevitably incite citizens to exchange 
their national currency for the Europa and stimulate its development into a single 
European currency (Dyson, 1994: 87; Tsoukalis, 1977: 164-5). 
The third plan targeted at the development of a European economic and 
monetary union was the Tindemans report of early 1976. This report saw the 
establishment of an economic and monetary union as an essential part of the European 
integration process, but did not propose an early transfer of national competences to 
the community level. The report was based on the idea of a two speed Community. 
According to the plan, the members of the Mini-Snake would engage in further co-
operation and pave the way for the other four EC member states. The report, however, 
fiercely criticised the separate meetings of the Snake members to co-ordinate their 
economic, monetary and exchange rate policies, and stressed that these meetings 
should be open for the four non-Snake members. In addition, the report proposed to 
facilitate the return of the four to the exchange rate mechanism. This did not mean, 
however, that the report suggested a weakening of the system's rigour. If states wanted 
to participate in the Snake they would be obliged to adopt certain monetary and 
budgetary objectives (Kruse, 1980: 239; Tsoukalis, 1977: 160-1). 
In general, the member states reacted negatively to the Tindemans report. 
This, however, did not stop the new Commission President, Roy Jenkins, from calling 
for the establishment of a European economic and monetary union again in October 
1977. According to the President it was necessary to develop a plan for the final stage 
of monetary union as well as for the phases leading up to it. These plans should aim at 
the harmonisation of the member states' economic fundamentals and contain proposals 
for the development of a suitable institutional framework for the union. In Jenkins' 
eyes, his proposals were neither federal nor con-federal in character: member states 
would continue to form the heart of the union and only those tasks that could be 
implemented significantly more efficiently by the European institutions would be 
transferred to the Community level (Hellmann, 1979a: 113-26; Ludlow, 1982: 47-9). 
Responses to the speech were largely negative, even the other Commissioners 
considered their President's plan to be unrealistic (Kruse, 1980: 240-1; Ludlow, 1982: 
53, 55-9). 
sl
* Amongst these economists was Niels Thygesen who would be a member of the Delors Committee in 
the late 1980s 
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7.23 The German President 
As explained earlier, it was French President Pompidou who in the first months of 
1971 had been responsible for the demise of the Werner Plan (see Chapter 6), and it 
was clear that as long as he resided in the Elysée, there was no chance that any further 
steps in the direction of a European monetary union could be taken. Neither had 
Pompidou ever been a supporter of the Snake, an exchange rate mechanism that, in his 
eyes, was nothing more than a D-mark block. When in January 1974, the franc could 
only be kept within its margins by digging deep into the French reserves and by 
imposing some harsh economic measures, the President decided to withdraw the franc 
from the Snake (Giscard d'Estaing, 1988: 111; cf. Heisenberg, 1999: 42; Howarth, 
2000: 31; Kruse, 1980: 224). ί25 
1974, however, would be a year of unexpected political changes, changes that 
would bring a turnaround in the French position regarding European economic and 
monetary policy making. In April 1974, President Pompidou died as a result of 
neglecting a chronic disease. During the Presidential elections that followed, Giscard 
d'Estaing ran as a candidate for the centrist parties. In the first round, he managed to 
beat the Gaullist candidate, Chaban Delmas, and thus became the right-wing 
candidate to fight the Socialist François Mitterrand in the second round.326 Giscard 
defeated Mitterrand with a margin of little over 1 percent of the vote (Frears, 1981: 
70).,27 This very narrow victory, combined with the fact that in order to maintain the 
majority in the Assemblée National he was dependent on the Gaullist UDR, severely 
limited the new President's freedom of movement during his first years in the Elysée.''1* 
Giscard appointed the Gaullist Jacques Chirac as his Prime Minister, Jean-
Pierre Fourcade as Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs, the French ambassador 
in Germany, Jean Sau vag nargues, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and his personal 
friend Clappier — the French representative in the Werner group — as Governor of the 
,25
 In his memoirs, Giscard recalls that he took the initiative to come to a decision on the position of the 
franc (Giscard d'Estaing, 1988). Hellmann, however, claims that Giscard was in Rome when President 
Pompidou took the decision to withdraw the franc. When the Minister of Finance was informed about the 
President's decision, he hurried back to Paris and subsequently travelled to Bonn in order to work out a 
solution for the predicament of the franc with the Germans. The German Minister of Finance, Helmut 
Schmidt, was prepared to offer the French a loan of 3 billion dollars to support the franc. Pompidou 
declined (Hellmann, 1979b· 45; Parsons, 1999. 241). 
,21
' France has a two-ballot system. This means that if none of the Presidential candidates manages to 
secure an absolute majority at the first ballot, a second ballot will automatically follow. In this second 
ballot, the two candidates that secured the most votes during the first round can run for President. It is 
commonly argued that Giscard was able to defeat Delmas because he had secured the support of the 
supporters of Pompidou in the Union des Démocrates pour la République (UDR). Their leader, Jacques Chirac 
would become Giscard's first Prime Minister. 
127
 Giscard secured 50.7 percent of the vote, Mitterrand 4 9 3 percent (Frears, 1981: 70). 
,21
' During the parliamentary elections of 1973, the Gaullists had secured 31.3 percent of the vote, while 
only 7.7 percent of the people had voted for the Giscardians (Cook and Paxton, 1998: 205). 
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French central bank.129 As has already been explained in Chapter 6, Giscard was a 
supporter of European integration and had always been an advocate of the 
establishment of EMU, and, during his election campaign he had ran under the slogan 
'centrist, liberal, and European', and promised to put EMU back on the political 
agenda (Parsons, 1999: 216). Sauvagnargues and Clappier were also convinced 
Europeans (Parsons, 1999: 233, 242). 
In September 1974, only four months after his election, the new President 
invited the government leaders of the other member states to the Elysée where he 
presented a whole set of proposals regarding further European integration. These 
proposals included various French concessions such as the removal of the French veto 
on the direct election of the European Parliament, and a less stringent position on the 
use of the majority rule. Additionally, Giscard called upon his colleagues to 
institutionalise the Conferences of Heads of State and Government and breathe new 
life into the negotiations on the establishment of a European monetary union (Ludlow, 
1982: 30-2; Parsons, 1999: 233)."° 
Finally, Giscard started a campaign to enable the return of the franc to the 
Snake.311 Giscard had always been a supporter of this European exchange rate 
mechanism (Parsons, 1999: 233). In order to hasten the franc's return to the Snake, 
Giscard introduced a stringent monetary plan to tackle ever-rising French inflation 
rates (Kruse, 1980: 227; Parsons, 1999: 242). The objective of the plan was to increase 
the French gross national product to a level comparable to that of Germany. At the 
same time, Giscard asked Fourcade to develop a plan for the revision of the Snake 
(Giscard d'Estaing, 1988: 111). The Fourcade plan, which was presented at the 
ECOFIN on 16 September 1974, included two decade-old French hobby-horses. The 
plan contained a proposal for the extension of the European financial support 
,2
'
)
 Dyson has commented that 'Giscard's political strategy was to appoint a Gaullist Prime Minister, 
Jacques Chirac, and then surround him with enemies' (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999 112) 
"" During the meeting of the Heads of State and Government in Pans in December 1974, this proposal 
was accepted and the European Council was born The objective of its establishment was to provide 
general leadership to the Community and set the guidelines for future developments Moreover, its 
establishment significantly reinforced the power of the Heads of State and Government in the European 
decision-making process (Ludlow, 1982 13-5, 32) According to Parsons, the intergovernmental nature of 
the European Council was not the prime motivation for the French President to propose its establishment, 
although it did increase the probability that the Gaullist majority in the National Assembly would be 
supportive In fact, Giscard mainly saw the Council 'as a way to free leaders from the nationalistic limits 
of their own ministers and officials' (Parsons, 1999 233) In his memoirs, the German Chancellor, 
Helmut Schmidt, also cites this consequence as one the prime benefits of the Council (Schmidt, 1990 
197) 
" ' Kruse refers to Giscard's position on the Snake as a 'complete reversal in the French government's 
policy on the snake' (Kruse, 1980 224-5) Kruse argues that the direct cause of this 'complete reversal' 
was the change in the French balance-of-payments (Kruse, 1980 224-5) However, the simple fact that 
the beliefs of Pompidou and his successor Giscard differed on this issue seems to be a more plausible 
explanation for the change in the French position 
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mechanisms, and advocated intervening on the exchange rate markets more regularly 
in order to prevent currencies from reaching the Snake's outer bands. 
A more novel element in the Fourcade plan, one that went back to Giscard's 
ideas concerning the reform of the international monetary system he had developed 
during the early 1960s (see Chapter 6), was the proposal to replace the parity grid, on 
which the Snake was based, with a system based on a European Unit of Account 
(EUA). In the parity grid, the margins of fluctuation and intervention points were 
determined by the difference in value between two separate currencies. As a result 
there were always two currencies that reached their (opposing) intervention thresholds 
at the same time. In the system proposed by the French, the margins of fluctuation 
would be determined by the value of the EUA: the (weighted) average of the value of 
all European currencies. According to the French, the in-built advantage of this system 
would be that currencies would reach their intervention thresholds at different times, 
rather than two currencies reaching their thresholds simultaneously. The question of 
which of the two countries reaching the Snake's outer limits had to intervene - a 
matter that had caused vexed relations between the members of the Snake so often in 
the past - could thus be avoided. Moreover, according to the French, past exchange 
rate movements in the Snake showed that it was plausible that in the new system the 
central banks of the stronger currencies would have to intervene as often as the weak-
currency states. For this reason, the new system would be more symmetrical (Gros and 
Thygesen, 1998: 39; Szâsz, 1988: 161-2; Voorzitter van de Raad van de 
Gemeenschappen, 1974: 22).'^ Thus, with hindsight it may be concluded that the 
Fourcade plan was the first sign of French dissatisfaction over the asymmetrical 
working of the Snake.'" 
132
 In theory, the Snake's intervention mechanism was not asymmetrical, for no rule existed that 
determined which of the centtal banks (that of the depreciating or appreciating currency) had to intervene 
to keep the currencies within their margins of fluctuation. However, in practice the decision which central 
bank had to intervene turned out to be dependent on the economic and monetary power of the states 
involved In general, the bank of the weak-currency state was urged to intervene by the other member 
states. According to the French this was especially unfair because in addition to having to bear the 
political humiliation of having to support its currency, it was more costly to raise the value of a 
depreciating currency than to lower the value of an appreciating currency. When intervening, the central 
bank of an appreciating (strong) currency had to buy foreign currency in order to lower the relative price 
of their currency (more demand for these other currencies would push up their value, thereby lowering the 
relative value of the appreciating currency) As a result, this bank would have the benefit of adding to its 
official reserves A state whose (weak) currency was depreciating would have to sell off part of their 
reserves to boost the value of their currency Such interventions would thus be far more costly 
(Heisenberg, 1999:41). 
' " Gros and Thygesen posit that 'far from wanting to ease the discipline within the system it was 
precisely the rigors that attracted France' (Gros and Thygesen, 1998) Parsons, however, claims that 
'neither Giscard nor Fourcade had any intention of "locking in" the Franc to a strict regime' (Parsons, 
1999· 243). In his eyes, the Fourcade plans were meant to undermine the stringency of the Snake. 
However, given the economic and monetary beliefs of the French President and his Minister of Finance, as 
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The other member states denounced the Fourcade plans. However, Giscard 
was determined to guide the franc back into the Snake. He implemented a plan for 
monetary austerity to raise the value of the franc. In early 1975, the value of the franc 
had sufficiently increased for the President to take a decision (Kruse, 1980: 224-5). 
Against the wishes of the French Ministry of Economic and Financial Affairs and the 
French Central Bank, on 9 May 1975, precisely twenty-five years after the presentation 
of the Schumann Plan, Giscard announced the return of the franc to the European 
currency mechanism at its initial rate (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 114).334 
However, this period of French monetary discipline was short lived. In the 
summer of 1975, Chirac convinced the President to fight the looming recession and 
rising unemployment with the introduction of an expensive tax plan (the so-called 
Rélance Chirac). Naturally, such a measure was hardly consistent with the quest for 
price stability and stable exchange rates, and before long the franc was on the verge of 
dropping out of the Snake again (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 114; Parsons, 1999: 
243-4).'^ Giscard now faced the same choice as Pompidou in 1974 and came to the 
same conclusion: 'we must not exhaust our reserves to remain within the fixed 
margins' and on 15 March 1976, 'the French franc left the monetary snake for good' 
(Giscard d'Estaing, 1988: 112, my translation)."6 
Since his attempts to integrate the franc into the Snake had failed, the French 
President felt the time had come for a change of tactics (Giscard d'Estaing, 1988: 
112). In February 1977, and again in late 1977, he pressed the German Chancellor, 
Helmut Schmidt, to convene a Franco-German meeting to discus reviving the 
negotiations on EMU. He also discussed his ideas with Jenkins (Dyson and 
Featherstone, 1999: 116; Ludlow, 1982: 58; Schmidt, 1990: 248). Due to his weak 
domestic political position Giscard was however not in the position to take the 
initiative himself. 
The President's change of tactics was also apparent from the new zeal with 
which he tended to his domestic economic and monetary objectives. In August 1976, 
well as their behaviour in the subsequent years, it seems more likely that the Fourcade plans were aimed 
at a limited flexibilisation of the Snake and were directed mainly against its asymmetrical nature 
(Heisenberg, 1999. 54). 
'^ On 10 July, when the franc actually re-entered the Snake, Fourcade stated that 'the wish to "strengthen 
the mechanism of the Economic and Monetary Union" had led to the decision to re-enter' (Siisi, 1999 
40). 
"
5
 According to Parsons, Fourcade objected to the plans and argued that they were at odds with the 
government's monetary objectives. Allegedly, Giscard had also expressed doubt about the wisdom ol the 
plans, but gave in because 'all agreed that domestic incentives pointed this way' (Parsons, 1999. 24}-4) 
"'' In March 1976, the Ministers of Finance had reached an agreement on a set of policy measures aimed at 
supporting the franc 'The measures were not implemented, however, because, during the weekend in 
question, returns in the French departmental elections, the imminence of which had provoked speculation 
against the franc in the first place, showed convincing gains for the left in general and the Socialists in 
particular' (Ludlow, 1982· 3î; cf Szâsz, 1999. 42). 
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'Chirac was pushed to resign' and Raymond Barre, former commissioner of the 
European Commission, was asked to assume the post of Prime Minister as well as that 
of Minister of Finance (Parsons, 1999: 244). Barre was known to be strong supporter 
of stringent monetary policies and an admirer of the German economic success. When 
Barre assumed his functions, Giscard specifically ordered him to bring French inflation 
down (Frears, 1981: 135; Heisenberg, 1999: 53; Schmidt, 1990: 223). 
In September, the First Minister revealed his plans, which contained various 
proposals aimed at stabilising the French economy, such as a three-month ban on price 
increases, a raise in value-added tax, a limit on wage and salary increases and a decrease 
in liquidity. In addition to these, the Minister proposed to adopt several measures 
aimed at the recovery of the French balance of payments and the promotion of 
economic growth and employment rates. The plans were rigorous but not popular 
(Frears, 1981: 135)/" So, after the dramatic results of the local elections of March 
1977 and with the parliamentary elections of March 1978 approaching, the 
government felt it had no choice but to water down its plans. Only those measures 
that were aimed at lowering unemployment rates and increasing the purchasing power 
of families were implemented (Frears, 1981: 135-6). 
7.2.4 The French Chancellor 
In 1974, a change of government also took place in West Germany. A spy scandal had 
forced the resignation of Chancellor Brandt and, on 16 May, former Minister of 
Finance, Schmidt, was elected Chancellor.31" Schmidt named Hans Apel as his 
Minister of Finance while Hans-Dietrich Genscher became Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Although, unlike in France, this change of government did not involve a change in the 
governing parties, Schmidt differed significantly from his predecessor Brandt in style, 
interest and beliefs. These differences soon became apparent in the German stance on 
European economic and monetary integration. 
Schmidt's beliefs concerning European monetary co-operation occupied the 
middle ground between the positions of his predecessors Schiller and Brandt (see 
Chapter 6). He had held strong convictions about the benefits of European integration 
and been a member of Monnet's Action Committee since the 1950s, but European 
H7
 Polls show that by the end of 1976, the popularity of Giscard and Barre was lower that that of any 
other President and Prime Minister that had served in the Fifth Republic till that time (Parsons, 1999: 
245, note 92) In addition, the Barre Plan caused significant differences of opinion between the 
Giscardians and the Gaullists 
"
8
 In July 1972, Schiller had resigned as Minister of the Supermimstry of Economic and Financial Affairs 
after the German cabinet had established capital controls in order to protect the D-mark against the 
speculation that was expected to occur in the weeks surrounding the elections (Dyson and Featherstone, 
1999) Schiller was succeeded by Schmidt. After the elections, Schmidt split up the Supermimstry and 
became Minister of Finance The less well-known Hans Fndenchs of the FDP became Minister of 
Economic Affairs. 
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integration was not pivotal to his belief system to the same extent as it had been to 
Brandt's.w Nonetheless, Schmidt was a proponent of further European integration and 
a supporter of the Snake because, in his view, this exchange rate arrangement was one 
of the institutions which could bring the ambition of European economic and 
monetary union back to life (Schmidt, 1990: 184; Tsoukalis, 1977: 130). 
In principle, the new Chancellor was also a proponent of a supranational 
Europe, but was too much of a political and economic realist to believe that this 
objective could be reached in any other way than incrementally.140 Therefore, he 
qualified the conviction — as laid down in the Werner plan — that a European 
monetary union could be established within eight years as 'utopian' (Schmidt, 1990: 
184, 211). He was equally sure that, in the end, the impetus for a significant transfer 
of national autonomy to the European level should not come from Bonn. According to 
the Chancellor 'der Schlüssel liegt noch immer dort, wo er seit den Zeiten von Robert 
Schuman, Jean Monnet oder René Pleven liegt, bei den Franzosen' (Schmidt, 1990: 
185). 
To Schmidt, however, the political objectives of European co-operation were 
as important as the economic ones. The economic and monetary issue-area was 
Schmidt's natural habitat and German economic prosperity was never far from his 
mind. In his eyes, the European Community contributed to that goal by offering 
Germany a free trade area (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 294-5; Schmidt, 1990: 
249), and his support for the Snake and EMU were also partly inspired by the 
economic benefits they offered. The members of the Snake were amongst Germany's 
most important trading partners and a fixed link between their currencies and the D-
mark would make a revaluation of the mark less likely. The Snake protected therefore 
the competitive advantage of the German export sector (Dyson, 1994: 86; Heisenberg, 
1999:42,51). 
The new Chancellor, however, cannot be characterised as a typical member of 
the German ordoliberal financial elite.141 As a Social Democrat, Schmidt aimed to 
' ^ A possible explanation for this, is that Schmidt's support for the European project was far less inspired 
by Germany's national socialist past than that of his predecessors. On only a few occasions Schmidt is 
known to have referred to his country's special historic responsibilities One of the few times he explicitly 
referred to the German historic responsibility to propel European integration forward, was on iO 
November 1978, when he tried to convince the Central Bank Council of the Bundesbank of the benefits of 
the EMS (see Section 7 4 3). 
>10
 In his memoirs, Schmidt has stated that - at least during their time as Ministers of Finance - Giscard 
shared his realism in this respect, for he recalls that 'wahrend der vielen Reden schoben wir uns kleine 
Zettelchen zu, auf denen wir uns mit boshaften Bermerkungen über den Aplomb und über die 
Realitatsferne einiger Redner lustig machten' (Schmidt, 1990: 184). 
,41
 The significance of the European economic policy to Schmidt, as well as his differences of opinion with 
the ordoliberals at the Ministry of Economic Affairs, had motivated Schmidt to make a significant change 
in the domestic bureaucratic balance of power after the elections of 1972 By moving the Money and 
Credit department from the Ministry of Economic Affairs to the Ministry of Financial Affairs, he made 
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increase economic growth and employment rates, and, while he was not blind to the 
benefits of maintaining a certain level of stability and welcomed France's attempts at 
monetary austerity in the mid-1970s (Schmidt, 1990: 194, 223), he did consider the 
Bundesbank's and the Ministry's of Economic Affairs preoccupation with the Germany 
inflation rate 'sehr einseitig' (Schmidt, 1990: 252). ί42 Neither did Schmidt share the 
financial elite's economist vision on European economic and monetary integration. In 
his eyes, far-reaching monetary co-operation should be combined with a certain level 
of economic convergence, but in his eyes 'bedingen und befruchten sich aber 
Fortschritte gegenseitig'. In other words, convergence of economic policies was not a 
necessary precursor to monetary integration (Schmidt, 1990: 228-9, 262).M1 As a 
result, Schmidt was prepared to engage in monetary co-operation without linking it to 
economic co-operation. In his view, monetary measures would automatically inspire 
the member states to harmonise their economic policies (Tsoukalis, 1977: 130).,44 
Finally, it is important to note that the new Chancellor's appreciation of the 
Atlantic relationship differed significantly from that of his predecessors. Ludlow 
rightly notes that 'Schmidt turned to the European Community as a framework for 
action because of the disorders that had emerged in the Atlantic Community' (Ludlow, 
1982: 63, see also Section 7.3.3)- During his period as Minister of Finance, Schmidt 
had already been irritated by the negligent US economic and monetary policies which 
since 1968 had put pressure on the value of the D-mark and forced the German 
sure that from that point on the Ministry of Finance would represent Germany in the ECOFIN and the 
Monetary Committee. Moreover, it made the Ministry of Finance responsible for maintaining 
governmental relations with the Bundesbank (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999 295, Schmidt, 1990 25 1) 
M 2
 Schmidt has stated that the Bundesbank 'waren im Grunde nur dann wirkllich glücklich, when 
Deutschland dauerhaft negative Inflationsraten hatte' (Schmidt, 1990 252) His evaluation of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs is even more devastating 'das Wirtschaftsministerium jedoch war seit 
Ludwig Erhards Ministerzeiten eher den Habitus eines Kunstlerklubs gewohnt, seine leitenden Beamten 
waren hochintelligent, egozentrisch, voller Antipathie gegen andere Denkschulen, gegenüber der Presse 
ziemlich indiskret; vor allem aber galt ihnen der zum beinahe mystischen Glaubensinhalt erhobene 
Begriff der "Ordnungspolitik" als sakrosankt' (Schmidt, 1990· 251). 
M ,
 On the basis of two citations, Szâsz claims that earlier in his career, Schmidt had valued price stability 
more highly Somewhere between 1976 and February 1978, the Chancellor appeared to have experienced 
a complete 'volte face' (Szâsz, 1988). Most authors, as well as Schmidt himself, offer a different 
interpretation In their eyes, price stability never constituted a priority for the Chancellor (Heisenberg, 
1999 44, Schmidt, 1990 252, Tsoukalis, 1977: 130). 
,
'
M
 Tsoukalis has noted that this vision - which was voiced by Schmidt amongst others at the time the 
franc first left the Snake in 1974 - constituted a genuine u-turn in German policy 'these were exactly the 
arguments used by the 'monetarists', the logic of which had never before been accepted by the German 
government' He subsequently concludes that the German economic vision was rather 'flexible'. However, 
the beliefs of the individual German decision makers did not change; the Bundesbank never shared 
Schmidt's vision, nor had Schmidt changed his opinion. The u-turn was cause by a change in the domestic 
balance of power rather than belief change Tsoukalis makes a similar remark with regard to Giscard. He 
states that 'the French minister also decided to rally with the "economists'" (Tsoukalis, 1977: 130). As 
becomes apparent when one compares Giscard's position during the EMS negotiation to his earlier beliefs 
(see Chapter 6), Giscard did not experience an individual belief change either. 
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financial authorities to intervene repeatedly in the capital markets (Schmidt, 1988: 
156-66). These relations worsened when, in 1977, Jimmy Carter was elected American 
President. 
Carter, whose election the Chancellor had undiplomatically advised against 
prior to the elections, started a human rights campaign and criticised the human 
rights record of the USSR. The Germans and the French considered this to be a threat 
to their profitable but delicate relations with Eastern Europe (Ludlow, 1982: 66-7; 
Schmidt, 1988: 188-200). In addition to this, the American government threatened to 
withdraw the American troops from West Germany because of a conflict over German 
commercial initiatives in the nuclear energy sector, which was a harsh reminder of 
Germany's dependence on the US (Ludlow, 1982: 67-9; Schmidt, 1988: 188-250; 
1990: 249).v" 
It is clear that the views of the new Chancellor were not shared by the entire 
German political elite. His economic beliefs in particular were denounced by the 
Bundesbank. However, until President Klasen, a personal friend of the Chancellor was 
replaced by the hardliner, Otmar Emminger, the relations between the Bank and the 
Bundeskanzleramt remained reasonably harmonious. Heisenberg even concludes that 
during Schmidt's first few years in office, 'for once the federal government and the 
Bundesbank were in complete agreement about the preferred course of action' 
(Heisenberg, 1999: 39). This agreement concerned the workings of the Snake and the 
Mini-Snake in particular. In its annual report of 1974, the Bundesbank voiced its 
satisfaction with the fact that the European exchange rate mechanism had not 
hampered the Bank's quest for price stability (Heisenberg, 1999: 44). 
The question is, however, how profound this meeting of minds between the 
Bundeskanzleramt and the Bundesbank really was, for a part of the Bank's satisfaction 
was based on the fact that the developments within the Snake were no longer linked to 
the development of a European monetary union, one of the ultimate objectives of the 
Chancellor. Moreover, the Bundesbank's reaction to several of the plans for European 
monetary union developed in the mid-1970s indicate that its ordoliberal and 
economist ideas had by no means been abandoned. Proposals for new credit facilities or 
the extension of existing ones, were again and again denounced by the Bundesbank 
using the familiar arguments: extension of the European financial support mechanisms 
hampered the quest for price stability and only postponed the implementation of the 
necessary economic measures or adaptations in the exchange rates (Dyson and 
Featherstone, 1999: 297; Heisenberg, 1999: 44; Szasz, 1988: 152-3). So, while the 
' ^ In his memoirs, Schmidt refers ro an 'unerwünschte, ubergrosse Abhängigkeit der Bundesrepublik von 
den USA, die infolge der Verweigerung franzosischer Beteiligung an einer gemeinsamen 
Verteidigungsorganisation unvermeidlich war' (Schmidt, 1990' 192) 
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Chancellor was prepared to engage in further European monetary integration - albeit 
incrementally — the Bundesbank, as ever, opposed any such endeavours. 
7.3 The Rising of the Phoenix346 
7.3.1 The Pivotal Axis 
Notwithstanding the fact that since 1974 many initiatives had been developed with 
the aim of breathing new life into the process of European monetary integration, and 
that in 1977 the European Council had decided to explore the possibility of engaging 
in further monetary co-operation, it was not until the first months of 1978 that the 
first steps towards the establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS) were 
taken.i17 In February ofthat year, the German Chancellor had concluded that a 
fundamental revision of the European exchange rate mechanism would be beneficial. 
He discussed his ideas with the French President who - naturally — was pleased with 
Schmidt's initiative. After the French Parliamentary elections, which totally 
unexpectedly had resulted in a victory for the government coalition, Giscard and 
Schmidt decided that the time had come to realise their plans and agreed to present 
them at the coming summit in Copenhagen (Ludlow, 1982: 88-91; Schmidt, 1990: 
255).,18 
The plans of the German and French leaders aimed to reintegrate the pound, 
lira and franc into a genuinely European exchange rate system. This system would 
include a European Monetary Fund (EMF), which in the years to come was to take over 
the functions of the European financial institutions and manage European financial 
support mechanisms, and a pool of a small part of the national reserves would be 
entrusted to its care. Additionally, from its establishment onwards, interventions on 
the capital markets would be made in European currencies instead of dollars. Finally, 
Giscard and Schmidt proposed to conduct the transactions between the member states' 
central banks in the European Unit of Account (EUA) and, ultimately, to use the EUA 
''"' To a great extent, the subsequent section is based on Peter Ludlow's The Making of the European 
Monetary System (Ludlow, 1982: 88-91) In his memoirs, Helmut Schmidt comments that this book 
'scheint mir hindsichtlich der wesentlichen Fakten der Entwicklung .. eine zutreffende, mit meiner 
Erinnerung übereinstimmende Darstellung' (Schmidt, 1990 249). 
147
 Within the literature, some difference of opinion exists about who actually took the crucial initiative 
for the establishment of EMS Ludlow nominates the German Kanzler, while Schmidt has stated that 'nach 
meiner Erinnerung ist der Gedanke im Gespräch zwischen uns beiden entstanden' (Schmidt, 1990: 249). 
Giscard confirms the Chancellor's reading bur has added that initially the Kanzler seemed rather 'hesitant' 
(Giscard d'Estaing, 1988: 112). Whoever is right, Ludlow has correctly concluded that visions of a new 
European monetary system had no chance of materialising without the support of the Chancellor. 
'
i 8
 According ro Ludlow, the two conspirators had even made a proposal for the agenda of the Council, a 
prerogative of the Danish President of the Community. The schedule proposed by Giscard and Schmidt 
left the Ministers of Foreign Affairs with very little negotiating time and allowed for the Heads of State 
and Government to dine separately from their Ministers and civil servants. The Danes adopted the 
proposals of the Chancellor and the President (Ludlow, 1982: 89). 
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as a reserve and credit currency too. The plan also allowed for the EUA to develop into 
a European single currency, which could be used in addition to, or even instead of, the 
national currencies (Kruse, 1980: 242; Ludlow, 1982: 92; Europese Raad, 1978b: 12). 
In contrast to the claims of some authors, the plan of the Chancellor and the 
President did not amount to a plan for the establishment of'a kind of de facto 
monetary union' (Coffey, 1987: 2). For, while it is likely that Giscard and Schmidt 
hoped that the EMF would one day develop into a genuine European central bank and 
that the Unit of Account would replace the national currencies, in the proposals 
presented to the European Heads of Government in early April 1978, such giant leaps 
forward were not proposed: the plans did not foresee any significant transfer of national 
monetary policy-making authority to the EMF, and the EUA was assigned mere 
administrative functions (Lieberman, 1992: 116; Ludlow, 1982: 92). Or as Schmidt 
has put it: 'auch im Rahmen des von uns herbeigeführten Europäischen 
Währungssystems bleibt den Regierungen die Entschlußfreiheit, entweder ihre 
monetäre und fiskalische Politik der Disziplin der Zahlungsbilanz anzupassen oder die 
Wechselkurse ihrer Währung zu ändern' (Schmidt, 1990: 211). 
The leaders of the other member states seemed to be taken by surprise by the 
proposals and raised few objections.3,19 Only the British Prime Minister, Callaghan, 
reacted negatively. At the end of the meeting, Schmidt and Giscard urged the others 
to keep the French-German plan secret, after which the meeting was closed without 
taking any final decision (Ludlow, 1982: 93)."° The following morning at breakfast, 
however, Schmidt, Giscard and Callaghan decided to establish a committee of three of 
their confidants that would elaborate the plans in secret. Schmidt assigned this task to 
Horst Schulmann, senior economic advisor at the Bundeskanzleramt, Giscard delegated 
it to Clappier, and Callaghan appointed the second permanent secretary at the 
Treasury, Ken Couzens, as his representative (Ludlow, 1982: 94). The establishment of 
the Committee was kept a secret from the other Heads of State. Moreover, even the 
responsible Ministers and officials within the German, French and British government 
were not informed of its existence. Schmidt informed neither the President of the 
Bundesbank, Emminger, nor its Vice-president and member of the Monetary 
Committee. Giscard chose not to inform the new Minister of Finance, René Monory, 
and the French representative at the Monetary Committee and Vice-President of the 
French central bank, De la Genière (Emminger, 1987: 357; Ludlow, 1982: 95-6). 
149
 Ludlow states that 'few of those present were competent to raise the technical questions that their 
advisers and subordinates would introduce into the discussion later in the year' (Ludlow, 1982 SB) 
, ,
" The final communiqué of the Copenhagen summit therefore remained silent on the monetary issue. It 
stated that 'the European Council discussed the need for greater monetary stability, both at the European 
and the international level. In this context it acknowledged the need for the prevention of destabilising 
capital flows' (Europese Raad, 1978b). 
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This Committee of Three came up with a proposal that Schmidt and Giscard 
discussed on 23 June in Hamburg,"1 and introduced to their European colleagues — 
again after dinner - on 6 July at the Bremen summit (Ludlow, 1982: 105; Schmidt, 
1990: 257).352 The plan reflected the agreement reached by Giscard and Schmidt in 
Hamburg and included some additional issues. The plan stated that the new exchange 
rate system would have to be 'at least as strict as the "Snake"'. The President and the 
Kanzler had agreed that the European Currency Unit (ECU), the successor of the EUA, 
would be at the heart of the system.351 In addition, two years after the start of the new 
arrangement, the extended financial support mechanisms were to be consolidated in 
the EMF.""1 Finally, the proposal mentioned Schmidt's and Giscard's conviction that 
the new system would only be successful if'participating [states] pursue policies 
conducive to greater stability at home and abroad' (Ludlow, 19821: 106-7; Europese 
Raad, 1978a: 108-110). 
At the second day of the Bremen Council, the Franco-German document was 
accepted as a basis for further study by the technical Committees of the Community. 
The only amendment that was adopted was the observation - added to the plan on 
instigation of the members of the Snake — that the old exchange rate mechanism 
should continue to exist. The Heads of State and Government also adopted a timeline 
for the negotiations; by early December, during the Brussels summit, the European 
Council had to come to a decision on the new initiative (Europese Raad, 1978a: 108-
9). 
At the end of the meeting, Giscard and Schmidt again fought 'vigorously' to 
prevent the publication of the plan. However, this time they failed to convince the 
others and both the Franco-German plan and the Council agreements were included in 
the Presidency Conclusions (Ludlow, 1982: 125). The cat was out of the bag: the 
French and German financial authorities would finally be informed of their leaders' 
" ' From late June on, the Committee became a Committee of Two, as Couzens withdrew in view of 
substantial differences of opinion (Ludlow, 1982. 105). 
i52
 Like in Copenhagen, only the Heads of State and Government were present at this meeting (Ludlow, 
1982: 122). 
" ' During the Bremen summit, a discussion arose about the name for the successor of the EUA In the 
eyes of Giscard an English name would be inappropriate because the United Kingdom would not 
participate in the new arrangement. At the same time, he expected that a French name would be 
perceived as a 'sign of French cultural imperialism' (Giscard d Estaing, 1988. 119, my translation) The 
French President - much to the amusement of Schmidt - thus proposed to christen the new unit the 
rather uninspiring but adequate English name 'European Currency Unit'. Only after the decision had been 
taken, most decision makers realised that the abbreviation of the new name, ECU, was the name of an 
ancient French coin (Giscard d'Estaing, 1988: 120, Schmidt, 1990. 257). 
354
 Ludlow claims that during the discussions on the plan, Schmidt indicated that ECOFIN should 
supervise the EMF. This would subject monetary policy making to the political authorities, a situation 
that was considered unacceptable within the German political establishment (Ludlow, 1982' 126). 
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plans. Now 'the rats' — as Schmidt referred to them — could start to nibble on the 
Franco-German proposals (Ludlow, 1982: 132). 
7.3.2 High Hopes Fulfilled 
In light of his decade-old preference for further European monetary unification, the 
French President's support for Schmidt's plans for further monetary integration comes 
as no surprise. What does seem curious is that during his Presidency, while Giscard 
called upon his colleagues several times to renew the negotiations concerning the 
establishment of a European union, he never actually took the initiative to engage in 
such an endeavour. This lack of personal initiative may be explained by the internal 
political position of the President. Since his narrow victory over Mitterrand in the 
1974 Presidential elections, this position had only worsened, preventing him from 
initiating a European monetary leap forward (Ludlow, 1982: 82-5). 
However, when in February 1978, a month before the parliamentary elections, 
Helmut Schmidt came up with the idea of introducing a new plan for further 
European monetary integration jointly, Giscard jumped at the idea. Some authors have 
claimed that the asymmetric workings of the Snake was one of the main reasons for the 
President to disregard his poor domestic position (Heisenberg, 1999)· In fact, in his 
memoirs, Giscard himself has elaborated on his aversion to the fact that in the Snake, 
the burden of adjustment was always put on the weak currency states, while 'the 
strong currencies with an "honourable" reputation who pulled the Snake upward, were 
left in peace' (Giscard d'Estaing, 1988: 109, my translation). However, his 
dissatisfaction with the functioning of the Snake alone cannot fully explain Giscard's 
support for the Chancellor's initiative. Giscard had been a proponent of further 
European monetary integration long before the Snake even existed."5 
In addition to a more symmetrical system, the Copenhagen proposal promised 
to realise many of the decade-old French hobby-horses. The plans contained proposals 
for the establishment of a European monetary fund, the extension of the financial 
support mechanisms and the reduction of the use of the dollar as a reserve and 
intervention currency, measures that for years had been high on the French wish list 
(see Chapters 5 and 6)."6 Moreover, the new European monetary system offered 
Giscard the external discipline needed for his quest for the reduction of French 
inflation rates. Given the objections raised to the Fourcade and Barre plans, it should 
come as no surprise that both Giscard and Barre were convinced 'das EMS zur 
' " Moreover, in the end Giscard agreed to the establishment of a monetary exchange rate system he 
considered to be almost as asymmetrical as the Snake (see Sections 7.4 1 en 7.4.2). 
"'' These issues can not be characterised as concessions made by Schmidt to the French. As can be derived 
from Section 7.2.3, the issues are largely consistent with the beliefs and preferences of the German 
Chancellor. 
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Verwirklichung ihrer eigenen ökonomischen Politik unbedingt zu benötigen' 
(Schmidt, 1990: 248).357 
Given the coming election, Giscard (like the Chancellor, see Section 7.3.3) 
had 'ein innenpolitisches Interesse an einer mindestens bis zum 19· März 1978 
anhaltenden Vertraulichkeit' (Schmidt, 1990: 249), for there was no doubt that the 
Gaullists would object to the plans. Therefore, the German and French leader had 
decided to proceed in secret. On 19 March, however, it turned out that the right-wing 
majorité'had unexpectedly won the Parliamentary elections."8 While the Gaullists, 
having won 150 seats, remained the largest party in the Assemblée, the Giscardians 
came close with 135 seats (Frears, 1981: 74-5). The results of the elections 'gave M. 
Giscard d'Estaing a political freedom that he had not possessed since he became 
president in 1974', a freedom that less than three weeks later he used to introduce the 
plans for the development of a new European monetary system to the Copenhagen 
European Council (Ludlow, 1982: 84). 
7.3.3 By-passing the Bundesbank 
Explaining the actions of the German Bundeskanzler is more complex than those the 
French President. As late as October 1977, Schmidt had criticised the attempts made 
by Jenkins to put EMU back on the political agenda. Although the plans of Schmidt 
and Giscard were much less far-reaching than those of the Commission President and 
entirely intergovernmental, the question remains of what motivated the Chancellor 
suddenly to take the initiative in revising the European exchange rate mechanism. 
As stated before, the Chancellor was a proponent of further European 
monetary integration. Moreover, Schmidt attached neither political nor economic 
preconditions to the establishment of further monetary integration. This is shown in 
the Copenhagen plans, which included, for example, proposals for the extension of the 
financial support mechanisms without the precondition that harmonisation of 
economic policies should precede such a measure. Schmidt's positive attitude to 
European monetary co-operation may thus be the key to explaining the substance of 
his proposals. It cannot, however, explain the timing. 
i51
 The fact that the Giscard government was driven by rhese motivations is confirmed by the remarks of 
Clappier during the first meeting of the CCBG after Bremen During this meeting he explained that, in 
the eyes of the French government, the plan would have two advantages. It provided the chance to reverse 
the international monetary crisis and and in this manner possibly contribute to the creation of a new 
European monetary order. Moreover, it would create a European rone of monetary stability, lower 
inflation and contribute to the growth of the economy. (Ludlow, 1982: 126). 
"
8
 A few weeks before the parliamentary election of 1978, the RI was re-christened Union pour la 
Démocratie Française (UDF). The Gaullist party, Union of Democrats for the Republic (UDR), had already been 
given an new name after the resignation of Jacques Chirac in 1976, and was now called Rassemblement pour 
la République (RPR). In the elections of 1978, the majorité won 290 seats, the left 200 (Frears, 1981: 75). 
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In the literature, various motives have been cited that may have induced 
Schmidt to take the initiative in February 1978. After four years Schmidt was 
convinced that Giscard 'es ernst meinte mit der Wiederherstellung von Stabilität', and 
that as a result French economic and monetary policy would finally be compatible 
with German policy (Schmidt, 1990: 194). When the French parliamentary elections 
of March 1978 had assured Schmidt that he was dealing with a 'starken und 
zuverlässigen französischen Partner', the time for a far-reaching European initiative 
had come (Ludlow, 1982: 85). 
The second reason for the Chancellor's new-found activism may be traced to 
the change in his own political fortunes that took place late 1977. In October 1976, 
bad election results had significantly lowered the political status and morale of the 
German government. This situation worsened when, in the spring of 1977, a second 
spy scandal (which again involved the Bundeskanzleramt) became public. This caused 
considerable unrest within the SPD. To make matters worse, in June, the German 
Constitutional Court concluded that during his time as Minister of Finance, Schmidt 
had overstepped his mandate. In response to this ruling, the Bundestag even threatened 
a vote of no confidence (Ludlow, 1982: 77-8). However, according to Ludlow, in the 
autumn of 1977 the tide turned after a successful governmental action against the 
highjackers of a Lufthansa jet in Mogadishu. This had earned Schmidt his reputation 
as the 'fixer', and provided him with the freedom of manoeuvre and self-confidence to 
start pursuing his European and economic objectives. 
Yet another possible motive may be found in Schmidt's memoirs, where he 
explains that reading the memoirs of Monnet in the weeks leading up to the February 
initiative, had opened his eyes to new possibilities in the European sphere. Monnet's 
tactic of bypassing the official national and European decision-making channels in 
order to propel the European project forward seemed to have particularly inspired 
Schmidt (Emminger, 1987: 364; Ludlow, 1982: 63; Schmidt, 1990: 182). There is no 
doubt that Schmidt was well aware of the fact that the German financial authorities 
were less than enthusiastic about the concept of further European monetary 
integration.35l', In fact, Schmidt was convinced that the Bundesbank and the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs would do anything to sabotage any plan that proposed further 
i w
 By that time, Schmidt and the new Bundesbank President, Emminger, had clashed several times. In 
early 1973, for example, the government and the Btincksbank met to determine how to deal with a wave of 
speculation that had occurred. President of the Bundesbank, Klasen, was in hospital and Emminger, then 
Vice-President of the Bank represented the Bank in the discussions During the meeting, Schmidt 
proposed the imposition of capital controls in order to hamper speculation, Emminger, however, insisted 
on letting the D-mark float When the men failed to come to an agreement, Schmidt called Klasen in the 
hospital to verify whether Emminger was voicing the position of the Bundesbank Emminger was 
overruled, and never forgot this (Heisenberg, 1999· 37-8). 
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European monetary integration.160 The circumventing strategy suggested by Monnet 
in his memoirs, however, offered a way out of this conflict between his personal policy 
ambitions and political reality. 
Finally, several authors suggest that the dollar crisis of late 1977 may have 
had something to do with the Chancellor's initiative (Schmidt, 1990: 249; 
cf.Emminger, 1987: 364; Ludlow, 1982: 69-72; Szasz, 1988: 158). Naturally, the 
crisis of 1977 was not the first to occur, however, it is clear that Schmidt by that time 
was fed up with both 'das rücksichtslose währungspohtische Verhalten der USA' as 
well as with the new American President. Moreover, Ludlow claims that in the eyes of 
the Germans this crisis was worse than the previous ones, for it was the first to occur 
since the new international monetary regime had been established in 1973, and its 
effect on the value of the D-mark was especially dramatic. The crisis also created 
significant civil unrest in Germany. Accordingly, Ludlow concludes that 'it was not 
particularly surprising that Mr Schmidt, who seemed to appear on television almost 
every other night assuring his people that everything would work out in the end, 
decided after many weeks of this pressure and no end in sight that he simply had to do 
something' (Ludlow, 1982: 72).361 
7.4 The Rats Nibbling 
7.4.1 Gnawing a Way from Bremen to Brussels 
While prior to the Bremen summit the Heads of State and Government had managed 
to retain the initiative, now decision making shifted to the national and European 
monetary authorities. Despite the efforts of— in particular the German — financial elite 
to water down the Copenhagen plans, at several times during the negotiations, the 
President and the Chancellor managed to intervene successfully to protect the core of 
their plans (Ludlow, 1982: 134). 
At the first meeting of the ECOFIN after the Bremen summit, the Ministers 
of Finance decided to delegate the technical discussions on the establishment of the 
European Monetary System to the Monetary Committee and the CCBG. It soon 
im
 Schmidt has stated in his memoirs that 'wir wussten aus unserer Zeit als Finanzminister, dass die 
Bürokratien als erstes alle Gründe zusammentragen wurden, die gegen das Unternehmen sprachen' 
(Schmidt, 1990: 250), and 'aus der Bundesbank hingegen war nich nur Kritik, sondern sorgfaltig 
orchestrierter Widerstand zu erwarten' (Schmidt, 1990: 251). 
,61
 Finally, Heisenberg suggests a possible economic motive for the Kanzler's initiative. When the franc 
left the Snake, the percentage of German products that were exported to members of the Snake dropped to 
27 percent Since in relation to the currencies of the other European states the D-mark could appreciate 
freely, a large part of German export now ran the risk of becoming less competitive (Heisenberg, 1999: 
42, 51). Heisenberg even claims that Schmidt had little interest in the rules of the new European 
monetary system as long as France, Germany's largest European trading partner, would participate 
(Heisenberg, 1999. 53) The franc's exit from the Snake in itself cannot explain the timing of the Kanzler's 
initiative, however, for the franc had already left the Snake twice before. 
243 
Mapping the Road to Maastricht 
became apparent that on two issues, agreement existed between and within the 
committees. All those involved agreed that while the new system had to be based on 
strict monetary discipline, it should also be flexible enough to allow for exchange rates 
to be adjusted occasionally. In addition, the experts agreed that some harmonisation of 
economic policies was necessary in order for exchange rates to be kept stable. With 
regard to the precise functions of the ECU and the tasks that were to be assigned to 
the future EMF, the French and German negotiators were of differing opinions 
(Ludlow, 1982: 158-9). 
When it came to the Presidency's concluding statement regarding the Bremen 
summit, the French, Italian, Irish and British representatives interpreted it to mean 
that the ECU would be at the centre of the system and that the ECU would be the 
point of reference on which the central banks were to base their decision to intervene. 
The German and Dutch negotiators, however, were of the opinion that the Snake's 
intervention mechanism - the parity grid (see Section 7.2.3) — should be maintained. 
Moreover, during the technical discussions it became clear that the proposals 
concerning the use of the ECU were technically complex to the point of being 
unworkable.362 These difficulties were associated with the nature of the ECU and 
would render management of the exchange rate mechanism unduly complicated. A 
side effect of the proposed system would also be that the de facto margins of 
fluctuation would be wider for strong currencies than for weak currencies.3''3 
To solve these problems and bridge the differences of opinion between the 
representatives, the Belgian delegation made a compromise proposal. This took the 
form of the concept of a 'divergence indicator' based on the ECU, which would 
162
 The value of a currency basket fluctuates heavily Moreover, the weight of a currency in the basket 
depends on the economic value of the currency and would thus also fluctuate. To base intervention criteria 
on such a flexible index naturally would complicate the management of the system. An example may 
clarify the extent of this problem. In the ECU system, a change in the value of one of the European 
currencies would change the value of the ECU and thereby change the base-values of all other currencies 
in relation to the ECU. In addition, such change would also necessitate the revision of the weights of all 
currencies. All these changes would in turn also necessitate changing the margins of fluctuation and 
therefore the intervention points (Gros and Thygesen, 1998: 46-7; Ludlow, 1982 162-5) 
"'
,
 As stated above, the weight of the currencies in the ECU would change as their value would change 
When a currency appreciated, the value of the ECU would thus also increase. This would result in a 
change in the margins of fluctuation of the currency. Given the fact that strong currencies weigh more 
heavily in the determination of the value of the ECU, the increase in the value of this basket - and 
therefore in the margins of fluctuation - would be larger if the value of a strong currency increased than 
when a weak currency changed in value. As a result, it would take a more substantial change in the value 
of a strong currency in relation to its base-value to reach its intervention points than in the case of a weak 
currency Moreover, if a currency were to become valuable enough to obtain a weight in the value of the 
currency basket of more than 50 percent, it would become impossible for it to reach its intervention 
points. For, at the moment that this currency would have reached its intervention point, the increase in its 
value already would have sent another currency over the opposite threshold. The history of the Snake 
showed that it was not unthinkable that the D-mark could one day reach a weight of 50 percent (Gros and 
Thygesen, 1998 47, Ludlow, 1982 163). 
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function as a kind of 'early warning system' for excessive exchange rate fluctuations 
and enable central banks to intervene in a timely fashion before a currency reached its 
maximum margin of fluctuation. Moreover, the indicator would allow the Snake's 
bilateral margins of fluctuation to be upheld. While intervention would not be 
mandatory if the divergence indicator was reached, intervention would remain 
obligatory when a currency's margins of fluctuations were crossed (Gros and Thygesen, 
1998: 47; Ludlow, 1982: 161-5). Italy and Ireland soon came to the conclusion that, 
given the complexity of the ECU proposal, they preferred the Belgian compromise and 
on 8 September, the French Minister of Finance and the President of the Banque de 
France also voiced their agreement (Ludlow, 1982: 164-5). 
The second issue that preoccupied the technical experts in the Community 
committees was the EMF-proposal. In the Copenhagen proposals and the Bremen 
discussions, Giscard and Schmidt had portrayed the EMF as a central element in the 
new monetary system. Although the Annex to the Conclusions of the Bremen Council 
stated that the European Monetary Fund would be created only after the EMS had 
been established, in time significantly more powers would be delegated to the EMF 
than the EMCF had enjoyed. During the technical discussions, Clappier - co-author of 
the Bremen Annex — explained that the consequence of this was that the Fund would 
not start functioning to its full capacity immediately, but that the institutional basis 
of the Fund would have to be in place at the start of the EMS. The Bundesbank, 
however, successfully resisted this interpretation of the Bremen Conclusions. 
During the discussions, the Bundesbank suggested that the establishment of 
the EMF would require an amendment of the Treaty of Rome. This claim was studied 
in a subcommittee of the Monetary Committee. The EMF could, in principle, find a 
legal basis in the Treaty in two ways. Firstly, its establishment could be based on 
Article 235. This Article awarded the Council the power to take any measures 
necessary to realise any of the objectives named in the Treaty, if such measures had 
been implied though not explicitly mentioned in the Treaty. Secondly, Article 236 
determined that the Treaty should be amended. In order to amend the Treaty, an 
intergovernmental conference had to take place, and the amendment had to be ratified 
by the member states. The experts concluded that the Bundesbank was right: Article 
235 did not allow for the establishment of the EMF and an amendment to the Treaty 
of Rome was thus necessary.'64 Given the extent of such an endeavour and the 
requirement for national ratification, the establishment of the EMF would therefore 
not be possible within the agreed time span for the establishment of the EMS. 
The establishment of the EMCF in April 1973 had taken place under Article 235. 
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Frankfurt got its way and the establishment of the EMF was postponed (Ludlow, 
1982: lóT-S).'65 
This conclusion also affected the discussions on the extension of the financial 
support mechanisms that would be managed by the new fund: the establishment of 
new mechanisms would also have required a Treaty amendment and that was no 
longer an option. As a result, the debate concerning the credit facilities focussed on the 
extension of the credit quota and the terms of repayment. The discussions reflected the 
familiar divisions amongst the national representatives, 'with the Bundesbank pressing 
for the smallest possible increase on existing facilities and others arguing for the 
opposite'(Ludlow, 1982: 169). 
In September, a meeting between Schmidt and Giscard took place in Aachen. 
A significant part of the discussions between the leaders was devoted to the ECU plan, 
the Belgian compromise and the establishment of the EMF. The written conclusions of 
this meeting stated that the French and German leaders supported the Belgian 
compromise, and were committed to the establishment of a monetary fund 'that was 
modelled after the IMF' as soon as the legal trajectory was concluded. In the 
meantime, the President and Chancellor declared that the EMCF remained in place 
and functioning (Ludlow, 1982: 183).36ή 
Now that the German Chancellor and the French President had voiced their 
support for the Belgian compromise, most of the technical problems quickly 
disappeared from the negotiating table.367 The only issues on which no agreement 
could be reached were the precise obligations faced by states when the divergence 
indicator was reached, as well as the extension of the credit facilities. Neither the 
Belgian compromise, nor the conclusions of the September meeting between Schmidt 
and Giscard stated explicitly what was to happen when the divergence indicator was 
reached. This lack of clarity led to a fierce discussion between Emminger and Clappier 
in the CCBG. The President of the Bundesbank refused to subscribe to Clappier's 
interpretation, the implication of which was that upon reaching the indicator, 
intervention would be automatic and mandatory. Emminger was only willing to agree 
to the rule that, upon reaching the indicator, states were obliged to enter into a 
discussion with the other member states. Several compromises were considered, but no 
, 6 5
 Ludlow has noticed that 'it is possible, indeed probable, that in the case of several if not all of the 
governments that used this argument the appeal to legal propriety was a convenient cover for their lack of 
enthusiasm for the EMS in general and the EMF in particular' (Ludlow, 1982 168). 
, 6 6
 Ludlow has stated that there is evidence to suggest that Clappier aimed to include references to a more 
significant role for the divergence indicator in the agreement, and that it was 'M. Giscard d'Estaing 
himself who approved the weaker references to the Belgian compromise that appeared in the final text' 
(Ludlow, 1982. 2Î3). 
<<i7
 Only the United Kingdom remained a staunch opponent of the plans However, this was of little 
consequence for the negotiations since at that time everyone assumed that the UK would not participate 
fully in the new system in any case (Ludlow, 1982 185). 
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agreement could be reached.,68 With regard to the extension of the existing rules 
concerning the short-term and mid-term financial support mechanisms, a recurrence of 
previous discussions took place. Again, the Germans argued against any significant 
extension of credits in terms of both the amounts lent and the terms of the loans, 
whereas the French took the opposite position. 
Both problems were solved at the highest political level. At the instigation of 
the Chancellor, the German representatives gave in on the credit issue and agreed to 
the French interpretation of the Bremen Annex during the ECOFIN of 20 November 
(Ludlow, 1982: 241-3). The status of the divergence indicator was solved at the 
European Council in Brussels on 4 and 5 December. During this meeting, Schmidt 
agreed that only in 'special circumstances' would interventions not be mandatory when 
the divergence indicator was reached (Ludlow, 1982: 237). 
Once the decision on its establishment was taken, nothing could prevent the 
launch of the EMS, or so it seemed. But an entirely novel issue - that was only 
indirectly linked to the establishment of the new exchange rate system — suddenly put 
its establishment in jeopardy. During the Summit of 4 and 5 December, Giscard put a 
number of demands on the table regarding the revision of the CAP. Unless the 
Council would seize the opportunity offered by the revision of the European exchange 
rate system to abolish the rules for the monetary compensation of exchange rate 
fluctuations for farmers (the Monetary Compensation Amounts, MCA) — a provision 
that to French minds had serious drawbacks — France would block the start of the 
EMS. Article A 6.1c of the EMS resolution already stated that the introduction of the 
EMS would not cause any changes in agricultural prices or the MCA's. However, this 
provision did not seem to satisfy the French (Kruse, 1980: 245; Ludlow, 1982: 263). 
After the Brussels summit, negotiators made feverish attempts to solve the 
MCA problem before the EMS's planned start date of 1 January 1979· However, the 
French Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs, Monory, maintained France's 
demand that the member states had to commit themselves to the reform of the MCA 
provision, and vetoed the implementation of the EMS agreement. Moreover, the 
Agricultural Council proved unable to come to an agreement on the matter. As a 
result, implementation of the EMS had to be postponed. 
l6e
 In the Monetary Committee, the Belgians proposed making intervention mandatory when the value of 
the indicator was reached, except when the central banks agreed this was not necessary. In the ECOFIN of 
16 October, France agreed almost immediately to the proposal. However, the German Minister did not 
budge. The German and Dutch representatives subsequently introduced a counterproposal in which all 
references to 'obligations' were replaced by a 'presumption to act' and a reflection period of five days was 
proposed between the moment a currency reached the indicator and the decision to take action. In 
addition to intervening in the capital market, such action could also consist of other economic measures 
that would reverse the deviation of the currencies (Ludlow, 1982: 233-6) 
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The problem, however, disappeared as suddenly as it had appeared. During 
the Agricultural Council of 5 and 6 March 1979, the French dropped their MCA 
demands without securing any noteworthy concession. On 14 March 1979, the 
European Monetary System became operative (Ludlow, 1982: 263-4). 
7.4.2 Same People, Same Goals, Different Tactics 
In France, the transfer of the heart of the decision-making process from the political to 
the technical level that occurred after the Bremen summit, had no significant effect on 
the division of power between the central decision makers. Even after Bremen, Giscard 
remained in charge of the project and, due to his position as Governor of the French 
central bank and trustee of the President, Clappier also maintained his position as the 
chief French negotiator. Despite the fact that the same actors dominated the decision-
making process, two important changes took place in the French tactics. 
At the start of the technical negotiations, the ECU plan formed the core of the 
French negotiating tactics. The central idea of this plan was similar to that of the EUA 
proposal in the Fourcade plan - namely the replacement of the parity grid of the Snake 
— and served the same objective: the establishment of a genuinely symmetrical 
European exchange rate system. Just days before Giscard's and Schmidt's Aachen 
meeting, however, the French dropped the ECU plan. Heisenberg has suggested that 
this was the direct result of the Bundesbank's categorical refusal to agree to the plan. 
Moreover, Emminger pressured Schmidt into convincing the French to drop the plan 
(Heisenberg, 1999: 49-54). Ludlow, however, has convincingly argued that during the 
discussions in the Community Committees, the negotiators of the weak currency states 
came to the conclusion that the ECU proposal 'might have almost exactly the opposite 
of the effect that its weak currency advocates had originally intended' (Ludlow, 1982: 
231). Not only would changes in the parities involve an enormous technical 
complexity and thus render them even more politically sensitive, the ECU system 
would also benefit the strong currencies and so neither would it provide the symmetry 
its proponents were seeking (Ludlow, 1982).169 
Although the French dropped the ECU plan, they held firm on the central 
objective of their efforts to build a new European monetary system: creating a more 
symmetrical exchange rate system and extending the use of the ECU. They tried to 
realise these objectives by supporting the establishment of the divergence indicator 
that was based on the European unit of account and by insisting on obligatory 
interventions to be connected to the indicator. If implemented, the workings of such a 
system differed only slightly from the ECU plan and ensured more symmetry, as well 
as more frequent and timely interventions in the exchange rates between the European 
1
'
w
 Italy had another reason to change its tactics, for one of its goals was the establishment of wider 
margins of fluctuation for the lira In the ECU-system, this would create many technical problems. 
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currencies In other words, while French tactics might have changed, their objectives 
remained exactly the same 
The second change of French tactics concerned the introduction of the MCA 
issue in the EMS discussions The explanation for this can be found in the domestic 
political situation of the President (Kruse, 1980 245, Ludlow, 1982 196) Since the 
parliamentary elections of March 1978, the President had enjoyed the freedom to plot 
a course independent of the Gaullists and the left-wing opposition These groups 
criticised the President's European policy, accusing him, amongst others, of letting 
himself be lured into a supranational Europe by the Germans However, until the end 
of the year, Giscard felt relatively safe Despite his criticism, on 10 October, Chirac 
had stated that he was not planning to break up the majorité (Ludlow, 1982 199-200, 
Schmidt, 1990 210) 
However, by the end of the year, two developments threatened to undermine 
Giscard's basis of power - the parliamentary coalition between the Gaullists and the 
Giscardians The first concerned a conflict between the Gaullists and the Giscardians 
about the first direct elections of the European Parliament (EP) In early December, 
arch-Gaullist Debré had objected to the decision of the European Council to fund a 
publicity campaign to promote the EP elections Moreover, on 12 December, when 
Giscard was in Brussels to negotiate the final decision on the EMS, the discussion 
resulted in a parliamentary motion introduced by the Gaullists (RPR) aimed at 
banning all public funding of election campaigns The RPR collectively voted in 
favour of the motion while the Giscardians (UDF) voted against (Ludlow, 1982 202-
3) ,7() 
The second issue that threatened to divide the RPR and UDF was the efforts 
of the Gaullists to politicise the growing dissatisfaction of the French farmers 
concerning the functioning of the CAP During the 1970s, French agricultural 
exports to Germany had declined The French farmers argued that this was the result 
of the perverse functioning of the MCA which — in their eyes - compensated the 
Germans relatively generously and thus created a comparative advantage for the 
Germans This issue was brought up by the RPR in the French parliament 
The domestic publicity and upheaval caused by the introduction of the MCA 
in the French parliament, as well as the strained relations with the Gaullists, induced 
the French President to introduce the MCA issue into the EMS negotiations Not only 
did it offer him the chance to rally an important electoral group behind him, but 
taking a tough stand in any European negotiation was also bound to win Gaullist 
approval (Ludlow, 1982 205, Schmidt, 1990 258) Upon his return from Brussels, 
Giscard tried to achieve some political gain from his sudden tough stand in the 
,7
" Early December, rhe Gaullists had already announced that they would participate separately from the 
UDF in the EP elections (Ludlow, 1982 202-3) 
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European Council, and announced that, thanks to his efforts, the interests of the 
French farmers were again high on the European agenda (Ludlow, 1982 264) 
Despite the fact that he delayed the implementation of the EMS by three 
months, it seems unlikely that Giscard would genuinely have been prepared to let the 
agricultural issue endanger the establishment of the new European exchange rate 
mechanism During the press conference he held upon his return from Brussels, 
Giscard already indicated that he expected the problems to be solved quickly (Ludlow, 
1982 267) It is clear that Chancellor Schmidt, at least, considered the manoeuvres of 
the French President to constitute nothing more than a 'Tribut ' to French agricultural 
interests (Schmidt, 1990 258) The subsequent course of events supports the Kanzler's 
interpretation, for on 23 February, Giscard sent Barre to Bonn to work out the 
problems, and according to Schmidt they solved 'mit je zwei oder drei Mitarbeitern 
den Hickhack der Landwirte und ihrer ministeriellen Erfüllungsgehilfen binnen zwei 
Stunden' Moreover, ten days later, they guided their plan effortlessly through the 
agricultural Council (Schmidt, 1990 248, 258) The solution to the MCA issue to 
which the French had agreed barely differed from the article already included in the 
EMS resolution and in no way obligated the member states to revise the EMS 
agreement (Kruse, 1980 245, Ludlow, 1982 279-83) 
7 4 5 Facing the Frankfurter Music 
Unlike the French case, the publication of the EMS plans, as well as the transfer of the 
decision-making momentum from the political to the technical level, caused a 
significant change in the German domestic balance of power concerning the 
negotiations Prior to Bremen, the Bundeskanzleramt, in the person of Schmidt and 
Schulmann, had been the only German player The new President of the Bundesbank, 
Emminger, had been informed only after the Copenhagen summit that the Kanzler had 
taken an initiative However, until the evening prior to the Bremen summit, when the 
Clappier-Schulmann proposal had already been written, he had systematically been 
kept out of the decision-making loop 
In the run up to the Bremen summit, however, it had become clear that 
substantial resistance to the plans existed amongst the German political elite 
Opposition leader Franz Joseph Strauss, for example, called on the Bundesbank and the 
Minister of Economic Affairs to sabotage the plans Moreover, a German employer's 
organisation announced publicly that in their judgment the plans involved 
considerable risks Opposition to the EMS endeavour grew even further during the 
technical negotiations In October, the advisory Committee of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs issued a very critical report concerning the EMS plan and some 
German commercial banks started a publicity campaign in which Schmidt was accused 
of jeopardising stability In addition, after the Aachen meeting between Schmidt and 
Giscard, the Handelsblatt commented that 'im neuen Wahrungssystem werde es sich 
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flot und fröhlich wie in Paris bei Nacht leben lassen, und das bürgerlich-sittliche Bonn 
zahlt im Moulin Rouge die Zeche' (Schmidt, 1990: 210). Finally, the ongoing 
criticism of the opposition parties led one journalist to conclude that 'the bipartisan 
approach to major community questions' was on the verge of breakdown (Ludlow, 
1982: 136, 182). 
However, the most devastating comments came from Frankfurt. When in May 
1978, the existence of the Committee of Three became public knowledge, the 
Bundesbank had immediately opened the attack. On the evening before the Bremen 
summit, Emminger warned the Bundeskanzler not to commit himself to anything and 
wrote him a letter saying that the EMS plans violated the autonomy of the Bundesbank. 
In his own words, Emminger's objective was 'zu verhindern, dass unsere geldpolitische 
Autonomie und unsere Stabilitätspolitik durch den neuen Plan beeinträcht würden' 
(Emminger, 1987: 358; cf. Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 299). 
The objections of the Bundesbank to the EMS plans were three-fold. At the 
heart of these objections lay the fear that the EMS proposals would result in a violation 
of the Bank's autonomy and (therefore) stimulate the development of an inflation 
community. The Bundesbank was a fierce opponent of the establishment of any 
obligation to intervene. The member states had agreed that in the EMS, interventions 
would have to occur in European currencies. Emminger expected this to imply that 
interventions would predominantly occur in D-marks. This would increase the 
liquidity of the German currency, which could lead to a rise in German inflation. In 
other words, he expected the obligation to intervene to prevent the Bundesbank from 
keeping liquidity - and therefore price stability - in check. A similar reasoning 
inspired the Bank's objections to the ECU plan. Because more weak currency states 
were be able to join the exchange rate mechanism if this plan was implemented, the 
Bank expected more extensive interventions to become necessary (Emminger, 1987: 
359, 61; Heisenberg, 1999: 58-60; Ludlow, 1982: 162). 
The German financial authority's fear for increased liquidity and its negative 
effects on German inflation rates was also the basis for its objection to the extension of 
the financial support mechanism. The Bundesbank acknowledged that credits were 
needed for the proper functioning of the new monetary system, however, in their eyes 
the existing short-term and mid-term credit facilities would cover demand generously 
(Emminger, 1987: 359)- Moreover, additional facilities only encouraged member 
states to maintain their currencies at rates that were not economically justifiable rather 
than harmonising their economic policies. However, the most problematic proposition 
in the EMS plans in the eyes of the Bundesbank concerned the establishment of a 
European Monetary Fund. According to the Bank, the Fund was a blatant violation of 
its autonomy and mandate. For this reason, it categorically refused to transfer any 
German reserves to this Fund (Emminger, 1987: 361; Heisenberg, 1999: 61-3; 
Ludlow, 1982: 166). Given the Bank's constitutional status, this was no empty threat. 
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When, after Bremen, the plans became public, Schmidt had little choice but 
to involve the responsible national authorities in the negotiation process.'7' The 
standard European decision-making procedures that had been triggered by the Bremen 
resolution awarded responsibility for the technical preparations of the resolution to the 
Committee of Central Bank Governors, the Monetary Committee and ECOFIN. 
Moreover, the Bundesbank law and public opinion made the Bundesbank 'a de facto 
ratifier', especially with regard to the establishment of the EMF and interventions on 
the capital markets (Emminger, 1987: 360; Heisenberg, 1999: 50; Ludlow, 1982: 
135).172 On 12 July, four days after the Bremen summit, Emminger was invited to a 
special meeting of the German government in order to discuss the EMS plans. During 
this meeting, he received reassurances that the Bundesbank would be fully involved in 
the upcoming European negotiations. 
During the technical discussion, the Bundesbank managed to torpedo several of 
the proposals it felt were harmful for the German economy:171 Both the establishment 
of the EMF and the introduction of new credit facilities were postponed and made 
subject to national ratification, providing the Bundesbank with a new opportunity to 
prevent their establishment. In addition, the financial elite's depiction of the ECU 
plan as too complex contributed to the French decision to drop the plan. Nevertheless, 
the Bank had not been able to prevent the entire project and had had to accept some 
flexibilisation of the existing financial support mechanisms. 
However, while the Bundesbank had not been able to prevent the creation of 
the divergence indicator, it had no intention of implementing this provision or the 
associated obligation to intervene when the thresholds were crossed. In a letter 
Emminger sent Schmidt in the run up to the Brussels European Council, the 
Bundesbank President stated that he would only give his authorisation to the 
establishment of the EMS when the Bank was freed from the obligation of intervening 
in any situation where, in its eyes, intervention would constitute an unacceptable 
threat to monetary stability. Only after Schmidt had provided this guarantee did the 
,71
 When in late May 1978, the media reported about the existence of the Club of Three, Emminger had 
confronted Schmidt According Ludlow the Chancellor answered 'we can talk about that later' (Ludlow, 
1982.95). 
,72
 Two signatures of the Bundesbank were needed for the establishment of the EMF to become legal 
Moreover, the Bundesbank law awards the bank the authority over interventions on the capital market 
(Ludlow, 1982: 160; Heisenberg, 1999 63) 
' * Heisenberg has claimed that the negotiations on the EMS show that the Bundesbank was the dominant 
actor in the process and that it had forced the government to make substantial concessions (Ludlow, 1982: 
240) Ludlow, however, claims that the list of concessions that Schmidt managed to elicit from the 
Bundesbank was 'even longer and more impressive' (Ludlow, 1982' 240). Fact is that, constitutionally, 
Schmidt had no other choice than to give in to a number of the Bundesbank demands, while the powers of 
the Bundesbank were not that great that it could stop the government using its constitutional prerogative 
of signing an international monetary agreement. 
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Bundesbank Council agree to sign the resolution on the establishment of the EMS 
(Emminger, 1987 361-2, Heisenberg, 1999 63-5 , Ludlow, 1982 166-7, 240) 
7.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, it has become clear that the establishment of the EMS was a direct 
result of the decades-old beliefs of the German Chancellor and the French President, 
and the unique meeting of their minds Given his positive evaluation of both European 
integration and his concern with price stability, the ideas of the French President were 
almost 'German', while the convictions of the German Chancellor — given his aversion 
to US dominance, his almost 'monetarist' outlook on European economic and 
monetary integration and his lack of federalist ambitions — made him blend in quite 
nicely with the French political establishment The beliefs of both leaders may thus be 
located in the middle of the cognitive Frenco-German axis between the French 
monetarist and Keynesian intergovernmentalists and the German ordoliberal 
federalists It was on this cognitive concurrence that the President and the Chancellor 
were able to base their common interest 
Wi thout a doubt, the fact that the characters of both men were imbued with 
sufficient political realism to define their common interest in terms of the 
establishment of an intergovernmental European Monetary System contributed to the 
success of their endeavour For, despite the fact that Schmidt and Giscard would 
probably have had few objections to the establishment of a genuine European Central 
Bank and a true European single currency, the establishment of such far-reaching 
supranational integration would probably have failed at that moment in time The 
domestic political status of neither Schmidt nor Giscard was strong enough to 
overcome the fierce opposition such plan would have elicited from both the German 
financial establishment and the Gaulhsts 
However, the Franco-German meeting of minds established by Giscard and 
Schmidt did not survive the next change in leadership Wi th the victory of the French 
Socialists in the 1981 elections, France returned to its expansive economic policies and 
monetarism, while — partly due to the success of the EMS - the status and power of the 
ordohberals would grow even stronger Wi th in half a decade after the establishment of 
the EMS, France and Germany had grown worlds apart The division grew so strong 
that it even came close to destroying the EMS altogether 
Notwithstanding the ambitions of the German Chancellor and the French 
President for the EMS to become the first step towards the establishment of a genuine 
EMU, it must be concluded that there was 'no automatic escalator that will transport 
the member governments from the present EMS to a full-blown EMU' (Ludlow, 1982 
293) Indeed, as will be shown in the next chapter, for a genuine European Monetary 
Union to arise from the EMS it was to take nothing less than the combination of a 
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geo-political revolution, a clearly defined vision of the political future as well as 
relentless political determination. 
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8 THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, THE MORE 
THEY STAY THE SAME 
'Gelegentlich braught man grossere Ereignisse, damit etwas gelingt, klar' 
-Horst Teltsthik*74 
'It is not only force of circumstances which is at the root of important changes in history the 
role of the determination of man and the capacity to transmit this to stable institutions cannot 
be replaced' 
-Ageme Europe, 29 June 1988 1 
8.1 Introduction 
On 13 March 1979, the European Monetary System (EMS) went into operation. The 
first few years of its existence may be characterised as turbulent. The numerous 
realignments needed in that period have even led some observers to conclude that at 
times 'the system appeared to hover on the verge of a break-up' (Szâsz, 1999)·,75 After 
the third devaluation of the French franc in March 1983, however, the system seemed 
to put down deeper roots, successfully helping to stabilise the European monetary 
situation (Gros and Thygesen, 1998). Despite its eventual success, the EMS - with its 
asymmetrical working, lack of a true monetary fund and failure to produce an increase 
in the use of the ECU — did not come close to the European monetary ambitions that 
had been nurtured in Paris and Brussels for decades. With the EMS falling short of 
their long-term monetary ambitions, it did not take long for the French to throw their 
full weight behind their quest for further European monetary integration again. It 
required however the determination of the German Chancellor Kohl, spurred on by 
the prospect of German reunification, to turn the plans for EMU into reality. 
In the literature, two events are often cited as the watersheds that enabled the 
establishment of a common interest on EMU. Some authors have argued that the 
monetary turmoil in France in the early 1980s constituted a pivotal learning 
experience for the French. This upheaval taught the Mitterrand government the merits 
of ordohberal economic policies and further European integration, and paved the way 
for the establishment of EMU. Others have made the claim that the 1989 revolution 
,71
 On 10 June 1999, in an interview with Prof. Dr. Franz Knipping 
(www eui.eu/ECArchives/EN/OralHistory shtml, document Int651) 
"^ On September 23 1979, October 4 1981, and June 6 1982, devaluations of, amongst others, the 
French and Belgium franc, Italian lira and the Danish crown took place. 
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in Eastern Europe constituted a major turning point in the history of European 
integration and made the binding of a potentially united Germany to a European 
Central Bank a necessity. In this Chapter, both claims will be studied. 
A closer analysis of the events of the period 1981 to 1983, and the 
development of Mitterrand's beliefs, however, will reveal that in 1983 no major u-turn 
in the President's beliefs concerning European monetary unification took place. 
Mitterrand had always been a supporter of European integration and held a, rather 
rudimentary but consistent, preference for fixed exchange rates. So, rather than causing 
any belief change on these issues, the monetary and political turmoil of the first two 
years of his Presidency forced Mitterrand to choose between his preference for further 
European integration and fixed exchange rates on the one hand, and the radical 
Keynesian policies of his government on the other. Apart from one ten-day period in 
March 1983, Mitterrand consistently preferred the former over the latter. However, 
while the President thus showed himself to be personally less radical than his 
government's economic program, he never became an ordoliberal. Even after 1983, 
Mitterrand's economic beliefs remained solidly in the Keynesian camp. 
While the research conducted in this thesis does not support the claim that 
1983 constituted a major learning experience for the French President, the evidence 
presented does however substantiate the claim that the 1989 revolution in Eastern 
Europe was a major turning point in the quest for EMU. For, while it is true that 
EMU was brought back on the European agenda long before the fall of the Berlin 
Wall , until the summer of 1989 no common interest on its establishment existed 
between France and Germany. The German ordoliberal coalition was highly critical of 
the plans, for they felt that the establishment of EMU would put German price 
stability at risk. Moreover, despite his personal disposition, Kohl was not willing to 
confront the Ministry of Finance and the Bundesbank on the issue. As a result, until the 
summer of 1989, the German national stance concerning European monetary 
integration reflected the scepticism of the German financial elite, preventing any 
agreement. 
The revolutionary developments in Eastern Europe of the spring and summer 
of 1989 altered this domestic balance of power, thereby providing the crucial impetus 
for the dormant monetary unification process. Again, however, this 'critical juncture' 
did not cause any reversal in the belief system of decision makers. Instead the 1989 
watershed caused a strengthening in the pre-existing beliefs of the central decision 
makers involved in the establishment of EMU, Chancellor Kohl in particular. As the 
events in Eastern Europe were unfolding, Kohl's underlying beliefs concerning the 
inseparability of German and European unification came to the fore and began to drive 
his ambitions on the issue. Induced by his heartfelt convictions, the Chancellor took 
the process of European monetary unification into his own hands, and overruled the 
German financial elite. For the first time since the days of Adenauer, a German 
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Chancellor had found the ambition, legitimacy and political clout that enabled him to 
dictate the German national preference on European economic and monetary 
unification, making agreement with the French possible. 
8.2 Early 1980s: Economic and Monetary Turmoil in France 
On 10 April 1981, Mitterrand was narrowly elected President of France."6 The 
election of the first socialist President of the Fifth Republic was remarkable in itself. 
However, the fact that four leading members of the French Communist party were 
given ministerial posts and the radical expansionary economic program the socialist 
party proposed, caused the real political upheaval (Morray, 1997: 93). As regards 
monetary policy, at the start of its first term, the Mitterrand government had adopted 
no clear position on the issue (Cameron, 1996: 59)· The socialist election manifesto — 
the '110 propositions' - merely committed the government to defending the franc 
against speculation, and, while criticising the EMS for forcing weak-currency countries 
to follow German monetary policies and austerity, it took no explicit stance on 
whether membership of EMS had to be continued. 
From 1981 to 1983, however, recurrent instances of speculation and capital 
flight pressured the socialist government into clarifying its position on the exchange 
rate issue. This caused a major political struggle within French governmental circles. 
On the one hand, the advocates of a programme of rigueur — amongst whom the French 
Minister of Finance, Jacques Delors — advocated putting an end to the continuous 
speculation by implementing a more ordoliberal monetary and economic policy. This 
would allow the franc to remain in the EMS (Morray, 1997: 98). On the other hand, 
the advocates of the l'autre politique - including Minister of the Budget Laurent Fabius 
and the General Secretary of the Elysée staff, Eduard Bérégovoy - advocated sticking to 
the expansionary economic policy program and withdrawing the franc from the EMS. 
They argued that this would allow France to lower interest rates and the price of its 
export products, and create more jobs. It took two years of political and monetary 
unrest before Mitterrand's decision of March 1983 to remain in the EMS finally 
resolved the issue in favour of the advocates of the program oi rigueur. 
As I have already explained, in the literature, the claim is often made that this 
episode of political and monetary turmoil constituted a critical learning experience for 
the French political elite, which eventually enabled the establishment of EMU. More 
specifically, the events are supposed to have caused two critical changes in the belief 
system of François Mitterrand: a shift from a sceptical attitude towards European 
integration to a favourable one; and a change from a radical Keynesian view of 
r i
' Mitterrand was chosen President over Giscard d'Estaing in the second ballot with 51.7 percent of the 
vote. In the parliamentary elections that were called after Mitterrand's election, the left-wing coalition 
also gained an absolute majority in the National Assembly. 
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economic policy to an ordoliberal one (Dyson, 1994: 115; McNamara, 1998: 43, 170-
4; Szasz, 1999: 69). 
In this section, I will take issue with this claim. For, while the 1983 decision 
to keep the franc in the EMS probably did constitute a necessary condition for the 
eventual establishment of EMU, the decision was not preceded by any meaningful 
change in Mitterrand's beliefs concerning European integration, or the EMS (cf. 
Walsh, 2001: 60). A close analysis of events (see below) and a study of the beliefs of 
the first socialist President of the Fifth Republic (see Section 8.3.5) reveal that 
Mitterrand had always been a supporter of European integration, and held a — rather 
rudimentary, but consistent — preference for fixed exchange rates throughout his career 
8.2.1 Choosing European Monetary Integration over Economic Expansion 
When the socialists came to power, the French economy was already in recession. 
Inflation rates and the trade deficit had run high and the franc was overvalued 
(Cameron, 1996: 59)· However, the economic situation worsened when it became clear 
that the socialist Mitterrand would take up residence in the Elysée. The prospect of the 
implementation of the socialist's radical expansionary economic policies produced a 
massive withdrawal of capital from the French market by international financial 
investors. This put the exchange rate of the franc under great pressure, and forced the 
Banque de France to intervene heavily to keep the French currency within its EMS-
bands. Despite the huge amounts of reserves lost, Mitterrand decided not to devalue 
the franc and keep it inside the monetary system (Bauchard, 1986: 10; Cameron, 
1996: Ol)."7 
Instead, the President ordered Prime Minister Mauroy and Delors to develop a 
plan to support the franc. This plan included measures like an increase in interest 
rates, and a strengthening of exchange rate controls (Cameron, 1996: 61). Before long, 
however, it became clear that these measures brought only temporary relief. Further 
deterioration of the trade balance and the continued overvaluation of the franc led to 
another speculative attack in the early autumn of 1981 (Cameron, 1996: 63). After a 
period of hesitation on the part of the President, Delors persuaded Mitterrand to agree 
to a realignment of the European currencies. On 4 October 1981, the mark and 
guilder were revalued by 5.5 percent, while the franc was devalued by 3 percent 
(Bauchard, 1986: 55-60; Cameron, 1996: 64-5). Moreover, upon his return from 
Brussels, Delors convinced Mitterrand to agree to a 15 billion expenditure freeze 
(Cameron, 1996: 65). ΐ 7 8 
1 7
 According to Cameron 'Mitterrand told Mauroy, alluding to his inauguration, "one does not devalue 
on a day like today . one does not devalue the money of a country that has just placed its confidence in 
you you cannot go up the Champs-Elysées and lower the franc'" (Cameron, ^iWi' 61, italics in original). 
,7K
 The Minister of Finance had threatened to resign it the French Council of Ministers did not adopt his 
proposals. 
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These measures were, however, insufficient to prop up the French economic 
foundations (Bauchard, 1986: 88-90). So, in March 1982, a further wave of speculation 
hit France. In response, the Minister of Finance and the Prime Minister presented a 
new plan to the President advocating more monetary stringency (Cameron, 1996: 65). 
At the same time, however, the proponents of l'autre politique began urging Mitterrand 
to withdraw the franc from the EMS. In their eyes, such a step would allow the 
continuation of the socialist economic program, and the resolution of the exchange rate 
problems (Cameron, 1996: 66). 
Months went by while the two opposing coalitions struggled for the 
President's ear. Mitterrand, however, remained undecided, siding one day with the 
advocates of strict monetary policy, and the next with the 'other policy' coalition. 
Eventually, Mitterrand decided to support the rigueur plan and in a press conference 
on 9 June 1982, announced a 'new and more difficult stage in reform' (Attali, 1995a: 
204, 234; Cameron, 1996: 66; Morray, 1997: 100-1; Northcutt, 1992: 113). This 
announcement was greeted by another wave of speculation, which drove the franc to 
the bottom of its EMS margins of fluctuation. On 11 June, Mitterrand sent Delors to 
Germany to negotiate a new exchange rate for the franc. It was decided that the franc 
would be devalued by 5.75 percent. Moreover, in return for a 4.25 percent revaluation 
of the mark, Delors promised the Germans to implement yet another austerity 
program (Bauchard, 1986: 101-3; Cameron, 1996: 66)."'^ This program was formally 
adopted by the French government the day after the devaluation (Morray, 1997: 103). 
All in all, Cameron has thus rightly concluded that, one year after Mitterrand had 
come to power, 'economic policy had fallen firmly under the control of a loose 
coalition of pro-EMS partisans of rigueur' (Cameron, 1996: 67). 
In late 1982, it became clear that the June devaluation had still not improved 
the underlying French economic situation or calmed the international financial 
markets: the franc remained under speculative pressure and the French again lost a 
substantial part of their reserves. When Mitterrand began to express misgivings about 
the policy of rigueur (Bauchard, 1986: 120; Cameron, 1996: 68), the 'other-policy' 
coalition saw a fresh window of opportunity and started to advocate their position 
again (Morray, 1997: 111-2). However, unable to decide, the President postponed the 
decision on the status of the franc until after the municipal elections of March 1983 
(Cameron, 1996: 69). 
After the first ballot of the municipal elections — in which the socialists 
suffered losses - Mitterrand suddenly changed course, taking the side of the l'autre 
179
 As Cameron rightly notices1 'the programme, of course, was the Mauroy-Delors package of price and 
incomes restraints and budget cuts - the programme ai rigueur which, although not yet officially approved 
by the French government, had been the subject of secret discussions and commitments between Delors 
and the German officials for two weeks!' (Cameron, 1996 67, italics in original, Hall, 1987: 57; Morray, 
1997: 103). 
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politique coalition. He now seemed determined to withdraw the franc from the EMS, to 
impose controls on imports, and to lower interest rates (Bauchard, 1986: 140-3; 
Cameron, 1996: 69)- Alarmed by the President's apparent change of heart, the rigueur 
coalition intensified their quest for the President's ear, and after a period which saw a 
coming and going of advocates of the different positions at the Elysée, the President 
reverted to his original position (Cameron, 1996: 69-71).,80 On 23 March 1983, 
Mitterrand decided not the leave the EMS (Attali, 1995a: 619-23). 
To enable the franc to stay in the EMS, Delors and the German Minister of 
Finance, Gerhard Stoltenberg, agreed on a revaluation of 5.5 percent of D-mark and a 
2.5 percent devaluation of the franc. In return for the revaluation of the D-mark, the 
Germans put several demands on the table, including a cut in public spending of 24 
billion francs in 1983, which the French Council of Ministers accepted (Bauchard, 
1986: 145-6; Cameron, 1996: 70; Hall, 1987: 57; Morray, 1997: 118). In a speech on 
French television, Mitterrand explained his decision to keep the franc inside the EMS 
by stating that he had not wanted 'to isolate France from the Community of which we 
benefit [...] separate it from the movement that will make this Europe at last one of 
the greatest players in the world' (Szâsz, 1999: 68; cf. Morray, 1997: 117). This time, 
the decision proved definitive. 
All in all, in this period Mitterrand showed the typical behavioural pattern of 
an uncommitted thinker by lending his ear alternatively to the one or the other 
coalition. However, in contrast to what is widely claimed in the literature, the events 
of the early 1980s show that Mitterrand experienced no major belief changes. Instead, 
when pressed to choose between his support for European integration and fixed 
exchange rates on the one hand and the Socialist's expansionary socialist economic 
program on the other, except for 10 days in March 1983, Mitterrand ultimately chose 
the former over the latter. Moreover, despite the fact that some observers have 
concluded that —given capital liberalisation and the judgement of the financial 
markets - Mitterrand had no choice but to accept a policy of rigueur (Hall, 1987: 56), 
accounts of what happened show that staying in EMS and instating a program of more 
ordoliberal economic policies was 'by no means the only decisions that could have been 
3
"" It is reported that Mitterrand's personal adviser - Jacques Attali - asked Fabius (in the eyes of Attali 
the weakest link in the l'autre politique coalition) to speak with Michel Camdessus, the director of the 
Trésor to verify the state of the official reserves. Camdessus informed Fabius that leaving the EMS would 
have all kinds of adverse consequences. Moreover, he suggested that 'reserves would have been required in 
order to defend a floating franc', although the defining characteristic of a floating exchange rate is that the 
value of a currency is determined by the market without interference from the central banks (Cameron, 
1996 70, note 62, my italics) Notwithstanding this deception, the argument seemed to have convinced 
Fabius, who subsequently stated that he 'understood that leaving the monetary system was impossible' 
(Cameron, 1996: 70, Bauchard, 1986: 144-5). Moreover, he passed the information to the President, 
which seemed to have contributed to the President's decision to keep the franc in the EMS 
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made' (Cameron, 1996: 59, italics in original).'81 For as Morray has rightly concluded, 
'if only he had really wanted to start a process of revolution', Mitterrand 'could have 
done so' (Morray, 1997: 83). 
8.3 Mid-1980s: German Reticence and the French Quest for Politicisation 
During the monetary turmoil of the early 1980s, the French made several attempts to 
restart the development of a European monetary union. However, faced with the 
strong opposition of the German financial elite, the new German Chancellor Kohl was 
not yet willing to support their endeavors. 
8.3.1 Putting EMU Back on the Agenda 
In Germany, the early eighties were relatively quiet years with regard to (European) 
monetary policy. From the election of Kohl as German Chancellor on 1 October 1982 
until February 1988, the Auswärtiges Amt (AA) and Bundeskanzleramt (BKA) displayed 
a cleat preference for further European integration in general, and a willingness to join 
forces with France in order to realise this goal.'82 However, this preference for further 
European integration did not seem to extend to further monetary integration, a goal 
high on the French agenda. In order to avoid a struggle with the euro-sceptics at the 
German Ministries of Finance and Economics and the Bundesbank, the AA and BKA 
seemed to prefer to leave decision making in this issue-area to the sceptical financial 
elite (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 334; Gaddum, 1994).,8, 
From the first monetary problems of the early 1980s onwards, the French 
socialist government, by contrast, had been pushing for further European monetary 
integration and reform of the EMS. As early as October 1981 - just after the first 
devaluation of the franc — the French government had issued a memorandum 
proposing further European integration, and called for a study of the further 
development of the EMS 'afin d'assurer le soutien du franc' (Saunier, 2001: 470). 
Furthermore, in 1982 and 1984, the Commission — supported by the French -
proposed reinforcing the EMS, improving the co-ordination of economic policies and 
,81
 In contrast to what Hall suggests, events show that recurrent devaluations of the franc may have been 
inevitable given the mood on the financial markets However, rhe form in which these would take place -
through negotiated currency re-alignment in EMS - was by no means predetermined. Mitterrand could 
have made the decision to step out of EMS and let the franc float. Moreover, he did not necessarily have to 
institute a policy of economic rigueur, he could have chosen to re-institute protectionist measures (Hall, 
1987· 56; cf. Cameron, 1996: 70, Morray, 1997). 
mi
 On the European ideas of the German Chancellor, see Section 8 3 4 
,B3
 In January 1983, the first signs of a division of labour along these lines became apparent when Kohl 
and the German Minister of Foreign Affairs introduced a plan for the development of a 'European Union' 
This plan encompassed proposals for the introduction of majority voting, the strengthening of the 
European Parliament, and the expansion of European integration into new sectors (Gaddum, 1994: 68). 
However, monetary policy was not amongst these sectors, much to the dismay of the French. 
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arranging for the wider acceptance of the ECU (Howarth, 2000: 57). Finally, in the 
margins of the 1984 Fontainebleau Summit on the British rebate, secret talks between 
the French and Germans took place during which the French Presidency made 
proposals for the development of a European economic and monetary union (Saunier, 
2001:482). 
Due to the opposition of the German financial elite to further monetary 
integration, and the difficulties the European states were dealing with at the time, 
none of these French initiatives for further European monetary integration was 
successful. In the mid-80s, however, the French - finally free from their monetary 
problems and their Euro-sceptic communist coalition partners - together with the 
European Commission, under the Presidency of the former French Minister of Finance, 
Delors, joined forces and began to push for further European monetary integration. 
This put the delicate intra-German division of labour under increasing pressure. 
During the IGC on the Single European Act, the Commission promoted the 
inclusion of a 'monetary dimension' in the Act, adopting the establishment of EMU as 
a goal. The proposals were actively supported by the French (Gaddum, 1994: 322). 
Though Kohl was a strong supporter of the SEA and the economic liberalisation it 
implied, on the question of the monetary dimension of the proposals he sided with the 
President of the Bundesbank, Karl-Otto Pohl, who strongly opposed the French 
proposals. According to the German Chancellor, capital liberalization and European 
economic convergence would have to be achieved prior to any further European 
monetary development (Dyson, 1994: 117; Gaddum, 1994: 321, 324). However, 
during negotiations on the Act — in the seclusion of the European Council - Kohl 
gave in to French pressures and agreed to include the establishment of European 
economic and monetary union as a goal in the preamble of the Act (Dyson, 1994: 117; 
Gaddum, 1994: 344; Szâsz, 1999: 89-92).m This showed the French for the first time 
that, if they could isolate the Chancellor from the German financial elite, it was 
possible to persuade Kohl to defy the wishes of the German financial authorities, 
follow his European heart and compromise on the monetary issue.1"5 
Notwithstanding his successful effort to include a monetary dimension in the 
Single European Act, Delors felt that after the signing of the Act, the differences 
between the member states were 'too great for progress to be possible' (Dyson, 1994: 
118; cf. Endo, 1999: 156). However, just as the Commission decided to leave the 
subject alone, French pressure for further monetary integration increased. For, while 
the Gaullists had managed to obtain a majority in the French Assemblée National, 'core 
,84
 Neither the Bundesbank, nor the Ministries of Economic and Financial Affairs are present during 
European Council meetings 
'"^ According to Dyson and Featherstone, putting pressure on the BKA and AA to defy the German 
financial authorities soon became the basis of French diplomacy concerning EMU (Dyson and 
Featherstone, 1999 128) 
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French demands on EMS reform remained the same', but 'they were now made more 
assiduously' (Howarth, 2000: 83).,86 Moreover, after recurrent speculation against the 
franc in April 1986 and again in January 1987, French misgivings about the 
functioning of the EMS grew. According to the Gaullists, the downward pressure on 
the franc was not justified by the French economic situation, for since the 1983 
devaluation of the franc, the government had successfully brought inflation rates 
down, and increased interest rates.387 However, due to the asymmetrical workings of 
the EMS, France was made to bear the burden of adjustment for the forced parity 
change, although not responsible for the speculation that had caused it (Dyson, 1994: 
121).38H 
In a reaction to these events, the French Minister of Finance, Edouard 
Balladur, called for reform of the European Monetary System. On 9 February 1987, 
Balladur introduced a memorandum in the Monetary Committee in which - as Dutch 
Finance Minister Ruding rightly concluded - 'a number of old French hobby horses 
were running around' (Szâsz, 1999: 72).i89 The document opened by repeating the 
decade-old French pleas for a common European policy towards the dollar and yen 
(French Members of the Monetary Committee, 1987: Section I). Moreover, to 
ameliorate the 'asymetry by which the burden of adjustment and settlement in cash 
falls automatically on the countries whose currencies are weakest' (French Members of 
the Monetary Committee, 1987: Section II, spelling mistake in orginal). The 
memorandum proposed forcing central banks (read: the Bundesbank) to intervene on 
behalf of the weak currencies before the need for devaluation occurred (intra-marginal 
intervention) (French Members of the Monetary Committee, 1987: Sections I and II-
,86
 Parliamentary elections took place on 16 March 1986. In contrast to other legislative elections of the 
Fifth Republic, the electoral system applied was a system of proportional representation. The Socialist 
party gained 31 percent of the votes, the RPR 11.2 percent, the UDF 8.3 percent, and the combined lists 
of RPR and UDF 21.5 percent. As a result, the coalition of RPR and UDF had won more parliamentary 
seats that the Socialists. President Mitterrand decided not to hold Presidential elections upon this loss for 
his party, and named the Gaullist leader Chirac as his Prime Minister. The first period of'cohabitation' 
between the French right and left began (Cook and Paxton, 1998' 205). 
187
 Although the French had adapted their economic policies to those of the Germans, the political elite 
were of the opinion that German standards regarding inflation were too strict to run the French economy 
effectively, in their eyes it would impede resolution of their unemployment problems. However, they felt 
that - under EMS - they effectively had no choice but to conform to the Bundesbank standards. This is one 
of the reasons why they pleaded for a reform of the EMS support mechanisms and increased co-ordination 
of interest rate policies. Such measures would give the French input in these standards, make them less 
stringent and, therefore, give the French more room for manoeuvre in their economic policy making 
(Howarth, 2000: 86). 
,flB
 In the eyes of the French, the German trade surplus was to blame for the recurrent currency 
speculation 
389
 In addition to the introduction of his February memorandum, Balladur called for a strengthening of 
EMS and the alleviation of its asymmetric nature in July, August and December of 1987 (Balladur, 1987; 
Cameron, 1995-44-5). 
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1). In order to 'deal with exchange rate crises, particular when fundamentals do not 
justify a realignment', the French Minister proposed increasing the amount of 
resources available to conduct interventions (French Members of the Monetary 
Committee, 1987: Section II-3). In addition to strengthening the Community's short-
term and medium-term financing mechanisms, and instituting a true European 
monetary fund, the French also proposed raising the acceptability of the ECU to 100% 
(French Members of the Monetary Committee, 1987: Section II-3)- Finally, the French 
voiced their dismay with the realignment procedures. In their eyes, the decisions on 
parity changes were not being based on economic arguments, and did not take 
sufficient account of the consequences of realignments on the CAP (French Members of 
the Monetary Committee, 1987: Section III-2, 3). Overall, the memorandum 
advocated 'co-operation at the highest political level' to deal with these issues (French 
Members of the Monetary Committee, 1987: Section I). 
The French Minister's initiative forced the reluctant Germans to react, and 
again the Bundesbank in particular was very sceptical about the French plans (Gaddum, 
1994: 330; Szâsz, 1999)· However, on the condition that the other member states 
adopt price stability as their primary economic goal, the bank agreed to introduce 
some new technical measures (Cameron, 1995: 45, note 23; Gaddum, 1994: 331; 
Szâsz, 1999: 73).,90 According to Dyson, the German central bank agreed to these 
measures to 'ward offa new high-level Franco-German initiative and political 
intervention in the EMS as a result of new Council bargaining' (Dyson, 1994: 122), 
thereby keeping decision making on the issue of European monetary out of the hands 
oftheBKAand AA. 
If warding off another deal between the French and the BKA on monetary 
integration really was the Bundesbank's prime motivation for agreeing to these 
measures, then it failed. For barely a month later, the Franco-German consultations to 
commemorate the 25th anniversary of the 1963 Franco-German Co-operation Treaty 
provided the French with a perfect opportunity to play the 'Kohl card' again. Being 
given the chance to deal with the BKA and AA directly without the presence of the 
German Ministers of Economics, Finance or the Bundesbank, the French proposed 
expanding the Treaty to include the establishment of a bilateral financial and 
™ The measures were agreed upon on 8 September 1987 by the Governors during a meeting in Basle 
Five days later, the agreement was confirmed by the European Ministers of Economics and Finance during 
an ECOFIN meeting in Nyborg. The Basle-Nyborg agreement proposed an extension (in both the 
rimescale and the extent) of the credit facilities available to the European Monetary Cooperation Fund 
(EMCF), the conditional use of very short-term financing for intra-marginal interventions, and the 
reduction of the acceptance limit for settlements in ECUs (Dyson, 1994 122, Szâsz, 1999· 7 î). 
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economic council to co-ordinate the countries' monetary policies (Gaddum, 1994· 
333)391 
Initially, the French attempt to politicise the monetary issue by forcing the 
BKA and AA to take charge seemed highly successful. Given the symbolic nature of 
the occasion and with the French dangling further defence co-operation before their 
eyes, Kohl and Genscher were unable to resist (Gaddum, 1994: 335), and agreed to, 
amongst other things, the establishment of a Franco-German Economic Council This 
Council was to consist of the Ministers of Economics and Finance and the Presidents of 
the Bundesbank and the Banque de France — and would meet four times a year to discuss 
economic policy 
The agreement, however, caused great political turmoil in Frankfurt. In the 
eyes of the Bundesbank, the establishment of the Franco-German Economic Council 
meant that the new Treaty bound the bank to the economic objectives of the Council. 
According to the Bundesbank, this represented a grave and unacceptable violation of its 
constitutional autonomy In order to prevent the ratification of the Treaty in the 
Bundestag, the Bundesbank initiated an extensive domestic political offensive against the 
German government (Dyson, 1994. 124-5) The offensive turned out to be very 
effective, for during the ratification process, the Bundestag added a preamble to their 
decision to ratify the Treaty explicitly stating that the new Treaty could not undo the 
constitutional powers and autonomy of the Bundesbank, and that the powers of the 
Franco-German Council would remain merely advisory (Gaddum, 1994 339)· 
Although in the end the German financial elite had won the battle, the signing of the 
new Franco-German Treaty indicated that the intra-German division of labour might 
be untenable in the face of the pressure being skilfully applied by the French 
(Gaddum, 1994. 336). Under the right circumstances, the German foreign policy elite 
was apparently prepared to agree to French proposals on economic and monetary 
integration and defy domestic opposition 
Again, the French were not satisfied Even before the Bundestag amended the 
Franco-German Co-operation Treaty, Balladur renewed his call for the reform of the 
EMS (Cameron, 1998 204, Dyson, 1994 125). Moreover, in January 1988, he 
submitted to ECOFIN a highly critical report on the asymmetry of the EMS and called 
for its reform (Dyson, 1994. 125-6) As was to be expected, these new French plans 
were heavily criticised by the German financial elite; Kohl also 'registered his 
"coolness" toward the plan almost immediately' (Cameron, 1998· 204, note 28). 
However, in contrast to his response to the previous French proposals, 'West-
,91
 The bi-lateral talks between France and Germany are the exclusive domain of the Chancellor and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs In fact, not only was the Bundesbank not present during these talks, it did not 
even receive a copy of the draft Treaty until the day before its scheduled signature in Paris on 22 January 
1988 (Dyson, 1994 124, Gaddum, 1994 338) 
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Germany's free-wheeling veteran Foreign Minister' Genscher now spoke out in support 
of the French plans (Colchester and Buchan, 1990: 167). He thereby breached the 
consensus to endorse the line of the German financial elite on the issue of European 
monetary integration. 
Despite the fact that the Gaullists were forced to leave office only five months 
after the submission of the Balladur plans, and that its proposals 'did not extend to full 
Economic and Monetary union' (Howarth, 2000: 84, my italics),'92 the plans were the 
starting point for the establishment of European Economic and Monetary Union. For 
in February 1988, Genscher took up the French ideas, and issued a plan for the 
establishment of a fully fledged European Economic and Monetary Union of his 
own.391 According to the German Minister, a single currency and a European central 
bank were 'economically necessary' for the completion of the internal market, and 
would reduce Europe's dependence on the dollar. Moreover, the proposed European 
central bank would be dedicated to price stability and enjoy full independence in order 
to be able to perform this task adequately. Finally, the Minister stated that the 
Hanover summit to be held in June should decide to establish a group of independent 
experts to work out more detailed proposals. 
Although the Genscher plan deliberately followed the German financial elite's 
economist line in its emphasis on price stability and the independence of the European 
central bank (Colchester and Buchan, 1990; Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 327-32), 
the proposals were not positively received by the German financial elite. In fact, the 
Ministry of Finance, in close collaboration with the Bundesbank, put together a 
counterproposal that was submitted to ECOFIN on 15 March 1988 (Dyson, 1994: 
128; Schönfelder and Thiel, 1994). While there was speculation that privately the 
BKA agreed to the principles put forward in the Genscher-plan (Gaddum, 1994: 351, 
note 287), publicly at least, Kohl showed himself reluctant to support the efforts of his 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 333)- During a press 
conference on 5 February 1988, he stated that EMU could only be realised in the very 
long term and after considerable economic convergence between the member states 
had been achieved (Gaddum, 1994: 348). During a subsequent visit to the European 
Commission in May 1988, Kohl refused publicly to support the start of the road to 
EMU (Gaddum, 1994: 351-2, Agence Europe, 10 May 1988: 6). 
w
 The fact that Balladur had no intention of including plans for a single currency in his proposals of 
1987 and 1988 is confirmed by his reaction to the British 'Hard ECU' plan of June 1990 This plan 
promoted the creation of a thirteenth currency which would co-exist alongside the other twelve, instead of 
the establishment of a true European monetary union with a single currency and was according to 
Balladur 'exactly my plan' (Ageme Europe, 29 June 90' 1) 
w ,
 Genscher's deviation from the national consensus was inspired by a desire to create a distinct profile for 
the FDP on the European issue (Interview with a high-level German official). 
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In France, imminent Presidential elections were occupying the attention of 
the political elite and preventing any extensive debate on Genscher's monetary plans. 
However, it was clear that the Genscher plan gained more support in France than in 
Germany. For not only did the memorandum explicitly address heart-felt French 
concerns about the asymmetrical operation of the EMS, but also French public opinion 
during the late 1980s was more favourably disposed towards further European 
integration than it had been for a long time. Furthermore, the President himself was 
positively disposed towards the plans. In the run up to the Presidential elections, 
Mitterrand repeatedly called for the ECU to be developed into a true European reserve 
currency and an explicit call for the creation of an ECB was included in his election 
manifesto (Howarth, 2000: 109)· So, in contrast to the Chancellor, Mitterrand rallied 
behind the Genscher plan (Dyson, 1994: 127). 
Because Germany held the Council Presidency in the first half of 1988, which 
gave the Minister of Foreign Affairs - as acting President of the European Council -
the right to set the agenda of the forthcoming European Council, Genscher was able to 
overrule the German sceptics and place his proposals high on the agenda of the 
Hanover European Council of June 1988 (Gaddum, 1994: 348). Despite the 
opposition of the German financial elite to the Genscher plan and the Chancellor's 
reticence, the German cabinet managed to reach an agreement concerning the German 
position in Hanover. The agreed goal read modestly that the Germans wanted 'ein 
Gremium aus den Zentrale Bank Directoren einzuberufen', which would study the 
possibility and shape of further European monetary co-operation (Gaddum, 1994: 
352), a position also agreed upon with President Mitterrand during a Franco-German 
bilateral summit at Evian on 2 June. However, four days before the summit , Kohl 
again stipulated that several conditions had to be fulfilled before further monetary 
integration could be achieved (Agence Europe, 24 June 1988: 3-4). So, while there was 
some movement on the European monetary issue, most of the major German players 
continued to drag their feet. Without changes in the political landscape, the chances of 
any European Monetary Union being established were slim. 
8.3-2 The Dragging of Feet: Hanover and the Delors Committee 
The Hanover summit was largely devoted to the discussion of the German Minister of 
Foreign Affairs' plans for European monetary unification.394 Kohl, with the recent 
experience of the Franco-German Economic Council initiative fresh in mind, was 
looking for a compromise that would be acceptable 'auch für die zögernden und 
zurückhaltenden Stimmen in Deutschland' (Bitterlich, 2004: 2 1 ; cf. Dyson, 1994: 
'^ 'Because foreign ministers attend the meetings of the European Council but finance ministers (and 
central bank governors) do not, Genscher was at the Hanover meeting while Stoltenberg and Pohl were 
not' (Cameron, 1995: 47, note 32) 
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128). Much of the discussion concentrated on the idea of a European central bank 
(Cameron, 1995: 47). Mitterrand argued strongly in favour of such an institution, but 
the German reaction was again divided: Genscher supported the French plan, while 
Kohl took a middle position. At the end of the first day, Kohl instructed his 
collaborator Bitterlich to work with Delors on a 'moderate and compromising' final 
communiqué for the next day (Bitterlich, 2004: 21-2). 
This communiqué was largely along the lines of the intra-German 
compromise and stated that the Council had decided 'to examine at the European 
Council meeting in Madrid in June 1989 the means of achieving' a European 
economic and monetary union. To that end the Heads of State and Government 
decided to entrust 'the task of studying and proposing concrete stages leading towards 
this Union' to a Committee of Governors of the Central Banks in a personal capacity 
(European Council, 1988).^ However, by agreeing to the provision that Commission 
President Delors would preside over the committee, Kohl 'befreite sich aus der Rolle 
des Schaniers zwischen Währungsexperten und drängenden EG-Partnern' (Gaddum, 
1994: 353). 
The Delors Committee met on a monthly basis in Basle and although the 
Committee deliberated behind closed doors, the reports of what went on in the Delors 
committee suggest that it was a repetition of the debates that went on in the Werner 
Committee. From the first meeting on 14 September 1988 onwards, it was clear that 
the German, Dutch and British members of the Committee considered the creation of 
a European central bank to be a long-term goal to be arrived at only through a long 
process of European economic integration. Other Governors, including the French, 
envisaged a more rapid completion of the process (Agence Europe, 14 September 1988: 
7, Colchester and Buchan, 1990: 170). Furthermore, in the third meeting, the 
President of the Banque de France, Jacques de Larosière, put a proposal on the table 
stating that a European Reserve Fund (ERF) should be established in the first phase 
(de Larosière, 1989). This fund would have a co-ordinating role over the pool of 
national reserves, and carry out interventions on the foreign exchange markets. Pohl, 
who demanded prior economic convergence before the institution of any monetary 
measures, opposed the plan (Pohl, 1989). During the seventh meeting in March 1989, 
the division resurfaced. A furious argument pitted Pohl, Duisenberg and Leigh-
Pemberton against De Larosière and Delors over the pace of, and preconditions for 
transition from one stage of the unification process to the next (Cameron, 1995: 48, 
note 34). The former wanted a slower pace, and to achieve greater convergence in 
economic and monetary policy prior to the creation of new monetary institutions; the 
w
 According to Bitterlich, by inviting the Central Bank Governors to participate in a personal capacity, 
Kohl had made an effort to convince the very reluctant Bundesbank President to join the Committee. 
According to Pohl, this provision would help him to maintain his independence (Bitterlich, 2004 22). 
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latter preferred a shorter transitional phase and automatic transfers. Moreover, in 'some 
of his purpler prose' Pohl insisted on incorporating binding budgetary rules 
(Colchester and Buchan, 1990: 170-1; cf. Thygesen, 1989: ó-tó).'96 
Despite this divergence of opinions, the Committee managed to present a 
unanimous report to ECOFIN on 17 April 1989, right on schedule (Committee for the 
Study of Economic and Monetary Union, 1989)· During the deliberations, it had 
already become clear that the economists had the upper hand. This was reflected in the 
Committee's Report, which proposed establishing EMU in three stages. Stage One was 
characterised by closer economic and monetary co-ordination on a voluntary basis, and 
included amongst other things the completion of the internal market, the 
strengthening of co-operation on economic and fiscal policy, the removal of all 
obstacles to financial integration and the inclusion of all currencies in the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) (Committee for the Study of Economic and 
Monetary Union, 1989: Section III-3). Stage Two was to function as a transition 
period in which the basic structures and organs of EMU would be set up and 
experimentation with joint monetary decision making would begin. Moreover, in this 
stage, precise - though not yet binding — budgetary rules were to be set (Committee 
for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, 1989: Section III-4). In Stage Three, 
European exchange rates would be irrevocably fixed and monetary competences 
transferred from the national states to the European Central Bank System. Moreover, 
in the macro-economic field, the Committee proposed to introduce binding budgetary 
rules (Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, 1989: Section III-
5). Finally, like the Werner Committee, the Delors Committee concluded that 
conditions for moving from one stage to another could not be determined in advance 
(Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, 1989: Art. 43). 
Overall, it may be concluded that the proposals concerning monetary union 
were very similar to those proposed in the Werner Report (Thygesen, 1989: 642). 
Furthermore, like the Werner Report, the proposed future monetary arrangements 
were heavily inspired by the German Bundesbank Act in the sense that the future ECB 
was to be 'independent of instructions from national governments and Community 
authorities', and first and foremost committed to price stability (Committee for the 
Study of Economic and Monetary Union, 1989: Art. 32). The report also stated that 
EMU 'would represent the final result of the process of progressive economic integration 
in Europe' (Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, 1989: Art. 
16, cf. Art. 25, 42, my italics). Two of the French 'hobby-horses' failed to make their 
way into the report: only administrative obstacles to the private use of ECUs would be 
removed; and no agreement was reached on the establishment of a European Reserve 
396
 All of these contentious issues returned as major topics of discussion during the IGC and the 
preparations for the IGC (see section 8.4) 
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Fund.'97 The proposals regarding the establishment of an economic union, and in 
particular those articles proposing to introduce binding rules on national budgetary 
deficits, also bore the mark of the ordohberals (Committee for the Study of Economic 
and Monetary Union, 1989: Art. 30, cf. Art. 19, 25, 27, 33). All in all, Pohl seemed to 
have been very successful in convincing his peers of the value of his ordoliberal and 
economist views on the establishment of a European Economic and Monetary Union. 
8.3-3 Defending Germany's Sound Economic Policies: Karl-Otto Pohl 
The Delors Report is an almost perfect reflection of the economic beliefs of Pohl. For 
while some have described the Bundesbank President as the odd man out at the 
Bundesbank due to his background in government, and an alleged lack of rigour and 
consistency in his economic beliefs (Connolly, 1996: 85, note 11; Dyson and 
Featherstone, 1999: 343-4),,98 the cognitive map that was derived from statements the 
President made before the publication of the Delors Report, shows that there is no 
doubt that his economic beliefs were entirely and consistently ordoliberal in nature 
(see Appendix B, Cognitive map Pöhl-1). 
Like Schiller in the 1970s, the belief in the merits of price stability forms the 
pivot of Pöhl's belief system, and features most often in the assertions on which his 
first cognitive map is based. In fact, from the cognitive map, it may be derived that 
two concepts referring to the concept of price stability belong to the core of Pöhl's 
belief system: 'Price stability' (PI) and 'ECB with price stability as its primary goal' 
(E9). However, in his assertions Pohl identifies no significant consequences as flowing 
from price stability, which indicates that apart from being a precondition to the 
establishment of EMU (see relation E9-E6), for him price stability is a goal in itself. 
According to Pohl all other policies,'including the establishment of a European 
economic and monetary union, would have to meet the essential requirement of not 
damaging price stability. In addition, Pohl subscribed to the typical ordoliberal idea 
that a quest for more price stability need not lead to higher unemployment (see 
relation Pl -Wl) . 
In addition to price stability, several other concepts in his map put Pohl 
firmly in the ordoliberal camp. Firstly, the Bundesbank President consistently saw the 
,9
 Like the Werner Report, the Delors Report explicitly mentions the difference of opinion between the 
members on the proposals to establish a European Reserve Fund (ERF) during the first stage (See Art 5 î 
in the Delors Report) 
,
'
)
* The claim that Pohl had insufficient knowledge of monetary economics seems rather implausible. For 
prior to starting his career at the Bundesbank, Pohl had been trained as an economist at the University of 
Gottingen and had been a research director at a prestigious institute in München. The negative evaluation 
of Pòhl's capacities is more likely to have come from the more hardline officials at the Bundesbank by their 
President's brief professional detour into journalism and his previous political career as a civil servant and 
State Secretary (from 1972 and 1977) at the Ministry of Finance Pohl served as President of the 
Bundesbank from 1980 until his resignation in late 1991. 
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need for economic integration to precede monetary integration. For him, engaging in 
further monetary integration prior to economic integration (M5) would lead to 
tensions between the member states (Tl), to inflation (-P1), and damage the general 
well-being of the member states (U3). Moreover, in his eyes the establishment of EMU 
(E6) had to be conditional on the liberalisation of capital markets (LI), and the 
establishment of a single European market (S2) - concepts that belong to the core of 
Pöhl's belief system - as well as the establishment of Economic union (E7), further 
development of the EMS (Dl), and the adhesion of all members to the EMS (Al). Or, 
as the President put it, EMU must be 'der monetäre Überbau einer wirtschaftsunion 
mit weitestgehender Freizügigkeit für Güter, Diestleistungen, Arbeitskräfte und 
Kapital' {Frankfurter Allgemeine Zettung, 28 May 1988: 15). For this reason, the 
establishment of a European economic and monetary union would be the result of a 
long process of economic convergence during which many conditions had to be 
fulfilled (see relations L2-E6, L2-E8).w Pöhl's ordoliberal focus is also indicated by his 
concern for the independence of the future European central bank, which in his eyes 
was a condition for maintaining price stability (relation 01-E9), as well as his rejection 
of monetary financing (M4). Moreover, like many ordoliberals, Pohl subscribed to the 
idea that European monetary unification would have to be preceded by further 
political integration (see relation E2-E6, E4-E6, S3-E6, and S3-E8).100 
With regard to his preferences on the international exchange rate mechanism, 
the Bundesbank President's position is somewhat ambiguous (compare the position of 
Schiller in Section 6.4.2). He positively values the EMS (Al, Dl , El, M2) as being in 
the general interest of the member states (see relation El-Ul) and leading to stable 
exchange rates (see relation El-SI). Furthermore, the eventual (and conditional) 
establishment of European economic and monetary union (E6, E8) may prove to be in 
the interest of the general prosperity of the member states (see relations E6-U1, E8-
Ul) as well as (eventually) a greater financial role for Europe in the world, according to 
Pohl (see relation E6-F2). However, on fixed exchange rates in general, his preferences 
vn
 Also notice that according to Pohl any fixing of exchange rates was conditional upon economic 
convergence (see relations between concepts C2 and C4 an Fl and Rl) . 
"'
00
 Finally, in his speeches and writings, Pohl distinguished far more concepts that refer to ordoliberal 
than Keynesian economic goals and instruments Moreover, the 'ordoliberal' concepts rank much higher 
than the 'Keynesian' ones in terms of centrality and saliency. The concepts referring to Keynesian 
economic goals and instruments include 'Consolidation of Support Mechanisms' (C5), 'Establishment of a 
European Monetary Fund' (E10), 'Employment' (Wl) , 'Financing of Governmental Debts by the ECB 
(Μ^ί)', and 'Monetary integration without economic integration' (M5). Of these the latter two are valued 
negatively. Concepts referring to ordoliberal economic goals and instruments include: 'Economic 
Convergence' (C4), 'ECB with Price Stability as its Primary Goal' (E9), 'Long Process' (L2), 'Independent 
ECB' (Ol), and 'Price Stability' (PI), all of these are valued positively The average centrality and saliency 
value of the concepts indicating a Keynesian outlook on economic policies (thus without concepts M4 and 
M5) are respectively 2 and 2.34 while the average values of the concepts indicating a ordoliberal belief 
system (including M4 and M5) are 3.57 and 8. 
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are again ambiguous. While he held that fixed exchange rates stimulate price stability 
(see relation Fl-PI), he also believed that they would lead to monetary instability and 
a decline in the general well-being of Germany (see negative relationships F1-M3 and 
F1-U3). Moreover, in his eyes, exchange rate adjustments (Rl) — which are only 
possible in a floating exchange rate mechanism — would on the one hand reduce 
tensions between member states (see relation Rl-Tl) , but at the same time reduce 
economic development (see relation R1-E12). However, since overall far more concepts 
referring to fixed than floating exchange rates may be distinguished in Pöhl's 
assertions, the conclusion is warranted that the Bundesbank President held a modest 
and conditional preference for fixed exchange rates. 
As for European integration, Pohl looked at this from a largely economic 
perspective. He rarely spoke of aspects of European integration which did not concern 
the economical or financial issues. Like most ordoliberals he stressed the need for 
further political integration (E4, E2), but this was a far less salient issue for the 
Bundesbank President than the economic requirements for further European 
integration."101 In addition, it may be concluded from Pöhl's cognitive map that the 
President had a positive outlook on both intergovernmental and supranational modes 
of decision-making. However, like the Chancellor, the Bundesbank President generally 
preferred supranational co-operation to intergovernmental decision making.402 
Overall, the conclusion is warranted that Pohl was not against EMU in 
principle. However, it is clear that his support for the eventual establishment of such 
an arrangement was highly conditional. From the outset, he was very sceptical about 
whether such an arrangement would meet the vital ordoliberal criterion of not 
,01
 The two concepts referring to European political or institutional integration, ('Development of 
European Institutions' (E4) and European Political Integration' (E2)), while valued positively, rank much 
lower in terms of centrahty and saliency than those referring to monetary integration The concepts 
referring to economic and monetary integration are 'Establishment of SEA' (S2), 'European Economic 
Union' (E7), 'European Economic Integration' (E3), 'Further Development of EMS' (Dl), 'All Member 
States in EMS' (Al), 'Establishment of a European monetary fund' (ElO), 'EMS' (El), 'Increased Monetary 
Co-ordination' (Ml), 'Establishment of EMU' (E6), 'Establishment of a European Currency' (E8), 
'Monetary Integration without Economic Integration (M5), 'Membership of EMS' (M2) These have 
average centrahty and saliency values of 4 8 and 8 6 (3 5 and 7 4 if concept E6 is omitted). The concepts 
of'Development of European Institutions' (E4) and 'European political integration' (E2) have an average 
centrahty and saliency value of 2.5 and 4.5. 
102
 The concepts referring to intergovernmental decision making that Pohl distinguishes ('All member 
states fully participating in EMS' (Al), 'EMS' (El), 'European Political Integration' (E2), 'European 
Economic Integration' (E3), 'Increased Monetary Co-ordination between Member States' (Ml), 
'Membership of the EMS' (M2), 'Establishment of Single European Market' (S2)) rank on average much 
lower than those referring to intergovernmental modes of decision making ('Development of the European 
Institutions' (E4), 'Establishment of EMU' (E6), 'European Economic Union' (E7), 'Establishment of a 
European Currency' (E8), 'Independent ECB' (Ol), and 'Transfer of Sovereignty in the Economic, 
Monetary and Fiscal Issue-area' (S3)). In fact, average centrahty- and saliency value of the former concepts 
are respectively 2 57 and 4.57 while the average values of the latter concepts are 6.67 and 15.67 (4 2 and 
8.4 when concept E6 is omitted). 
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damaging German price stability (see concepts L2 and W2). Moreover, he was of the 
opinion that far-reaching economic integration had to precede further monetary 
integration. It was therefore to be expected that he took a very long-term perspective 
on the issue (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 347). The full extent of this scepticism — 
which as it turned out was not mitigated by the signing of the highly ordoliberal and 
economist Delors Report by his European colleagues - became apparent almost 
immediately after the release of the report. 
8.3-4 Manoeuvring between Strategy and Belief: 'Der Dicke' in a tight Spot 
Reactions to the Delors Report followed the expected lines. The French political elite 
and Genscher were pushing forward,'"" while only one day after the publication of the 
Delors Report, Pohl stated that the negotiations on EMU were yet to begin and 
nothing had been decided. The reaction of the German Ministry of Economics was 
outright hostile. In a memo dated 18 July 1989, the Ministry stated that it considered 
political unification to be a precondition to monetary unification, and demanded 
binding rules on budgetary discipline to be included in the treaty (Schönfelder and 
Thiel, 1994: 50, 54). 
By May, however, decision makers in Bonn and Frankfurt had already agreed 
that the decision to prepare for the start of the first phase of EMU would be taken at 
the European Council of Madrid, scheduled for 26 and 27 June 1989-1w One crucial 
question remained however unresolved: The factions could not reach an agreement 
about the starting date of an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on EMU 
(Schönfelder and Thiel, 1994: 55-6). Until the Strasbourg summit of December 1989, 
this issue dominated the intra-German and European discussions. 
During their unofficial Franco-German consultation on 22 June 1989, Kohl 
and Mitterrand adopted an agreement which followed the lines of the intra-German 
compromise to start the first stage of EMU based on the conclusions of the Delors 
Report. However, as on the national German level, they did not reach an agreement 
concerning the starting date of an IGC. While Mitterrand was pushing for an early 
403
 The French political elite had generally been opposed to the idea of a politically independent bank. 
However, even before the first meeting of the Delors Committee, De Larosière - much to the dismay of 
Minister of Finance, Bérégovoy - had convinced the President that no agreement on EMU could ever be 
reached unless the French accepted the German demands on this issue (Howarth, 2000: Η^-4, 142). In 
fact, in July 1989, Mitterrand went on record stating that he was 'totally in favour' of the Delors plan, 
and wanted 'to give life to this EMU' (Haywood, 1993: 273). 
4 0 4
 According to the Conclusions of the European Council of Hanover (27 and 28 June 1988), in which 
'the Member States confirmed the objective of progressive realization of economic and monetary union', 
'the European Council meeting in Madrid in June 1989' should decide 'to examine . the means of 
achieving this union' (Padoa-Schioppa, 2000: 225, Appendix 3). As in the early 1970s, the first stage of 
EMU proved to be uncontroversial and started without much discussion on 1 July 1990. 
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start, Kohl refused to set a date for the start of the IGC405 In the Chancellor's view, 
the parts of the Delors Report concerning stages two and three needed further 
discussion prior to the start of the conference, a position voiced earlier by the 
Bundesbank. The Bundeskanzler was of the opinion that 'sehr viel Sachverstand is 
notwendig' to prepare for the start of the intergovernmental negotiations, and that it 
was unrealistic to expect to finish the negotiations on EMU before July or even 
December of 1991 (DzDPS, 1998, nr. 8: 308). The inability of the French and 
German leaders to resolve this issue was reflected in the conclusions of the European 
Council of Madrid of June 1989, which merely concluded that, the IGC 'would meet 
once the first stage had begun and would be preceded by full and adequate 
preparation' (Conclusions of the Madrid European Council, 26 and 27 June 1989, on: 
www.ena.lu/mce.cfm). 
All in all, during 1988 and the first part of 1989, the attitude of Chancellor 
Kohl with regard to the European monetary issue shows a peculiar oscillation between 
ordoliberal and economist reluctance on the one hand, and concessions to the French 
cause on the other hand. An analysis of his assertions, however, reveals clearly that — 
for Kohl - this oscillation constituted the hard choice between tactics and preference. 
For, as the cognitive map derived from several of his speeches and writings dated 
before the publication of the Delors Report indicates. Kohl had at heart always been 
pro-EMU (see Appendix B, Cognitive Map Kohl-1). 
In the literature. Kohl is often described as a practical rather than an 
intellectual man, a doer rather than a thinker. Despite the fact that he did not care as 
much for intellectual debates as did Mitterrand, this image seems only partially 
accurate. On the matter of European politics, Kohl held some very well defined and 
fixed, albeit not original, ideas. His European outlook and early interest in politics is 
often traced back to his childhood in the Pfalz,406 right on the French border, and his 
childhood war-experiences (Clough, 1998: 27, 35; Dyson, 1998: 42-3; Dyson and 
Featherstone, 1999: 256; Hofmann, 1984: 24, SI).407 In these early years, the 
conviction grew in him that binding Germany to Europe was essential to prevent 
Germany from reverting to its old ways, and to guarantee peace and security for 
Germany and its neighbours (Clough, 1998: 27, 64; Paterson, 1998: 32).4"H His 
^ In the months to come, Kohl would cite the national elections that were planned for December 1990 
as the reason for refusing to commit to an early starting date However, since, at the time of June 
consultations, the date for the elections had not yet been set (DzDPS, 1998, nr. 62 454), it seems more 
likely that Kohl wanted to prevent giving too much away on the European monetary issue and creating 
further conflict with the reluctant German financial elite 
406
 Kohl joined the CDU when he was only sixteen years old (Clough, 1998. 36, Dyson and Featherstone, 
1999: 108) 
""
,7
 Kohl lost an uncle and his older brother, Walter, during World War II 
"'
8
 As a teenager, Kohl reportedly took down the barriers at the border with France near his home town 
(Clough, 1998: 64; Dyson and Featherstone, 1999 ^08, Dreher, 1998 }2) 
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historical memories and early formed ideas on European relations, developed into 
deeply felt personal convictions, which seemed to have remained with him ever since. 
Some have even concluded that from the age of seventeen onwards, Kohl's 'Weltbild — 
was auch immer geschah — was unerschütterlich festgelegt' (Clough, 1998: 38). 
Kohl's European beliefs were essentially a copy of the European policy ideas of 
Adenauer (Paterson, 1998: 25-6; cf. Lieshout, 2004: 54-6, see Chapter 5). Like 
Adenauer, Kohl had a fundamentally positive outlook on every form of European 
integration. Moreover, as is easily discernible from his cognitive map, European 
integration held a pivotal role in the Chancellor's belief system.109 In his eyes, 
European integration served the general interest of all member states, as well as a 
whole range of economic goals like economic growth (E2) and increased 
competitiveness (El), economic liberalisation (L2), price stability (PI), and economic 
development (E4) (Kohl, 1990b: 18; 2000: 20). 
More importantly, however, like Adenauer, Kohl was above all a man of 
politics and a firm believer in the primacy of the political (Dyson, 1998: 40; Dyson 
and Featherstone, 1999: 259-60; Hofmann, 1984: 81). In other words, the political 
benefits of European integration were far more important to the Chancellor than the 
economic ones.41" In the view of the Chancellor, binding Germany to the European 
community was vital if the freedom and safety of Germany and the other member 
states were to be guaranteed (G4, F3, P5) (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 257; Kohl, 
1989: 152; 2000: 21). As for the Chancellor's preferred mode of decision making in 
the European arena, it is clear that - even though European unification, and more 
specifically the use of majority decision making, required Germany to make sacrifices 
(see relation M2-G3) — Kohl was a proponent of more supranational decision making 
(Hofmann, 1984: 96).d" 
w>
 A number of concepts referring to European integration can be distinguished in Kohl's cognitive map, 
all of which are valued positively. Moreover, the two concepts that make up the core of his first cognitive 
map both refer to European integration (see concepts 'European integration' (E5) and 'Completion of the 
internal market' (SI) 
410
 Except for the benefit of increasing 'Price Stability' (PI), the political benefits of European integration 
like - 'Freedom for Germany' (G4), 'Freedom' (F3), 'Peace' (P5), 'Franco-German reconciliation' (F2) and 
'Reunification of Germany' (P4) - rank higher in terms of centrality and saliency than the economic 
benefits of European integration like 'Economic Growth' (E2) and 'Increased Competitiveness' (El), 
'Economic Liberalisation' (L2), and 'Economic Development' (E4) 
i
" For while Kohl distinguished exactly the same number of concepts referring to intergovernmental and 
supranational decision making and valued all of these concepts positively, the latter outrank the former in 
both centrality and saliency. The four concepts referring to intergovernmental decision making and their 
centrality- and saliency measures are: 'EMS' (E7), 'European Economic Co-operation' (E10), 'European 
Political Co-operation' (Ell) , 'Further Monetary Co-operation' (Ml) The sum of their combined saliency-
and centrality values is 38 The four concepts referring to supranational decision making and their 
centrality- and saliency measures are: 'Establishment of EMU' (E6), 'European Unification' (E9), 
'European Economic Unification' (E14), 'Majority Decisions' (M2). Their combined centrality and 
saliency values amount to 46. 
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Moreover, Kohl cherished two ideas that also typified the worldview of the 
first German Chancellor. Firstly, he saw European integration as a vital means of 
Franco-German reconciliation (F2). However, like Adenauer, the Chancellor was 
convinced that the reverse was also true: Europe could only be united on the basis of 
close and friendly relations between France and Germany (Clough, 1998: 62, 138; 
Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 257).'"2 Or as Kohl put it 'So wie Europa den 
notwendigen Rahmen fur die deutsch-französische Aussöhnung bot, so war und ist 
diese Verständigung auch Voraussetzung, Grundlage und bleibender Antrieb für den 
europäischen Einigungsprozess' (Kohl, 1989: 153). In keeping with this idea, only 
days after his election in 1982, Kohl travelled to Paris to meet Mitterrand and made a 
special effort to develop and maintain friendly relations with the French President 
during his Chancellorship (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 256). 
The second idea regarding the political benefits of European integration 
modelled after the worldview of Adenauer was the link Kohl drew between further 
European integration and the reunification of Germany. In his eyes, rather than 
inhibit, European integration would encourage German reunification (see relation E5-
P4, and E9-P4). In light of the widely held idea that a trade-off existed between 
binding Germany to its European partners and reunification, and that by pursuing the 
Westbindung of Germany Adenauer had effectively reduced the chances of reunification, 
Kohl's belief in this causal relationship is remarkable (Clough, 1998: 63; Paterson, 
1998: 28). Moreover, from statements made long before the fall of the Berlin Wall it 
may be derived that like Adenauer — whose statement that 'das deutsche Problem nur 
unter einem europäischen Dach zu lösen sei' Kohl often cited - the German Chancellor 
also believed that a reciprocal relationship existed between German reunification and 
European integration. In other words, according to Kohl, German reunification would 
stimulate European integration and vice versa (see relations P4-E5, P4-E9). 
For someone who reportedly lacked 'a clear grasp of the technical issues' and 
experienced 'an intellectual discomfort with technical economic arguments' (Clough, 
1998: 44; cf. Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 311), Kohl devoted a great deal of his 
speeches and writings to economic issues. As for his views on exchange rate 
arrangements, like Mitterrand, Kohl showed no sign of contemplating the benefits of 
floating exchange rates. Moreover, his preference for a fixed exchange rate system may 
412
 In fact, Kohl distinguished no less than four concepts that refer to the need for friendly Franco-German 
relations: 'Franco-German friendship' (Fl), 'Franco-German conciliation' (F2), 'Franco-German co-
operation' (F4), and 'Shared interests between France and Germany' (S4). More specifically, in the eyes of 
Kohl, 'Franco-German co-operation' (F4) would foster 'European Political Co-operation' (El 1), 'European 
Economic Co-operation' (E8), the 'Establishment of EMU' (E6), 'Further Development of EMS' (El 2), 
'European Unification' (E9), and 'European Integration' (E5) Furthermore, 'Franco-German conciliation' 
(F2) (being fostered by 'European integration', E5) as well as 'Shared intetest between France and 
Germany' (S4) would stimulate 'European unification' (E9)· 
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be considered relatively intense.413 With regard to his macro-economic ideas, it is clear 
from his assertions throughout the years that Kohl embraced the ideas of economic 
liberalisation that had characterised the German outlook on international economic 
relations since the World War l\.AU Moreover, from the early years of his 
Chancellorship onwards, Kohl advocated less government interference in the economy 
(Paterson, 1998: 25). However, as is to be expected from a strong believer in the 
primacy of the political, 'Kohl embraced economic liberalization with caution, 
measuring its benefits against the risks of short-term political damage, and inclining 
to slow down the tempo of change and concern himself with its social and political 
effects' (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 259)- More importantly, however, Kohl 
adopted the German liberal view not only on international economic relations, but he 
also internalised the main tenets of the German ordoliberal outlook on economic and 
monetary policies (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 259)-4" He was convinced in 
particular of the need to maintain price stability (PI), and strict governmental policies 
(-L1). In his view, such policies led to more socio-economic development (E2, S3), and 
a reduction in the unemployment rate (E3) (cf. Hofmann, 1984: 86). 
All in all, it may be concluded from the analysis of his cognitive map that, 
despite the fact that he viewed the establishment of EMU as requiring sacrifices on the 
part of Germany (G3), 'Kohl was always pro-EMU in principle' (Dyson, 1998: 39; cf. 
Kohl, 1989: 157). In fact, he seemed to prefer the establishment of EMU to the 
further development of the EMS. One explanation for this is that — to a greater extent 
than the EMS, which was clearly not favoured by the French - 'EMU was, for Kohl, 
bound up with his European-centred and Paris-oriented policy', and as such 
corresponded perfectly with 'his belief in, and use of, Adenauer as a model' (Dyson and 
Featherstone, 1999: 308).416 This analysis also provides an explanation for the apparent 
discrepancy between Kohl's reluctant public attitude on the one hand, and his moves 
4
" In che map, three concepts referring to fixed exchange rate arrangements are present - 'Establishment 
of EMU' (E6), 'EMS' (E7), and 'Further Development EMS (including all members)' (E12), all of which 
are valued positively. 
^
lA
 Concepts referring to economic liberalisation like 'Liberalisation' (L2), and especially 'Completion of 
the Single European market' (S2), belong to the most central and salient economic beliefs in Kohl's 
cognitive map. 
115
 In Kohl's map, four concepts that refer to Keynesian variables or instruments may be distinguished' 
'Economic Growth' (E2), 'Employment' (E}), 'Increased Purchasing Power' (Wl) , and 'Expansionary 
Governmental Policy' (LI). With the exception of the latter, he values these concepts positively. In 
addition, his cognitive map includes three concepts that refer to more ordoliberal economic 
considerations: '(European) Central Bank Independence' (CI), 'Price Stability' (PI), 'Solid Government 
Finances' (S2). The ordoliberal ideas (including the negatively valued concept 'Expansionary 
Governmental policy') consistently outrank the former in their individual (these score an average 
centrality- and saliency rates of 2 3/5.3 versus 5.5/6.5), as well as in their total values (respectively 23 
versus 59). 
'"
6
 More than any other politician studied in this thesis, the cognitive map of Helmut Kohl adequately 
predicts his behaviour at a later stage (see Section 8.3). 
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to stimulate European monetary unification during negotiations on the Single 
European Act, the Elysée treaty, and the 1988 Hanover European Council on the other 
hand. Rather than being rooted in his belief system, Kohl's public attitude towards 
EMU was based on a tactical evaluation of the German internal political power 
configuration. Finding himself sandwiched between the French and his own Minister 
of Foreign Affairs on one side and the sceptical German financial elite on the other, 
Kohl's tactics were to drag his feet and put up roadblocks (cf. Dinan, 2004: 236). 
8.3-.5 Deciphering the Enigma of François Mitterrand 
More than of any other politician studied in this thesis, the preferences of President 
Mitterrand are hard to trace. Presenting his views and arguments in often poetic and 
enigmatic texts, it is no wonder that the President has been characterised as 'sphinx-
like' and 'mysterious'. Moreover, his contemplative governing style, knack for secrecy, 
and his 'cultivation of plural sources of information and rival policy advisers' give the 
impression of an uncertain and hesitant man with contradictory and inconsistent views 
(Cole, 1994: 102-3).4I7 However, if one reviews all the available evidence, some 
general conclusions can nevertheless be drawn. 
The first conclusion is that, throughout his political career, Mitterrand was a 
consistent proponent of European integration (Haywood, 1993; Northcutt, 1992: 34, 
47-8; Ross, 1996: 39; Saunier, 2001: 466, note 5; Tiersky, 2000: 166-7). Many 
examples of his pro-European attitude are listed in the literature. For instance, he 
attended the European Congress at The Hague in 1948 (Cole, 1994: 116; Tiersky, 
2000: 163), and throughout his career as a member of the Assemblée Nationale, he 
consistently voted in favour of further European integration. Later, European 
integration featured as an important issue in his electoral campaigns during the 1960s 
(Cole, 1994: 116-7; Haywood, 1993: 270-1; Northcutt, 1992: 63-4; Tiersky, 2000: 
163). In fact, throughout his career, the President regularly mentioned the benefits of 
establishing a single European currency (Haywood, 1993: 270). This pro-European 
stance is also apparent from the first cognitive map derived from a selection of speeches 
417
 Some have explained these contradictions by depicting Mitterrand as a political opportunist, always 
ready to sacrifice his beliefs for self-interest, self-promotion and power While such characterisation may 
hold some truth, Cole has rightly pointed out that political manoeuvre is one of the 'prerequisites for 
survival in a ruthless political environment' (Cole, 1994 53) The complexity of Mitterrand's belief 
system is easily discernible from the large number of relations per concept in his first cognitive map (4 25 
versus 3.8 and 3.75 for Kohl and Pohl respectively), the large amount of loops (a leads to b, leads to c, 
leads to a) and inconsistencies (compare for instance the contrasting relations E9-D5-I1, and E9-F2-I1) in 
his belief system, and the relatively high amount of intangible concepts like 'European Social Space' (S3), 
'Changing Circumstances' (C2), 'Political Will' (P2), 'Successful European integration' (S5), 'Valuing 
European Democratic Ideals' (D5), 'European Rélame (E10), and 'Development of the Best in Oneself 
(S8) (see Appendix B, Cognitive Map Mitterrand-1) 
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and interviews by the French President held in the period from 1983 until 1988.418 In 
fact, Mitterrand's beliefs concerning European integration constitute the core of his 
belief system concerning European monetary integration (Haywood, 1993: 274-5, 
Europe Documents, 20 February 1984: 4, 14 April 1988: 2).41!, 
Mitterrand's rationale for supporting further European integration was two-
fold (Cole, 1994: 126). Firstly, despite their ideological differences, Mitterrand was 'as 
French and as firmly national-minded' in his support for European integration as De 
Gaulle had been (Tiersky, 2000: 162; cf. Hoffmann, 1987; Northcutt, 1992: 105). 
Mitterrand believed that France could only safeguard its global political role by 
joining forces with its European partners. A united European power led by the French 
had the potential to develop into a third superpower, foster peace and prosperity, and 
safeguard French independence (Tiersky, 2000: 162).420 He also perceived European 
118
 More than half of the concepts in his map refer in one way or another to European integration More 
specifically 28 of the 48 concepts in Mitterrand's first map refer to European integration while - in 
comparison - only 18 out of 47 concepts in the first map of Helmut Kohl refer to European integration 
(see Cognitive Map Mitterrand-1 and Cognitive Map Kohl-1 in Appendix B) Moreover, all concepts 
referring to European integration are positively valued 
,1
'
;
 Six of the seven concepts that make up the core of Mitterrand's belief system refer to European 
integration The concepts (true) European unification' (El), 'European integration (prior to SEA)' (E9), 
'Development of new European policies' (D2), 'Solving current problems in the Community' (E8), and the 
'Completion of SEA' (SI) belong to the core of Mitterrand's belief system (for the centrality and saliency 
measures see Appendix D) The only concept in the core of his belief system that does not refer directly to 
European integration is 'Political Will' (PI) Mitterrand had not always voiced his pro-European 
preferences as strongly as he did in the late 1980s, because particularly during the 1970s, the French left 
had been divided on European policy making the Socialist Party (PS) was internally divided on the issue, 
while the Communist Party (PCF) was overtly anti-European (Ross, 1996 39) For a left-wing 
presidential candidate to stand any chance of winning a presidential election, the divided French left 
needed to develop a common party platform In order build such a platform, Mitterrand adopted a very 
ambiguous public stand on European integration (Haywood, 1993 270, 272) However, even during this 
period, there is evidence of his pro-European stand In 1973, for instance, Mitterrand threatened to resign 
if the Socialist Party did not adopt a more pro-European standpoint (Ross, 1996 39, note 12, cf. Cole, 
1994 118-9). Similar ambitions and strategic reasoning led him to maintain a low profile on the 
European issue in the run up to the 1981 Presidential elections (Cole, 1994· 119-20, Hall, 1987 56, 
Saunier, 2001 466, note 5, 470) With the ousting of the Communists in 1983, however, Mitterrand was 
free again to pursue further European integration (Morray, 1997. 78, 80, 126, Northcutt, 1992 91-2) 
This resulted m increased activity in the European issue-area on the part of the President from 1984 
onwards (Saunier, 2001. 482) In contrast to the 1970s, during the cohabitation period of 1986-1988, 
Mitterrand did maintain his pro-European profile (Cole, 1994 128-30) 
420
 See the relations linking the concepts 'European Integration' (E9), and 'Solving Current Problems of 
the EU' (E8) with the concept 'Europe Standing Together' (E4), as well as the (indirect) relations between 
'Completion of SEA' (SI), 'Development of New European Policies' (D2), 'Full Use of ECU' (E2), 
'Increased Use of Majority Rule' (Ml) and 'Europe's Status Equal to US and Japan' (S4). Moreover, in 
Mitterrand's map, indirect links between several concepts referring to European integration (SI, T l , E9, 
12) and the concept 'Independence of Europe' (12) can be distinguished This concept is positively related 
to the positive values 'Security for Europe' (S6) and 'European Unification' (El). In addition, the US-
European relationship is negatively evaluated (see negative relationships between the concepts 'Europe's 
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integration as serving French interests in general.421 The reasons for Mitterrand's pro-
European stance were thus largely geopolitical. However, Europe could also provide a 
more social model of society than the capitalist model of the US (relation S1-S3-U4-
S5). Mitterrand's overall grand vision of European integration was 'one of social 
democracy on a European scale led by the French' (Ross, 1996: 40; cf. Cole, 1994: 118; 
Haywood, 1993: 274-5; Saunier, 2001: 469).422 
With regard to the form of European integration, Mitterrand's preferences are 
rather ambiguous. On the one hand, he often voiced support for a more federalist 
future for Europe (Haywood, 1993: 274-6; Tiersky, 2000: 161). He also voted in 
favour of supranational arrangements like the ECSC and supported the establishment 
of the European Commission. This positive evaluation of supranational forms of 
decision making can also be discerned in the first cognitive map derived from 
Mitterrand's assertions. Mitterrand distinguishes several concepts referring to 
supranational decision making, and values most of them positively.42' Moreover, the 
concept of'(true) European unification' (El) belongs to the core of his belief system. 
On the other hand, however, there is also evidence that casts doubt on the 
depth of Mitterrand's federalist convictions. His preferences concerning the mode of 
decision making seem to depend on the issue at hand. Mitterrand never fully 
supported the reinforcement of the powers of the European Parliament, for instance 
(Cole, 1994: 125; Haywood, 1993: 276-7),424 while, in the early 1980s, he opposed 
several plans for the development of European institutional arrangements (the 
Genscher-Colombo and Spinelli-plans) (Cole, 1994: 126-7). Moreover, like most 
members of the French political elite, Mitterrand strongly believed in the primacy of 
Need for US Protection' (E5), 'US-European Friendship' (F2) and the positively valued concept 
'Independence of Europe' (II) 
421
 See the relationships between the several concepts referring to European integration and 'General 
Utility', and the 'Utility of France' (Ul , U3), 'Maintaining of CAP' (C3), and the concept 'Developing the 
best in oneself (D3) 
122
 In the literature, a third rationale for Mitterrand's favourable attitude towards European integration is 
mentioned1 Franco-German reconciliation (l'amitiéprivilégiée) (Haywood, 1993: 277-8; Tiersky, 2000' 
162; Ross, 1996· 40; Saunier, 2001 467, 469, 471) However, no evidence of this reasoning is present in 
the cognitive map derived from assertions between 1983 and 1988. In the map derived from assertions 
from 1988 until the fall of the Berlin Wall, this reasoning is present (see Section 8 3 5). 
121
 The concepts referring to supranational modes of decision making that are present in the first cognitive 
map of Mitterrand are. '(True) European Unification' (El), 'Establishment of EMU/ECB' (E3), 'European 
Institutional Progress' (E7), 'Increased Use of Majority Rule/Giving up Part of Sovereignty' (Ml), 
'Political Union' (P4), 'Reinforcement of the European parliament' (Rl), and 'Decision Making by 
Experts' (D6). All these concepts are valued positively except concept 'Reinforcement of the European 
Parliament' (Rl) which has an ambiguous value, and 'Decision Making by Experts' (D6) which is 
negatively valued. 
ilA
 As is shown in his cognitive map, the President linked the prospect of the reinforcement of the 
European parliament (Rl) positively to the concept 'General Utility' (Ul), however, in his mind it was 
not connected to the 'Utility of France' (U3). 
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the political (PI). In his eyes, decision making should be in the hands of national 
leaders rather than in the hands of experts at the Commission (or anywhere else) (D6). 
In fact, the concept of'Political Will', which in the mind of the President referred to 
the decision-making authority of national political leaders, was among the most 
central and salient concepts in his belief system (see Appendix D).425 Overall then, it 
may be concluded that Mitterrand, while probably more inclined to accept 
supranational arrangements than his predecessors, preferred intergovernmental over 
supranational modes of decision making (cf. Cole, 1994: 131). 
Concerning economic policy, one conclusion can be drawn easily: economic 
beliefs do not feature prominently in Mitterrand's belief system.426 On first sight this 
may seem curious, for at least with regard to his macro-economic policy preferences, 
one would expect that a President elected on a highly radical economic program to 
have equally radical economic preferences. However, it seems that the economic ideas 
of Mitterrand, while firmly in the Keynesian camp, were not nearly as radical or 
intense as the policy proposals of his party would lead one to believe.127 
The study of Mitterrand's belief system conducted in this thesis thus supports 
those authors who have raised doubts about the extent of his commitment to the 
radical economic program that landed him in the Elysée. Morray, for instance, has 
noted that Mitterrand - lacking interest in, and knowledge of economic policy making 
"^ In Mitterrand's first map, more concepts referring to intergovernmental modes of decision making can 
be distinguished, and all of them are valued positively, More importantly, not only do two of these 
concepts belong to the core of his belief system, the combined value of the concepts referring to 
intergovernmental decision making is also much higher than that of the supranational concepts. The 
concepts referring to intergovernmental modes of decision making are: 'Full Use of ECU (as reserve 
currency)' (E2), 'European Cultural Integration' (E6), 'European Integration (prior to SEA) '(E9), 'Co-
ordination of Foreign Policies' (Fl), 'Political Integration' (PI), 'Political Will' (P2), 'European 
Integration in the Technical Issue-area' (Tl). Of these, the concepts of'European Integration (prior to 
SEA)' and 'Political Will' belong to the core of Mitterrand's belief system The combined centrality and 
saliency values of the concepts referring positively to supranational decision making add up to a total of 
74, whereas the combined centrality and saliency values of the concepts referring positively to 
intergovernmental (and negatively to supranational) decision making is 114. Due to its ambiguous value, 
the concept 'Reinforcement of European parliament' (Rl , centrality 3, saliency: 3) is omitted from this 
calculation 
'"'' In his map, very few concepts referring to economic or monetary policy making can be distinguished, 
and none of these comes even close to being as central and salient as the concepts that make up the core of 
his belief system. Only two concepts refer to the monetary system: 'Full Use of ECU (as reserve currency' 
(E2) and 'Establishment of EMU/ECB' (E3), and four concepts are present that may give an indication of 
his overall macro-economic ideas: 'Economic Growth' (G3), 'Government Support for Industry' (G4), 
'European Social Space' (S3), 'Unemployment' (U4) None of these concepts comes close to fulfilling the 
criteria to be part of the core of Mitterrand's belief system. 
127
 The economic ideas of Mitterrand - while not central to his belief system - were definitely Keynesian. 
All the concepts referring to macro-economic policies he distinguishes - 'Economic Growth' (G3), 
'Government Support for Industry' (G4), 'European Social Space' (S3), 'Unemployment' (U4) - indicate a 
concern for Keynesian variables and instruments No concepts indicating ordoliberal beliefs can be 
distinguished in his first map 
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— was never the force behind the radical ideas espoused in the 101 propositions. In 
fact, during his 1981 election campaign, Mitterrand distanced himself from the 
program by adopting 'a reassuring tone of moderation' (Morray, 1997: 92). In 
addition, having started his political career as a politician associated with a centre-
right political position (Cole, 1994: 6-7), references to socialist economic policies were 
scarce before 1965. Finally, the economic policy record of his first government, and the 
events surrounding the monetary upheavals of the early 1980s, provide an additional 
indication that Mitterrand's commitment was rather weak. For, as I have shown 
before, during his first three years in the Elysée, Mitterrand abandoned many of the 
economic proposals made in the 101 propositions, giving his pro-European beliefs 
priority over his Keynesian economic preferences (see Section 8.2). After the 
communists had been ousted from the government in 1983, Mitterrand opted for still 
less radical economic policies. The lack of salience of Mitterrand's economic beliefs is 
thus also reflected his willingness to act strategically and be flexible on the issue. 
Despite his lack of knowledge of economics (Bauchard, 1986: 38; Morray, 
1997: 99; Northcutt, 1992: 77, 95), on the question of international monetary 
relations Mitterrand did have a rudimentary preference for fixed exchange rates/2" This 
preference was informed by a desire for a strong franc and the proverb 'to float is to 
sink' (fluctuât et mergitur). As indicated previously, this instinctive preference for fixed 
exchange rates, in combination with his pro-European ideas, resulted in a support for 
the participation of the franc in the EMS (see Section 8.1.1). Only for a few days in 
March 1983, did he seem to waver on this point (Cole, 1994: 103). 
8.4 The Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Politicisation of EMU 
While in early 1989, Kohl was still dragging his feet on the European monetary issue, 
the developments in Eastern Europe in the summer of 1989 changed everything. The 
events politicised the issue of European economic and monetary unification, dealing 
the final blow to the already faltering German division of labour between the political 
and financial elite, and providing a decisive impetus for the establishment of EMU. 
The crucial factor was the remarkable effect that the revolution in Eastern Europe and 
the prospect of German reunification had on the belief system of the German 
Chancellor: it strengthened Kohl's long-standing belief in the need to lock the future 
of Germany irrevocably with that of Europe. 
AM
 While - as stated above - Mitterrand's ideas on international monetary relations were neither salient 
nor central to his views, only concepts referring to fixed exchange rate mechanisms like 'Full use of ECU 
(as reserve currency' (E2) and 'Establishment of EMU/ECB' (E}) can be distinguished 
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8.4.1 And the Wall came down 
When in May 1989, the European member states were preparing for the coming 
discussion on the Delors Report at the Madrid summit, Hungary made a widely 
publicised announcement that it had opened its borders to Austria. Since almost all 
Hungarians were already permitted to travel freely to Austria, the decision had little 
practical effect in Hungary itself (Zelikow and Rice, 1997: 63). However, the 
Hungarians had not paid attention to the consequences of this measure for the citizens 
of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), who were allowed to travel to Hungary, 
but not to the West. By June, a handful of East German tourists tried to reach the 
West via Hungary. Having failed to do so, they had taken refuge in the West German 
Embassy in Budapest and were refusing to leave. By the middle of August, hundreds 
of GDR citizens were arriving in Hungary each week. Unable and unwilling to cope 
with the crisis, the Hungarians opened their borders with Austria to East German 
citizens (Kohl, 1997: 46-9, 51-3; Zelikow and Rice, 1997: 67). By the end of 
September, 40,000 East Germans had fled to the West via this newly opened route 
(Kohl, 1997: 73-6; Zelikow and Rice, 1997: 68). 
While the refugee crisis spread, East German protesters started to take to the 
streets demanding political reforms (Beunders, 1990; Kohl, 1997: 88; Zelikow and 
Rice, 1997: 82-6). As a result, on 17 October, the reform-minded Egon Krenz 
replaced Erich Honecker as First Secretary of the East German communist party. The 
new leadership of the GDR started work on plans for a fully fledged political and 
economic reform program. These plans included proposals to allow the East Germans 
to travel to the West (Zelikow and Rice, 1997: 86)/" ; The new law on travel was 
hastily drafted and rubberstamped by the Central Committee of the Socialist party on 
9 November 1989 (Zelikow and Rice, 1997: 99). That same day, the law was 
announced at the end of the daily press conference held by the government. Since the 
exact text of the draft was not available, journalists, diplomats and the population at 
large were left guessing as to what the law actually entailed, and soon rumours spread 
in the streets that all travel restrictions had been lifted. In East Berlin, thousands of 
people set off to the Berlin Wall. Faced with growing crowds demanding to be let 
through, the guards at the border gave way, and allowed thousands of East Berliners to 
cross the border into West Germany. The Wall had come down (Kohl, 1997: 77-81; 
Zelikow and Rice, 1997: 100).1il' 
429
 There are signs that some members of the Soviet delegation that had assisted the East Germans with 
the development of these plans foresaw the momentous events that this provision would cause For, as 
Krenz left Moscow after the deliberations, some of them are reported to have commented, 'there goes the 
committee for the dissolution of the GDR' (as cited in. Zelikow and Rice, 1997' 91). 
1,0
 As Zelikow and Rice rightly noted 'the truth of the matter is that the hapless East German 
government had opened the Berlin Wall by mistake', and that this watershed event in the history of 
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8.4.2 leb Wollte Deutschlands Einheit4ÌI 
Even before the Wall came down, the events unfolding in Eastern Europe had had an 
effect on Chancellor Kohl. Even though in the summer and autumn of 1989 nobody 
foresaw that little over a year the two German states would be reunified, from May 
1989 onwards, the subject of possible German reunification just 'hung in the air' 
(Zelikow and Rice, 1997: 106). As early as March 1989, developments in the East had 
inspired the US National Security Council to reopen discussions on German 
reunification. In a memo to President Bush, it argued that the US Government should 
aim at putting the issue back on the international agenda (Zelikow and Rice, 1997: 
ZS^S).'"2 In line with this new policy, from May onwards President Bush started to 
refer to a possible, future reunification and to voice his support for such a 
development.4,1 The Americans were clearly ahead of the rest of the world, and Bonn 
in particular, with their ideas on German reunification, but their activism had a 
significant impact on the ideas and actions of the German Chancellor in the months to 
come. 
During the spring of 1989, the German government stuck to the Ostpolitik 
initiated by Brandt in the early 1970s. The starting point of this policy was to accept 
the existence of a separate East German state and to promote lasting good relations 
between the FRG and the GDR. Therefore, the government maintained its policy of 
seeking to persuade those East German citizens trying to flee, to stay in the GDR, and 
to use legal channels to come to the West. Meanwhile the West German government 
worked behind the scenes to promote the chances of immigration of those who had 
tried to reach the FRG (Zelikow and Rice, 1997: 66). 
During the summer of 1989, however, the German Question became a 
frequent topic of conversation in the European capitals, especially in Bonn. Chancellor 
Kohl first raised the topic in a personal conversation with Gorbachev during the Soviet 
leader's official visit to the FRG on 14 June. While sitting privately together on the 
bank of the Rhine, Gorbachev emphasised that in his eyes all states, including the 
GDR, were responsible for their own actions, and that the Soviet-Union no longer 
Europe was the result of'one of the most colossal administrative errors in the long, chequered history of 
public bureaucracy' (Zelikow and Rice, 1997 101) 
4,1
 This is the title of Kohl's memoirs on this period (Kohl, 2000). 
412
 The memo read: 'Today, the top priority for American foreign policy in Europe should be the fate of 
the Federal Republic of Germany' 'Even if we make strides in overcoming the division of Europe 
through greater openness and pluralism, we cannot have a vision for Europe's future that does not include 
an approach to the "German question " Here we cannot promise immediate political reunification, but we 
should offer some promise of change, of movement' (Zelikow and Rice, 1997: 28) 
^ Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, Bush referred to German reunification in public speeches, 
comments to the press and during talks with foreign leaders at least eight times (16, 19, 20, and 27 May, 
18 and 26 September, 23 and 24 October). US Secretary of State, Baker, raised the topic on - amongst 
others - 8 and 16 October (see www.2plus4 de on respective dates, Zelikow and Rice, 1997 24, 28-9, 35, 
80-1,93-6). 
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wished to interfere in their internal matters (Kohl, 1997: 29). Moreover, according to 
Kohl, after a long and emotional conversation concerning their personal experiences 
during the Second World War, Gorbachev declared that the Cold War between the 
Soviet Union and the FRG had come to an end (Kohl, 1997: 32). Whether Kohl's 
representation of Gorbachev's position is accurate or not,434 to the German Chancellor 
this open and intimate talk with the Soviet leader was the 'Schlüsselerlebnis', that 
made him realise that the days of the Cold War were over, and revived his hopes for 
the eventual reunification of Germany (Kohl, 2000: 30-5). 
During the months that followed, Kohl began to instigate a gradual change in 
the government's Ostpolitik in general, and the refugee problem in particular (Zelikow 
and Rice, 1997: 66).'<i5 According to Zelikow and Rice, under the influence of the 
crisis and speculation about future German reunification, Kohl's 'emotions welled up', 
and he no longer wanted to 'do what Ostpolitik required' (Zelikow and Rice, 1997: 
79). Step by step, the government moved away from the policy of promoting good 
relations with the East German leadership, actively began to help East Germans reach 
the West, and pressed the GDR for far-reaching economic and political reforms 
(Zelikow and Rice, 1997: 66). This new line of policy was highly controversial within 
the FRG and led to intense discussions in government circles and in the West German 
media. 
Kohl, however, seemed deaf to the dissenting domestic voices. Spurred on by 
the very vocal support coming from the other side of the Atlantic, he 'began to fall 
back on the vocabulary of another time and another leader' (Zelikow and Rice, 1997: 
80). On 22 August, in a statement on the refugee crisis, Kohl publicly announced that 
the German Question was back on the international agenda. Moreover, in a statement 
issued on 9 October, in which he called on the GDR leadership to initiate far-reaching 
political and economic reforms, he declared that the objective of the CDU was to 'auf 
einen Zustand des Friedens in Europa hinzuwirken, in dem das deutsche Volk in freier 
Zelbstbestimmung seine Einheit wieder erlangt' (Kohl, 2000: 101).436 
So, while in the first half of October 1989, the East German leadership was 
developing its reform plans for the GDR, Kohl threw caution and convention to the 
4M
 Gorbachev seems to have had a very different interpretation of what his words to Kohl had meant He 
had told Kohl that 'any change had to respect the historic "realities'", and that he had warned him not to 
try to use the 'transitions in Poland and Hungary to encourage "desrabilization of the situation" (Zelikow 
and Rice, 1997. 68-9) 
4.5
 In Bonn, policy making on the refugee crisis was dominated by a small group of people consisting of, 
amongst others, Chancellor Kohl and his main adviser on international affairs, Horst Teltschik. Genscher 
and the Auswärtiges Amt were excluded from the decision-making circle because intra-German relations 
were classified by the BKA as 'domestic politics' 
1.6
 From August until the fall of the Berlin Wall, Kohl referred at least six times to the possibility of 
German reunification: on August 22, 11 September, 9 and 16 October, 2 and 8 November (Kohl, 1997 
46, 53, 71, 74, Zelikow and Rice, 1997: 80, 92-6, Agence Europe, 16 October 1989 4). 
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wind and began to push the GDR for radical reforms. The objective of this new 
strategy was the abolition of socialism in the GDR, for 'if East Germany lost socialism, 
it would lose the main principled justification for its existence as a separate state' 
(Zelikow and Rice, 1997: 93). To the German Chancellor, the ultimate goal of his new 
policy towards the East was, therefore, the eventual reunification of Germany and 
while nobody anticipated that in December 1990 Germany would indeed be reunified, 
it was clear that during the autumn of 1989 'Kohl was moving' (Zelikow and Rice, 
1997: 93). He was moving in the direction of the dissolution of the German 
Democratic Republic and the reunification of Germany, and while Kohl was moving, 
Adenauer's concept of the Westbindung of Germany resurfaced, and created the critical 
impetus for the project of European monetary unification. 
8.43 Adenauer's Legacy invoked 
As Kohl changed his strategy towards the East, he began referring to European 
integration more frequently. In an interview with the Stuttgarter Zeitung in mid-
October, for instance, Kohl declared that, to his mind, the government's policies 
towards Eastern Europe and those concerning European integration were two sides of 
the same coin, and that 'the more the free part of Europe progresses together, the 
greater will be its attraction and its brilliance for the East' {Agence Europe, 16 October 
1989: 4). Then, on October 23, Kohl called President Bush in order to gain his 
support for the new German Ostpolitik, emphasising that the German Bindung to 
NATO and EC was as strong as ever (DzDPS, 1998, nr.64: 460). Finally, on 8 
November - one day before the fall of the Berlin Wall - Kohl declared before the 
Bundestag that 'wir streben an — und das bleibt Ziel unserer Politik, wie Konrad 
Adenauer es einmal formuliert hat —: "In einem freien und geeinten Europa ein freies 
und geeintes Deutschland'" (www.2plus4.de: 8 November 1989, cf. Zelikow and Rice, 
1997: 95). While the rest of the world stood hesitantly by and watched history unfold, 
the German Chancellor knew exactly what to do: follow the motto of Adenauer and 
seize the opportunity to reunite Germany under a European roof. 
Kohl's new-found determination may be traced back to the peculiar effect the 
revolution in Eastern Europe and the prospect — however faint — of German 
reunification had had on the belief system of the Chancellor. The cognitive map 
derived from Kohl's speeches and interviews held after the fall of the Berlin Wall show 
that, rather than changing his ideas, the events unfolding in Eastern Europe reinforced 
certain long-term and pre-existing beliefs.1" Without exception, his support for 
European integration in general, fixed exchange rates, supranational modes of decision 
1,7
 If one compares the core of Kohl's belief system before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is clear 
that it has remained extremely stable over time The concept stability of the core of Kohl's cognitive map 
is 100% (see Concept Comparison in Appendix E) 
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making, ordoliberal economic policy making and, most importantly, European 
economic and monetary unification, had grown stronger. 
More specifically, it is clear that European integration still constituted the 
pivot of Kohl's belief system after the fall of the Berlin Wall/ 3 8 and his support for 
supranational modes of decision making also became more pronounced.439 Moreover, 
while previously the Chancellor's focus had almost exclusively been on European 
economic unification, after the fall of the Berlin Wall this focus shifted towards the 
political unification of Europe.440 All in all, as events unfolded, the Chancellor seemed 
to feel the need for an even stronger, and more political Westbindung of (a reunited) 
Germany. This reinforcement of Kohl's support for European integration and 
unification is rooted in his ideas on the interdependence of European integration and 
German reunification. As events in Eastern Europe unfolded, ideas relating to the 
revolution in Eastern Europe, what the proper German policy with regard to these 
developments should be, and ideas concerning the possible German reunification grew 
stronger.441 Due to the Chancellor's long-term conviction that European integration 
and German reunification were two sides of the same coin, the increased saliency of his 
ideas concerning German reunification was a natural corollary to the reinforcement of 
his ideas concerning European integration. Therefore, they became far more central 
and salient to the Chancellor's belief system.412 
, , ,
' In addition to all the concepts included in the core of his first map, three additional concepts referring 
to European integration are central and salient enough to be included in the core of Kohl's belief system. 
Moreover, overall more concepts referring to European integration can be distinguished in Kohl's second 
map. In addition to the concepts of'European Integration' (E5), and 'Completion of SEA' (SI), the 
concepts of'Establishment of EMU' (E6), 'Political Unification of Europe' (P2), and 'European 
Unification' belong to the core of Kohl's second cognitive map Moreover, overall, 22 instead of 18 out of 
47 concepts referring to European integration are present in his second cognitive map. 
""
9
 The concept of'Political Unification of Europe' (P2) entered the core of Kohl's belief system as the 
third 'supranational' concept. The concepts referring to supranational decision making in Kohl's second 
map include 'Establishment of EMU (E6)', 'European Unification' (E9), 'Political Unification of Europe' 
(P2), 'Strengthening of the European Parliament' (R3) The sum of their centrality and saliency values 
amounts to 99 (55 if concept E6 is omitted), while the sum of the values of the intergovernmental 
concepts is 24 In the first map, these values were respectively 46 (33 if E6 is omitted) and 38 Overall, 
this warrants the conclusion that the Chancellor's preference for supranational modes of decision making 
had been strengthened 
1 ω
 See concepts 'Political Unification of Europe' (P2) and 'Strengthening of the European Parliament' 
(R3) 
" ' The centrality and saliency of the concept referring to the reunification of Germany (P4) doubled and — 
together with the previously non-existent concept 'Reforms in Eastern Europe' (R2) — entered the core of 
Kohl's belief system Moreover, Kohl now explicitly mentioned 'German Policy towards Eastern Europe' 
(G8) in his speeches and interviews. 
4A2
 The exact same reciprocal relations between 'European integration' (E5) and 'European unification' 
(E9) on the one hand and 'German reunification' (-P4) on the other can be distinguished in Kohl's first 
and second cognitive map. In addition to the above mentioned interdependence between the concepts 
'European Integration' (E5) and 'European Unification' (E9) and 'German reunification' (-P4), in Kohl's 
second map, the concepts 'Germany in the Western alliance' (G6), 'European Economic Co-operation' 
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While events were taking place, a comparable reinforcement became apparent 
in Kohl's preferences concerning the form of the European monetary system, macro-
economic policy and his belief in the primacy of the political. It may be concluded 
from the second cognitive map that the value Kohl attached to the establishment of 
EMU in terms of centrality and saliency more than doubled.4,13 Moreover, Kohl's ideas 
concerning the primacy of the political became more pronounced, for, on average, the 
macro-economic beliefs declined in centrality and saliency in comparison to the 
concepts referring to European integration. However, taking a more political outlook 
on the world did not imply that Kohl experienced a change in the substance of his 
macro-economic ideas. In fact, as the centrality and saliency rates of his various macro-
economic beliefs show, if anything, the Chancellor's beliefs became more 
ordoliberal.^1 
8.4-4 Pohttasation of EMU: How Kohl Outmanoeuvred the German Financial Elite 
As the revolutionary developments in Eastern Europe unfolded, they changed the 
political landscape, strengthened the German Chancellor's beliefs, and, as a result, the 
issue of European economic and monetary unification was politicised. As the 'grandson 
of Adenauer' (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 257), Kohl perceived the possible demise 
of the GDR and German re-unification as having direct consequences for his prime 
(geo)political goal of German Westbindung, and therefore on the issue of European 
economic and monetary unification (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 308). In light of 
these developments, he was finally willing to follow his lifelong convictions, take the 
future of Germany in his own hands, and confront the German financial elite. In 
addition, in the months to come, it became painfully clear to the Chancellor that, 
despite Germany's longstanding commitment to the Western alliance in general and 
the European project in particular, old fears of an Alleingang of Germany re-emerged 
(ElO), 'European Political Co-operation' (El 1), and 'Germany in the EU' (G2) lead into the concept 
'German Reunification' Moreover, he also perceived the 'Political Unification of Europe' (P2) to follow 
from German reunification In addition, in his second map the concept 'German East-European Policies' 
(G8) has a similar reciprocal relation with the concept 'German European Policies' (G7) as the one 
described above Moreover, in the eyes of the Chancellor the fact that 'Germany is part of the Western 
alliance' (G6), 'European economic cooperation' (ElO) and 'European political co-operation' (El l ) informs 
'German policy making towards Eastern Europe' (G8) 
lf
 ' See concept E6 with a centrality of 14, and saliency of 30 
AAJi
 The sum of the centrality and saliency values of the concepts in the second cognitive map that refer to 
Kohl's 'Keynesian' macro-economic beliefs — European Social Development' (EH),'Social-economic 
Development' (Sì), and 'Increased Purchasing Power' (Wl) - as well as his 'ordoliberal' economic beliefs 
- '(European) Central bank Independence' (CI), 'Credibility of the EMU/EURO' (Ci), 'Not Fixing an 
early Start Date for the IGC' (Hi) , 'Expansionary Governmental Policy' (-L1), and 'Price Stability' (PI) -
are respectively 15 and 50 Those in the first map were 23 and 59· However, the relative value of the 
ordoliberal concepts has grown with respect to the previous map they now have an average centrality and 
saliency score of λ ? times as opposed to 2 6 times the score of the Keynesian concepts 
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with some force in other European capitals. As a result, he had to reassure his Western 
partners that German loyalty to NATO and EU was stronger than ever (Bitterlich, 
1998: 113). 
The first signs of the new BKA assertiveness were noticeable during a 
discussion between Kohl and Andreotti, the Italian Prime Minister, on 18 October 
1989, just as Kohl was developing his new policy towards the GDR. During this 
conversation, Kohl stated that, given the developments in Eastern Europe, a discussion 
on the future of Europe had to take place during the forthcoming summit in 
Strasbourg. The Chancellor's vision of the future included an irrevocably binding of 
Germany to the Community by means of European political unification, 'damit wolte 
er auch deutlich machen, dass bei uns nicht der Geist von Rapallo wehe' (DzDPS, 
1998: nr. 62: 453). In addition to political integration, Kohl intended to endorse 
further European monetary unification, but indicated that 'diese Fortschritte seien nur 
möglich wenn das Ziel politische Union heisse'. Furthermore, Kohl went beyond the 
intra-German agreement of May 1989, which had made no mention of the timing of 
the IGC (see section 8.2.5), and informed Mitterrand through Bitterlich, personal 
adviser of the German Chancellor on Franco-German relations and European 
integration, that 'der Strassburger Ratsgipfel könne den Beginn der 
Regierungskonferenz fur das zweite Halbjahr 1990 ankündigen, die Ratifizierung der 
Abkommen solle bis 1992 erfolgen' (Küsters, 2003: 298, cf. Weidenfeld as cited on 
www.2plus4.de, 8 Dezember). He thereby eliminated one of the roadblocks he himself 
had put up during the Franco-German consultations of June. 
During the 54th Franco-German Consultation in Bonn on 2 and 3 November 
1989, Chancellor Kohl raised EMU as the central topic of his discussions with 
President Mitterrand and underlined that, in light of the revolutionary developments 
in Eastern Europe, a successful European Council in Strasbourg was of the utmost 
importance.445 Moreover, he suggested that preparation for the upcoming Strasbourg 
Council take place in close co-operation between the Elysée and the BKA for 'in der 
Bundesrepublik laufe aus innenpolitische Gründen eine gewisse Kampagne gegen die 
Währungsunion'. In addition, he stated that he wanted to avoid any dispute between 
Germany and France 'in diesem Kernbereich der europäischen Einigung' (DzDSP, 
1998: nr. 70: 470-473). To that end Kohl had already 'BM Genscher und BM Waigel 
gebeten, diese fragen aus ihren besprechungen auszuklammern'. Finally, Kohl 
reiterated his readiness to agree to a timetable for the IGC on EMU, but in exchange, 
pressed for French agreement on the 'informal arrangement' that this IGC should not 
^
5
 Kohl and Mitterrand also spoke in Pans about the developments in the East and the development of a 
European Economic and Monetary Union on the night of 24 October, but no information about what they 
discussed is available (DzDSP, 1998. nr 70 472, Küsters, 2003: 299). The minutes of the 54'h 
Consultations — which refer to this discussion — suggest however that the timing of the IGC on EMU was 
one of the topics of conversation (DzDSP, nr 70 472; nr 100 565). 
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start before late 1990. For, while the Chancellor was willing to give in on this issue, 
Mitterrand had to understand that the CDU/CSU would find itself in an awkward 
position if Kohl could be publicly accused of having given up the D-mark during the 
coming elections (DzDPS, 1998: nr. 70: 470-473). 
Six days later the Berlin Wall fell. The turbulent developments in Germany 
and the glimmer of hope for German re-unification now made further development of 
European integration more important than ever. In two personal letters, one sent on 
27 November - one day before the presentation of his famous ten-point plan for 
unification'1'16 - and the other on 5 December, Kohl tried to convince Mitterrand of the 
sincerity of his resolve to bind Germany more closely to the Community. Moreover, he 
reiterated his compromise proposition on the timetable for EMU, emphasising that if 
the Council of Strasbourg should take a decision on the starting date of the IGC on 
EMU, the establishment of EMU was irrevocable (cf. DzDPS, 1998: nr. 100, nr. 108, 
nr. I l l : 565-567, 596-600 and 614-615, Bitterlich, 1998: 114-115). 
However, in light of the German domestic resistance to the project of 
European monetary unification, there were limits to the compromises Kohl could 
make. In order to reassure the Bundesbank and the Ministries of Economics and 
Finance, in the letter of 27 November, Kohl voiced the economist concern that the 
large differences in inflation rates among the member states that were caused by some 
states running substantial budgetary deficits, jeopardised the economic convergence to 
be reached in the first phase, and proposed 'verstärkter Bemühungen um 
stabilititätspohtische Konvergenz' (DzDPS, 1998: nr. 100: 614; nr. 100A: 566-7). 
Moreover, Kohl again proposed linking the establishment of EMU to the 
establishment of a genuine European Political Union (EPU).147 The link between these 
unions was aimed at the 'Ruhigstellung innenpolitischer Kritiker' of EMU 'die ene 
Stabilitätsverfall befüchteten' (Küsters, 2003: 300, DzDPS, 1998: nr. 100: 473). 
The French President's reply made it clear, however, that Mitterrand was not 
the least bit interested in EPU (DzDPS, 1998: nr. 108: 597). In fact, he suspected the 
proposal to be 'ein Ablenkungsmanöver und ene Verzögerungstaktik der Deutschen', 
and as a sign that Kohl was not prepared to commit himself to EMU (Küsters, 2003: 
302). Kohl's solemn words about the irrevocability of EMU and German loyalty to the 
Community had not convinced Mitterrand, who during the summit in Strasbourg 
demanded that Kohl provide irrefutable evidence of his resolve to bind Germany 
further to the Community (cf. DzDPS, 1998: nr. 102: 574-577, nr. 108: 597, Agence 
1,6
 Having informed no-one in advance, on 28 November, Kohl presented his Zehnpiwktenplan for the 
future of East Germany and the eventual unification of Germany. With the exception of Washington, the 
plan was not very well received in the capitals of the West and Moscow 
^ The proposal for the establishment of EPU was an elaboration of the calls for the further development 
of the powers of the European Parliament that Kohl had been voicing in the early 1980s and during the 
54'h Franco-German consultations. 
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Europe: 8 December 1989: 4). This is exactly what Kohl did. On December 9, during 
the 'frostiest' summit Kohl ever experienced (Kohl, 1997: l ^ ) , 1 4 8 Mitterrand finally 
received the proof he had demanded. The Heads of State and Government decided that 
the IGC on EMU was to start during the second half of 1990, as Kohl had agreed to in 
October 1989. However, as for the precise form the path towards EMU would take — 
including the status of the future ECB, the rules concerning budgetary discipline, and 
the extent of the accompanying political unification - nothing had yet been 
decided.449 
In a tête-à-tête with the American Minister of Foreign Affairs, James Baker, on 
December 12 1989, Kohl reflected on the events of, and leading up to the Strasbourg 
summit, and acknowledged that, since West Germany was the most significant 
economic power in Europe, and soon its population would be increased by 17 million 
citizens, Germany should join EMU. Moreover, the participation of Germany in 
European Monetary Union was a political necessity because, according to Kohl: 
'er habe seit viele Jahre erklärt, dass wir den weiteren Zusammenschluß Europas 
brauchten. Aber besonders gelte dies für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Schon 
Adenauer habe erklärt, dass das deutsche Problem nur unter einem europäischen Dach 
zu lösen sei. Dies sei auch immer seine These gewesen ... Er frage sich was er denn 
noch mehr tun könne, als beispielweise die Schaffung einer Wirtschafts- und 
Währungsunion mitzutragen. Diese Entschluß habe er gegen deutsche Interesse 
getroffen. Beispielweise sei der Präsident der Bundesbank gegen die jetzige 
Entwicklung. Aber der Schritt sei politisch wichtig, denn Deutschland brauche 
Freunde ... Er gönne gerne Frankreich der Ruhm für den Erfolg von Straßburg, aber 
ohne ihn wäre die Sache dort nicht gelaufen' (DzDPS, 1998: nr. 120: 638). 
8.4-5 A World upside-down: Mitterrand and the Fall of the Berlin Wall 
In contrast to the German Chancellor, the French President's reaction to the rapid 
changes in the summet and autumn of 1989 seems erratic. Rather than reinforcing his 
4
'
18
 The 'frostiness' was largely caused by the fact that Kohl had failed to consult anyone before making 
public his ten-point plan on German reunification Moreover, during the summit Kohl proved unwilling 
(or, as he put it,'unable') to guarantee the Oder-Neisse border (Kohl, 1997. 119; Thatcher, 1993'796-7; 
Zelikowand Rice, 1997: 235). 
n y
 Kohl's main objective during the Strasbourg Council was to secure a statement of all member states 
voicing their support for the developments in Eastern Europe (DzDPS, 1998, nr 94: 543). However, the 
Germans underestimated the hostility and mistrust of their European partners. Eventually, after very 
difficult discussions, the Heads of States and Government agreed to a declaration stating that 'the 
European Council is conscious of the responsibilities weighing on the Community in this crucial period 
for Europe . The Community must live up to this expectation and these demands ... It is in the interest 
of all European States that the Community should become stronger and accelerate its progress towards 
European Union' (Ageme Europe, 10 December 1989 1). During the Strasbourg Council, Kohl stressed the 
need for parallel developments between EMU and EPU, and the need to strengthen the powers of the 
European Parliament (Agence Europe, 9 December 1989: 3). However, the French were again not interested 
(Küsters, 2003 299). 
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pre-existing ideas, 'the earthquake of 1989-90 upset his expectations and calculations' 
(Hoffmann as cited in: Zelikow and Rice, 1997: 97), and caused the President to 
respond in a 'rather disoriented' fashion (Cole, 1994: 162). In fact, Mitterrand's 
reaction appears suspiciously similar to his reaction to the monetary turmoil in 1983. 
For, from the summer of 1989 until January 1990, Mitterrand's reacted with 'small 
touches, oblique statements, contradictory advances and retreats' (Hoffmann as cited 
in: Zelikow and Rice, 1997: 97; cf. Cole, 1994: 162). 
Overall, during these months, Mitterrand oscillated between three reactions 
(Brück, 2003: 116; Cole, 1994: 153). His immediate reaction was apparently one of 
denial. During the weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Mitterrand kept repeating 
his long-term - but theoretical - viewpoint that the German search for unity was 
legitimate and supported by the French state."150 However, when he realised that this 
search was no longer merely a theoretical possibility, fears of a German Alleingang, 
memories of the Rapallo Pact, and the prospect of a Europe dominated by the German 
giant resurfaced in the President's mind. These fears led him to toy with the thought 
of recreating the Triple Entente to balance the growing German threat.451 Finally, the 
last option to circulate in the mind of the French President was that of persisting with 
the plan to bind Germany further to Europe.452 Mitterrand's preferred method for 
achieving this was the acceleration of the establishment of the European monetary 
union. On 20 November 1989, he stated, for instance, that solidarity with Eastern 
450
 This line of thinking was dominant in Mitterrand's views during the summer of 1989 and 
immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall. During this period, Mitterrand repeatedly and publicly 
voiced the opinion that the Germans had a right to self-determination (Brück, 2003 116-7). At the same 
time, however, despite the intense speculation about imminent German reunification in the French media 
and governmental circles, Mitterrand remained unconvinced that reunification was on the agenda, for in 
his eyes the Soviet Union would never allow it (Attali, 1995b. 441, 446, Brück, 2003 116-9, 125, 
Mitterrand, 1996- 143-6) 
4.1
 This second line of thinking seemed to have emerged in late November 1989, after Kohl had presented 
his ten-point plan for the reunification of Germany without having consulted the French President This 
reportedly greatly distressed and infuriated Mitterrand (Attali, 1995b 441; Brück, 2003. 133-6; Cole, 
1994. 153)· With hindsight, Mitterrand denied ever having contemplated creating an alliance with either 
the UK, or the Soviet Union to balance the emerging German power (Mitterrand, 1996) However, the 
evidence supporting the view that he indeed did consider such a strategy seems clear (Attali, 1995b 445, 
Brück, 2003 139-48, Cole, 1994- 153-4; Thatcher, 1993: 793, 796). 
4.2
 From October 1989 onwards, Mitterrand had been calling for further European integration in his 
statements on the legitimacy of the German quest for unity. On 25 October 1989 during a speech to the 
European Parliament, for instance, he proclaimed 'in the name of what could the German people be 
accused for wanting to be reunited·1 . The lesson to be drawn is that the political construction of 
Community Europe must be accelerated' (Agence Europe, 25 October: 3-4, Brück, 2003: 122) Moreover, 
after the 54'', Franco-German summit of 3 and 4 November, Mitterrand stated 'ich glaube dass das 
Streben nach Wiedervereinigung fur die Deutschen legitim ist', and added that 'je mehr sich die 
Ereignisse in Osteuropa überschlagen, desto mehr mussen wir die Europeaische Gemeinschaft 
beschleunigen und starken' (Mitterrand, 1989 #631: 285, Agence Europe, 3 November 1989: 3, 
Mitterrand, 1996. 52-3) 
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Europe also meant 'European Community unity; for while Europe is moving where it 
should move, the community should strengthen and, when necessary, accelerate' 
{Agence Europe, 20 November 1989: 3-5; 7 December 1989: 1). Moreover, the French 
Presidency's goal for the Strasbourg summit was to bind Germany irrevocably to the 
Community by making significant headway towards the establishment of the 
European monetary union (Brück, 2003: 126-30). 
Ultimately, Mitterrand never really made an active choice for one strategy or 
another. However - since Kohl opted decisively for further European unification, 
Mitterrand found himself being led down the familiar, tried and tested track of 
Westbindung by Kohl. From their personal talks in Laiche in January 1990 onwards, 
Mitterrand's brief flirtation with the concept of a Triple Entente was quickly forgotten 
in the face of Kohl's determined quest to build a European roof over a reunited 
Germany and his continuous efforts to convince his friend at the Elysée of his sincere 
allegiance to the European cause. As time passed, it turned out that — as had already 
been shown during the early 1980s - the French President was in fact better at, and 
happier with 'driving on old tracks ... than at setting new ones in new directions' 
(Hoffmann as cited in: Zelikow and Rice, 1997: 97). The French President therefore 
soon settled on the strategy of irrevocably binding a unified Germany to Europe by 
forcing an acceleration of the establishment of the European economic and monetary 
union. This choice is clearly reflected in the cognitive map that was derived from 
Mitterrand's assertions made after the fall of the Berlin Wall.45' 
When analysing Mitterrand's speeches and interviews from 1990 onwards, the 
most striking feature is the prominence of the establishment of EMU in his 
thinking.^ The prospect of establishing European monetary (not economic) union 
influences almost every relationship in Mitterrand's second cognitive map, and lies at 
the root of the differences between the second and the first map. At first sight, 
Mitterrand's general evaluation of European integration does not seem to have 
changed: it is still central to his thinking.'155 However, while prior to the fall of the 
Berlin Wall Mitterrand had a fairly broad view of the range of issues the European 
community should encompass, his focus seems to have narrowed significantly over 
time. From the early 1990s onwards, his beliefs on Europe are dominated by ideas 
concerning further monetary and political integration.'156 His preoccupation with 
'"
,
 The speeches and interviews studied in this section all date from the period after Mitterrand had 
settled on his ultimate strategy of how to deal with the impending German reunification. 
^ Not only does the French President distinguish 7 separate concepts directly referring to EMU, but 4 of 
these - 'Establishment of EMU/ECB' (E3), 'Maastricht decisions' (M4), 'Single currency' (S9), and 
'Speeding up of EMU-process' (VI) - dominate the core of his belief system 
4,5
 Again, the majority of concepts in the core of his belief system refer to European integration. 
Moreover, all concepts referring to European integration (in any form) are valued positively. 
456
 See concepts E3, M4, VI, S9,13, V2, O l , V3, T2, E12 on monetary integration, and concepts M4, PI , 
R l , E7, P4, Fl on political integration. 
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European monetary unification, and - too a lesser extent — European political 
integration seems to have colonised his belief system, replacing almost all references to 
integration in other issue-areas. This constitutes a substantial change in comparison to 
Mitterrand's first cognitive map.457 
The salience of the establishment of EMU in Mitterrand's thinking after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall is also apparent in his beliefs concerning the exchange rate 
mechanism and his preferred European mode of decision making. For, while it is clear 
that Mitterrand still held a clear preference for fixed exchange rates after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, with time, this preference became far more salient.'158 In addition, his 
preferences regarding the form of European integration also changed. While the study 
of his assertions prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall indicates that — overall — 
Mitterrand preferred intergovernmental modes of decision making, his second 
cognitive map shows a clear preference for supranational forms of European 
integration.'159 Mitterrand's appreciation of supranational decision making seems, 
however, to result entirely from his desire to establish a European monetary union, for 
his evaluation of supranational decision making in non-monetary issue-areas actually 
decreased.460 The changes in Mitterrand's belief system on the issue of exchange rate 
4 , 7
 The stability of the core of Mitterrand's belief system is extremely low The single concept stability of 
the core of his first cognitive map is 0%, meaning that none of the concepts that belonged to the core of 
his first map ended up in the core of his second cognitive map This figure may, however, overstate the 
volatility of Mitterrand's beliefs, for as indicated above, as in the first map, the core of the second map is 
dominated by concepts referring to European integration (see also below) 
i , s
 Not only can five times as many concepts referring to exchange rate arrangements be distinguished in 
the second map compared to the first, but the centrality and saliency measures have on average more than 
tripled The concepts referring to exchange rate arrangements are 'Establishment of EMU/ECB' (ES), 
'EMS' (El 2), 'Start of EMU on 1-1-99' (13), 'Maastricht Decisions' (M4), 'Irreversible EMU' (Ol), 
'Speculation' (-S11), 'Single Currency' (S9), 'Adhesion of all Member States to EMU' (T2), 'Speeding up of 
EMU Process' (VI), and 'EMU Preparations' (V2) The average centrality and saliency rates of these 
concepts are 6 2 and 9 1 (5 4 and 8 when concept E6 is omitted), while prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall 
the rates were 2 and 2 
1 , 9
 All concepts referring to intergovernmental decision making in the core of his first cognitive map are 
replaced by concepts relating to supranational decision making Moreover, the supranational concepts 
rank more highly on average than the intergovernmental concepts in terms of both centrality and 
saliency In addition, any ambiguity concerning the desirability of the reinforcement of the powers of the 
EP (Rl) has disappeared The supranational concepts include '(True) European Unification' (El), 
'Establishment of EMU/ECB' (Ε3), 'European Institutional Progress' (E7), 'Start of EMU on 1-1-99' (H), 
Increased use of majority rule/giving up part of sovereignty' (Ml), 'Maastricht Decisions' (M4), 
'Irreversible EMU' (Ol), 'Political Union' (P4), 'Reinforcement of European Parliament' (Rl), 'Single 
Currency' (S9), 'Speeding up of EMU-process' (VI) These concepts have an average centrality and saliency 
rate of 5 1 and 8 3 (4 3 and 7 2 if concept E3 is omitted) The intergovernmental concepts include 
'European Integration (prior to SEA)' (E9), 'EMS' (El2), 'Co-ordination of Foreign policies' (Fl), 'Political 
Integration' (PI), 'Political Will' (P2), and Completion of SEA (SI) These concepts have an average 
centrality- and saliency value of 2 7 and 3 8 respectively. 
""'" If one omits the concepts referring to EMU, it becomes apparent that Mitterrand distinguishes exactly 
the same supranational concepts as prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall Moreover, apart from the concept 
referring to political union (P4) these concepts all rank significantly lower in terms of centrality and 
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arrangement, as well as the form of European decision making, are thus a direct result 
of Mitterrand's newly found preoccupation with the establishment of European 
monetary union. 
The only preference that seems unaffected by the changes caused by 
Mitterrand's focus on the establishment of EMU is his preference for Keynesian macro-
economic policy. His second cognitive map shows beyond any doubt that the pressure 
exerted by the German financial elite for a more economist and ordoliberal approach to 
EMU was wasted on the French President. For, the few statements he made on 
economic issues reflect a strong Keynesian outlook.461 Moreover, as stated above, 
Mitterrand still made hardly any references to any form of European economic 
integration in his statements and, if he did, emphasised the monetarist concern for an 
early start and completion of the IGC on EMU.462 
All in all, it must be concluded that Mitterrand's beliefs changed substantially 
under the influence of the revolutionary developments in Eastern Europe. The 
volatility of Mitterrand's beliefs on European monetary unification is, however, easily 
overstated. Mitterrand had been a proponent of the establishment of European 
monetary union long before the Berlin Wall fell. Moreover, as in the case of Helmut 
Kohl's belief system, the changes in Mitterrand's preferences concerning European 
integration, and the form of the exchange rates mechanism constituted a change in 
degree rather than substance. In addition - in contrast to Pompidou and De Gaulle -
Mitterrand had never cherished any heartfelt or principled objections to supranational 
modes of decision making. Therefore, the supranational mode of decision making 
implied in the establishment of an EMU fell on relatively fertile ground. Finally, 
Mitterrand's macro-economic beliefs proved resilient in the light of the changing 
geopolitical situation. As in the early 1980s, they remained essentially Keynesian and 
monetarist despite external pressure. 
saliency than before. In addition, the average value of concepts referring to non-monetary supranational 
decision making in the second map, is in fact slightly lower that the average value of the concepts 
referring to intergovernmental decision making The concepts referring to non-monetary supranational 
decision making include the concepts El , E7, Ml , P4, Rl and their average centrality and saliency values 
are 3 2 and 3 0. The average values of these same concepts in the first cognitive map amounted to 5 and 
8 } 
461
 While Mitterrand has incorporated the concept of'sound money' into his belief system, he 
distinguishes even more concepts indicating a Keynesian outlook on economic policy than before. 
Moreover, these concepts have a higher average value. In addition to the concepts 'Economic Growth' 
(G3), 'European Social Space' (S3), and 'Unemployment' (U4), which were present in Mitterrand's first 
cognitive map, the following Keynesian/monetanst concepts are included in the second map: 'Start of 
EMU on 1-1-99' (13), 'Social Justice/Equality' (S7), 'Speeding up of EMU Process' (VI), and 'Fixing of the 
Schedule of the IGC' (V3) The average centrality and saliency values of these concepts are 3 7 and 5.4 as 
opposed to 1 75 and 2.25 in the first cognitive map. 
4i
'
2
 The presence of concepts like 'Start of EMU on 1-1-99 (13), 'Speeding up of EMU Process' (VI), and 
'Fixing of the Schedule of the IGCs' (V3) in Mitterrand's second map, indicates a profoundly monetarist 
outlook on European monetary unification 
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8.5 Showdown: The IGC and its Preparation 
The commitment of Kohl and Mitterrand to the European ideal was ultimately 
reinforced by the fall of the Berlin Wall (Cole, 1994: 156). However, in the 
subsequent months, the leaders' respective commitments continued to differ with 
respect to the details. The Chancellor's preferred strategy was to bind Germany to 
Europe through the establishment of European monetary union within the framework 
of European Political Union. The French President, however, was not interested in 
European Political Union and advocated the acceleration of the establishment of a 
European Central Bank. Moreover, in the meantime, Kohl's resolve to place (a 
reunited) Germany under a European political and monetary umbrella, and talk of the 
acceleration of the process leading towards EMU, made the members of the German 
financial elite increasingly apprehensive. 
8.5.1 EPU, EMU, and the Elysée-BKA Engine 
Now that Strasbourg had shown the Germans the depth of the distrust of their 
European partners, allaying the fears that had taken hold of the Elysée was one of the 
most important issues on the Chancellor's mind. As a result, in the period following 
the summit, Kohl tirelessly persisted in his attempts to eliminate the French distrust 
with regard to the German intentions. During their conversations at Mitterrand's 
country house in Latché on 4 January 1990, for instance, Kohl once again evoked 
Adenauer's famous quote - 'die Deutschen Probleme könnten nur unter einem 
europäischen Dach gelöst werden' - and emphasised that developments in Eastern 
Germany were no hindrance to the European integration process (DzDPS, 1998, nr. 
135: 683). In addition, during the weeks thereafter he tried to reassure the President 
that 'everything which is taking place in Germany is occurring geopolitically at the 
centre of Europe' and promised to 'accelerate the rate of work, also because of what is 
happening in Germany' (Kohl, 1990a: 1-2, cf. Agence Europe, 24 March 1990: S).46' 
However, Strasbourg had shown that mere protestations of German loyalty 
were not enough to reassure the French President. In his eyes, 'the acceleration of the 
European process must accompany the acceleration of the inter-German process' 
(Agence Europe, 15 February 1990: l).4M Having settled the issue of the starting date of 
the IGC on EMU, in the mind of the French President this acceleration also implied 
"'' For further assertions of German loyalty to the European project made by the German Chancellor, see 
Ageme Europe, 4 January 1990 λ; 18 January 1990 6, 6 February 1990: 3; 24 March 1990 3; 10 May 
1990; 1 1 mei 90, 16 mei 90 3-5, Bulletin des Presse- und Informations Amt der Bundesregierung, nr 58' 453-
7; DzDPS. 1998, nr. 192 860-861; nr 203 910, nr. 218: 945. 
4 ω
 For further calls for the acceleration by Mitterrand during the first months of 1990 see, Agence Europe, 
30 January 1990 4, 15 February 1990 1,6, 26 March 1990 5-6, DzDPS. 1998, nr 187 849, nr. 203. 
910 
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the fixing of an end date for the IGC.465 The date he had in mind was mid-1991 (Agence 
Europe, 26 March 1990: 5-6). Moreover, the President had every intention of holding 
the German Chancellor to the promise made during the 54th consultations that the 
EMU would be dealt with by means of close co-operation between the Elysée and the 
Β Κ Α φ ζ Ο Μ , 1998, nr. 187: 851). 
While Kohl was willing to agree to the acceleration of the EMU process,466 
domestic resistance put him in a difficult position. Minister Waigel had made it clear 
that, as far as he was concerned, no end date for the IGC could be assured (Agence 
Europe, 9 April 1990: 15). Since the German financial elite had agreed that further 
political integration would be a condition for further economic and monetary 
integration, the Chancellor felt that further political unification could provide the 
vehicle with which to appease domestic opposition. 'Aufgabe der D-mark gegen 
Zustimmung Mitterrands zum Durchbruch in Fragen der Politischen Union', held the 
potential to appease the domestic opposition and Mitterrand at the same time 
(Küsters, 2003: 309). 
During a conversation between Kohl and Mitterrand on 15 February, Kohl 
repeated his proposals of late 1989 to intensify European political integration. This 
time, the French President did pay some lip service to the Chancellor's plans for - as 
he put it - a European 'Confederation' (DzDPS, 1998, nr. 187: 849), but 'an einer 
substantiellen politischen Reform zeigte die französische Regierung kein sonderliches 
Interesse' (Küsters, 2003: 309).467 In fact, Mitterrand still suspected EPU to be a 
means to divert attention away from EMU.468 However, the opportunity of a quid pro 
quo clearly manifested itself: if Mitterrand supported EPU and provided the Chancellor 
with the much needed ammunition against domestic critics, Kohl would support the 
French leader's calls for a specific end date. On 19 April 1990, the deal was made 
165
 Mitterrand had started to push for the setting of an end date for the IGC on EMU in the course of an 
interview on the French television channel TF1, when he remarked that he was 'not very concerned about 
the opening date of the intergovernmental conference for economic and monetary union the important 
thing is not to know when we will start, but rather when we will finish It is desirable - but this is not a 
diktat - for the conference to conclude in mid-199r (Agence Europe, 26 March 1990: 5-6; cf. 15 February 
1990. 1,6). 
466
 Early February, in a speech before economic symposium in Davos, Kohl had already indicated that he 
supported speedy negotiations on EMU (Ageme Europe, 6 February 1990: 3). 
467
 The French always use the term European Confederation to refer to a rather loose intergovernmental 
European arrangement including most of'geographical' Europe, rather than political union. With 
hindsight, the use of this term seems to have adequately reflected the depth of the French commitment to 
the'German' idea of EPU (Bitterlich, 1998: 119-20; Küsters, 2003. 305). 
46,
' The French lack of interest in the Chancellor's EPU-proposals was so evident that in early April, the 
Germans even suspected that the French 'sich aus der gemeinsamen Initiative klammheimlich 
davonstehlen' (DzDPS, 1998, nr. 243. 1011, Küsters, 2003. 305). 
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public.469 In a letter to the Irish President of the European Council, the French and 
German leader jointly proposed that during the first Dublin Summit to be held on 28 
April 1990, the Heads of State and Government would decide to start a parallel IGC 
on the establishment of a European Political Union.470 They further suggested that 
EMU 'should enter into force on 1 January 1993 after ratification by the national 
parliaments' {Agence Europe, 19 April 1990: 3). Both the proposal for the IGC on EPU 
and on the end date of the IGC on EMU were subsequently formalised during the first 
Dublin summit (Schönfelder and Thiel, 1994: 92).'m 
By agreeing to the ratification date of the EMU, Kohl had effectively made 
the concession on the end date of the IGC on EMU sought by Mitterrand, since the 
IGC would have to be concluded before January 1992 in order to allow for ratification 
of the Treaty before 1 January 1993 (Dyson, 1994: 141). In other words, the BKA had 
again sided with the French against the reluctant German financial elite, and Kohl had 
proven that — even after the fall of the Berlin wall and with the reunification of 
Germany imminent - the European engine was still functioning. In the eyes of the 
German political elite, the point of no return on the road to European economic and 
monetary union had been passed, and the technical details were all that remained to be 
settled. In the minds of the members of the German financial elite, however, the battle 
was only just beginning. 
8.3.2 The German Financial Elite on the Defense 
During the first months of 1990 — after the date for the start of the IGC had been 
decided on and the President and Chancellor were stepping up the pace of the progress 
towards EMU - the West-German financial authorities became apprehensive. If, after 
the publication of the Delors Report, few of the central bankers considered the 
proposals for European economic and monetary unification to be viable (Pohl, 1989: 
131; Schönfelder and Thiel, 1994: 93), things were now developing rather too quickly 
for their taste. In reaction to the developments at the highest political level, they 
began to voice their views and demands more forcefully. In a speech on 17 January 
1990, for instance, Bundesbank President Pohl stressed the need for the ECB to be fully 
independent {Agence Europe, 18 January 1990: 15); subsequently, in a speech before the 
European Parliament's Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee in May, Pohl made 
169
 On } April 1990, Teltschik informed Kohl that 'wir sind der franzosischen Seite insoweit 
entgegengekommen dass die entsprechenden Reformschritte nach Ratifizierung möglichst am 1 
Januar 1993 in Kraft treten sollen' (DzDPS, 1998, nr. 243: 1005, cf Ageme Europe, 2 April 1990 4) 
4
 " The basis of the EPU initiative had already been put on paper in February and developed by the 
Germans during March and April (Bitterlich, 1998. 119). 
Γ ι
 During the summit, Mitterrand had been pushing Kohl to fix a date for the end of the IGC However, 
Kohl was not prepared to a date — let alone to set it to middle of 1991 as Mitterrand was proposing — due 
to domestic resistance to such an agreement (Agence Europe, 9 April 1990. 15, 31 March 1990: 3-4) 
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clear his view that member states had a long way to go before EMU could become a 
reality (Agence Europe, 16 May 1990: 12, cf. Agence Europe, 13 June 1990: 10, Pohl, 
1990a: 31-41). 
After Kohl had overruled the Bundesbank on the issue of the establishment of 
the Intra-German Monetary Union on 1 July 1990,'i72 the scepticism and demands of 
the bank became more vociferous still. The full range of conditions posed by the bank 
for the establishment of European economic and monetary union was outlined in the 
Bundesbank Stellungnahme published in September 1990 (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1990: 
Part. V, Art. 1, 3, Part VI, Art 4). In this document, the German central bank made 
the following demands: full independence for the European and national central banks; 
the ECB to take full responsibility for interventions on the capital market (Deutsche 
Bundesbank, 1990: Part V, Art. 2); member states' entry in the final stage of EMU to 
be conditional upon lasting convergence in inflation, interest rates, and budgetary 
deficits (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1990: Part VI, Art.l); no fixed deadlines for the start 
of stages two and three (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1990: Part VII, Art. 4); and binding 
criteria for budgetary deficits to be included in the treaty. Moreover, the document 
stated that 'aus der Sicht der Bundesbank stellen die vorstehend genannten Eckwerte 
unabdingbare und damit nicht disponibele Anforderungen dar' (Deutsche 
Bundesbank, 1990: Part VIII). In other words, the document was a barely disguised 
warning directed at the German Chancellor that 'if an agreement on EMU did not 
follow these guidelines, the bank would not give up the mark and transfer its rights to 
the new European central bank system' (Cameron, 1996: 64). 
The Bundesbank's increased sense of urgency in protecting its sound economic 
policies was also reflected in the beliefs of its President. Under pressure from Kohl's 
new-found determination and Mitterrand's demands for an acceleration of the 
establishment of EMU, Pöhl's belief system shows a similar change to the one recorded 
in the Chancellor: the preferences dearest to his ordoliberal heart were reinforced. In 
comparison to the cognitive map derived from his speeches and interviews from before 
the autumn of 1989, Pöhl's preference for fixed exchange rates emerges more clearly 
from the assertions he made after 1989·17, In addition, his preference for ordoliberal 
17
-' During the preparations for the establishment of the German Monetary Union in early 1990, a conflict 
arose between the BKA and the Bundesbank concerning, amongst others, the new conversion rate between 
the East and West German currencies For political reasons, the BKA insisted on a conversion-rate of 1:1, 
which in the eyes of the Bundesbank would endanger price stability. Despite fierce opposition by the 
Bundesbank, the conversion rate was eventually set at a rate of 1:1 
171
 While the average value of the concepts referring to fixed exchange rates was lower than in his first 
cognitive map, he perceived no negative consequences to result from any of them, nor did he identify any 
positive consequences to follow from exchange rate adjustments (Rl). The average centrality and saliency 
values of the concepts indicating a preference for fixed exchange rates (so including the negatively valued 
concept Rl) amount to 3.7 and 5 7 (2 5 and 3 2 if concept E6 is omitted) as opposed to 6.3 and 14.3 (3.8 
and 6.6 if concept E6 is omitted) in the previous map. 
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and economist economic policies had clearly become stronger. Whenever the chance 
presented itself, the Bundesbank President stressed the need for maintaining price 
stability (PI, E9), and the need for economic integration to precede any further 
monetary integration (C4, M5) (Pohl, 1990b: 6-8). In addition, he pleaded for the 
implementation of sound budgetary policies (E10, L3, M4) and guaranteeing the 
credibility of the ECB (C6) {Agence Europe, 17 January 1990: 15; 16 May 1990: 12; 11 
June 1990: 10; 13 June 1990: 10; 23 January 1991: 14; 20 March 1991: 13).w These 
were precisely those issues that featured prominently in the Bundesbank statement on 
EMU of September 1990.475 AU in all, it is clear that - if anything - Pöhl's ordoliberal 
views grew stronger over time. 
This clear strengthening of the Bundesbank President's beliefs seems, however, 
to have been indirectly, rather than directly, caused by the fall of the Berlin Wall. The 
timing and substance of the changes indicate that rather than the actual event, other 
decision makers' reactions to the revolution in Eastern Europe caused the 
reinforcement of his beliefs. French calls for acceleration of the project, Kohl's 
tendency to give in to French demands, and the Chancellor's unilateral decisions on 
the shape and form of the Intra-German Monetary Union were the particular factors 
that forced the Bundesbank President to make his views heard more vociferously. 
8.5.3 The three Battles 
The three issues most important to the German financial elite - the independence of 
the future ECB, the rules on excessive budgetary deficits under EMU, and the need for 
significant economic convergence prior to further monetary unification - were the 
pivotal topics of discussion during the preparatory talks and the IGC itself. However, 
despite the fact that the start of the technical preparations of the IGC gave the German 
financial elite ample opportunity to influence the decision-making process, and set the 
'
171
 Over time the value Pohl awarded to the pivotal ordoliberal concept - price stability (PI) - had almost 
tripled. Its centrality rate increased from 5 to 16, while the saliency rate went from 10 to 27 Moreover, 
while on his first map, three concepts associated with a more Keynesian and monetarist economic 
preference could be distinguished, no such concepts are present on the second cognitive map 
Furthermore, the amount of concepts associated with ordoliberal and economist economic thought have 
almost doubled On average, these concepts rank higher in value than in the first map. In addition to the 
concepts 'Economic convergence' (C4), 'ECB with price stability as its primary goal' (E9), 'Establishment 
of a European monetary fund' (-E10), 'Long Process' (L2), 'Financing of Governmental Debts by the ECB' 
(-M4), 'Monetary Integration without Economic Integration' (-M5), 'Independent ECB' (Ol), and 'Price 
Stability' (PI) that also feature in his first cognitive map, the concepts 'Bundesbank policy' (Bl), 'Credible 
ECB' (C6), 'Limited Budgetary Deficit' (L3), and 'Bundesbank's critical attitude towards further European 
integration' (VI) are present on the second map. The average centrality and saliency values of these 
concepts amount to 6 3 and 7 5, while the average values of the ordoliberal/economist concepts in the first 
map were 3.6 and 8. 
175
 Note the increased value of concepts PI and E9, the higher score of concepts C4 and M5, the change of 
heart on the desirability of a European monetary fund (E10) in combination with the addition of concept 
L3, and concept C6. 
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agenda,476 they were only partly successful in securing their demands. Particularly on 
issues where the BKA and the French were teaming up together — such as the 
transition to the second and third stage — the German financial elite was overruled. 
ECB Independence: Primacy of the Economic or the Political? 
One of the major concerns of the German financial elite, especially the Bundesbank, was 
the independence of the future European Central Bank. While agreement on the 
formal independence of the ECB had already been accepted in the Delors Report and 
not subsequently contested,477 during the preparations for the IGC, the actual 
independence of the ECB became an area of contention between the French and the 
German financial elite. This was an area in which the German financial elite were able 
to impose their will with ease. 
In the opinion of the German financial elite, the French assault on the actual 
independence of the ECB came in three guises: its demands for democratic 
accountability on the part of the ECB, the establishment of an economic government, 
and the French proposals with regard to external monetary policy making. Underlying 
these demands was the well-known French view that political considerations should 
take precedence in the process of monetary decision making. Monetary, budgetary and 
fiscal policies were instruments with which to further political and social goals, and 
thus as instruments that properly belonged in the hands of politicians. The German 
financial elite, on the other hand, combined their ordoliberal ideas with ardent support 
for the primacy of economics and wanted to prevent their 'sound' economic ideas from 
falling victim to political interests by keeping decision making in the hands of the 
monetary experts. 
With regard to the democratic accountability of the ECB, the Commission — 
supported by the French — proposed in its March 1990 memorandum that the future 
ECB would issue 'periodic reports to the European Council and to the Parliament as 
well as to hold hearings with the latter' (Commission of the European Communities, 
1990: Part IV, art. 1.1). To the German monetary experts, however, such a provision 
was an open invitation for politicians to interfere in their domain (cf. Agence Europe, 
10/11 September 1990: 5; 12/13 November 1990: 16). As they saw it, the ECB 
needed no additional democratic legitimacy, for it would have been ratified by 
4 7 6
 For the most part, the preparations of the IGC were conducted by the experts in the Monetaty 
Committee and the CCBG. Moreover, the decision made in Dublin to open a second IGC on EPU, shifted 
'part of the attention to Political Union and leaving the preparation for EMU mainly to the finance 
ministers and their advisers' (Iralianer, 1993. 62). In Germany, negonations during the IGC were 
delegated to the Ministry of Finance. 
*
1Ί
 Guarantees for the institutional, operational and personal independence of the future ECB were already 
included in the Delors report, as well as in the March memo of the Commission and the report of the 
Monetary Committee. During the ECOFIN meeting at Ashford Castle on 31 March and 1 April 1990, all 
member states except the UK formally agreed to these provisions (Schonfelder and Thiel, 1994: 91). 
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national parliaments. Moreover, due to the adoption of price stability as its primary 
goal, its policies would enjoy a high level of output legitimacy (Monetary Committee 
of the Communities, 1990: Part B, Art. 32-3; Schönfelder and Thiel, 1994: 83). The 
issue was settled in the draft statutes of the ECB the Committee of Central Bank 
Governors presented to ECOFIN on 27 November 1990. It was decided that the ECB 
would present an Annual Report to all institutions of the EU, and would publicise 
'reports on the activities of the System at regular intervals' (Committee of Governors of 
the Central Banks of the Member States of the European Economic Community, 1990: 
Chapter III, Art. 15, 3-4). 
The second French demand that, as far as the German financial elite was 
concerned, would compromise the actual independence of the ECB concerned the 
proposals for the establishment of an economic government as a political 
counterweight to the monetary power of the ECB (Howarth, 2000: 83, Agence Europe, 
8/9 October 1990: 4, 6 December 1990: 11). As the French saw it, ignoring 'the 
parallelism between economic and monetary matters ... could lead to failure' (French 
draft Art. 4-1). From the outset, however, there was little chance that the French 
would be able to secure this demand. The French were also internally divided on the 
issue. The plan for an economic government was introduced by Bérégovoy. While for 
some time the plan enjoyed some half-hearted support of the French President,47" in 
January 1991 the President forced his Minister of Finance to give in and accept the 
formal and actual independence of the future ECB (Howarth, 2000: 143). Moreover, 
the plan for an economic government was never supported by the German Chancellor, 
and even the European Commission expressed reservations on the issue (Mazzucelli, 
1997: 65-6; Schönfelder and Thiel, 1994: 78-9). 
The third French demand that the German financial elite viewed as a potential 
threat to the actual independence of the future ECB was the issue of external monetary 
policy making.179 It surfaced in the Monetary Committee. On the one hand, the 
German financial elite argued that external monetary relations would have 
consequences for price stability and should therefore be the responsibility of the 
ECB;480 on the other hand, the French argued that, since external monetary policy 
17e
 Howarth suggests that the issue of an economic government 'provided a useful bargaining chip in the 
negotiations with the Germans' (Howarth, 2000. 143) 
179
 This included the fixing of exchange rate and exchange rate regime of the single currency with regard 
to third currencies and interventions on the currency markets. Agreement was reached early in the IGC 
preparations that the daily management of external monetary policy would be in the hands of the future 
ECB (Commission of the European Communities, 1990b· Part IV, Art. 1 4). 
~"
,
'
1
 In the Bundesbankstellungnahme of October 1990, the Bundesbank made it clear that 'Die Geldpolitik 
des EZBS darf nicht durch Entscheidungen im Bereich der äusseren Währungspolitik behindert werden'; 
the ESCB, therefore, should be given the sole responsibility for interventions in capital markets and 
should have codecision rights on all other external monetary policy decisions (Deutsche Bundesbank, 
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would have implications for general economic policy and the relations between the EU 
and third countries, decision making on these issues should remain in the hand of the 
political authorities (Monetary Committee of the Communities, 1990: Part B, Art. 21-
24; Howarth, 2000: 134). This division persisted throughout 1990,'181 and was only 
resolved at the last ECOFIN meeting before the Maastricht summit on 2 and 3 
December 1991, when a partial solution was reached. It was decided that the general 
guidelines for external monetary policy were to be set by ECOFIN, but would not be 
binding. In Maastricht, the phrase was added that 'these general orientations shall be 
without prejudice to the primary objective of the ESCB to maintain price stability' 
(EU Treaty, 2002: Art. 109, 2; Schönfelder and Thiel, 1994: 142). 
On the whole, the BKA did not get involved in these technical issues. As a 
result, the discussions took place between the French and the German financial elite, 
with the German financial elite managing to impose their will. They would, however, 
prove less successful in this respect on the second issue at stake during the IGC and its 
preparations: the rules concerning budgetary deficits under EMU. 
Budgetary Policy: Sound Economics or Freedom of Action 
The second major concern for the German financial elite during the preparatory talks 
and the IGC were the rules concerning excessive budget deficits under EMU. On this 
issue, the German Minister of Finance and the Bundesbank faced not only the French, 
but to a lesser extent, the BKA. The West-German financial elite insisted that 
avoiding excessive deficits should be an obligation laid down in a quantitative treaty 
text, and 'insisted on binding rules and sanctions, arguing that otherwise excessive 
deficits were to be expected, overburdening monetary policy' (Szâsz, 1999: 159)· 
Additionally, they pleaded for the adoption of the German 'Golden Rule' on 
budgetary policy, which implied that a government's yearly deficit should not exceed 
1990 Part V, Art. 2f). This position was voiced by its President throughout 1990 (Ageme Europe, 12/13 
November 1990: 16; 3/4 December 1990. 5-6). 
^
f
" In the draft statutes of the ESCB and ECB of 27 November 1990, the CCBG reported the difference of 
opinion on the level of participation of the ECB in exchange rate decisions vis-à-vis third countries 
However, by then most members were arguing for a mere consultative role for the ECB (Committee of 
Governors of the Central Banks of the Member States of the European Economic Community, 1990 15-
6). The disagreement was also apparent at the ministerial level (Agence Europe, 3/4 December 1990: 5-6). 
The French draft treaty submitted to the IGC in early 1991 stated that 'the Council shall lay down 
guidelines for the Community's exchange-rate policy' after having consulted the ECB (French 
Government, 1991. Chapter 3, Art 2). Furthermore, it was proposed that the Council would also set the 
guidelines for the administration of foreign-exchange reserves, and interventions on the capital markets 
(French Government, 1991 • Chapter 3, Art 3) However, the German draft stated that the Council would 
take unanimous decisions on the exchange rate system, and decisions on the central rates after having 
consulted the ECB, in order to ensure compatibility with the goal of price stability. The ECB would be 
responsible for interventions with regard to third currencies (German Government, 1991' Art 109C, 1-
2) 
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its expenditures on investments (cf. Agence Europe, 27 April 1990: 11). This strictly 
quantitative position was, however, controversial within the West-German 
government; the BKA, for example, was prepared to interpret monetary prudence in a 
more flexible way, if this would enable them to gain political or geopolitical benefits 
from the bilateral negotiations with the Elysée. 
During the whole of 1990, the German financial elite continued pressing for 
quantitative and binding rules on budgetary discipline (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1990: 
43). The Monetary Committee, which was in charge of working out the budgetary 
sections of the future treaty during the IGC, supported this view (Monetary 
Committee of the Communities, 1990: 2-3). The French and the Commission, 
however, rejected both quantitative and binding budgetary rules (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1990b: Art. 2.2). Moreover, the precise definition of 
'excessive budgetary deficit' and the sanctions on exceeding such a limit remained 
under discussion.4"2 
Negotiations on the issue dragged on throughout 1990, compelling the 
French President to intervene. During the 56th Franco-German Consultations on 17 
and 18 September 1990, Mitterrand complained to Kohl about the uncompromising 
attitude of the German financial authorities in the preparatory negotiations on EMU. 
During the preparations for the subsequent Rome Summit and the start of the IGC, 
Kohl renewed his promise of close co-operation between the BKA and Elysée (DzDPS, 
1998: nr. 424: 1545), and in keeping with this promise, a few days before the start of 
the IGC, Kohl and Mitterrand held a working dinner to examine the agenda of the 
European Council 'point by point'. Moreover, the two political leaders repeated their 
resolve to tackle the remaining issues 'on a concordant basis' (Agence Europe, 7 
December 1990: 3). 
Despite Kohl's intervention, the German financial elite managed to include an 
unspecified but quantitative definition of excessive deficit in the German draft treaty 
that was submitted to the IGC in February. Moreover, the German draft pleaded for 
deficit ceilings to be mandatory (German Government, 1991: Art. 105B). Again, the 
Monetary Committee supported these proposals and, during the spring of 1991, 
proposed the relatively stringent reference values of 3% and 60% of GDP concerning, 
respectively, the budget deficit and government debt (Monetary Committee of the 
Communities, 1991: 3). However, unlike the German draft (and that of the 
Luxembourg Presidency), no such quantitative and binding clause on excessive deficits 
was included in the proposals presented by the Commission on the eve of the IGC 
4B2
 Early in the negotiations, agreement was reached to forbid monetary financing of budgetary deficits, as 
well as on the provision that neither the Community nor other member states was obliged to bail out a 
member state with budgetary problems (the no-bail-out provision) The formal decision on the ban on 
monetary financing and bail out was made during the ECOFIN meeting at Ashford Castle on 31 March 
and 1 April 1990 (Schonfelder and Thiel, 1994. 91) 
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(Commission of the European Communities, 1990c Art 3 3, Luxembourg Presidency, 
1991, Commission of the European Communities, 1990a Art 104), nor in the almost 
identical French draft treaty (French Government, 1991 Art 1-4) 
During the informal ECOFIN Council in Apeldoorn on 23 September 1991, 
the Ministers of Finance adopted the proposals of the Monetary Committee, but 
decided that the upper limits it had laid down should not be applied indiscriminately, 
and that the debt-quota (60%) should take into account the direction in which the 
budget deficit was developing, as well as possible 'special circumstances' Anxious to 
secure a successful conclusion to the IGC during their Presidency, the Dutch 
'ordoliberal' government included these provisos in its Presidency proposal on EMU of 
28 October 1991 (Szâsz, 1999 159-60) 
The rules, however, were to be hollowed out even further After Apeldoorn, 
the Italian delegation also advocated making the reference value concerning the 
budget deficit (3%) more dynamic, arguing that it ought to take into account the 
possible 'temporality' and 'exceptionality' of a deficit Not surprisingly, the French 
delegation supported these Italian proposals Fearing that discussion on this issue 
would manoeuvre Chancellor Kohl in an isolated position vis-à-vis Mitterrand during 
the coming negotiations in Maastricht, and to the dismay of the Bundesbank, the West-
German chief-negotiator on EMU, Horst Kohler, decided that he had no choice but to 
go along with the Italian proposals (Van Riel and Metten, 2000 59) Accepting a 
more flexible definition of excessive deficits meant that the aim to incorporate a 
strictly quantitative regime for the maintenance of budgetary discipline among states 
participating in EMU had become an illusion In spite of the wishes of the German 
financial elite, the rules that constituted what was known as the excessive deficit 
procedure in the Treaty of Maastricht were thus flexible, not binding and entirely 
intergovernmental (EU Treaty, 2002 Art 104C) 
Transitions to Stage 2 and 3 Convergence or Irreversibility 
The third and most salient and political issue during the IGC and the preparations 
preceding it, concerned the transfer to stages 2 and 3 On these issues, the German 
financial elite faced the combined resolve of the German Chancellor and the French 
President While - according to the political leaders — the exact timing of the start of 
the second and third phase was immaterial, the setting of a deadline for the start of the 
two subsequent stages of EMU was a vital step in ensuring that development towards 
EMU was irreversible Moreover, in order to prevent the establishment of EMU from 
being postponed indefinitely, it was essential that the criteria for the transition to 
subsequent stages were not too strict (Schonfelder and Thiel, 1994 104) 
The German financial elite, however, were strongly opposed to the setting of 
deadlines for the entry of the member states into the second and third stage of EMU 
In their view, prior to making any decisions on further monetary unification, the 
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independence of the national and European central banks, as well as sufficient 
economic convergence between member states would have to be achieved. Deciding on 
a transition to the second or third stage, which involved the implementation of further 
monetary measures, without the fulfilment of such guarantees would endanger price 
stability. They therefore advocated strict, binding and quantitative conditions for the 
transition to both the second and the third stage. 
As for the transition to the second stage, in its report to ECOFIN of early 
March, the Monetary Committee was in agreement with the German position and 
spoke out in favour of making progression to this stage dependent on the fulfilment of 
objective criteria like a high degree of price stability, no excessive deficits, 
participation in the narrow bands of the ERM, and sufficient economic convergence 
(Schönfelder and Thiel, 1994: 97). This, however, proved unacceptable to the French, 
who advocated a quick transition from the first to the second stage, and a fixed 
deadline for the transition in order to prevent the first phase from being prolonged 
indefinitely {Agence Europe, 24/25 September 1990: 1; 10/11 September 1990: 5-8). 
In its August communication, the Commission sided with the French and 
proposed 1 January 1993 as the starting date for a short second stage with a genuine 
'substantial content' (Schönfelder and Thiel, 1994: 98). However, these proposals were 
totally unacceptable to the German financial elite. At an informal ECOFIN in Rome 
on 8 September 1990, Minister Waigel argued that the second stage ought only to 
begin after significant economic convergence had been reached and all national central 
banks were fully independent, while Bundesbank President Pohl stressed that no 
deadlines for the start of stages 2 and 3 could be set {Agence Europe, 10/11 September 
1990: 5-8, cf. Schönfelderand Thiel, 1994: 96, 100).^ 
The position of the German financial elite was however not supported by the 
German political elite. During the first months of preparations for the IGC, Genscher 
sided with his colleague and friend, Roland Dumas, and publicly spoke out in favour 
of a starting date of 1 January 1993 (Schönfelder and Thiel, 1994: 104). Moreover, 
exactly two weeks after the official reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990, Kohl 
intervened.181 On 18 October 1990, during an interview on French television, Kohl 
cast the objections of the financial authorities aside, and announced that the second 
stage would start on 1 January 1994 {Agence Europe, 18 October 1990: ó).185 
The decision in favour of an early start for the second stage was formalised by 
the member states during the first Rome summit of October 1990 (European Council, 
^ In addition, the Germans argued against any new institutions to be established in either phase one or 
two. 
'"' One day earlier, Bundesbank President Pohl had reiterated his opposition to setting a date for the start 
of the second stage (Ageme Europe, 17 October 1990 7) 
"" While agreeing on the need to advance the start of the second stage, Genscher and Kohl clearly did not 
see eye to eye on the date of this advancement. 
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1990: 3). In order to appease the German financial elite, Kohl made sure some minor 
conditions for the admittance of member states to stage 2 were included (Mazzucelli, 
1997: 70).486 However, this did not change the significance of the decision that had 
been made. The transfer to the second stage would be automatic and irreversible and, 
as such, 'the acceptance of 1 January 1994 as the date to start Stage Two was a 
triumph of politicians over technical experts' (Mazzucelli, 1997: 80).487 What 
remained to be decided was the transition to the third stage. 
In its report of August 1990, the Commission proposed that transition to the 
third stage should be preceded by a political decision made by the European Council 
(Schönfelder and Thiel, 1994: 98). Prior to that, an evaluation of certain minor 
conditions, like a limited degree of economic convergence, would have to take place. 
This plan met with resistance from the German financial elite who wanted decision 
making to be in hands of the experts, and to be based on stringent economic 
conditions. This put Chancellor Kohl in an awkward position once again. On the one 
hand, the German financial elite was demanding stringent and binding convergence 
criteria; on the other, the French continued to press him to make a concession on a 
quick transition from second to the third stage {Agence Europe, 24/25 September 1990: 
1). Furthermore, Genscher, had already voiced his support for the start of the third 
phase on 1 January 1997. The predicament of the Chancellor reached a climax at the 
Rome European Council of October 1990, when the French President made fierce 
11,6
 The criteria included the achievement of the single market program, the setting in train of a process to 
ensure the independence of the members of the 'new monetary institution', the preclusion of the monetary 
financing of budget deficits, and the adherence of'the greatest possible' number of Member States to the 
ERM (European Council, 1990 3) 
48
 For a time, the Rome Conclusions seemed to have settled the issue of the second stage However, 
during the IGC it became apparent that the member states had very different interpretations of the Rome 
Conclusions. The differences concerned the nature, mandate and Presidency of the 'new monetary 
institution' to be established during the second stage. In the eyes of the French, the Rome Conclusions 
implied that at the start of the second stage, the establishment of the European System of Central Banks 
would be established which would start to perform the tasks outlined in the Rome Conclusions 
immediately upon its instatement (French Government, 1991: Art. 5.4 & Arr. 5 5). The German draft 
treary, however, proposed that at the start of the second stage 'a Board of Governors of the Central Banks 
of the Member States' would be established with very limited tasks, leaving factual monetary policy 
making and the conduct of interventions on the exchange markets in the hands of the national central 
banks (German Government, 1991 Art. 8E). In addition, a difference of opinion between the French and 
the Germans emerged on the Presidency of the new institution. While the French advocated the 
instalment of a President and Vice President from outside the realm of the Central Banks (in other words, 
politicians), the Germans wanted the institution's President to be one of the Central Bank Governors. 
Both issues were settled in September 1991, when Delors and the Belgian delegation came up with a 
compromise proposal to establish what they called a 'European Monetary Institute' (EMI) with very 
modest policy-making capacities During the Apeldoorn meeting of 23 September 1991, agreement was 
reached on this proposal (Schonfelder and Thiel, 1994: H 3 , 142). The matter of the Presidency of the 
EMI was resolved during the last ECOFIN before the Maastricht Summit. It was decided that the 
President of the EMI would be an outsider, but would be nominated by the Central Bank Governors. 
Moreover, the Vice-President would be one of the Governors of the national central banks. 
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attempts to convince the German Chancellor to agree to a deadline for the transition 
from the second to the third stage. However, Kohl was not yet ready to make more 
concessions (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 396-7). 
With the decision on the issue still pending, the German draft treaty of early 
1991 reflected the views of the German financial elite. The document stipulated three 
convergence criteria to be met by member states in order to participate in stage three: 
a high degree of price stability, acceptable levels of national budgetary deficits, and a 
convergence of interest rates (Mazzucelli, 1997: 112). The contrast with the French 
draft could not have been greater. To the great dismay of the German financial elite, 
the French proposed that the deadline be fixed.488 Discussion on the issue continued 
throughout the year. 
During the Apeldoorn ECOFIN of September 1991, the Ministers of 
Economics and Finance finally came to an agreement on the convergence criteria. It 
was decided that inflation rates should not exceed 1.5 percent of the average of the 
three member states with the lowest inflation rates, and that budget deficits had to 
remain within 3 percent of GDP. In addition, long-term interest rates had to converge 
towards the rates of the best performing member state, and member states wanting to 
join the last stage must belong to the narrow band of ERM. However, the Ministers 
also agreed - with the explicit consent of Waigel and the new President of the 
Bundesbank, Helmut Schlesinger -189 that the criteria would not be applied 
indiscriminately. The manner in which the final decision on the transition to the third 
stage was to be taken remained however open, and would have to be decided at the 
Maastricht summit. 
With hindsight, even before the Maastricht summit, there were signs that the 
final decision would go against the advice of the financial experts. As early as June 
I99I, Kohl went on record voicing his support for 1 January 1997 as the end date for 
the convergence process during a press conference after the Luxembourg European 
Council. Then, during a meeting with Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers only days before 
the Maastricht Council, Kohl had threatened not to sign the Maastricht Treaty if EMU 
was not made 'irreversible' (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 370). In addition, the 
French were preparing a compromise plan designed to enable the German Chancellor 
to overrule the German financial elite. On the evening of 8 December, Mitterrand and 
188
 In April 1991 the Vice-President of the Bundesbank, Hans Tietmeyer, voice his irritation with the fact 
that Delors and the French kept doubting German loyalty to EMU, as well as their insistence on deadlines 
for the second and third stage (Dyson, 1994' 155) 
^ On 15 May 1991, Pohl had resigned from his position as President of the German Bundesbank. Pohl 
stated that he resigned for personal reasons, however, it has been speculated that Chancellor Kohl's 
decisions concerning intra-German monetary union and the acceleration of the development of EMU had 
put the working relation between the two men under severe strain, and that this was the real reason for 
Pohls resignation 
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the Italian Prime Minister Andreotti met to discuss the transition to the third stage. 
They developed a proposal stating that the European Council would agree on 1999 as 
the deadline for creating the ECB. In addition, the plan stipulated that only the 
members that fulfilled the criteria could enter the third stage. However, even if only 
three of the member states fulfilled these criteria, the third stage would start on 1 
January 1999· The implementation of these proposals thus ensured the irreversibility 
of EMU (Mazzucelli, 1997: 174-5). Moreover, it also satisfied the key demand of the 
German financial elite: keeping those members who did not have their economic 
fundamentals in order out of EMU.190 
Eventually, the Heads of State and Government decided on an agreement 
along the lines of the French-Italian compromise: if by the end of 1997 the date for the 
beginning of the third stage had not been set, then the third stage would start on 1 
January 1999 with those member states that fulfilled the quantitative convergence 
criteria decided on by the Ministers of Economics and Finance. The decision would be 
taken by qualified majority, which meant no veto would be possible (Dyson and 
Featherstone, 1999: 447; Schönfelder and Thiel, 1994: 98). All in all, Kohl's resolve to 
bind Germany irrevocably to its European partners had led him to make yet another 
concession to the French. Moreover, 'the Chancellor's acceptance of a timetable with 
fixed dates on EMU was in all ways a personal decision which defied the views of the 
Bundesbank and the German bureaucracy' (Mazzucelli, 1997: 199). 
8.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown that, in contrast to the 1970s, a common interest 
between France and Germany developed during the years 1989 and 1990. More 
importantly, I have demonstrated that, in contrast to what is often argued in the 
literature, this common interest was not caused by any major reversal or 
transformation in the belief systems of the pivotal decision makers involved; rather, 
the common interest that was established was the direct result of the strengthening of 
Helmut Kohl's pre-existing beliefs on the relationship between German reunification 
and European integration, which was caused by the 1989 revolution in Eastern 
Europe. This reinforcement led him to take the future of Germany and EMU in his 
own hands, and defy the scepticism of the German financial elite. 
I have also taken issue with the accounts of the establishment of EMU in 
which the monetary turmoil of the early 1980s is identified as the pivotal learning 
experience on the part of the French political establishment which enabled the 
establishment of EMU. As has become clear, Mitterrand neither underwent a radical 
490
 During the last ECOFIN before the Maastricht summit, Bérégovoy had already made a proposal along 
similar lines. The procedure he proposed also combined a firm timetable for stage three with qualified 
majority voting in the European council to take final decision (Mazzucelli, 1997, 174, 185). 
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belief change in the direction of more ordohberal economic beliefs, nor did he develop 
any sudden preference for further European integration during these years. In fact, a 
close study of the events of the period 1981 to 1983, as well as of Mitterrand's beliefs, 
reveals that the President had always been a supporter of European integration, and 
held a, rather rudimentary but consistent, preference for fixed exchange rates. 
Rather than causing a belief change on these two respective issues, the 
monetary and political turmoil of the first two years of his presidency put Mitterrand 
in a position in which he was forced to choose between his preference for further 
European integration and fixed exchange rates on the one hand, and the radical 
Keynesian policies his government was trying to implement on the other hand. The 
evidence presented in this chapter shows that the President preferred to keep the franc 
in the European monetary system rather than to pursue his party's radical socialist 
economic visions. This does not mean, however, that Mitterrand had been transformed 
into an economic ordoliberal; while his economic beliefs were not nearly as radical or 
central to his belief system as his party's policy programme might have suggested, 
even after 1983 Mitterrand's beliefs remained solidly in the Keynesian camp. 
While I disagree, then, with the claims made with regard to the French 
'critical juncture' of 1983, the evidence reported in this chapter does support the thesis 
that the fall of the Berlin Wall was critical for the establishment of EMU. However, 
the processes by which the fall of the Berlin Wall exerted its crucial influence on the 
establishment of EMU were very complex. 
The French had taken the initiative to further European monetary integration 
long before the fall of the Berlin Wall. During these years, however, little public 
support had existed in Germany for the establishment of any European economic and 
monetary union. While Chancellor Kohl and Minister of Foreign Affairs Genscher 
were ardent supporters of further European integration and, therefore, in favour of the 
principle of the establishment of a European single currency, the German financial 
elite — including the Ministries of Economics, Finance and the Bundesbank — were 
convinced that the establishment of EMU would put German price stability at risk. 
Moreover, despite his personal disposition and French pressure, the Bundeskanzler was 
not prepared to challenge the German financial authorities and for this reason resigned 
himself to the fact that decision making on European monetary issues was the 
privilege of the Ministry of Finance and the Bundesbank. As a result, until the summer 
of 1989, the German position concerning European monetary integration reflected the 
typically sceptical ordoliberal and economist points of view that had dominated the 
German preference on this issue for three decades. So, while EMU had already been on 
the European agenda for more than a year before the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
enjoyed the support of the French President, it is clear that the pivotal German 
decision makers were reticent and dragging their feet. 
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The crucial impetus for the restart of the European integration process came in 
the summer of 1989 As the revolutionary developments in Eastern Europe unfolded, 
slowly but surely the issue of reunification of Germany was placed back on the 
international political agenda Wi th the Americans consistently referring to the 
German Question, a change took place in the mind of Chancellor Kohl However, 
rather than a radical change in his beliefs, the developments in Eastern Europe tapped 
right into the Chancellor's existing beliefs concerning the inseparability of German 
reunification and European integration, and reinforced them The strengthening of his 
beliefs transformed Kohl into a man with a mission During the summer of 1989, the 
German Chancellor slowly but surely began to steer a course towards the reunification 
of Germany, and finally went head to head with the German financial elite over the 
issue of European monetary unification, in order to build an expanded European roof 
over a potentially reunited Germany It was this which gave the crucial impetus to the 
establishment of the European Economic and Monetary Union 
During the subsequent two years. Kohl gradually made more concessions, 
carefully walking the thin line between French demands and domestic resistance He 
successively took the initiative to establish a European political union to satisfy 
domestic demands, agreed to an end date for the IGC during the Dublin summit in 
April 1990, guaranteed the irreversibility of EMU by agreeing to a starting date for 
the second stage only two weeks after the official reunification of Germany, and 
decided on a fixed starting date for the third stage of EMU at the Maastricht summit 
of December 1991 
Mitterrand's reaction to the fall of the Berlin Wall was totally different from 
the one of the German Chancellor The revolutionary developments in Eastern Europe 
induced a period of vacillation on the part of the French President, much like the one 
seen in the early 1980s, as he contemplated various strategies to deal with the events 
Although Mitterrand never really made a choice between these strategies, eventually, 
Kohl's determination turned Mitterrand's non-decision into acquiescence in the 
Chancellor's strategy the irrevocably binding of Germany to her European partners 
Mitterrand, however, swiftly adapted to this strategy, and began to tend to French 
interests again He managed to water down Kohl's EPU-mitiatives, and made the 
acceleration of the establishment of EMU the central issue of discussion 
Finally, it has also become clear that the revolution in Eastern Europe caused a 
strengthening of the economic beliefs of Bundesbank President Pohl It seems, however, 
that rather than the geopolitical change in itself, it was the new-found pro-European 
zest of the German Chancellor and the French President, which posed a threat for 
Pohl's sound economic ideas, that led to the strengthening of the President's pre-
existing beliefs concerning EMU As a result of this, he began to voice his demands 
more regularly and intensely 
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Eventually, the effect of the Bundesbank President's increased activism was that 
several of his central demands were honoured the future European central bank would 
formally, and materially be independent, budgetary criteria were incorporated into the 
EMU treaty, and convergence criteria were instated as preconditions for the entry into 
the third phase However, it is clear that from the fall of the Berlin Wall onwards, the 
German financial elite played only second fiddle to Chancellor Kohl in the definition 
of the German national stance concerning European monetary unification It was this 
change in internal German political relationships, spurred on by the reinforcement of 
Kohl's pre-existing beliefs due to the fall of the Berlin Wall, which enabled the 
establishment of a common interest between Germany and France on the 
establishment of the European Economic and Monetary Union 
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9 MAPPING THE ROAD TO MAASTRICHT: 
CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis has told the history of EMU from a cognitive and domestic politics 
perspective. It has tracked the evolution of the French and German national 
preferences concerning European economic and monetary unification in the period 
1945 to 1991, and attempted to provide an understanding of the processes that led to 
successive divergences and convergences of these preferences. In this chapter, I will 
summarise the empirical findings of the thesis, and draw some theoretical conclusions. 
To do this, first the story of the 1970s and 1990s attempts to establish EMU, as 
presented in Chapters 5 to 8 will be retraced. Subsequently, a discussion will follow of 
the most important findings with regard to the hypotheses concerning the validity of 
the cognitive-domestic politics model that were developed in Chapter 3. Finally, I will 
assess the theoretical significance of these findings. 
All in all, my research shows clearly that to understand why the 1970s 
attempt to establish EMU failed while the 1990s attempt succeeded, individual and 
national preference-formation processes, as well as processes conducive to the 
establishment of a common interest must be taken into account. Moreover, although 
my findings are not supportive of all the hypotheses derived from the Statist Cognitive 
Theory, in my eyes the conclusion is warranted that this approach provides a better 
explanation of the historical events with respect to the establishment of EMU than its 
major rivals Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the Social Constructivist identity-
approach. 
9.2 The Road to Maastricht 
The post-World War II quest for EMU began with a period in which the characteristic 
German and French national preferences concerning the European monetary union, 
which would later come to dominate the discussion on EMU, were still in the 
formative stages of their development. Shortly after the war, the French refused to 
contemplate any form of co-operation with archenemy Germany, and the French 
position on the nature of the international exchange rate system changed with every 
new government that was inaugurated. During the early 1950s, however, the French 
had to face geo-political reality, and traded their balancing tactics towards Germany 
for a strategy of binding Germany into a European framework. Moreover, with the 
return of De Gaulle to politics, the typical French position on European monetary 
integration emerged that was to dominate negotiations on further European monetary 
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integration for the subsequent decades De Gaulle's thesis included a plea for fixed 
exchange rates and a strong franc, alongside a rejection of all forms of European co-
operation except those based on pure inter-governmentalism 
Until the early 1960s, the German position on European monetary integration 
was very clear, by contrast Chancellor Adenauer dominated German foreign policy 
and advocated the Westbtndung of Germany, reconciliation with France, and further 
European integration In the early 1960s, however, the dominance and convictions of 
the Chancellor were increasingly challenged by the rise of an ordohberal coalition of 
German financial authorities, which took a purely economic view of European 
integration These authorities promoted price stability as the central pillar of the 
economy and advocated reticence with respect to European monetary measures The 
rise of this coalition heralded the advent of the characteristic rift between the German 
political elite on the one hand and the 'sound economics coalition on the other hand, 
which would dominate national and European negotiations on European economic and 
monetary integration in the years to come Overall, during the 1950s and 1960s, the 
German and French positions on European economic and monetary unification grew 
more divergent, making the establishment of a common interest on European 
monetary unification impossible 
The first real opportunity for the establishment of EMU came in late 1969, 
when for the first time since World War II, several European leaders showed an 
interest in the issue On entering office, the German Chancellor, Brandt, held some 
deep-rooted convictions concerning European integration, believing it to be a panacea 
for all German and European ailments During the first months of Brandt's 
Chancellorship, Monnet managed to convince the Chancellor that European monetary 
unification was the means to re-launch European integration The individual belief 
change experienced by the German Chancellor resulted in a burst of political activism 
on his part, aimed at put t ing European monetary unification on the European political 
agenda However, after the Summit of The Hague in December 1969, the ordohberal 
German Minister of Economics, Schiller, managed to wrest back control of the policy-
making process In his eyes, the creation of a European monetary union would be a 
danger to German price stability, unless preceded by the establishment of economic 
and political union Before long, the Chancellor resigned himself to the position of his 
Minister and began to adopt more ordohberal preferences on economic and monetary 
policies (see Table 9 1) As a result, by the time the Werner Final Report was 
published in October 1970, the German national preference had again become one of 
reticence 
In contrast to Brandt, President Pompidou did not propose to set up a fully 
fledged European economic and monetary union at the summit in The Hague, but 
advocated a purely intergovernmental reserve fund His plans were solidly rooted in 
the Gaullist world view he had held for years Still, the French negotiators approved 
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the Werner Report, which called for the establishment of such a supranational union 
A closer look at the events of 1970 reveals that this inconsistency in the French 
national preference was the result of the pulling and hauling of the pivotal domestic 
political actors, who were trying to realise their own differing preferences on the issue 
For, while President Pompidou was opposed to EMU, the Minister of Finance, Giscard 
d Estaing, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Schumann, along with the French 
negotiators in the Werner group, supported the plans Moreover, Pompidou had lost 
sight of the discussions in the Werner Group However, when, in November 1970, he 
was confronted with the results of the Werner Group's deliberations, the President 
immediately torpedoed the plans On the whole, it is clear that, during the early 
1970s, no common interest between France and Germany existed The most central 
German and French decision makers - the German financial elite and President 
Pompidou — simply did not see eye to eye on the issue 
By the mid-1970s, the political scenery had changed dramatically In 
Germany, Schmidt had succeeded Brandt, while in France Giscard d'Estaing had 
replaced Pompidou This meant that for the first time since World War II, both the 
German Chancellor and the French President were supportive of further European 
monetary unification and also shared a modestly ordoliberal outlook on economic and 
monetary policy It was on this meeting of the minds that a Franco-German common 
interest in the establishment of the European Monetary System was built Despite the 
Chancellor's and President's ambitions, however, the EMS did not constitute a fully-
fledged monetary union Given the domestic balance of power in both countries at that 
time, the two men simply could not deliver a true European Central Bank and a single 
currency 
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Table 9 1 Central Decision Makers' Preferences on EMU » Change in Preference 
The Franco-German meeting of minds established by Giscard and Schmidt 
survived no longer than the next change in leadership While both Kohl and 
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Mitterrand were supporters of further European integration and fixed exchange rates, 
the gap between the radical Keynesian economic program implemented by the 
Mitterrand government, and the ideas of the ordoliberal German financial elite was 
simply too great for any agreement to be reached. Moreover, while pursuing further 
European integration in other issues, Kohl left decision making in the European 
monetary issue-area to the German financial authorities. In the late 1980s, however, a 
common interest on EMU did nevertheless develop. 
While the research conducted in this thesis does not support the claim that 
1983 constituted the major learning experience for the French President which 
permitted the subsequent establishment of EMU, it does demonstrate that the 1989 
revolution in Eastern Europe was crucial in reanimating the dormant process of 
European monetary unification. As events in Eastern Europe were unfolding, the 
'German Question' was placed back on the international political agenda. Kohl's 
beliefs concerning the inseparability of German and European unification were 
reawoken and strengthened his existing beliefs concerning European monetary issues. 
As a result, he took the process of European monetary unification into his own hands, 
overruled the German financial elite on several crucial occasions, and provided the 
vital impetus for the establishment of EMU. For the first time since the days of 
Adenauer, a German Chancellor had found the drive, legitimacy and political clout to 
dictate the German national preference on European economic and monetary 
unification. 
While the revolutionary developments in Eastern Europe thus caused a 
reinforcement of the German Chancellor's beliefs, it turned Mitterrand's world upside 
down. His first reaction was to deny the fact that the fall of the Berlin Wall meant 
that German reunification had become a real possibility. Once he came to accept this 
fact, he contemplated both the option of reviving the Triple Entente to balance an 
enlarged Germany, and of accelerating European integration to bind Germany further 
to its European partners. As in the early 1980s, the French President proved unable to 
decide, lending his ear alternatively to proponents of balancing and binding. 
Eventually, the President never really made a choice, but simply acquiesced to Kohl's 
determination to bind Germany irrevocably to her European partners. Mitterrand, 
however, soon recovered and started to push for the swift and irrevocable 
establishment of the European Central Bank. So while the revolution in Eastern 
Europe had a very different effect on Kohl and Mitterrand, it did, ultimately, result in 
the emergence of a common interest between France and Germany on EMU. 
9.3 Cognition and Power: Main Findings 
The research conducted in this thesis has revealed a history of EMU that significantly 
differs from that habitually presented in the literature. In this section, I will sum up 
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what these findings mean for the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 3 and assess their 
theoretical implications. 
93-1 The Hypotheses Revisited 
To test whether the Statist Cognitive Theory on national preferences offers an adequate 
explanation for the making and breaking of the Common interest on EMU, several 
hypotheses were articulated. 
Hypotheses concerning Individual Preference Change 
The first set of hypotheses derived from Cognitive Theory concerned the relation 
between a decision maker's expertise and the stability of his beliefs. The first of these 
stated: The more knowledgeable and experienced an actor in a particular issue-area, the stronger 
and more stable its preferences concerning that issue (la). The second and related hypothesis 
stated that the more central to an actor's belief-system the belief on which a certain preference is 
based, the stronger and more stable that preference (lb). The results of this study support 
both propositions. 
A strong relationship was found between a decision maker's expertise and the 
stability of their preferences. Overall, of the 21 concrete expectations derived from 
hypothesis la, 15 were accurate (see Table 9.2, Column 1). The conclusion is similar 
for the relationship between the centrality of a decision maker's beliefs and the 
stability of these beliefs.191 Of the 21 expectations derived from this hypothesis lb, H 
were supported, while 8 were not (see Table 9-2, Column 2). Admittedly, the number 
of observations made in these two cases is not very large, but they indicate the validity 
of the first two propositions. 
However, these quantitative data only tell part of the story. On the basis of 
hypothesis la and the decision makers' level of expertise (see Section 4.6), Cognitive 
Theory would predict that of the 21 cases studied in this thesis, 14 decision makers' 
preferences would be stable, and 7 unstable (see Table 9-2, Column 1). My research, 
however, indicates that in 18 cases decision makers' preferences were stable over time, 
" ' The fact that both hypotheses score similarly can be explained by the fact that my research indicates a 
strong relationship exists between the two independent variables distinguished in these hypotheses: 
expertise and centrality of beliefs. In fact, support for the existence of this relationship is stronger than for 
any other relation tested in this study There are only two exceptions to this rule in this research (see 
Table 9 2, Columns 1 and 2) The first is Minister Karl Schiller, who, despite his education in economics 
and relevant working experience, did not hold strong preferences on the character of the exchange rate 
system. In fact he was largely indifferent towards the subject. The second is Chancellor Kohl who did 
enjoy an education in political science, and did have a strong preference for European integration in 
general, but no concepts concerning the specific form of decision making in the EU turned up in the core 
of his belief system prior to 1989 Accordingly, it may be concluded that the more knowledgeable and 
experienced an actor in a particular issue-area, the more central its beliefs concerning this issue within its 
wider belief system. 
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while only in 3 cases they were unstable. A similar conclusion may be drawn for the 
proposed relationship between the centrality of decision makers ' beliefs and the 
stability of their preferences (Hypothesis 1 b). Of the 21 expectations, 12 were expected 
to be stable (see Section 4.6), while in fact 18 were (see Table 9.2, Column 2). From 
these findings, three conclusions can be drawn. 
:;: 
"' Decision ~ :;: Expectations Findings Maker 0 ·~ Level of Expertise Centrality of Beliefs 
Brandt ERS Unstable Unstable 
Stable Stable 
----·- ------ - -
Unstable Unstable Unstable 
Pompidou Stable Stable Stable 
Stable Stable Stable 
Stable Stable Stable 
Schiller Stable Unstable Stable 
- --- - -
Unstable Unstable Stable 
- J - - - - - - - • -------- ---- --· 
MON Stable Stable Stable 
Giscard ERS Stable Stable Stable 
d'Estaing BUR ------Stable Stable Stahle 
MON Stable Stable Stable 
Kohl ERS Unstable Unstable Stable 
- -·-- -- Stable--BUR Stable Unstable 
u~;bk Unstable ---~------MON Stable 
Mitterrand ERS Unstable Unstable Stable 
----------
BUR Stable Stable Unstable 
MON Unstable Unstable Stable 
Pohl ERS Stable Stable Stable 
- - -----
BUR Stable Stable Stable 
-----
MON Stable Stable Stable 
Table 9.2: Preference stability: Hypotheses and Findings unsubstantiated expectation 
The first conclusion is that the propositions concerning the relation between 
an actor's expertise and the stability of its preferences were more accurate in the case of 
experts and central beliefs than in the case of laymen and peripheral beliefs. Of the 14 
instances in which decision makers were classified as experts - and were thus expected 
to have stable preferences - 13 did in fact retain their pre-existing preferences, and 
thus acted in accordance with the theory (93 %). By contrast, of the 7 instances in which 
a decision maker had little expertise, in only 2 cases did a politician actually changed 
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his preferences, and therefore act in accordance with the theory (29%). With regard to 
the centrality of decision makers' core beliefs and the stability of their beliefs, a similar 
conclusion may be drawn, the expectations in the case of central beliefs were more 
accurate that those involving peripheral beliefs. Of the 12 cases in which core beliefs 
were involved, 10 actually showed the expected belief stability, and were thus in 
accordance with the hypothesis (83%) Of the 9 cases in which peripheral beliefs were 
involved, on the other hand, only 2 actually showed the expected belief change, and 
therefore acted in accordance with the hypothesis (22%). 
Two related questions are raised by these results what explains the lack of 
correlation between the expectation concerning the stability of peripheral beliefs and 
the beliefs of laymen, and the findings' And, what explains the difference between the 
validity of hypotheses la and lb in the case of laymen and peripheral beliefs on the one 
hand and experts and central beliefs on the other hand' It might be the case that one 
of the assumptions underlying these propositions - the presumption that beliefs are 
structured hierarchically — is wrong, and that neither the variable 'centrality of beliefs' 
nor 'expertise' actually acts as an intervening variable between decision makers' beliefs 
and the stability of their preferences If this were true, it would necessitate the 
reformulation of Cognitive Theory in general, as well as several hypotheses in this 
thesis Still, it would not completely negate the fundamental ideas behind Cognitive 
Theory the analytical core of the theory — the proposition that new ideas are filtered 
and coloured by actors' pre-existing beliefs — would not be affected, for expertise and 
centrality of ideas are simply the scope of domain conditions for this general 
mechanism 
However, the findings may also indicate a methodological rather than a 
theoretical problem- it may be the case that the variables of expertise and core beliefs 
have not been correctly operationahsed. Decision makers like Kohl and Mitterrand 
were perhaps relative laymen in economic and financial matters compared to decision 
makers like Schiller, Giscard or Karl-Otto Pohl However, because of their long-term 
involvement in politics, they still possessed significant knowledge and experience in 
these matters, compared to ordinary citizens These men may therefore not have been 
inexperienced and uneducated enough for their beliefs to be flexible. In cases involving 
actors less knowledgeable and experienced, the proposition may still hold Similarly, 
the centrality of the decision makers' belief system was operationahsed as the concepts 
in their cognitive map of their beliefs concerning EMU that scored at least 1/3 of the 
saliency and centrality values of the most central and salient concept 4'J2 However, since 
""' It appears that the choice to set the limit for beliefs to be characterised as core beliefs at 1/3 of the 
saliency and centrality values did not bias the results The conclusions would have been exactly the same if 
the measure would have been established at '/i of the saliency and centrality measure of the most salient 
and central concept 
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all of the decision makers in this study were involved in decision making on EMU, it 
may be that their beliefs concerning EMU should have been characterised central to 
their (more general) worldview Further research is needed to determine whether it is a 
theoretical problem or a methodological problem that lies at the bottom of the 
discrepancy between hypotheses la and lb and the findings concerning peripheral 
beliefs and those of laymen 
The second conclusion concerning the expected stability of pivotal decision 
makers' beliefs is that in only three instances did a central decision maker actually 
change his preferences regarding an aspect of EMU Two of these involve a change in 
the belief system of Brandt, and are in accordance with the hypotheses The other 
concerns Mitterrand's change of mind on the European mode of decision making 
While, on the basis of his working experience and personal interest, this preference 
was expected to be stable, it actually shifted from a preference for intergovernmental 
decision making to supranational decision making However, as was argued in Chapter 
8, Mitterrand's change of mind might not have been as radical as appears from the 
cognitive map, for the change that we see between his cognitive maps is entirely due 
to the rise in saliency of his pre-existing belief in the value of EMU 
On the whole, Statist Cognitive Theory thus underestimates the stability of 
central decision makers' preferences in the case of EMU This is a remarkable finding, 
given that Cognitive Theory already predicted that decision makers' preferences would 
be far more stable than according to Liberal Intergovernmentahsm or the Social-
Constructivist identity-approach This is all the more remarkable when the 1990s case 
is taken into account the world underwent the greatest geo-political change since the 
end of World War II, and conditions for preference change therefore must have been 
very favourable 
The third conclusion with regard to individual preference change that can be 
drawn is that while only three instances were found in which decision makers clearly 
experienced a reversal of their preferences, in ten instances actors pre-existing 
preferences were reinforced Over time, the preferences of Pompidou and Schiller with 
regard to the mode of European decision making grew stronger, and Pohl's preference 
for fixed exchange rates and ordoliberal economic policies were reinforced In addition, 
Kohl's support for European integration in general, fixed exchange rates, supranational 
modes of decision making, ordoliberal economic policy-making and, most 
importantly, European economic and monetary unification in general grew stronger 
Even in the case of Mitterrand, his preference for the establishment of EMU was 
eventually reinforced 
The third hypothesis introduced in Chapter 3 concerned the behaviour of 
uncommitted thinkers It stated that the less knowledgeable and expertented an actor in a 
particular issue-area, the more likely the actor will shift between different, competing belief 
patterns concerning a policy problem, 'not at once, but in sequence' ( h) Two decision makers 
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display this pattern Mitterrand and Brandt The case of Mitterrand in particular is a 
textbook example of this pattern Both during the monetary turmoil in the early 
1980s, as well as after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the President continually shifted 
from one set of ideas to another Since Mitterrand had had no education or working 
experience in the field of economics, nor held any strong ideas on the subject, this 
finding is in accordance with hypothesis 1c 
While the pattern of shifting between competitive preferences displayed by 
Mitterrand is evident from the process tracing, this flux in preferences is not evident 
when one compares his two cognitive maps Although it would have made the 
findings more reliable if it did, the fact that the pattern of fluctuation does not appear 
in the comparison of the maps is easily explained by the methodological choices made 
Because the overall goal of this thesis was to discover whether pivotal decision makers' 
preference changes led to any change in the national preference, and subsequently 
made the establishment of a common interest possible, the decision was made to base 
Mitterrand's second cognitive map on speeches taken from the period after his 
wavering between preferences had taken place At that time, Mitterrand's preferences 
were again stable enough to exert an influence on the national position on EMU The 
findings of the comparison of cognitive maps do not therefore contradict the findings 
of the process-tracing 
While he provides a less clear example of the pattern of vacillation mentioned 
in hypothesis 1c, it is evident that Brandt was relatively easily persuaded of the value 
of EMU by Monnet Moreover, as soon as he encountered opposition to his plans, he 
lost interest again, and eventually adopted the more sceptical position of his 
opponents All in all, the conclusion seems warranted that the preferences of the 
German Chancellor on European economic affairs tended to fall into line with those of 
the persons surrounding him Since Brandt had had little working experience, interest 
or education in economic and financial issues, and did not hold any strong convictions 
on the economic and monetary aspects of EMU prior to The Hague, his behaviour is 
also in line with the hypothesis 
The findings regarding the cases of Schiller and Kohl, by contrast, do not 
support the hypothesis 1c Based on his lack of expertise and interest, it was to be 
expected that Schiller would show the above-described wavering behaviour with 
regard to his preference for the type of European decision making However, no 
evidence has been found that supports this expectation In fact, like many members of 
the German financial elite, the Minister of Economic Affairs consistently argued for 
further political integration as a precondition for further monetary integration In 
addition, based on his lack of experience, education and pre-existing beliefs, Kohl was 
also expected to shift between preferences with regard to the exchange rate system and 
economic and monetary policy making No evidence of such a pattern was found 
However, it is clear that the Chancellor was willing to make sacrifices on these issues 
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once his ideas concerning German reunification and European integration were at 
stake. In sum, in two of the four cases involving uncommitted thinkers, the 
proposition clearly holds. All in all, it may be concluded that only in two out of seven 
cases did hypothesis 1c not prove correct. 
The fourth and fifth hypothesis concerning central decision makers' 
preferences concerned the mechanisms by which individual belief change will occur. 
These hypotheses stated respectively that the more knowledgeable and experienced an actor 
in a particular issue-area, the less likely that the actor changes its preferences through learning or 
persuasion (Id); and that the more central to an actor's belief-system the belief on which a 
certain preference is based, the less likely the actor will 'learn' or will be persuaded to change this 
preference (le). In my research only three instances of individual preference change were 
found. Therefore, learning and persuasion were by definition scarce. Of the three cases 
in which preference change occurred, one case is a clear example of persuasion, and the 
second of learning. With regard to the third case, the evidence is inconclusive. 
The first two instances of individual preference change involved Chancellor 
Brandt. The first was a change from no preference concerning European monetary 
unification to a preference in favour of EMU. Here, there is strong evidence that 
persuasion took place. Firstly, Monnet clearly acted as an agent arguing in favour of 
preference change. Secondly, Monnet and Brandt had several discussions on EMU prior 
to Brandt's change of mind. Finally, the change in Brandt's preferences took place in 
the direction of the position being advocated by Monnet. Undoubtedly, persuasion was 
the mechanism which induced preference change in this instance. 
Reviewing this case, there are three remarkable findings. First, since Brandt 
cannot be characterised as an expert on two of the three dimensions of EMU, and held 
no conviction on EMU prior to Monnet's attempt to persuade him, the case is fully in 
line with the hypotheses Id&nd le. Second, while Brandt was persuaded and 
maintained his support for EMU after Monnet convinced him of its value, the appeal 
of EMU then seems to have dwindled soon after The Hague. While, theoretically 
speaking, persuasion should lead to an internalisation of new ideas, it appears that in 
this case no true internalisation took place. In any case, Brandt's newly adopted beliefs 
clearly never became very salient in his mind. As with beliefs that are acquired during 
a person's formative years, it may be that newly adopted convictions may require time 
to develop into core beliefs, or even that they may never reach the status of core belief. 
Finally, the fact that Monnet managed to frame EMU in a manner which fitted into 
the Chancellor's wider foreign policy scheme may explain the success of his efforts. 
The second preference change Brandt experienced, was a change from a 
Keynesian to an ordoliberal set of economic preferences. In this case, it is not 
completely clear whether persuasion or learning took place. For while Brandt's newly 
adopted ideas were completely in line with those espoused by the German financial 
elite, no evidence was found that the German financial elite acted as a persuasive agent 
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in the sense that any significant level of interaction took place between the financial 
authorities and the Chancellor with the express purpose of persuading Brandt 
Therefore, this may be a case of learning, but the evidence is inconclusive However, 
whether it was a case of persuasion or learning, the finding does not contradict 
hypothesis Id since Brandt was no expert in the field of economics, and had no strong 
ideas on the issue, it is to be expected that he would have been more open to learning 
or persuasion 
The third case in which individual preference change took place, was that of 
Mitterrand In this case, it is doubtful whether a true revision of preferences took 
place, for the change in Mitterrand's preferred mode of decision making in the EU that 
shows up in the cognitive map was the exclusive result of an increase in the saliency 
and centrahty of Mitterrand's wish to establish a European monetary union 
Nonetheless, despite the fact that Chancellor Kohl played a pivotal role in 
Mitterrand's increased support for EMU, in my opinion, this case represents a learning 
process rather than one of persuasion, for during the months subsequent to the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, Kohl did not try to persuade Mitterrand of the benefits of European 
monetary unification Rather, the Chancellor tried to convince the President of the 
value of political unification and the extension of the powers of the European 
parliament, in which he failed What induced the reinforcement of Mitterrand's 
preference for EMU can be characterised as a process of 'diagnostic learning' the 
process by which an actor changes its beliefs about the meaning of events During 
November and December 1989, what changed in the French President's mind was his 
conviction about the implications of the revolution in Eastern Europe and the fall of 
the Berlin Wall At first, Mitterrand denied that the changes taking place meant that 
German reunification had become a real possibility In his eyes, the Russians would 
never allow it What eventually prompted Mitterrand to contemplate the acceleration 
of EMU, was his realisation that German reunification had in fact become possible 
Apart from learning and persuasion, a third psychological mechanism of 
individual preference change was identified imposition-of-will W i t h respect to this 
mechanism, Cognitive Theory expects that the stronger and the more central the preference to 
an decision maker's belief system, the more credible and valuable the other actor's promises or 
threats will have to be to impose its will on the decision maker successfully (If) Only one 
example of this mechanism was found the case in which President Pompidou forced 
his Minister Giscard d'Estaing to reverse the official French position on the final 
version of the Werner Report at the ECOFIN meeting of 14 December 1970 This is 
clearly a case of imposition-of-will rather than persuasion The French constitution 
makes it abundantly clear that Pompidou had the authority to enforce his will in 
European affairs on his Minister of Finance It is also clear that, while Giscard obeyed 
the President's wishes and rejected the Werner Report, prior and after the meeting of 
14 December 1970, he never spoke out against establishing EMU This rules out the 
323 
Mapping the Road to Maastricht 
possibility of learning or persuasion All in all, Giscard's change of heart must be 
interpreted as a pragmatic and strategic move, rather than a genuine preference 
change However, no conclusion about the validity of hypothesis If can be derived 
from this single case of imposition-of-will 
In sum, several conclusions may be drawn about the nature of the individual 
preference-formation processes as experienced by pivotal high-level decision makers 
Firstly, it is clear that Cognitive Theory offers an adequate explanation for the 
preference stability in the case of the decision makers studied Secondly, strong 
evidence was found to support the hypothesis that the more knowledgeable and 
experienced an actor is in a particular issue-area, the stronger its preferences 
concerning that issue Thirdly, it has become clear that decision makers' preferences 
concerning EMU were very stable over time Very few cases were uncovered in which 
learning or persuasion induced a cognitive u-turn Of the 21 cases studied, only in 
three cases decision makers experienced a change in preferences (if Mitterrand is 
included), while in 8 cases they experienced no change at all, and in 10 cases the 
preferences of decision makers were actually reinforced over time Overall, it may be 
concluded that in the case of EMU, decision makers' preferences were even more stable 
than Cognitive Theory expected 
Hypotheses concerning Preferences and Political Action 
The second set of hypotheses concerned the relationship between central decision 
makers' preferences and their inclination to engage in political action Testing these 
hypotheses was not straightforward since it turned out to be difficult to determine 
which of the decision makers held the strongest preferences on EMU Several decision 
makers held a strong preference on just one particular aspect of the establishment of 
economic union and, as was argued above, the strength of several decision makers' 
preferences varied over time It was therefore decided to test these hypotheses by 
comparing the behaviour of a single decision maker and the strength of its preferences 
at different moments in time 
The first hypothesis concerning the relationship between central decision 
makers' preferences and their political behaviour that was derived from Statist 
Cognitive Theory stated that the stronger an actor's preference, the less inclined the actor will 
be to engage in bargaining or compromising (2a) The findings concerning this hypothesis 
are ambiguous In the case of Pompidou, there seems to be no relationship between the 
reinforcement of his convictions and his willingness to compromise Even before The 
Hague, it is clear that Pompidou was not willing to compromise on the issue of 
European monetary unification In addition, Pohl's resignation may be a strong sign of 
his uncompromising attitude By contrast, Kohl and Mitterrand became in many 
respects more, rather than less, willing to compromise on the issue of European 
monetary unification While these two politicians did not see eye to eye on a number 
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of issues related to EMU, both were prepared to make concessions to enable their quest 
for EMU to succeed. So, while overall the critics of EMU, Pompidou, Schiller and 
Pohl, became less compromising, its supporters became more so. The proposition that 
actors with strong preferences will be less compromising, may thus only apply to those 
committed thinkers that disagree with, and are trying to block plans that are being 
drawn up. The supporters of these plans, by contrast, show a tendency to become more 
compromising. All in all, the evidence thus seems to suggest that whether a decision 
maker will be more or less inclined to compromise during negotiations is not a direct 
consequence of the strength of beliefs, but the result of the combined effect of this 
strength, and whether or not they agree with the policy-proposals on the table. Further 
research is needed to test this amended version of hypothesis 2a. 
The second and third hypotheses concerning the relation between the strength 
of a decision maker's preference and its political behaviour state respectively that the 
stronger an actor's preferences in a particular issue-area, the more likely the actor will be to 
engage tn political action in order to gam decision-making power m this issue-area (2b); and 
that the stronger an actor's preferences in a certain issue-area, the more power-seeking the actor 
will be in that area (2c). As stated above, comparison of their cognitive maps indicates 
that Pompidou, Schiller, Kohl, Mitterrand and Pohl experienced a reinforcement of 
their beliefs. Moreover, during the year 1969, Brandt developed a preference for EMU 
that he had not held before. Overall, it is clear that these processes of belief-
reinforcement have gone hand in hand with increased political action (2b) and a search 
for power (2c). 
Supporting evidence for hypotheses 2b and 2c was found in the case of Brandt, 
Schiller, Mitterrand and Kohl. Prior to 1969, Brandt never interfered in issues 
concerning European monetary policy making. However, once he became convinced 
that EMU could in fact serve his grand foreign policy design, a burst of activity 
followed. His main strategy was colonising decision-making power by bypassing 
standard action channels in order to hide his plans from other — more sceptical — 
political actors. In the case of Schiller, it is obvious that only when the plans 
endangered the goals and values close to his ordoliberal heart, did the Minister become 
politically active. After The Hague, Schiller successfully tried to influence the 
negotiations in ECOFIN by writing and submitting an extensive plan of action, and 
managed to gain central decision-making power over the policy process by proposing 
to delegate the elaboration of the plans for EMU to an AdHoc Committee instead of 
COREPER. Finally, he made sure that he remained in control by influencing the 
membership of the Werner Committee in such a way that his State Secretary became 
the German representative. It is clear, then, that when his ordoliberal ideas were at 
stake, Schiller did become more politically active, and power-seeking. 
In the case of Mitterrand too, the reinforcement of his preference for EMU in 
the early months of 1990 went hand in hand with more political activity on his part. 
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While Mitterrand had acknowledged the benefits of EMU prior to 1990, he had never 
been actively involved in the plans for its establishment. However, once the President 
had settled on the strategy of binding Germany to Europe via the ECB, he made EMU 
the main topic of his conversations with Kohl, and put him under pressure to make 
concessions. At the same time, he also pushed the Germans for an acceleration of the 
negotiations on EMU through his frequent public statements on the relationship 
between German and European unification. In addition, during the final negotiations 
on EMU, he teamed up with the Italian Prime Minister to devise a plan that would 
enable Kohl to overcome domestic resistance to EMU. Prior to 1990, the French 
President had not displayed this kind of political activism. 
Finally, the case in which a strengthening of preferences most evidently 
resulted in a burst of political action and a search for decision-making power was that 
of Chancellor Kohl. Prior to 1989, Kohl had been pursuing European integration in a 
range of issue-areas, but was content to leave decision making on the issue of European 
monetary integration to the German financial elite. By the end of 1989, however, 
Kohl's att i tude had radically changed. The revolutionary developments in Eastern 
Europe had triggered his desire for the reunification of Germany and thereby his 
conviction that further European unification was essential. As a result, he initiated a 
plan to establish a European Political Union, and made several crucial concessions on 
EMU. Furthermore, after November 1989, he successfully ignored, excluded and 
overruled the sceptical German financial authorities on several occasions, and actively 
sought to settle the EMU-issue directly with the Elysée. 
In the case of Pompidou and Pohl, the findings with regard to hypotheses 2b 
and 2c are ambiguous. President Pompidou clearly was not a supporter of EMU, and 
felt very strongly about this. Over time his resistance to supranational decision making 
grew. However, the strengthening of this belief was not matched with a higher level of 
political activity or a more urgent search for decision-making power. On the contrary, 
he actually completely lost sight of what was going on in the Werner Committee. 
Once it became clear that the French negotiators had agreed to a set of plans he 
objected to, however, he did use his presidential power to reverse the decision. In the 
case of Pohl, it is clear that initially the Bundesbank President sought no decision-
making power; he was manipulated into taking his seat on the Delors Committee by 
Kohl. Once it became clear that Kohl and Mitterrand were pushing ahead with EMU 
- which in his eyes endangered Germany's sound economic policies - the Bundesbank 
President became more politically active. While he sought no official decision-making 
power, Pohl did begin to speak out more frequently and strongly on the issue, 
emphasising the many conditions that EMU had to fulfil. Eventually, however, the 
Bundesbank President resigned, giving up any power to influence the establishment of 
EMU. In this case, the relationship between a reinforcement of convictions and the 
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level of political activity and power-seeking displayed by the actor is thus more 
complex than the hypothesis suggests 
Overall, however, decision makers that acquired strong preferences on a 
certain issue, engaged in more political activity and a search for power in order to gain 
decision-making power in this issue-area In addition, it has become clear that similar 
political tactics were displayed by all decision makers they all sought to exclude actors 
with opposite policy-beliefs from the Ultimate Decision making Unit Moreover, 
decision makers all decided to make creative use of loopholes in decision-making 
procedures to exclude opponents rather than change those rule, while none of the 
pivotal decision makers studied in this thesis made any at tempt to change their 
opponents' views This may indicate that the main finding of this research — that high-
level decision makers rarely change their preferences — is more or less common 
knowledge amongst political practitioners 
Hypothesis concerning National Preference Change and the Establishment of a Common Interest 
It is clear that overall the Statist Cognitive Theory that was developed in Chapter 3 
offers an adequate explanation of preference formation and change in pivotal decision 
makers However, can it offer an explanation for national preference change and the 
establishment of common interests'1 As was argued in Chapter 3, the expectations with 
regard to the significance of learning and persuasion processes in national preference 
change and the establishment of common interests that may be derived from the 
Statist Cognitive Theory are significantly less optimistic than those based on Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism or Modernist Social Constructivism The following hypothesis 
can be derived from Statist Cognitive Theory The more stable the preferences of the members 
of the UDU are, the more likely it is that changes in national preferences and the establishment 
of a common interest will result from either imposition-of-will or turnover, rather than from 
individual belief change induced by persuasion or learning (3a) As such, it expects change to 
result from domestic political processes rather than cognitive belief change Given the 
fact that - with the exception of Brandt and possibly Mitterrand - the preferences of 
all pivotal decision makers were very stable, it may be expected that in the case of 
changes in national preferences and the establishment of a common interest on EMU, 
imposition-of-will and turnover will occur more frequently than persuasion and 
learning 
Wi th regard to the national preferences, it may first be concluded that, in 
general, they were less stable than the preferences of individual decision makers Given 
the aggregate character of national preferences this should come as no surprise In my 
research, six changes in the French and German national position on EMU were 
discussed (see Table 9 3) Of these changes in the national preference, only the change 
in the German stance prior to The Hague was the direct result of a u-turn in the 
preferences of an individual decision maker However, Brandt's change of heart only 
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had this effect because prior to this point, he had been shielding decision making from 
the more sceptical actors in Germany In other words, this national preference change 
was the result of the combination of belief change induced by persuasion and turnover 
National Preference Change 
Brandt-Monnet 1969 
Schiller 1970 
Kohl summer 1989 
French negotiators in ECOFIN & Werner 
Committee 
Pompidou's intervention December 1970 
Mitterrand early 1990 
Mechanism of National Preference 
Change 
Persuasion & Turnover 
Reinforced Preferences & Turnover 
Reinforced Preferences & Turnover 
Turnover 
Imposition-of-will 
Diagnostic Learning & Reinforced 
Preferences 
Table 9 3 National Preference Change and the Mechanisms involved 
In the case of Schiller's efforts to regain decision-making power after The 
Hague, as well as Kohl's determination in the summer of 1989, national preference 
change was the result of the strengthening of preferences in combination with 
turnover In the case of the French representatives and Ministers taking hold of the 
French position in the 1970s EMU negotiations, the change in the national preference 
was the direct result of the pulling and hauling of these political actors Pompidou's 
reversal of the decision by Giscard and his collaborators to support the Werner Report, 
was a clear example of imposition-of-will Finally, in the case of Mitterrand, it was 
suggested that diagnostic learning caused a strengthening of the French national 
preference (see Table 9 3) 
This overview presents some remarkable findings In the first place, in only 
two of the six cases national preference change was induced by individual belief change 
spurred on by (diagnostic) learning and persuasion, while in 5 cases turnover and 
imposition-of-will took place (in one case, in addition to persuasion) Overall, this 
leads to the conclusion that as far as national preference change is concerned, the 
findings provide some support for hypothesis òa As such, it is clear that the domestic 
pushing and hauling was the main cause of national preference change Moreover, it 
may be concluded that the findings are more supportive of this hypothesis than of the 
propositions concerning national preference change that can be derived from Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism and Modernist Social Constructivism 
In addition, turnover took place in four of the six cases, and thus appears to be 
the most important mechanism for national preference change In contrast, there was 
one instance each of imposition-of-will, persuasion, and (diagnostic) learning This 
means that, the expectation derived from the Statist Cognitive Theory that turnover 
constitutes a relatively important mechanism of national preference change was 
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supported (3a). However, imposition-of-will was not found to be a significant 
mechanism of national preference change. It may be that such overt exertion of 
relational power is simply a too crude a method for decision makers to use. Turnover is 
a more subtle and less visible form of the use of power, and therefore reduces the 
chance of antagonising political opponents. 
The findings indicate that, like turnover, reinforcement of preferences 
constitutes an important mechanism for inducing national preference change: it took 
place in three out of six cases. This mechanism was not recognised as a mechanism of 
national preference change in the original theoretical framework. However, far from 
negating Statist Cognitive Theory's approach to national preference formation, this 
mechanism reinforces it. The many instances of preferences reinforcement found in the 
history of EMU clearly indicate that changes in the external environment are only 
incorporated into an actor's belief system if they resonate with pre-existing beliefs: a 
psychological mechanism central to the Statist Cognitive Theory. All in all, the 
process of preference reinforcement as a mechanism of national preference change 
clearly deserves more theoretical and empirical attention. 
The final conclusion that may be drawn is that in four of the six instances in 
which national preference change occurred, no single political or psychological 
mechanism was responsible for the change, but rather a combination of mechanisms. 
In all these instances, individual preference change or reinforcement induced the 
decision maker in question successfully to seek additional decision making power 
(turnover). 
With regard to the establishment of a common interest, there seems to be no 
correlation between specific types of mechanisms of national preference change and the 
subsequent establishment of— or failure to establish - a common interest. In those 
instances where national preference change prohibited the establishment of a common 
interest concerning EMU (Schiller 1970, Pompidou's intervention December 1970), a 
reinforcement of preferences, turnover, and imposition-of-will occurred. While in the 
cases that changes in the national preferences led to the establishment of a common 
interest on EMU (Kohl summer 1989, Mitterrand early 1990) a reinforcement of 
preferences, turnover, and diagnostic learning took place. These findings indicate no 
overall clear pattern. 
Rather, the findings of this study indicate that - more than relying on a 
specific mechanism for national preference change - the establishment of a common 
interest depends primarily on the nature of decision makers' pre-existing beliefs, and 
their ability to dominate national decision-making processes. For, as has been shown, 
in the case of the failed attempt to establish a common interest on EMU in the 1970s, 
the most crucial factors determining the outcome were the persistent sceptical attitude 
towards EMU displayed by President Pompidou and the German financial elite, the 
inability of these actors to learn or be persuaded to be more pro-EMU, and the lack of 
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domestic influence of proponents of EMU in both France and Germany. The success of 
the plans to establish EMU in the 1990s, on the other hand, depended crucially on the 
favourable disposition of Kohl and Mitterrand towards EMU, and their ability to 
dominate the national preference-formation process after the fall of the Berlin Wall . 
The crucial difference between the failed 1970s and the successful 1990s attempt to 
establish EMU lies therefore in the difference in the dominant decision makers' pre-
existing and rigid preferences, rather than in any learning or persuasion. 
9-3.2 The Importance of understanding National Preferences and Common Interests 
Overall, my findings show that neither the outcome nor the process of the 1970s and the 
1990s attempts to achieve monetary unification can be understood unless national 
preferences, and changes therein, are taken into account. W i t h regard to the outcome of 
both attempts to establish EMU, it has become clear that neither can be explained 
solely on the basis of a structural approach. Only by explicitly acknowledging the fact 
that the existence of a common interest is a necessary precondition for co-operation, is 
it easily ascertained that in the 1970s, rather than the demise of Bretton Woods or the 
Oil crisis, the lack of agreement between the central French and German decision 
makers was what caused plans for EMU to fail. Similarly, a purely structural view of 
the 1990s at tempt to establish EMU leaves the researcher wondering how a 
supranational institution like the European Central Bank was established in a period in 
which the hegemon was perceived to be in decline. In fact, it is clear that the political 
will of the central decision makers and the domestic power balance both played a 
crucial role in establishing a common interest in setting up EMU. 
Furthermore, it may also be concluded that the process by which co-operation is 
established cannot be adequately understood if the individual and national preference-
formation processes, or the mechanisms leading to a common interest are not taken 
into account. In the case of EMU, it has been demonstrated that national preferences 
are rather flexible. In each of the two cases that were studied, no less than three 
changes in the German and French national preferences took place. These changes 
involved shifts between profoundly different views on the European monetary 
unification process, which cannot be explained by purely structural factors. In 
addition, only when national preferences and the process of building a common 
interest are included in the explanation, some seemingly inexplicable events in the 
history of EMU — like the 'sudden' change in the French stance on EMU in the 1970s, 
and the French inaction after the fall of the Berlin Wall - may be understood. 
Finally, without studying the national preference-formation process, it seems 
puzzling that the revolutionary developments in Eastern Europe and the reunification 
of Germany could have had an effect on the establishment of EMU, for the initiative to 
establish EMU had been taken long before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Only when the 
psychological nature of preference formation is taken into account, as well as the fact 
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that decision makers can anticipate possible future situations, can one understand the 
way in which the reunification of Germany exerted an influence on the faltering 
process of monetary unification even before it took place. Moreover, if one adopts a 
'psychological' view on individual preference formation, one can explain why the 
revolution in East Europe had an entirely different effect on the French President than 
on the German Chancellor. All in all, this thesis shows that understanding the 
establishment of EMU without understanding preference formation processes and 
domestic politics is really not possible. 
9.3.3 Cognitive Theory versus Liberal Intergovernmental ism and Social Constructivism 
While this study shows that an understanding of national preferences and the way in 
which a common interest is established is essential to explain the history of EMU, the 
question remains whether the Statist Cognitive Theory offers the most adequate 
explanation of how and why preferences change, and how a common interest is 
established. As was described in Chapter 2, two other theories also claim to shed light 
on the preference-formation process: Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Social 
Constructivism. As explained in Chapter 3, these theories put forward very different 
expectations concerning the significance of the different mechanisms of national 
preference change in establishing a common interest, and the likelihood of such 
convergence of national preference actually coming about. 
It is clear, however, that the results of this study are more in line with the 
Statist Cognitive Theory than its rivals. Firstly, and most importantly, it has been 
shown that in the case of EMU, decision makers' preferences were even more stable 
than expected on the basis of Statist Cognitive Theory. This finding clearly contradicts 
the claims made by Moravcsik and Risse et.al. that individual belief change through 
learning or persuasion is easy and occurs relatively frequently. Secondly, my research 
shows that if national preference change occurs, this is more frequently caused by a 
process of turnover or the strengthening of central decision makers' preferences than by 
a cognitive u-turn induced by learning or persuasion. As stated before, while 
preference reinforcement was not initially identified as a mechanism of national 
preference change, it is clear that evidence of its existence supports rather than 
contradicts the image of the psychological pivotal decision maker put forward in the 
Statist Cognitive Theory. 
However, while it is hard to find any evidence supporting the Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist view on preference formation, some of the basic propositions 
underlying the identity-approach of Risse et al. seem to offer some clues to the 
understanding of individual and national preference formation processes. As these 
authors have suggested, it did take a 'critical juncture' to create a common interest 
between Germany and France with regard to EMU. However, the effects of the 
revolution in 1989 were much more complex than was assumed by Risse et al. First, it 
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led to a strengthening rather than a revision of Kohl's preferences. Second, the 
revolution in Eastern Europe had a very different effect on Mitterrand and Kohl 
Third, the reunification of Germany affected the beliefs and actions of the pivotal 
decision makers before it actually happened. Finally, this 'critical juncture' was shown 
not only to influence decision makers' beliefs and preferences, the pending 
reunification also indirectly changed the German domestic balance of power by giving 
Kohl the domestic clout and legitimacy to overrule the powerful German financial 
elite on the EMU-issue. 
The complex effects resulting from this 'critical juncture' are more in line 
with the model of the cognitive 'inferring' actor than with the 'rule-following' social 
constructivist actor According to Statist Cognitive Theory, changes in the external 
environment are filtered and coloured by a decision maker's existing beliefs Therefore 
these changes are only noticed, and may only have an impact, if they fit in with an 
actor's pre-existing ideas From this perspective, it is logical that the events did not 
affect all decision makers in the same way while some became more pro-EMU, others 
grew more averse. All in all, what constitutes a 'critical juncture', and what effects it 
may have, is thus dependent on the beliefs and characteristics of the central decision 
makers involved 
Another finding which fits to some extent with the identity approach is that, 
despite the individual differences between the central decision makers' views on EMU, 
something resembling a specific national position on EMU did seem to exist. The 
French preference for intergovernmental decision making, fixed exchange rates, 
Keynesian economic policies and a monetarist approach to further monetary 
integration may be observed to a greater or lesser extent in De Gaulle, Pompidou, 
Giscard and Mitterrand The only significant exception to this pattern is the 
ordohberal view on economic policy of Giscard d'Estaing. Similarly, the typical 
German preference for supranational decision making modes, and ordohberal and 
economist views on EMU were also apparent from the mid-1960s until the signing of 
the Treaty of Maastricht These positions are visible in Brandt, Schmidt, Kohl, Erhard, 
Schiller and Pohl alike In addition, the characteristic German dichotomy between the 
political elite giving priority to reconciliation with France on the one hand, and the 
ordohberal financial elite putting price stability over and above everything else on the 
other hand, has also existed since the mid-1960s. This warrants the conclusion that 
there some truth to the claim made by Risse et.al that a distinct national aspect is 
present in the German and French position on EMU preferences. Further research 
should establish how such national preference-dimensions come about, and are passed 
on to subsequent generations of decision makers 
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9.4 Conclusion 
The findings of this thesis indicate that in the case of EMU, pivotal decision makers' 
pre-existtng beliefs, their inability to learn, as well as the balance of power between pivotal 
decision makers were the main variables which determined whether a common interest 
in between France and Germany came into being As has been shown, in the case of 
the failed attempt to establish a common interest on EMU in the 1970s, the crucial 
factors inhibiting success were the persistent sceptical attitude towards EMU of 
Pompidou and the German financial elite, the inability of these actors to learn or be 
persuaded to be more pro-EMU, and the lack of political power of the proponents of 
EMU Furthermore, it has also become clear that the success of the plans to establish 
EMU in the 1990s depended crucially on the favourable disposition of Kohl and 
Mitterrand towards EMU, the triggering of Kohl's dormant pre-existing beliefs about 
the inseparability of German and European unification by the revolution in Eastern 
Europe in the summer of 1989, and the will and the domestic clout with which the 
emerging possibility of German reunification provided the Chancellor, enabling him 
to overrule the ordoliberal German financial elite that had been obstructing agreement 
on EMU for years Accordingly, the crucial difference between the failed 1970s and 
the successful 1990s attempt to establish EMU, lies in the different pre-existing, 
unchanging preferences of the most powerful decision makers' involved in the 
negotiations on EMU Overall, this supports the proposition put forward by Statist 
Cognitive Theory that pivotal decision makers' pre-existing beliefs largely determine 
their future preferences, and that they are largely incapable of learning, even in light of 
such a momentous event like the fall of the Berlin Wall 
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A LIST OF SPEECHES, PRESS-STATEMENTS, INTERVIEWS A N D 
WRITINGS USED IN THE COGNITIVE MAPS 
Case 1, Before The Hague 
Willy Brandt (7) 
A) 'Friedenspolitik in Europa'. Speech for the Assembly of the Western European Union on 14 
December 1966. 
B) 'Für die Einheit Europas'. Speech for the Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg 
on 24 January 1967. 
(All reproduced in: Brandt, 1968a). 
C) Interview with Südwestfunk on 28 November 1968. 
D) Interview with the Swiss Journal Weltwoche on 8 January 1969. 
E) 'Es geht um ein gesundes Europa', in the BUNTE-lllustnerten of 15 January 1969. 
F) Interview for a special meeting of the Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung und der Europa-
Union in March 1969. 
G) Speech for the Foreign Affairs Association {Gesellschaft fUr Auslandskunde) in Munich on 20 
May 1969. 
(All reproduced in: Brandt, 1969b) 
Georges Pompidou (7) 
A) 'The Policy of France. Independence of Europe'. Speech delivered before the French National 
Assembly. 17 June. 1965 (Pompidou. 1965). 
B) 'Nous ne devons pas compromettre la stabilité monétaire'. Speech for the Association des 
Journalistes Spécialisés, 15 February 1967 (L· Figaro, 16 February 1967: 3). 
C) 'La rencontre de Rome entre les dirigeants des Six doit permettre de déterminer les 
perspectives dune coopération politique'. Debate on general politics at the Palais Bourbon, 19 
April 1967. (Le Figaro, 20 April 1967 : 1). 
D) Conference at the French Circle in Genève, 12 February 1969. 
E) Speech held at the O.R.T.F., 16 May 1969. 
F) Pressconference held at the Elysée, 10 July 1969. 
G) Speech held after the Council of Ministers, 8 August 1969. 
(All reproduced in: Pompidou, 1975). 
Karl Schiller (7) 
A) 'Der Boom und seine Bändigung'. 1958. 
Β) 'Wirtschaftspolitik'. 1962. 
C) 'Stetiges Wirtschaftswachstum als ökonomische und politische Aufgabe'. 1963. 
D) 'Germany's Economic Requirements'. July 1965. 
(All reproduced in: Schiller, 1964). 
336 
Appendices 
E) Speech held at the Annual Meeting of the IMF and Worldbank in Rio de Janeiro on 26 
September 1967. 
F) Speech concerning the inauguration of the factory of IBM Germany in Main on 4 October 
12ÖZ. 
G) Speech held for the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Hagen on H December 1967. 
(All reproduced in: Schiller, 1967). 
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (6) 
A) Speech held on 1 October 196-5 for the Annual Meeting of the International Monetary Fund 
in Washington. 
B) Speech held on 9 September 1964 during the Annual debate of the International Monetary 
Fund in Tokyo 
C) Conference held at 11 February 1965 at the Maison du Droit. 
(AU reproduced in: Giscard d'Estaing, 1965: 20). 
D) Speech held in early June 1966 in Metz (Le Monde, 1 juin 1966: 8). 
E) Speech held in September 1966 in Saint Jean de Luz during a conference on Europe (Le 
Monde, 10 September 1966: 5). 
F) Interview with Europe No 1 in August 1966 (L· Monde, 24 August 1966: 14). 
Case 1, After T h e Hague 
Willy Brandt (7) 
A) Speech for the the Federation of German Wholesale and Foreign Trade (Bundesverband des 
Deutschen Groß- und Außenhandels) on 2 June 1970 in Bonn. 
B) Declaration on European policy on 6 November 1970 in the Bundestag. 
C) Speech for the Plenary Assembly of the Deutschen Industrie- und Handelstages on 26 February 
1971 in Bonn. 
D) Declaration in the Bundestag during its 13rh Session on 24 June 1971. 
E) Interview with Le Monde, Pans, on 6 July 1971 concerning the EEC. 
F) Interview with Der Spiegel on 27 September 1971. 
(All reproduced in: Brandt, 1971). 
G) Speech during the 9th Annual Meeting of the trade union for press and paper (IG Druck und 
Papier) in Nürnberg on 24 October 1971 (Reproduced in: Brandt, 1973). 
George Pompidou (7) 
A) Interview with la Revue Réalités, 14 April 1970 (Reproduced in: Pompidou, 1975: T.l). 
B) Pressconference, Pans 2 July 1970. 
C) Pressconference, Pans, 21 January 1971. 
(All reproduced in: Cousté and Visine, 1974). 
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D) Speech held on the occasion of the Diner at the Elysée in the honour of Willy Brandt, 
Chancellor of the German Federal Republic, 25 January 1971. 
E) Pressconference held at the Elysée, 25 September 1971. 
(All reproduced in: Pompidou, 1975: T.2). 
F) Television interview, Paris, 22 December 1971 (Reproduced in: Cousté and Visine, 1974). 
G) Declaration during the open session of the Conference of Heads and State and Government 
of the member states of the European Communities in Paris, 19 October 1972 (Reproduced in: 
Pompidou, 1975: T.2). 
Valéry Giscardd'Estatng (7) 
A) Television interview, 11 May 1971. 
B) Declaration at the Assemblée nationale, 12 May 1971. 
C) Letter to the President of the European Commission, 1 September 1972. 
(All reproduced in: La politique étrangère de la France. 1" semestre, October 1971 : 159-
60, 162-7; 2er semestre, October 1972 : 66. On: www.ena.lu/mce.cfm). 
D) Speech at the Annual Meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the Worldbank held 
from 25-29 September 1972 (Excerpt) (Europa-Archiv, vol. 27, Folge 23/1972, D.577-8). 
E) 'Challenging the status of London', interview with M. Giscard d'Estaing. lanuary 1973 (The 
Banker, vol. 123, iss. 563: 44-9). 
F) Television interview on 1 3 February 1973 concerning the monetary situation (Europa-Archiv, 
vol. 28, Folge 7/1973, D.164-6). 
G) Radio and Television Speech held at 19 January 1974 concerning the monetary measures 
taken by the government (Excerpt) (Europa-Archiv, vol 28, Folge 7/1973, D.164-6; vol 29, 
Folge 8/1974, D.178-9). 
Karl Schiller (4) 
A) 'Bemühen um Geldwertstabilität und leistungsfähige Wirtschaft'. Speech held at the 
inauguration of the Expo on German Industry (Deutschen Industrieausstellung) in Berlin on 17 
September 1970. 
B) 'Voraussetzungen fur eine prosperierende Weltwirtschaft'. Speech held for the Annual 
Meeting of the Governors of the International Monetary Fund and Worldbank in Copenhagen 
on 21 September 1970. 
(All reproduced in: Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung; nr. 126,22 
September 1970: 1.300; nr.129, 25 September 1970: 1335). 
C) Declaration held for the European Parliament concerning the Economic Union and the 
prospect of a Monetary Union in the European Communities on 18 November 1970 - Reply 
(Publikatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen — Annex, November 1970). 
D) 'Aussprache zur Großen Anfrage zur Außenpolitik'. Speech held during the deliberations of 
the Bundestag on 29 January 1971. (Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung: 
nr. 14, 2 February 1971: 149). 
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Case 2, Before the Summer of 1989 
Helmut Kohl (6) 
A) 'Die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der internationalen Politik'. Speech held for 
the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on 23 October 1986 in Chicago (Reproduced in: Kohl, 
1989). 
B) 'Das Erbe Ludwig Erhards - Herausforderung an die Wirtschaftspolitik'. Speech held 
during the Commemoration of the 90'h birthday of Professor Dr. Ludwig Erhard on 4 February 
1987 in Bonn (Reproduced in: Kohl, 1990b). 
C) 'Für eine gemeinsame europäishe Sicherheitspolitik'. Speech held at the commemoration of 
the 25th Anniversary of the Franco-German Treaty on 22 January 1988 in Paris (Reproduced 
in: Kohl, 1989). 
D) 'Europas Zukunft — Vollendung des Binnenmarktes 1992'. Speech held at the meeting of 
German entrepreneurs on 15 March 1988 in Bonn 
E) 'Zum 40. Jahrestag der Wàhrungs- und Wirtschaftsreform'. Speech held at the Dies of the 
Ludwig-Erhard Foundation on 12 June 1988 in Frankfurt. 
(All reproduced in: Kohl, 1990b). 
F) '40 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland — Unsere Verantwortung für Deutschlands Zukunft'. 
Speech for the opening of the CDU Congress on the theme of "40 years of German Federal 
Republic: Peace - Freedom - Social Justice" on 18 January 1989 in Bonn. (Reproduced in: 
Kohl, 1992). 
François Mitterrand (4) 
A) 'Je crois à la Nécessité historique de l'Europe'. Speech held at the European Council in 
Greece, 6 December 1983 (In: Mitterrand, 1986). 
B) 'François Mitterrand addresses European Public Opinion'. Speech to the Dutch Parliament 
on 7 February 1984 (Europe Documents, no. 1297, 20 February 1984). 
C) Speech held at the European College in Bruges, at the occasion of the opening ceremonial of 
the academic year of the European College on H October 1987 (Europe Documents, no. 1479, 31 
October 1987). 
D) 'Europe and France in François Mitterrand's View. A long letter to All French Citizens'. 
Written prior to the 1988 presidential elections on 14 April 1988 (Europe Documents, no. 1502, 
14 April 1988). 
Karl-Otto Pohl (3) 
A) 'The European Monetary System and the Outlook for the International Monetary System'. 
Speech held on the occasion of the awarding of a high honour of distinction to the Governor of 
the Bank of Italy, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, 17 April 1986 (Europe Documents, tit. 1404, 30 April 
1986). 
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B) 'Die Vision eines europäischen Währungsraumes'. 28 May 1988 (Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 28 May 1988: 15). 
C) 'The further development of the European Monetary System'. September 1988 (Annex to 
the Delors report, September 1988: 129-155). 
Case 2, After the Summer of 1989 
Helmut Kohl (6) 
A) 'Aufbruch zu Freiheir und Selbstbestimmung. Die Deutschland- und Europapolitik im 
Blick aug den Zerfall der Diktaturen des Ostblocks'. Declaration on the state of the nation in 
the divided Germany, 8 November 1989 (Reproduced in: Kohl, 1992). 
B) 'Gesicherter Frieden in Freiheit und Wohlstand'. Speech held on the occasion of the Annual 
Meeting of the Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände on 14 December 1989 in Bonn 
(Reproduced in: Kohl, 1990b). 
C) 'Der Standort Deutschlands in einem künftigen Europa'. Speech held at 17 January 1990 on 
a conference of the Bureau International de Liaison et de Documentation and the Institut Français des 
Relations Internationales in the International Conference Centre in Paris (Reproduced in: Kohl, 
1992). 
D) 'The Community and a United Germany'. Pressconference in Brussels on 23 March 1990 
(Europe Documents, nr. 1607). 
Ε) 'A United Germany in a United Europe'. Speech delivered to the American Council on 
Germany, New York City, N.Y. 5 June 1990 (Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol LVI, no 18, July 1, 
1990). 
F) '... im Ziechen von Freiheid, Rechtstaatlichkeit und Demokratie. Aufgabe deutscher Politik 
in den neunziger Jahren'. Speech held on 20 May 1991 on invitation of the Atlantic Council, 
Georgetown University, Center for Strategic and International Studies and American Institute for 
Contemporary German Studies in Washington (Reproduced in: Kohl, 1992). 
François Mitterrand (7) 
A) Interview with Ms Anne Sinclair on TF1, 25 March 1990. 
B) Joint Press conference on the occasion of the Extraordinary European Council in Dublin on 
27 April 1990. 
(All reproduced in: Mage, 1997). 
C) Joint press conference of President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl on 15 November 1991 
(Reproduced in: Kimmel and Jardin, 2002). 
D) Press conference à L'Issue du Conseil Européen, Maastricht, 10 December 1991. 
E) Interview with Antenne 2 in Paris, 11 December 1991. 
F) Interview with the journal Sud-Ouest at Latché, 16 August 1993. 
(All on: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr) 
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G) Extracts from a speech by French President François Mitterrand to the European Parliament 
Strasbourg, 17 January 1995 (On: www.ellopos.net/politics/mitterrand-multilingualism.htm). 
Karl-Otto Pohl (3) 
A) Extracts of President Pöhl's Press Conference, Frankfurt, 19 September 1990. In: Deutsche 
Bundesbank's Statement on Creating Economic and Monetary Union in Europe, Memo 
presented to the press (Europe Documents, nr 1655, 5 October 1990: 6-8). 
B) 'Europäische Währung und Europäische Zentralbank aus deutscher Sicht'. 1990 (in: Franz, 
1990:31-41). 
C) 'A new Monetary Order for Europe'. The 1992 Per Jacobsson Lecture, Washington D.C. 20 
September 1992 
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Maastricht decisions M4 
Monetary tenswn M5 
MemqeJ:Ship of NATO Nl 
Irreversible EMU 01 
Opt-out clause 02 
Political integration Pl 
Development of new European POlicies D2 Political will P2 
~(,pm~nc.1('U(~~~llf~'~y~ ~3 
Valuing_ European (democratic) ideals D5 
O.usibll-making· oy cipi:rrs AD6 
Pre-WWll political traditions P3 
Political Union P4 
Political willm Germany P5 
Difficult negotiations D7 
(True) European Unification El 
Lack of pohtical w11110 Great-Britain P6 
Reinforcement of European Parliament Rl 
European relance ElO 
EMS E12 
Re-unification of Germany R2 
Ratification R3 
fnll use ofJ!CU.{l!olo .. l~V) .. ~ Completion of SEA Sl 
Establishment ofEMU/ECB E3 Conflict/competition between European SlO 
Europe standing together E4 
. , :ut~'sbet!d for US'p't'O?e'cirtli\. ·'E~ 
r;f:;ropean cu!~.i.IJ.~qp ,.E6 
Eurooean institutional proJ~;ress E7 
· i-':.:.1\it~~~fe.ilN.T~r. (,[4't1l.l\~\u:Uff,, ; ~ 
Eur~_ integration (prior to SEA) E9 
Coordination of foreign POlicies Fl 
countries 
~ulation Sll 
!>urn~ 
.S2 
Eurooean social space S3 
Sratus Europe equal to US and Japan S4 
Successful European inteJ(ration · S5 
Security for Europe S6 
• t Europe:.ml'r~~·hip _f) 
French POlicy F3 
French-German conflict F4 
Social Justice/equality S7 
Develooment of an industrial socie'cv S8 
SinJ~;Ie currency S9 
Freed om of action F5 European integration in the technical issue- Tl 
Better functiOning of sea F6 
Economic growth G3 
Gov~'tOMenYSupport fdr 1odustfi .. G4 
Sound money G5 
Self-absorbed/disconnected Germany G6 
Problems for Germany G7 
Germany res_I>eetmg current borders GB 
Historical drama Hl 
area 
Adhesion of all member states to EMU T2 
Benefit of U1 
Btililili~O!~ U2 
Benefit of France U3 
Unemployment U4 
Benefit of Kohl U6 
Benefit of eleven U7 
Independence of Europe Il 
\ Mete institutional, economic, legal I2 
~ integration 
Stan of EMU on 1-1-99 I3 
SpeedioJ( up of EMU-process Vl 
EMU preparations V2 
FixinJ( of the schedule of the IGC V3 
Enlargement Wt 
Increased use of majority rule/giving up patt Ml Wishes of the German people W2 
of sovereiJI:nty 
'· Massacre & dtsrruction · M2 
': Mere uweri;!.linrerests M3 
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Pohl 
Concept AC ~m~i.io.t:rhe EMS Ui 
All member states fully participating in A1 
EMS 
Monetary stability M3 
Financing of governmental debts by the M4 
Bundesbank policy B1 ECB 
Changes in domestic monetary and fiscal C1 
policy 
Convergence in economic policies C2 
Monetary integration without economic M5 
integration 
Effective monetary control M6 
Monetary convergence C3 
Economic convergence C4 
Multispeed EMU M7 
Independent ECB 01 
;~~~cfariii!i"btfil.P't>lllt 'ftie.;ti.al\:fs'Ms 'CI Price stability P1 
Cred1ble ECB C6 Parallel currency P2 
1992 monetary crisis C7 Political consensus P3 
Further development of EMS D1 Exchange rate adjustments R1 
lfE?O'tt9ffilt'amur!lant.!s F!)1 
Relinquishing the DM D3 
Delors report D4 
Goals of politicians D5 
EMS E1 
Stable exchange rates S1 
Establishment of Single European market S2 
~·Ttafi~re1'b'f~"fem:gn:ty1rt m~ 'i'coii&mri; S3 
' mon~rary apd fiscal issl!l'-area 
Supranational decision-making S4 
Establishment of a European monetary fund E10 
Further European integration Ell 
''l!t'oM:iifl'fta&eloi:>.rll~tiftli''Elft'il'iie ~Et2 
Strong currency S5 
Tensions between EU members T1 
Treat to the existence of the monetary T2 
; European political integration E2 
. European economic integration E3 
Pevel.Qpm~,'lf.the }lUJ;q~,,i~tJ.!ttops .ll..4 
Establishment of EMU E6 
system 
Benefit of U1 
Benefit of Germany U2 
Benefic of European member states U3 
tE'frtop&'~ ec6'no1fik·ttni<iri ~m 
~,Esta,bli~men.r.qf a EuroPean,t;.W&~Ql;.Y ,Ea 
ECB with price stability as its primary goal E9 
Fixed exchange races F1 
Greater financial role for EU in the world F2 
Benefic of Bundesbank U4 
Benefit of European parliament U5 
Bundesbank's critical attitude cowards Vl 
further European integranon 
Employment W1 
1iberalisation of capital markets L1 Utopias W2 
Long process 12 
1muted budgetary defiCit 13 
Increased monetary coordination between M1 
member states 
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D CENTRALITY AND SALIENCY 
Case 1 
Before The Hague 
Brandt-1 
Concept 
German policy 
European unificanon (general) 
Peace 
European influence on international 
affairs 
Enlargement 
European co-operation 
Benefit of Germany 
Completion of the EEC 
European political unification 
European political co-operation 
Benefit of all 
European economic unification 
Harmonisation of European economic 
intetests 
French-German co-operation 
Re-unification of Germany 
Power politics 
Welfare / economic development 
Co-operation in NATO 
Exchange surplus in Germany 
Solidarity 
European security cooperation 
Change of French government 
Improved relanons with Eastern 
Europe 
Political will 
Harmonisation of European economic 
policy 
Harmonisation of European monetary 
policy 
Monetary unrest (1967) 
Deficits in foreign countries 
Stabile D-mark 
Economic stability in Europe 
Solution to monetary problems 
Ptagmatism 
Employment 
AC 
Gl 
E10 
VI 
E6 
W l 
E l l 
U2 
CI 
E8 
E7 
Ul 
E9 
H3 
F3 
D2 
M3 
W3 
C3 
D4 
SI 
E12 
F4 
11 
PI 
H4 
H5 
M2 
Tl 
D3 
E3 
M4 
P2 
W2 
C 
14 
13 
11 
9 
9 
9 
8 
6 
6 
6 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
AC 
C 
S 
Separation Core / non-Core Beliefs 
Adminis t ra t ive Code 
Cent rah ty 
Saliency 
Concept 
Peace 
German policy 
European unificanon (general) 
Enlargement 
European influence on internanonal 
affairs 
Benefit of all 
Benefit of Germany 
European co-operation 
Completion of the EEC 
European political unification 
European economic unification 
French-German co-operation 
Power politics 
Harmonisation of European economic 
interests 
European political co-operation 
Re-unification of Germany 
European security co-operanon 
Welfare / economic development 
Change of French government 
Solidarity 
Political will 
Improved relations with Eastern 
Europe 
Exchange surplus in Germany 
Co-operation in NATO 
Deficits in foreign countries 
Monetary unrest (1967) 
Harmonisation of European monetary 
policy 
Harmonisation of European economic 
policy 
Employment 
Pragmatism 
Solution to monetary problems 
Economic stability in Europe 
Stabile D-mark 
AC 
VI 
G l 
E10 
W l 
E6 
Ul 
U2 
E l l 
CI 
E8 
E9 
F3 
M3 
H i 
E7 
D2 
E12 
W 3 
F4 
SI 
PI 
11 
D4 
C3 
Tl 
M2 
H5 
H4 
W2 
P2 
M4 
E3 
D3 
S 
23 
23 
20 
14 
14 
13 
12 
12 
10 
9 
8 
7 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
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Pompidou-1 
Concept 
French policies 
Deepening 
Effective and freely chosen devaluations 
European confederation 
Economic crisis/instability 
Exgansive fin & economic policy 
Economic growth 
Loss French gold, exchange holdings 
Stabile franc 
Rapprochement between East & West 
Independence of France 
Protection against/no speculation 
An Atlantic Europe 
European economic cooperation 
Economic stability/no inflation 
Harmonisation of economic policies 
Benefit of France 
Restored trade relations 
Long process 
Political integration 
Decision making by technical inst 
Liberalisations of credits and prices 
Social justice 
New industrial revolution 
European political co-operation 
Independence of Europe 
Inflation in reserve currency countries 
Benefit of Europe 
More competitiveness french business 
Benefit of French regions 
Survival of Europe 
Welfare 
Employment 
Europe as world-power 
Progress 
European autonomous security policy 
Bretton Woods 
A European state 
French-Eastern European relations 
Internat Mon system based on gold 
Monetary crisis (of 1972) 
Mutual consultations 
Protection of French farmers 
Sacrificing French interests 
US military support 
Friendship with the US 
Peace 
AC 
F2 
D2 
D3 
E9 
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El 
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S3 
T l 
14 
P2 
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E14 
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H4 
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L3 
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5 
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4 
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3 
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3 
3 
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2 
2 
2 
2 
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2 
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1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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Deepening 
Effective Afreely chosen devaluations 
European confederation 
French policies 
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Independence of France 
Loss French gold, currency holdings 
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Benefit of France 
An Atlantic Europe 
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New industrial revolution 
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Political integration 
Benefit of all 
European autonomous security policy 
European political co-operation 
Independence of Europe 
Inflation in reserve currency countries 
Benefit of Europe 
Increased competitiveness fr business 
Benefit of French regions 
Survival of Europe 
Welfare 
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Bretton Woods 
European state 
French-Eastern European relations 
Internat mon system based on gold 
Monetary crisis (of 1972) 
Mutual consultations 
Protection of French farmers 
Sacrificing French interests 
US military support 
Friendship with the US 
Peace 
AC 
D2 
D3 
E9 
F2 
C4 
El 
S5 
H3 
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S3 
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S4 
H4 
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Schiller-I 
Concept 
Benefit of Germany 
Economic growth 
Price stability in Germany 
Financial discipline 
Re-organisation/Improvement of the 
international monetary system 
Balance of payments deficit in the UK 4 
US 
IMF/SDR s 
Enlargement 
European unification 
Free trade 
Suitable liquidity 
Price stability in the world 
Deepening 
Exchange rate modifications in all states 
Benefit of all 
Bretton Woods 
Deflation 
European coordination of employment 
policy 
Fiscal policy 
Money policy 
International coordination of 
employmenr policy 
Recession 
International co-operation 
Revaluation of the D-mark 
European coordination of monetary & 
fiscal instruments 
Gold standard 
Increased Gold price 
Harmonisation European economies 
International coordination of money Si 
fiscal policies 
Economic and social welfare 
Increased effectiveness and efficiency 
Peace 
Interdependence of material interests 
Competing devaluations 
Availability of credit 
Monetary shocks 
Political will member states 
Post-war expansion of trade 
Post-war expansion of production 
Employment 
Crisis in world trade 
AC 
VA 
E2 
P6 
Fl 
RI 
B4 
16 
W l 
E7 
V2 
LI 
P5 
Dl 
W3 
Ul 
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E8 
F5 
G2 
14 
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R2 
E9 
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H2 
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Price stability in Germany 
IMF/SDR s 
Benefit of Germany 
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Economic growth 
Suitable liquidity 
Re-organisation/Improvement of the 
international monetary system 
European unification 
Price stability in the world 
Free trade 
Economic and social welfare 
Benefit of all 
Bretton Woods 
Deepening 
Increased effectiveness and efficiency 
Exchange rate modifications in all states 
Balance of payments deficit in the UK 
a: US 
Deflation 
European coordination of employment 
policy 
Fiscal policy 
Money policy 
International coordination of 
employment policy 
Revaluation of the D-mark 
Recession 
Peace 
European coordination of monetary Si 
fiscal instruments 
Gold standard 
Increased gold price 
Harmonisation European economies 
International coordination of money Be 
fiscal policies 
Interdependence of material interests 
Competing devaluations 
Availability of credits 
Monetary shocks 
Political will member states 
Post-war expansion of trade 
Post-war expansion of production 
Employment 
Crisis in world trade 
AC 
17 
P6 
16 
U4 
W l 
Fl 
E2 
LI 
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E7 
P5 
V2 
W5 
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W3 
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R3 
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Giscard-1 
Concept 
Breccon Woods 
European currency/EMU 
No correction mechanisms enforcing 
financial discipline 
European integration 
Inflation 
Completion of European integration 
Stability of world economy 
Europe as an economic world power 
French preference for revision of Bretton 
Woods to a system build on gold 
An international monetary system based 
on gold 
International multilateral surveillance 
Sufficient but not too much liquidity 
Unfair division of costs and benefits 
US balance of payments deficit 
Abolishment of fiscal borders 
Economic expansion 
Surplus in European countries 
Ample use of European currency in 
banking system 
Completion of the internal market 
(1968) 
Development of a European economic 
policy 
Europe of alliances 
European currency becoming world 
currency 
European preference for gold 
Harmonisation of fiscal and social 
policies 
High level of employment 
Positive developments after WWII 
Solution to many problems 
Speedy introduction of majority rule in 
European Parliament 
Speedy introduction of universal 
suffrage for European Parliament 
Anti-national supranational Europe 
AC 
Bl 
E2 
N l 
E6 
11 
CI 
S5 
E4 
Fl 
G2 
13 
S6 
Ul 
U2 
Al 
El 
Ol 
A2 
C2 
Dl 
E3 
E5 
E7 
HI 
H2 
PI 
S2 
S3 
S4 
S7 
C Concept 
No correction mechanisms enforcing 
financial discipline 
Bretton Woods 
European currency 
Unfair division of costs and benefits 
European integration 
Completion of European integration 
Europe as an economic world power 
Inflation 
Stability of world economy 
Sufficient but not too much liquidity 
French preference for revision of Bretton 
Woods to a system build on gold 
An international monetary system based 
on gold 
US balance of payments deficit 
Ample use of European currency in 
banking system 
International multilateral surveillance 
Surplus in European countries 
Economic expansion 
Abolishment of fiscal borders 
Completion of the internal market 
(1968) 
Development of a European economic 
policy 
Europe of alliances 
European currency becoming world 
currency 
European preference for gold 
Harmonisation of fiscal and social 
policies 
High level of employment 
Positive developments after WWII 
Solution to many problems 
Speedy introduction of majority rule in 
European Parliament 
Speedy introduction of universal 
suffrage for European Parliament 
Anti-national supranational Europe 
AC 
N l 
Bl 
E2 
Ul 
E6 
CI 
E4 
11 
S5 
S6 
Fl 
G2 
U2 
A2 
12 
Ol 
El 
Al 
C2 
Dl 
E3 
E5 
E7 
HI 
H2 
PI 
S2 
S3 
S4 
S7 
S 
14 
14 
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9 
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1 
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Brandr-2 
Concept AC c 
~9> E5_ 18 
Completion of the EEC C1 14 
German policy GI II 
Hagu; s~~t- - - - - - - - - - - H1 7 
Improved relations with Easr-Europe Il 7 
Enlargement WI 6 
European political co-operation E7 5 
Reinforced relations with US R1 5 
Reinforcement of European institutions R2 4 
Economic & monetary parallelism E1 4 
EEG speaking with one voice E4 4 
Economic growth in Europe E2 3 
Economic stability in Europe E3 3 
Europe influencing international affairs E6 3 
Benefit of all U1 3 
Clause de prudence C2 2 
Europeanpoli tical unification ES 2 
Floating ofD-mark F2 2 
Harmonisation of European economic H3 2 
interests 
Benefit of Germany U2 2 
Democratic control on Europe D1 2 
Harmonisation Eur. foreign policies H2 2 
Supranational co-operation S2 2 
Fast & efficient European decision F1 1 
making 
Attraction of the EEG to Ease-Europe A1 l 
Co-operation in NATO C3 l 
Mere material interests M1 1 
Solidarity S1 1 
493 In the decision makers' second map the 
centrality and saliency of the concept 'EMU' is 
by far the highest . However, this score is biased 
because the inclusion of this concept was used 
as the central selection criterion for the 
assertions used to base the second map on. In 
the first map, this bias is not present because 
for these maps the central selection criteria 
included concept referring to all dimensions 
(see Chapter 4, note 166). The core of these 
maps is calculated on the basis of the highest 
ranking concept other than chat referring to the 
establishment of EMU. 
Appendices 
Concept AC s 
EMU ES :26 
Hague summit H1 20 
Completion of the EEC Cl 20 
_9t;:n_:.al!_P2li_:y ___________ G1 19 
Improved relations with East-Europe Il 9 
Enlargement W1 9 
Reinforcement of European institutions R2 6 
Economic & monetary parallelism E1 4 
European poli rica! co-operation E7 4 
Reinforced relations with US R1 4 
Clause de prudence C2 3 
Economic growth in Europe E2 3 
Economic stability in Europe E3 3 
Europe influencing_ international affairs E6 3 
European political unification E8 3 
Floating ofD-mark F2 3 
Harmonisation of European economic H3 3 
interests 
Benefit of Germany U2 3 
Benefit of all Ul 3 
Democratic conrrol on Europe D1 2 
EEG speaking with one voice E4 2 
Fasr & efficient European decision F1 2 
making 
Harmonisation of Eur foreign policies H2 2 
Supranational co-operation S2 2 
Attraction of EEG to East-Europe A1 1 
Co-operation in NATO C3 1 
Mere material interests M1 1 
Solidarity S1 1 
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Pompidou-2 
Concept AC c Concept AC s 
European monetary zone E10 22 European monetary zone E10 45 
(fund/unit of account) (fund/unit of account) 
~u,:ol?e~n_c~nf:~er!t~OI2:_ _____ E9 12 
--
Euro ean confederation E9 16 
Europe acting as a front E7 7 ,!!~ol'~ a~t0~ ~ ~o~t- _____ E7 12 
--Intergovernmental decision- 12 7 Economic harmonisation E2 10 
making Intergovernmental decision- 12 10 
Economic harmonisation E2 6 making 
Europe as a world-power E8 6 Euro ean state Ell 9 
European state Ell 5 Increased credit facilities 11 8 
Increased credit facilities 11 4 Preservation of CAP Kl 7 
Preservation of CAP K1 4 Economic stability/no inflation E3 6 
Fixed exchange rates F1 4 Fixed exchange rates Fl 6 
Hague summit H1 4 Hague summit Hl 6 
Political will Pl 3 Europe as world- ower E8 5 
Balanced economies B1 3 Economic rowth El 4 
Economic stability/no inflation E3 2 French policies F2 4 
Economic growth E1 2 Sin le currency S1 4 
French policies F2 2 Europe acquiring economic and E6 3 
Single currency S1 2 monetary power 
Europe acquiring economic and E6 2 Lon rocess Ll 3 
monetary power Political will P1 3 
Long process Ll 2 Balanced economies Bl 2 
Decision making by technical D1 2 Concerted defence against the C2 2 
institutions inflow of ca i tal 
Deepening D2 2 Decision making by technical D1 2 
French- German co-operation F3 2 institutions 
Harmonisation of agricultural H2 2 Dee enin D2 2 
policy French- German co-operation F3 2 
Airy Castles L2 2 Harmonisation of agricultural H2 2 
Monetary harmonisation M2 2 olic 
Mutual consultations M3 2 L2 2 
Protection against/no speculation P2 2 Monetary harmonisation M2 2 
Enlargement W1 2 Mutual consultations M3 2 
Concerted defence against the C2 1 P2 2 
inflow of capital W1 2 
Common management of reserves C1 1 Common mana ement of reserves C1 
Creation of opportunities for C3 1 Creation of opportunities for C3 
Europe Euro e 
European influence on the E4 1 European influence on the E4 
reorganisation of the international reorganisation of the international 
monetary system moneta s seem 
European mutual financial E5 1 European mutual financial E5 
assistance assistance 
Monetary crisis (of 1972) M1 1 Monetary crisis (of 1972) Ml 
Protection of French farmers P3 1 Protection of French farmers P3 
Protection of European farmers P4 1 Protection of European farmers P4 
Benefit of Europe U1 1 Benefit of Euro e Ul 
Benefit ofF ranee U2 1 Benefit of France U2 
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Schiller-2 
Concept AC c Concept AC s 
Esciblislunent of EMU E4 19 Establishment of EMU E4 22 
Inflation in EEG I3 10 
Fu~the; E~~Pea-;, in~egn~~i~n- - - "F4 -6-
Inflation in EEG I3 13 
Parallelism between economic and Pl 10 
Parallelism between economic and Pl 5 monetary measures 
monetary measures 
European political union E6 4 
S:l~u~e_d:_p,5u_5l:_n:_e ________ Cl 9 
European political union E6 6 
Benefit of all Ul 4 Further European integration F4 6 
Price stability in the world P5 4 European economic union E5 5 
The Hague summit Hl 3 Benefit of all U1 5 
Normalisation of relations between Nl 3 Auromatic transfer to subsequent A1 4 
East & West German relations phases of EMU 
Improved position of European Il 3 The Hague summit H1 4 
currencies Normalisation of relations between Nl 4 
Monetary powerful Europe Ml 3 East & West German relations 
Beneficial pressure Bl 3 Price stability in Germany P6 4 
Political will of the member states P2 3 Supranational decision making Tl 4 
Enlargemenc W1 3 Improved position of European I1 3 
Economic ill Europe E3 3 currencies 
Flexible external parities F2 3 Monetary powerful Europe M1 3 
Clause de prudence Cl 2 Price stability in the world P5 3 
Price stability in Germany P6 2 Beneficial pressure B1 2 
Supranational decision making Tl 2 Financial discipline F1 2 
Financial discipline F1 2 German focus on price stability in G1 2 
Increased effectiveness and !2 2 EMU negotiations 
efficiency Increased effectiveness and I2 2 
One European voice 01 2 efficiency 
Powerful Europe P3 2 One European voice 01 2 
Deepening D1 2 Political will of the member states P2 2 
Discrediting of European idea D2 2 Powerful Europe P3 2 
French-German co-operation F3 2 Interdependence of material V1 2 
Re-organisation of the R1 2 interests 
incernational monetary sys tem Enlargement W1 2 
European economic union E5 l Common economic policies C2 1 
Automatic transfer to subsequent A1 1 Deepening D1 1 
phases of EMU Discrediting of European idea D2 1 
German focus on price stability in G1 1 ECB autonomy E1 1 
EMU negotiations Economic growth E2 1 
Interdependence of material V1 1 Economic ill Europe E3 1 
interests Flexible external parities F2 1 
Common economic policies C2 l French-German co-operation F3 1 
ECB autonomy E1 l Re-organisation of the Rl 1 
Economic growth E2 l international monetary system 
Single European currency S1 1 Single European currency S1 1 
Benefit of future members U2 1 Benefit of future members U2 1 
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Giscard-2 
CorJcept AC c Co11ce/Jt AC s 
European currency/EMU; ,E2 11 
European integration E6 11 
Floating of cerrain Eur. currencies F3 10 
Floating of certain Eur. currencies F3 17 
;European currency/EMU E2 15 
Eu2:0£e~n i_n~g!"~o~ _______ E6 14 
---
~o.!,le.!_a'l' ~r~tjn_E~r'?Pe_ _____ M2 
- J_ 
Break in EMU discussions B2 7 
Break in EMU discussions B2 9 
Monetary order in Europe M2 9 
French policies F7 6 
Joint float of EEC currencies J1 6 
Appreciation ofDM A4 5 
Fixed exchange rates F8 5 
Reduction of margins of fluctuation R1 5 
Reduction of margins of fluctuation R1 8 
French policies F7 8 
Floating OM-crisis F2 6 
Joint float of EEC currencies J1 6 
Fixed exchange rates FS 6 
Agreement on EMU A3 4 Agreement on EMU A3 5 
Floating OM-crisis F2 4 
French commitment to the EEC F6 4 
Appreciation of DM A4 5 
French commitment to the EEC F6 5 
Inflation 11 4 European monetary integration M1 4 
Deflation 03 4 Deflation 03 4 
Disunion amongst EEC members 02 3 
Collective European revaluation C4 3 
Development ofEur. economic policy 01 3 
European unit of account ElO 3 
European monetary integration M1 3 
Unfair division of costs and benefits U1 3 
Disunion amongst EEC members 02 3 
US balance of payments deficit U2 3 
Collective European revaluation C4 3 
Development of Eur. economic DOlicy 01 3 
European unit of account E10 3 
French boycott community insr. F4 3 
US balance of payments deficit U2 3 German policies G3 3 
Convertibility of all currencies C5 2 
Economic expansion E1 2 
European reserve fund E9 2 
First stage of EMU F5 2 
Financial discipline F9 2 
German policies G3 2 
German-French rapprochement G4 2 
Inflation 11 3 
Unfair division of costs and benefits U1 3 
Convertibility of all currencies C5 2 
Economic expansion E1 2 
European reserve fund E9 2 
F irsr stage of EMU F5 2 
German-French rapprochement G4 2 
Inflow of dollars I6 2 Harmonisation of Eur. economies H3 2 
Surplus in European countries 01 2 
Paris as international financial centre P2 2 
Eco. interdependence of Eur. states I2 2 
Inflow of dollars !6 2 
Temporary float of the franc Tl 2 
Benefit of France U3 2 
Surplus in European countries 01 2 
Paris as international financial centre P2 2 
Benefi r of all U5 2 Temporary float of the franc Tl 2 
Adequate functioning Eur. institutions A5 1 
Adequate functioning of CAP A6 1 
Benefit of France U3 2 
Benefit of all U5 2 
Common sense C3 1 Financial discipline F9 2 
Devaluation of the dollar D4 1 Adequate functioning Eur. institutions A5 1 
European problems E8 1 
French boycott community insr. F4 1 
High level of employment H2 1 
Harmonisation of Eur. economies H3 1 
Adequate functioning of CAP A6 1 
Common sense C3 1 
Devaluation of the dollar 04 1 
European problems E8 1 
Eco. interdependence Eur. states I2 1 
Symmetrical mon. intervention system I4 1 
Internarionalisarion of capital markers 15 1 
Liberalisarion L1 1 
High level of employment H2 1 
Symmetrical mon. intervention system I4 1 
Internarionalisation of capital markers I5 1 
Liberalisarion L1 1 
Solution to floating OM-crisis S8 1 
Benefit of some other Eur. states U4 1 
Solution to floating OM-crisis S8 1 
Benefit of some other Eur. stares U4 1 
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Case 2 
Before summer 1989 
Kohl-1 
Concept AC c Concept AC s 
European integration E5 22 European integration ES 36 
~oT~e~oE '2_f ~E~ ________ ~1- - 16 ,S:o.:n£le_:i~ 2f ~E~ _________ S1 25 
European unification E9 11 Price stability P1 16 
Price stability_ P1 10 Benefit of Ul 15 
Benefit of U1 9 European unification E9 14 
European political cooperation Ell 7 Increased purchasing power W1 12 
~~-tablishment of EMU E6 6 Expansionary governmental policy Ll 12 
French-German cooperation F4 6 French-German coo_p_eration F4 10 
Expansionary governmental policy Ll 6 Economic development E4 10 
Partition of Germany P4 6 Peace P5 8 
Economic harmonisation E8 5 Partition of Germany P4 8 
Further monetary coOQ_eration M1 5 European political cooperation Ell 8 
Peace P5 5 Establishment of EMU E6 7 
(Eur,)Central bank independence C1 4 Further monetary cooperation M1 6 
Liberalisation L2 4 Economic harmonisation E8 6 
European economic cooperation E10 3 (European)Central bank independence Cl 6 
Further development EMS E12 3 International labour-division Il 5 
Economic development E4 3 Liberalisation L2 4 
EMS E7 3 French-German reconciliation F2 4 
Majority decisions M2 3 Further development EMS E12 4 
Benefit of Germany U3 3 Solid government finances S2 3 
Increased purchasing power W1 3 Autonomous role for Europeans Rl 3 
Decentralised (Euro_pean) central bank C2 2 Majority decisions M2 3 
Economic growth E2 2 German policy G1 3 
Employment E3 2 EMS E7 3 
French-German friendship F1 2 European economic cooperation ElO 3 
French-German reconciliation F2 2 Benefit of Germany U3 2 
German policy G1 2 Benefit of France & Germany U2 2 
(reunified) Germany in the EC/EU G2 2 Shared interest Germ and France S4 2 
German sacrifices G3 2 Social-economic development S3 2 
German strength G5 2 Making compromises M3 2 
Internationallabour-<livision Il 2 German freedom G4 2 
Making compromises M3 2 German sacrifices G3 2 
Solid government finances S2 2 (reunified) Germany in the EC/EU G2 2 
Social-economic development S3 2 French-German friendship Fl 2 
Shared interest Germ, and France S4 2 Employment E3 2 
Benefit of France & Germany U2 2 Economicgrowth E2 2 
European competitiveness E1 1 Decentral (European) central bank C2 2 
European social development E13 1 Trusr of the citizens Tl 1 
European economic unification E14 1 Political freedom of action P6 1 
Freedom F3 1 History of Europe Hl 1 
German freedom G4 1 German strength GS 1 
History of Europe H1 1 Freedom F3 1 
Political freedom of action P6 1 European economic unification E14 1 
Autonomous role for Europeans R1 1 European social development E1 3 1 
Trust of the citizens Tl 1 European competitiveness E1 1 
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Mi tterrand -1 
Concept AC c Concept AC s 
(True) European Unification E1 13 (True) European Unification E1 26 
European integration (prior to SEA) E9 13 European integration (prior to SEA) E9 19 
Completion of SEA S1 11 
Development new European policies D2 10 
Political will P2 18 
so!vi;;i ~r;;n;-c~~m:~tr p-;oble~; - -Es- -16 
Political will P2 10 Benefit of all Ul 15 
Solving current Communil}'j>foblems E8 9 Ability to deal with problems A1 14 
~o~ti_;;a!._i~e~~i~n _________ P1 9 
---
European institutional progress E7 14 
Ability to deal with problems A1 8 Development new European policies D2 12 
European institutional progress E7 8 Political integration P1 10 
Independence of Europe Il 8 Completion of SEA S1 9 
Benefit of all U1 7 Europe standing_ together E4 8 
European relance E10 6 Independence of Europe Il 8 
European free trade area S2 6 Mere material interests M3 8 
Valuing European (democratic) ideals D5 5 Successful EurOE_ean integration S5 8 
Mere material interests M3 5 European technical integration T1 7 
Successful European integration S5 5 Coherence members' interests Cl 6 
European technical integration Tl 5 European relance E10 6 
Coherence members' interests C1 4 European free trade area S2 6 
Europe standing together E4 4 Status Europe equal to US and Japan S4 6 
Status Europe equal to US and Japan S4 4 Valuing Eur. (democratic) ideals D5 5 
Decision-making by experts D6 3 Unemployment U4 5 
Full use of ECU (as reserve currency) E2 3 European cultural integration E6 4 
European cultural integration E6 3 Mere inst., eco., legal integration I2 4 
Increased use of majority rule/giving up M1 3 Increased use of majority rule/giving M1 4 
part of sovereignty up part of sovereignty 
Reinforcement of Eur. Parliament R1 3 Changing circumstances C2 3 
Development of an industrial society S8 3 Decision-making by experts D6 3 
Benefit of F ranee U3 3 Full use of ECU (as reserve currency) E2 3 
Unemployment U4 3 Pre-WWHpolitical traditions P3 3 
Changing circumstances C2 2 Reinforcement of Eur. Parliament R1 3 
Europe's need for US protection E5 2 Development of an industrial society S8 3 
Coordination of foreign policies F1 2 Benefit of France U3 3 
Europe-US Friendship F2 2 Development of the best in one selves D3 2 
Mere inst.~ eco., legal integration 12 2 Europe's need for US protection E5 2 
Pre-WWII political traditions P3 2 Coordination of foreignf>Olicies F1 2 
Political Union P4 2 Europe-US Friendship F2 2 
European social space S3 2 Massacre & destruction M2 2 
Retaining CAP C3 1 Political Union P4 2 
Cold war C4 1 European social space S3 2 
Development of the best in one selves D3 1 Retaining CAP C3 1 
Establishment ofEMU/ECB E3 1 Cold war C4 1 
French policy F3 1 Establishment of EMU/ECB E3 ! 
Economic growth G3 1 French policy F3 1 
Government support for· industry G4 1 Economic growth G3 1 
Massacre & destruction M2 1 Government support for industry G4 1 
Membership of NATO N1 1 Membership of NATO N1 1 
Security for Europe S6 1 Security for Europe S6 1 
Benefit of others U2 1 Benefit of others U2 1 
Enlargement W1 1 Enlargement W1 1 
372 
Appendices 
Pohl-1 
ConcePt AC c Concept AC s 
"'""7biistiment of EMU: E6 19 Establishment of EMU E6 52 
r fixed exchange rates F1 10 Fixed exchange rates Fl 17 
"'f,:",.!il> ll~me\'lt of a European currency E8 :7 liberalisation of capital markers ll 14 
[ Exchange rate adjustments R1 7 
f Establishment of Single Eur. market S2 7 
Establishment of Single Eur. marker S2 13 
Establishment of a European curreru:~ Es 1~ 
!:_ri_se 1t~i_!!tl:_ __________ ~1- - 7 
Further development of EMS Dl 6-
ECB with price stability as its primary E9 12 
.o:oal 
Stable exchange rates Sl 5 
Transfer of sovereignty in the S3 5 
!,'r!!'e_:<t!b~i~ ___________ Pl 12 
-s3 - -Transfer of sovereignty in the economic, 11 
economic, mon. and fiscal issue-area mon. and fiscal issue-area 
Tensions between EU members Tl 5 Economic conver~ence C4 10 
Monetary stability M3 4 Exchange rate adjustments R1 10 
Economic convergence C4 4 Further development of EMS D1 9 
EMS E1 4 Greater financial role for EU in world F2 8 
Development of Eur. institutions E4 4 Independent ECB 01 8 
ECB with pricestability as primary E9 4 All member states fully participating in A1 7 
goal EMS 
Greater financial role for EU in world F2 4 long process 12 7 
long process 12 4 Stable exchan.o:e rates Sl 7 
Benefit of Ul 4 Changes in domestic mon. & fisc. Cl 6 
Benefit of European member states U3 4 policy ' 
Convergence in economic policies C2 3 Convergence in economic policies C2 6 
Establishment of Eur. monetary fund E10 3 
European economic union E7 3 
Development of the Eur. institutions E4 6 
Financing ofgovernmental debts by M4 6 
liberalisation of capital markers ll 3 
Financing of governmental debts by M4 3 
the ECB 
ECB 
Tensions between EU members Tl 6 
European economic union E7 5 
Monetary integration without M5 3 
economic integration 
General Benefit Ul 5 
Benefit of Germany U2 5 
Changes in domestic monetary and Cl 2 
fiscal policy 
Monetary stability M3 4 
EMS El 4 
Economic disturbances D2 2 Benefit of European member states U3 4 
European economic inte.o:ration E3 2 Establishment of Eur. monetary fund ElO 3 
Increased monetary coordination Ml 2 European political integration E2 3 
between member stares Monetary integration without economic M5 3 
Independent ECB 01 2 integration 
Benefit of Germany U2 2 Employment Wl 3 
Employment Wl 2 Economic disturbances D2 2 
All member states fully participating A1 1 European economic integration E3 2 
in EMS Increased monetary coordination M1 2 
Consolidation of support mechanisms C5 1 between member states 
Further European integration Ell 1 Effective monetary control M6 2 
Economic development in Europe E12 1 Utopias W2 2 
European political integration E2 1 Consolidation of support mechanisms C5 1 
Membership of the EMS M2 1 Further European integration Ell 1 
Effective monetary control M6 1 Economic development in Europe El2 1 
Utopias W2 1 Membership of the EMS M2 1 
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After Summer of 1989 
Kohl-2 
Concept AC c Concept AC s 
Establishment of EMU £6 14 Establtshmenc of EMU E6 30 
Partition of Germany P4 12 Partition of Germany P4 17 
Political unification of Europe P2 10 Political unification of Europe P2 17 
Reforms in Eastern Europe R2 10 European unification E9 15 
European unification E9 9 _s:o_:nel~i~n _!;f ~E~ ________ S1 13 
---European integration E5 8 Not fixing early starting-date for IGC H3 11 
German strength G5 8 European inregration E5 11 
S:oT~e:!o!: <E ~E~ _________ S1 , 8 
---
Hasty steps H2 10 
Germany in the EG/EU G2 6 Germany in the EG/EU G2 10 
European economic cooperation ElO 5 German strength G5 9 
German policy Gl 5 Benefi t ofGermany U3 7 
German Ease-German policies G8 5 Price stabiliry P1 7 
Hasty steps H2 5 European economic cooperation E10 7 
Not fixing_ early starting-date for IGC H 3 5 German policy G1 6 
Benefit of Germany U3 5 European political cooperation Ell 6 
European political cooperation Ell 4 Hisrocy of Europe Hl 5 
Expansionary _g_overnmental policy Ll 4 German Ease-German policies G8 5 
Credibility of the EMU/EURO C3 3 Expansionary governmental policy L1 5 
Germany in Western alliance G6 3 Increased purchasing power Wl 4 
Eur~e speaking with one voice 01 3 German monetary structure G9 4 
Price stability P1 3 Germany in the W estern alliance G6 4 
Social-economic development S3 3 French-German cooperation F4 4 
Increased purchasing power W1 3 Credibility of che EMU/EURO C3 4 
European strength El5 2 Benefit of Kohl U5 3 
French-German cooperation F4 2 Sensitivity of markets to mon. issue S5 3 
Future architecture (united) Germany F7 2 Social-economic development S3 3 
German European policies G7 2 Strengthening of European Parliament R3 3 
German monet~ry structure G9 2 Europe speaking with one voice 01 3 
1iberalisation 12 2 Future architecture (uniced)Germany F7 3 
Solid government finances 52 2 European strength E15 3 
Sensitivity of markets to mon. issue S5 2 (Eur.)Central bank independence C1 3 
Benefic of Europe U4 2 1iberalisacion 12 2 
Benefit of Kohl U5 2 Benefit of Europe U4 2 
(Eur.)Central bank independence Cl 1 Solid government finances S2 2 
Delors report 01 1 Reforms in Eastern Europe R2 2 
European social development E13 1 German European policies G7 2 
Economic development E4 1 German sacrifices G3 2 
Economic harmonisation E8 1 Future architecture of Europe F6 2 
Freedom F3 1 Freedom F3 2 
Future architecture of Europe F6 1 General benefic U1 1 
German sacrifices G3 1 Self-determination S6 1 
Histo_ry of Europe Hl 1 Further monetary cooperation M1 1 
Furrher monetary cooperation M1 1 Economic harmonisation E8 1 
Strengthening of European Parliament R3 1 Economic development E4 1 
Self-determinacion 56 1 European social developmenr E13 1 
General benefit U1 1 Delors report Dl 1 
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Mirrerrand-2 
r Concept AC c Concept AC s 
I-bu.bliSh!jleor of EMU/FCB B 13, Establishment ofEMUIECB: E3' 19 
j Benefit of France U3 l3 
r Maastricht decisions M4 12 
Benefit ofFrance U3 18 
Maastricht decisions M4 15 
~_;d}_n,\l: '!l' ::_f EI-:!U..:r.!o~es_! ____ V1 2_ 
General benefit Ul 8 
(Complete) Freedom of action F5 7 
Speeding up of EMU-process V1 12 
~ir_:.g~ ~r.!:e':!_cy.._ __________ ~J2- 12 
Political will P2 10 
Policical will P2 7 Benefit of U1 9 
Re-unification of Germany R2 7 Status EutOQe equal to US and Japan S4 9 
l'iilgk currency S9. 7 Re-unification of Germany R2 9 
Monetary cension M5 6 Starr of EMU on 1-1-99 I3 9 
Development new European _1>_olicies D2 5 (Complete) Freedom of action F5 9 
Difficult negotiations D7 5 EMU preparations V2 7 
(True) European Unification E1 5 Speculation S!l 7 
European institutional progress E7 5 Monetary tension M5 7 
Start of EMU on 1-1-99 I3 5 European social space S3 6 
Irreversible EMU 01 5 Irreversible EMU 01 6 
Europe standing together E4 4 (True) European Unification El 6 
Economic growth G3 4 Difficult negotiations D7 6 
Political Union P4 4 Development new European policies D2 6 
Speculation Sll 4 Political Union P4 5 
European social space S3 4 Economic growth G3 5 
EMU preparations V2 4 European integration (prior to SEA) E9 5 
European integration (prior to SEA) E9 3 European insti turional progress E7 5 
French policy F3 3 Europe standing together E4 5 
Pre-WWII political traditions P3 3 Completion of SEA S1 4 
Political will in Germany P5 3 Social Justice/equality S7 3 
Completion of SEA S1 3 Successful European integration S5 3 
Status Europe equal to US and Japan S4 3 Conflict/compet. between Eur. states SlO 3 
European relance E10 2 Political will in Germany P5 3 
Better functioning of sea F6 2 Pre-WWII political traditions P3 3 
Sound money G5 2 French policy F3 3 
Problems for Germany G7 2 Fixing of the schedule of the IGC V3 2 
Historical drama H1 2 Benefit of Kohl U6 2 
Conflicr/compet. between Eur. stares S!O 2 Adhesion all member states to EMU T2 2 
Successful European integration S5 2 Security for Europe S6 2 
Security for Europe S6 2 Ratification R3 2 
Social Justice/equal ity S7 2 Opt-our clause 02 2 
Adhesion all member states to EMU T2 2 Historical drama H1 2 
Benefit of Kohl U6 2 Problems for Germany G7 2 
Valuing Eur. (democratic) ideals 05 1 Sound money G5 2 
EMS E12 1 Better functioning of SEA F6 2 
Coordination of foreign policies F1 1 EMS E12 2 
French-German conflict F4 1 European n";lance E10 2 
Self-absorbed/disconnected Germany G6 1 Wishes of the German people W2 1 
Germany respectinE_ current borders G8 l Benefit of eleven U7 1 
Increased use majority~ rule Ml l Unemployment U4 1 
Opt-out clause 02 1 Reinforcement ofEur. Parliament R1 1 
Political integration P1 1 Lack of political will in Great-Britain P6 1 
Lack of political will in Great-Britain P6 1 Political integration P1 l 
Reinforcement of Eur. Parliament R1 l Increased use majority rule M1 1 
Ratification R3 l Germany respecting current borders G8 1 
Unemployment U4 1 Self-absorbed/disconnected Germany G6 1 
Benefit of eleven U7 1 French-German conflict F4 1 
Fixing of the schedule of the IGC V3 1 Coordination of foreign policies F1 1 
Wishes of the German people W2 l Valuing Eur. (democratic) ideals D5 l 
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Pohl-2 
Concept AC c Concept AC s 
ECB with price stability as primary E9 18 Price stabili!}' Pl 27 
goal Establishment of EMU E6 :21 
Price stability Pl 16 
Est;hiishm~n~ ;f EMU - - - - - - - -E6- --11 
!;iTi:_e<!_ b_!!d-'le:_ar.r ~ef.!_ci:_ ______ L3 18 
Benefit of Bundesbank U4 15 
Effective monetary control M6 9 Liberalisation of ca].Jital markets Ll 14 
Benefit of Bundesbank U4 8 Benefit of European member states U3 10 
Liberalisation of capital markets Ll 7 Benefit of U1 10 
Monetary integration without eco. inc. M5 7 Tensions between EU members Tl 10 
Independent ECB 01 7 Independent ECB 01 9 
Economic convergence C4 6 Effective monetary control M6 9 
Tensions between EU members Tl 6 Monetary integration without eco. inr M5 9 
General benefit Ul 6 Fixed exchange rates Fl 8 
Fixed exchange rates Fl 5 Further European integration Ell 7 
Limited budgetary deficit L3 5 Economic convergence C4 7 
Bundesbank policy Bl 4 Delors report D4 6 
Changes domestic mon. & fisc._policy Cl 4 Changes domestic mon. & fisc. policy Cl 6 
Delors report D4 4 Establishment of Single Eur. market S2 5 
Increased mon. coord. between Ml 4 Increased monetary coordination Ml 5 
members between member states 
Sup_ranational decision-making_ S4 4 Benefit of European parliament us 4 
Benefit of European member states U3 4 Supranational decision-making S4 4 
Convergence in economic policies C2 3 Bundesbank policy Bl 4 
EMS El 3 Bundesbank's critical attitude towards Vl 3 
Establishment of Eur. monetary fund ElO 3 fu rther European integration 
Further European integration Ell 3 Strong currency S5 3 
Long process L2 3 Political consensus P3 3 
Establishment of Single Eur. market S2 3 ECB with price stability as primary E9 3 
Strong currency S5 3 goal 
Benefit of European parliament U5 3 Establishment of Eur. monetary fund E10 3 
Bundesbank's critical attitude towards Vl 3 EMS El 3 
further European integration Further development of EMS D1 3 
Full participation all members in EMS Al 2 Credible ECB C6 3 
Credible ECB C6 2 Convergence in economic policies C2 3 
Further development of EMS D1 2 Full particiption all members in EMS Al 3 
Goals of politicians D5 2 Benefit of Germany U2 2 
Monetary stability M3 2 Exchange rate adjustments Rl 2 
Financing governmental debt by ECB M4 2 Multispeed EMU M7 2 
Multispeed EMU M7 2 Financing governmental debt by_ ECB M4 2 
Political consensus P3 2 Monetary stability M3 2 
Exchange rate adjustments Rl 2 Long process L2 2 
Benefit ofGerman__ll U2 2 Greater financial role for EU in world F2 2 
Monetary convergence C3 1 Goals of politicians D5 2 
1992 monetary crisis C7 1 1992 monetary crisis C7 2 
Giving up the DM D3 1 Treat to existence of monetary system T2 1 
European economic integration E3 1 Stable exchange rates S1 1 
Grearer financial role for EU in world F2 1 Parallel currency P2 1 
Parallel currency P2 1 European economic integration E3 1 
Stable exchange rates Sl 1 
Treat ro existence of monetary system T2 1 
Giving up the DM D3 1 
Monetary convergence C3 I 
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E CONCEPT COMPARISON 
Stability of Map-1 Core Beliefs 
Brandt 
Concept 
German policy (Gl) 
Peace (VI) 
European unification (general, E10) 
Similar Concepts in the Core of 
Map-2 
EMU (E5) 
Single Concept 
Stability 
Srable 
Unstable 
Unstable 
Replaced Concept 
Stability 
Stable 
Unstable 
Stable 
-Single concept stabthty-rate 33% -Replacedconcept itabdity-rate 66% 
Pompidou 
Concept 
Deepening (D2) 
Effective and freely chosen 
devaluations (D3) 
European confederation (E9) 
French policies (F2) 
Economic crisis/instability (C4) 
Economic growth (El) 
Expansive financial & economic 
policy (S5) 
Similar Concepts in the Core of 
Map-2 
Single Concept 
Stability 
Stable 
Unstable, 
impossible since 
August 1971 
Stable 
Stable 
Unstable 
Stable 
Unstable 
Replaced Concept 
Stability 
Stable 
Unstable 
Stable 
Stable 
Unstable 
Stable 
Unstable 
-Single concept stability-rate 57% -Replaced concept stability-rate 57% 
Schiller 
Concept 
International co-operation (17) 
Price stability in Germany (P6) 
IMF/SDRs (16) 
Benefit of Germany (U4) 
Enlargement (Wl) 
Economic growth (E2) 
Financial discipline (Fl) 
Reorganisation of international 
monetary system (Rl) 
Balance of payments deficit in UK & 
US (B4) 
Similar Concepts in the Core of 
Map-2 
Single Concept 
Stability 
Unstable 
Stable 
Unstable 
Unstable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Unstable 
Replaced Concept 
Stability 
Unstable 
Stable 
Unstable 
Unstable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Unstable 
-Single concept stabihty-rate 56% -Replacedtontept stability-rate 56% 
òli 
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Giscard 
Concept 
Bretton Woods (Bl) 
European currency/EMU (E2) 
No mechanism enforcing financial 
discipline (Nl ) 
European integration (E6) 
Inflation (11) 
Similar Concepts in the Core of 
Map-2 
European currency/EMU (E2) 
Single Concept 
Stability 
Unstable, 
collapsed in 
August 1971 
Stable 
Unstable 
Stable 
Stable 
Replaced Concept 
Stability 
Stable 
Stable 
Unstable 
Stable 
Stable 
-Single concept stabtltty-rate 60% -Replaced concept stability-rate 80% 
Kohl 
Concept 
European integration (E5) 
Completion of SEA (SI) 
Similar Concepts tn the Core of 
Map-2 
Single Concept 
Stability 
Stable 
Stable 
Replaced Concept 
Stability 
Stable 
Stable 
-Single concept stabthty-rate 100% -Replacedconcept stabtltty-rate 100% 
Mitterrand 
Concept 
Development of new European 
policies (D2) 
(True) European Unification (El) 
European integration (prior to 
SEA) (E9) 
Solving current problems in the 
Community (E8) 
Political will (P2) 
Political integration (PI) 
Completion of SEA (SI) 
Similar Concepts in the Core of 
Map-2 
Establishment of EMU/ECB (EÎ), 
Maastricht decisions (M4), 
Speeding up of EMU-process (VI), 
Single currency (S9) 
Single Concept 
Stability 
Unstable 
Unstable 
Unstable 
Unstable 
Unstable 
Unstable 
Unstable 
Replaced Concept 
Stability 
Unstable 
Stable 
Unstable 
Unstable 
Unstable 
Unstable 
Unstable 
-Single comept stability-rate Οψο -Replaced concept stability-rate 14% 
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Pohl 
Concept 
Establishment of EMU (E6) 
Establishment of a European 
currency (E8) 
Fixed exchange rates (Fl) 
ECB with price stability as its 
primary goal (E9) 
Liberalisation of capital markets 
(LI) 
Price srabihty (PI) 
Exchange rate adjustments (Rl) 
Establishment of Single European 
marker (S2) 
Similar Concepts in the Core of 
Map-2 
Establishment of EMU (E6) 
Establishment of EMU (E6) 
Single Concept 
Stability 
Stable 
Unstable 
Unstable 
Stable 
Unstable 
Stable 
Unstable 
Unstable 
Replaced Concept 
Stability 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Unstable 
Stable 
Unstable 
Unstable 
-Single concept stabthty-ratt }8c/i -Replacedconcept stability-rate 63% 
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Preferences on EMU -dimensions 
D Rejected Alternative c Centrality s Saliency 
Preferred Alternative ERS Exchange Rate System 
EUR European Integration 
D Ambiguous Preference X Ambiguously preferred concept 
Brandt 
Concepts 
EMU-Dimension Mapl c s I Map2 I Cc s 
ERS-fixed I t: Ml £io; I' 
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SAMENVATTING (DUTCH SUMMARY) 
Binnen de traditionele benaderingen van de internationale betrekkingen (IB) is de 
vraag naar het ontstaan van een gemeenschappelijk belang in internationale 
samenwerking altijd een ondergeschoven kindje geweest Hoewel deze benaderingen 
stellen dat het bestaan van een gemeenschappelijk belang een noodzakelijke (doch met 
voldoende) voorwaarde is voor het ontstaan van mterstatelijke samenwerking, 
assumeren ze het bestaan ervan en leggen ze de nadruk op de kenmerken van het 
internationale systeem in hun verklaringen van (het falen van) mterstatelijke 
samenwerking In de introductie van dit proefschrift wordt betoogd dat juist dit feit 
ertoe leidt dat traditionele IB theorieën geen adequate verklaring kunnen bieden voor 
de ontstaansgeschiedenis van de Europese Economische en Monetaire Unie (EMU) - de 
door henzelf uitgeroepen ultieme testcase voor hun theorieën Deze constatering leidt 
tot de centrale vraag van dit proefschrift Waarom kwam een Frans-Duits 
gemeenschappelijk belang in EMU tn de vroege jaren negentig wel tot stand, terwijl plannen 
daartoe in de jaren zeventig — ondanks verwoedde pogingen en gunstigere structurele 
omstandigheden — mislukte ? 
O m tot een beantwoording van deze centrale vraag te komen, zijn in 
hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift twee recentere IB-theorieen bekeken welke geprobeerd 
hebben de definitie en de ontwikkeling van nationale standpunten te begrijpen het 
liberaal intergouvernmentalisme (LI) ontwikkeld door Andrew Moravcsik, en de 
sociaal constructivistische nationale identiteitsbenadering (SC) van Thomas Risse, 
Daniela Engelmann-Martin, Hans-Joachim Knopf, en Klaus Röscher Het liberaal 
intergouvernementalisme introduceert - zoals de term al zegt — een liberale kijk op de 
totstandkoming van nationale voorkeuren Zij stelt dat de positie die staten innemen 
in internationale of Europese onderhandelingen hun oorsprong vinden in de 
economische belangen van de meest dominante maatschappelijke groepering binnen 
een staat op het gebied van economisch en monetair beleid de nationale producenten 
De staat wordt hierbij beschouwd als een willoos doorgeefluik van de dominante 
maatschappelijke voorkeuren naar het Europese niveau LI is een typisch rationele 
keuzemodel waarin verondersteld wordt dat de dominante actoren binnen een land op 
basis van een rationele kosten-baten afweging tot hun voorkeuren en besluiten komen 
De nationale identiteitsbenadering van Risse et al vertrekt vanuit een geheel ander 
uitgangspunt Deze benadering stelt dat niet de rationeel geformuleerde (economische) 
belangen het nationale standpunt bepalen maar dat deze voorkomt uit nationale 
intersubjectieve sociale structuren Hierbij wordt verondersteld dat besluitvormers 
hun besluiten baseren op een gedeelde notie van hun nationale identiteit en de daarbij 
behorende normatieve opvattingen over legitiem gedrag Anders dan bij LI is hierbij 
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dus met de calculatie van kosten en baten doorslaggevend maar de morele juistheid 
van de keuze 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt echter vastgesteld dat zowel het liberaal 
intergouvernementalisme als de nationale identiteitsbenadenng geen adequaat 
antwoord biedt op de centrale vraag uit dit proefschrift Beide theorieën kampen met 
theoretische problemen Zo biedt het liberaal intergouvernementalisme geen 
werkelijke theorie van binnenlandse politieke machtsprocessen, en blijkt haar visie op 
de rol van de staat inconsistent De identiteitsbenadermg van Risse et al blijkt 
theoretisch onvoldoende ontwikkeld om toetsbare verwachtingen uit afte leiden en 
leidt tot deterministische of niet falsifieerbare hypothesen Tevens blijken de 
verwachtingen die uit beide theorieën kunnen worden afgeleid op cruciale punten niet 
overeen te komen met gebeurtenissen in de ontstaansgeschiedenis van de EMU 
In hoofdstuk 3 van dit proefschrift wordt daarom een alternatief 
verklaringsmodel opgesteld een statelijke cognitieve model Deze benadering stoelt 
op twee pijlers een model van nationale voorkeurswm/;zg en een model van 
voorkeurs^!?//»///« Met betrekking tot de vorming van de nationale voorkeur wordt 
allereerst de assumptie van de staat als unitaire actor, en daarmee het bestaan van een 
unitaire nationale voorkeur, volledig losgelaten Er wordt verondersteld dat er binnen 
een staat vele politieke actoren actief zijn welke onderling sterk van mening kunnen 
verschillen over de juiste politieke keuzes Bovendien wordt er, in tegenstelling tot 
binnen LI, van uitgegaan dat overheidsinstanties en statelijke actoren autonome 
voorkeuren hebben en potentieel zeer machtige politieke actoren zijn Afhankelijk van 
de kwestie die op het spel staat en de nationale en Europese politieke procedures in 
deze kwestie zullen verschillende nationale actoren een rol spelen in de ontwikkeling 
van nationale beleidsvoorkeuren Deze voorkeuren zijn echter altijd een uitkomst van 
een machtsstrijd tussen deze actoren Bovendien hoeft het proces van nationale 
voorkeursvorming met per definitie te resulteren in een eenduidige nationale 
standpuntbepaling op Europees niveau 
Wat betreft het ontwikkelde model van voorkeursdefinitie, wordt — in 
tegenstelling tot de rationele en de normatieve actoren uit LI en SC — uitgegaan van 
een psychologische visie op besluitvormingsprocessen en beleidsmakers 
Voortbordurende op de sociaal cognitieve theorie uit de Politieke Psychologie wordt 
beargumenteerd dat het proces waarmee voorkeuren ontwikkeld worden op twee 
belangrijke psychologische principes is gestoeld Allereerst stelt de cognitieve theorie 
dat mensen hun voorkeuren bepalen en keuzes maken door middel van gevolgtrekking 
(inferenties) Dit betekent dat een mens met simpelweg de beschikbare informatie in 
zich opneemt en afweegt en daar haar keuzes op baseert, maar dat deze informatie 
gefilterd en gekleurd wordt door het in het verleden opgebouwde gedachtegoed Met 
andere woorden, de betekenis en het belang van bepaalde informatie wordt bepaald 
door het bestaande wereldbeeld van een besluitvormer, en hierop baseert hij zijn 
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voorkeuren en keuzes. Informatie die op basis van het bestaande gedachtegoed met 
relevant lijkt, of inconsistent geacht wordt met de bestaande ideeën, wordt simpelweg 
ontkend of niet opgenomen. Het tweede principe is het principe van spaarzaamheid. 
Hierbij wordt ervan uitgegaan dat er een limiet is aan de informatie die het menselijke 
brein kan verwerken en dat zij het gebruik van haar capaciteiten dus moet beperken 
om te kunnen blijven functioneren. Dit kan zij het beste doen door uit te gaan van een 
simpel en stabiel wereldbeeld. O p basis van een simpel en stabiel gedachtegoed 
kunnen op zeer efficiënte en snelle wijze (veel efficiënter en sneller dan op basis van 
een kosten-baten analyse) besluiten worden genomen waardoor het menselijk brein 
ontlast wordt. 
In tegenstelling tot de rationele calculerende liberaal 
intergouvernementalistische besluitvormer en de normatieve sociaal constructivistische 
actor, veronderstelt cognitieve theorie dus dat besluitvormers hun voorkeuren afleiden 
uit hun reeds bestaande ideeën en de informatie die door dit bestaande gedachtegoed 
gefilterd en gekleurd is. De beste voorspelling voor de toekomstige voorkeuren van een 
actor zijn dus afte leiden uit zijn bestaande voorkeuren. 
Deze alternatieve theorie van voorkeurs vorm ing en definitie levert een geheel 
andere verwachtingspatroon op met betrekking tot de mechanismen die kunnen leiden 
een gemeenschappelijk belang, het belang van de verschillende mechanismen, en de 
kans dat een gemeenschappelijk belang daadwerkelijk tot stand komt. Een 
gemeenschappelijk belang, de convergentie van beleidsvoorkeuren, kan via vier 
mechanismen tot stand komen: drie psychologische mechanismen die leiden tot een 
verandering in het wereldbeeld van de dominante besluitvormers — leerprocessen 
(learning), overtuiging (persuasion), machtsuitoefening in de zin van wilsoplegging 
(imposition-of-will); en een politiek mechanisme waardoor de configuratie van de 
groep dominante actoren binnen het nationale voorkeursvormingsproces kan 
veranderen — turnover. 
Gezien de veronderstelling dat voorkeuren gebaseerd zijn op een actor's reeds 
bestaande gedachtegoed en dat rivaliserende informatie wordt ontkend en geweerd, 
kan op basis van de statelijke cognitieve theorie de verwachting uitgesproken worden 
dat het onwaarschijnlijk is dat veranderingen in de nationale voorkeur of de 
totstandkoming van een gemeenschappelijk belang het resultaat zal zijn van 
leerprocessen of van pogingen besluitvormers met een rivaliserend gedachtegoed te 
overtuigen van hun ongelijk. Eerder zal een verandering in de nationale voorkeur of de 
totstandkoming van een gemeenschappelijk belang veroorzaakt worden door 
wilsoplegging of veranderingen in de groep van dominante besluitvormers (turnover). 
Deze verwachtingen verschillen significant van de verwachtingen die afte leiden zijn 
van LI of SC. Het rationele keuzemodel waarop LI gestoeld is verwacht dat politieke 
actoren actief op zoek gaan naar nieuwe en betere informatie om hen in staat te stellen 
de juiste keuzen te maken. Binnen dit model wordt leren dus verondersteld 
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gemakkelijk te zijn. De morele centrale besluitvormer uit het sociaal 
constructivistische model daarentegen kan veronderstelt worden gevoelig te zijn voor 
overreding, zeker als deze in termen van legitimiteit worden gesteld Beide theorieën 
hebben geen oog voor wilsoplegging of turnover als mechanismen voor nationale 
voorkeursverandering en de ontwikkeling van een gemeenschappelijk belang. 
Al met al kan vanuit de statelijke cognitieve theorie de verwachting afgeleid 
worden dat om de definitie en vorming van nationale voorkeuren en de 
totstandkoming van een gemeenschappelijk belang te begrijpen zowel een goede 
analyse van de bestaande overtuigingen van de centrale besluitvormers, als een begrip 
van de binnenlandse politieke arena en machtsverhoudingen cruciaal is. Bovendien 
wordt beargumenteerd dat — hoewel het bestaande gedachtegoed van besluitvormers 
de beslissende factor kan zijn welke de totstandkoming van een gemeenschappelijk 
belang mogelijk maakt — verandering deze overtuigingen door middel van 
leerprocessen of overtuiging onwaarschijnlijk is. Dit leidt tot de - enigszins paradoxale 
— verwachting dat, terwijl overtuigingen een van de cruciale factoren zijn die nationale 
standpunten en de mogelijkheid op een gemeenschappelijk belang bepalen, 
veranderingen in die overtuigingen zeldzaam zijn Bovendien valt uit de theorie afte 
leiden dat wanneer nationale voorkeuren toch een verandering doormaken — en 
daarmee de totstandkoming van een gemeenschappelijk belang mogelijk maken — het 
waarschijnlijker is dat een dergelijk verandering tot stand is gebracht door 
wilsoplegging, of veranderingen binnen de groep van dominante besluitvormers 
(turnover) 
In de empirische hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift worden deze 
verwachtingen getest De methodologische technieken die hiervoor gebruikt worden 
zijn 'process-tracing' en 'cognitive mapping'. Deze laatste techniek wordt zowel 
gebruikt om een diepgaande analyse te maken van het bestaande gedachtegoed 
omtrent Europese monetaire eenwording van de centrale besluitvormers betrokken bij 
de oprichting van de EMU, als om vast te stellen of in de loop der tijd een verandering 
in deze overtuigingen heeft plaatsgevonden 
De daadwerkelijke casestudies, waarover in hoofdstukken 6 en 8 wordt 
gerapporteerd, worden ingeleid door een historisch overzicht van de periode 
voorafgaande aan, en tussen de mislukte totstandkoming van een gezamenlijk belang 
in de oprichting van een Europese Economische en Monetaire Unie in de jaren '70 en 
de geslaagde poging in het begin van de jaren '90. Deze overzichten bieden een 
historisch kader van de pogingen tot oprichting van EMU en helpen het gebeurde te 
begrijpen en in perspectief te plaatsen 
Uit de vier empirische hoofdstukken blijkt dat de weg naar Maastricht al in 
de periode vlak na de tweede Wereldoorlog is begonnen In deze periode zien we de 
karakteristieke West-Duitse en Franse nationale standpunten met betrekking tot 
Europese monetaire samenwerking - welke de latere discussies zullen bepalen — tot 
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ontwikkeling komen. Na een periode van wisselend beleid met betrekking tot 
aartsvijand Duitsland en economische betrekkingen, komt met de komst van De 
Gaulle als President de typische Franse positie met betrekking tot Europese monetaire 
eenwording tot stand. Deze houdt een sterke voorkeur voor stabiele wisselkoersen en 
een sterke franc in, alsmede een verwerping van elke vorm van Europese samenwerking 
behalve een puur intergouvernementele. In Duitsland zien we in deze periode de 
typische tweedeling binnen de politieke elite ontstaan die de standpuntbepaling tot 
vandaag de dag zal bepalen: Terwijl de politieke elite - bestaande uit de 
Bondskanzelarij en het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken — onder leiding van de 
eerste West-Duitse Kanselier Adenauer de verzoening met Frankrijk en de 
Westbindung van Duitsland als leidraad ziet voor elk Europees initiatief, stellen de 
Duitse financiële autoriteiten - waaronder de Centrale Bank en de Ministeries van 
Financiële en met name Economische Zaken — zich meer en meer op het ordoliberale 
standpunt dat prijsstabiliteit het ultieme doel moet zijn voor de Duitse positie inzake 
Europees economisch en monetair beleid. In de loop der jaren blijkt de Duitse 
financiële elite steeds meer in staat het Duitse nationale standpunt te bepalen. Dit 
resulteert erin dat gedurende de periode van de Tweede Wereldoorlog tot het einde 
van de jaren '60, de Franse en Duitse posities inzake Europese monetaire eenwording 
steeds meer uit elkaar gaan lopen. Dit maakt het vinden van een gezamenlijk belang in 
EMU onmogelijk. 
De eerste echte kans voor de oprichting van EMU kwam in 1969, toen voor de 
eerste keer sinds de Tweede Wereldoorlog, verscheidene Europese leiders interesse in 
de kwestie toonden. Bij zijn aanstelling koesterde de Duitse Kanselier, Willy Brandt, 
enkele diepgewortelde overtuigingen over Europese integratie. In zijn ogen was het 
een panacee voor alle Duitse en Europese kwalen. Tijdens zijn eerste maanden als 
Kanselier slaagde Jean Monnet, een overtuigde voorvechter van Europese 
eenwording, erin de Brandt te overtuigen dat de Europese monetaire eenwording het 
middel was om Europese integratie nieuw leven in te blazen. De verschuiving in 
gedachtegoed die de Duitse Kanselier als gevolg hiervan doormaakte, resulteerde in 
verwoedde pogingen van zijn kant om Europese monetaire eenwording op de Europese 
politieke agenda te plaatsen. Echter, na de Top van Den Haag in december 1969, 
slaagt de ordoliberale Duitse Minister van Economische Zaken, Karl Schiller, erin de 
controle over het Duitse beleidsvormingsproces te krijgen. In zijn ogen zou de 
verwezenlijking van een Europese monetaire unie een gevaar voor de Duitse 
prijsstabiliteit zijn, tenzij deze voorafgegaan zou worden door de oprichting van een 
economische en politieke unie. Het duurde niet lang voordat de Kanselier zich schikte 
naar het standpunt van zijn Minister en een meer ordoliberale gedachtegoed begon te 
ventileren. Tegen de tijd dat in oktober 1970 het Werner Rapport werd gepubliceerd, 
werd het Duitse nationale standpunt daarom opnieuw gekenmerkt door 
terughoudendheid. 
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In tegenstelling tot Brandt, deed de Franse President Georges Pompidou in 
Den Haag geen voorstel om een werkelijke Europese Economische en Monetaire Unie 
op te richten, maar bepleitte hij voor de totstandkoming van een zuiver 
intergouvernementeel reservefonds Zijn plannen waren stevig verankerd in het 
Gaullistisch' gedachtegoed dat hij sinds jaar en dag koesterde Vreemd genoeg ging 
Frankrijk, bij monde van de Franse vertegenwoordigers, echter wel akkoord met het 
Werner Rapport, waarin de totstandbrenging van een werkelijk supranationale unie 
voorgesteld werd Een diepgaande analyse van de gebeurtenissen van 1970 laat zien 
dat deze inconsistentie in de Franse nationale voorkeur het resultaat was van de 
politieke activiteiten van enkele belangrijke binnenlandse politieke actoren, die 
probeerden om hun eigen pro-Europese voorkeuren te realiseren Want terwijl 
President Pompidou tegen de oprichting van de EMU was, werd de oprichting hiervan 
wel gesteund door de Minister van Financien, Giscard d'Estaing, de Minister van 
Buitenlandse zaken, Schumann, en de Franse onderhandelaars in het Werner Comité 
Bovendien bleek Pompidou de besprekingen in de het Werner Comité uit het oog te 
zijn verloren Echter, toen hij in november 1970 met de resultaten van de discussies 
van het Werner Comité werd geconfronteerd, sprak de President onmiddellijk een veto 
over de plannen uit, en maakte daarmee een einde aan de poging overeenkomst te 
bereiken over de totstandkoming van EMU Al met al is daarmee gebleken dat tijdens 
de vroege jaren 70 met betrekking tot de oprichting van EMU geen 
gemeenschappelijk belang tussen Frankrijk en Duitsland bestond De overtuigingen 
van de meest centrale Duitse en Franse besluitvormers — de Duitse financiële elite en 
President Pompidou — liepen daarvoor eenvoudigweg te veel uit elkaar 
Midden jaren '70, was het politieke landschap dramatisch veranderd In 
Duitsland, was Helmut Schmidt Brandt opgevolgd, terwijl in Frankrijk Giscard 
d'Estaing Pompidou had vervangen Dit betekende dat voor het eerst sinds de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog, zowel de Duitse Kanselier als de Franse President voorstander was van 
verdere Europese monetaire eenwording en zij daarbij een gematigde ordoliberale visie 
op economisch en monetair beleid deelden Deze overeenstemming maakte een Frans-
Duits gemeenschappelijk belang in de oprichting van het Europese Monetaire 
Systeem (EMS) mogelijk Ondanks de ambities van de Kanselier en van de President 
was het EMS echter geen werkelijke monetaire unie zij was volstrekt 
intergouvernementeel van aard Gezien het binnenlandse machtsevenwicht in beide 
landen, was de oprichting van een Europese Centrale Bank en de invoering van één 
enkele Europese munt op dat moment simpelweg niet haalbaar 
De Frans-Duitse overeenstemming tussen Giscard en Schmidt bleek niet sterk 
genoeg om de volgende verandering in het politieke landschap te overleven Hoewel 
zowel de nieuwe Kanselier Helmut Kohl als de nieuwe President François 
Mitterrand voorstanders waren van verdere Europese integratie en vaste wisselkoersen, 
was het verschil tussen het sterk Keynesiaanse economische programma van de 
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regering Mitterrand en het ordoliberale gedachtegoed van de Duitse financiële 
elite eenvoudig te groot om te worden overbrugd Bovendien dwongen binnenlands 
machtspolitieke overwegingen Kohl ertoe alleen verdere Europese integratie na te 
streven in andere kwesties dan de monetaire Niet van zins de toorn van de Duitse 
financiële elite over zich af te roepen, liet de Kanselier de nationale standpuntbepaling 
liever over aan deze machtige autoriteiten In de late jaren '80 zou een 
gemeenschappelijk belang op EMU zich niettemin ontwikkelen 
Terwijl het onderzoek in dit proefschrift geen ondersteuning biedt voor de 
vaak gehoorde bewering dat de monetaire onrust in begin jaren '80 het cruciale 
leermoment vormde voor de Franse President welke de totstandbrenging van EMU 
mogelijk maakte, toont het wel aan dat de revolutie van 1989 in Oost-Europa het 
haperende proces van Europese monetaire eenwording het doorslaggevende zetje in de 
rug gaf 
De gebeurtenissen in Oost-Europa plaatste het 'Duitse Vraagstuk' opnieuw op 
de internationale politieke agenda en blies Kohl's overtuiging dat Duitse en Europese 
eenwording onlosmakelijk met elkaar waren verbonden, nieuw leven in Bovendien 
verschafte de mogelijkheid tot Duitse eenwording zijn latente wens verdere Europese 
monetaire eenwording te bewerkstelligen nieuwe urgentie Na jaren van 
terughoudendheid, nam de Kanselier het proces van Europese monetaire eenwording 
in eigen handen, en bleek bereid de bezwaren van de Duitse financiële elite op enkele 
essentiële punten in de onderhandelingen te trotseren Voor het eerst sinds de dagen 
van Adenauer, had een Duitse Kanselier de urgentie, legitimiteit en de politieke 
macht gevonden om de Duitse nationale voorkeur inzake de Europese economische en 
monetaire eenwording te dicteren Dit zou de cruciale impuls voor het Europese 
monetaire eenwordingsproces blijken 
Terwijl de revolutionaire ontwikkelingen in Oost-Europa dus een versterking 
van het bestaande gedachtegoed van de Duitse Kanselier veroorzaakten, zetten zij de 
wereld van President Mitterrand op zijn kop Zijn eerste reactie was er één van 
ontkenning In zijn ogen zou Moskou — ook na de val van de Berlijnse Muur — Duitse 
hereniging nooit goedkeuren Het duurde echter niet lang voordat Mitterrand moest 
erkennen dat met de ontwikkelingen in Oost-Europa de Duitse hereniging een reële 
mogelijkheid was geworden In de maanden daarna overwoog Mitterrand afwisselend 
twee reacties de Triple Entente opnieuw leven inblazen om tegenwicht te bieden aan de 
macht van een versterkt Duitsland (balancing), of de Europese eenwording versnellen 
en versterken om Duitsland onlosmakelijke aan zijn Europese partners te binden 
(bandwagoning) Zoals in de vroege jaren '80, bleek de Franse President niet in staat te 
beslissen Hij bleef twijfelen tussen 'balancing' en 'bandwagoning' Uiteindelijk kwam 
de President nooit werkelijk tot een beslissing, maar schikte zich simpelweg in het feit 
dat Kohl vastbesloten was (het herenigd) Duitsland onherroepelijk aan haar Europese 
partners te binden Mitterrand, hervond zich echter snel en begon spoedig te pleiten 
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voor de snelle en onherroepelijke oprichting van een Europese Centrale Bank Terwijl 
de revolutie in Oost-Europa dus een zeer verschillend effect op Kohi en Mitterrand 
had, resulteerde het uiteindelijk in de totstandkoming van een gemeenschappelijk 
belang tussen Frankrijk en Duitsland in de oprichting van EMU 
Er zijn verschillende theoretische conclusies die op basis van dit historische 
relaas getrokken kunnen worden Deze conclusies zijn gebaseerd op de analyse van de 
voorkeuren van de volgende zeven centrale besluitvormers Brandt, Schiller, 
Pompidou, Giscard d'Estaing, Kohl, Pohl, en Mitterrand Met betrekking tot de aard 
van individuele voorkeursvormingsprocessen van centrale besluitvormers kan ten eerste 
gesteld worden dat de statelijke cognitieve benadering die ontwikkeld is in dit 
proefschrift een goede verklaring biedt voor de stabiliteit van de voorkeuren van de 
bestudeerde besluitvormers Het empirische materiaal ondersteunt de hypothese dat 
hoe beter geïnformeerd en meer ervaren een actor is op een bepaald gebied, hoe sterker 
zijn voorkeuren inzake die kwestie Verder is het duidelijk geworden dat de 
voorkeuren van de centrale besluitvormers met betrekking tot Europese monetair 
eenwording door de tijd heen zeer stabiel bleven Van de 21 deelvoorkeuren die 
geanalyseerd zijn, bleek dat slechts in drie gevallen een besluitvormer een verandering 
in voorkeur heeft ervaren tweemaal in het geval van Kanselier Brandt en eenmaal in 
het geval van President Mitterrand, terwijl in 8 gevallen het gedachtegoed van 
besluitvormers geen verandering liet zien, en er in 10 gevallen sprake was van een 
versterking van bestaande overtuigingen Al met al kan zelfs worden geconcludeerd 
dat — in het geval van EMU - de voorkeuren van de centrale besluitvormers niet alleen 
het voorspelde patroon lieten zien, maar nog stabieler waren dat op basis van 
cognitieve theorie verwacht werd 
De verwachting die uit de statelijke cognitieve theorie afgeleid kan worden 
dat actoren met een sterke voorkeur minder snel compromissen zullen sluiten, blijkt in 
deze casus niet onvoorwaardelijk op te gaan Gebleken is dat deze stelling slechts 
opgaat voor die besluitvormers met sterke overtuigingen die geconfronteerd worden 
met plannen waarmee zij het oneens zij De besluitvormers met sterke overtuigingen 
die voorstander zijn van de geplande beleidsverandering vertonen juist de neiging 
meer toegefelijk te worden Dit lijkt erop te duiden dat de neiging van een 
besluitvormer om tijdens onderhandelingen compromissen te sluiten niet het directe 
gevolg is van de sterkte van zijn overtuigingen maar van het gecombineerde effect van 
deze sterkte, en zijn voorkeur met betrekking tot de op handen zijnde 
beleidsveranderingen Verder onderzoek is nodig om deze bijgestelde verwachting te 
testen 
Wel kan gesteld worden dat besluitvormers met een sterke voorkeur vaker 
overgingen tot politieke actie om hun voorkeuren te realiseren en daarbij meer 
machtsbelust waren dan besluitvormers met minder sterke voorkeuren Bovendien is 
het duidelijk geworden dat alle besluitvormers in hun politieke acties eenzelfde 
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patroon lieten zien: hun geprefereerde tactiek bestond er zonder uitzondering uit dat 
zij actoren met rivaliserende beleidsovertuigingen probeerde uit te sluiten van de 
uiteindelijke besluitvorming. Daarentegen heeft geen van de centrale besluitvormers 
die in dit proefschrift worden bestudeerd een poging gedaan hun rivalen op andere 
gedachten te brengen. Dit kan een indicatie zijn dat de belangrijkste bevinding van 
dit onderzoek - dat centrale besluitvormers op hoog politiek niveau zelden van 
voorkeuren veranderen — voor mensen uit het beleidsveld geen verrassing zal zijn. 
Wat betreft de vorming van nationale voorkeuren en de totstandkoming van 
een gemeenschappelijk belang in EMU kan het volgende gezegd worden. Er zijn drie 
momenten gevonden waarop de Duitse nationale voorkeur blijkt te zijn veranderd: na 
de interventie van Monnet in 1969, op het moment dat Brandt de controle over de 
kwestie verliest aan Schiller, en na de revolutie in Oost-Europa. Evenzovele 
veranderingen zijn geconstateerd in de Franse nationale voorkeur: gedurende de 
onderhandelingen over het Werner Rapport, met de interventie van Pompidou na de 
publicatie van dit rapport en na de val van de Berlijnse Muur. 
Hieruit kunnen de volgende conclusies getrokken worden: In de eerste plaats 
blijkt dat slechts in slechts twee van de zes gevallen waarin zich een verandering in de 
nationale voorkeur heeft voorgedaan, deze werd veroorzaakt door een verandering in de 
individuele overtuigingen door leren of overtuiging, terwijl er in 5 gevallen sprake was 
van turnover of wilsoplegging. Dit leidt tot de conclusie dat de bevindingen de 
hypothese ondersteunen dat binnenlands politieke machtsprocessen de belangrijkste 
oorzaak van nationale voorkeurverandering zijn. Bovendien vond in vier van de zes 
gevallen van nationale voorkeursverandering turnover plaats, en is er maar één geval van 
wilsoplegging, overtuiging, en leren gevonden. Dit betekent dat de verwachting van 
de statelijke cognitieve benadering dat turnover een belangrijk mechanisme van 
nationale voorkeursverandering zou zijn, wordt gesteund. Tegen de verwachting in 
werd echter niet bevestigd dat wilsoplegging een belangrijk mechanisme van nationale 
voorkeurverandering is. 
Tevens bleek uit het onderzoek dat een versterking van bestaande 
overtuigingen een belangrijk mechanisme voor nationale voorkeursverandering vormt: 
in drie van de zes gevallen werd dit mechanisme gevonden. Binnen het originele 
theoretische kader in hoofdstuk 3 is dit mechanisme niet geïdentificeerd als een 
mechanisme dat kon leiden tot nationale voorkeurverandering. Echter, deze bevinding 
versterkt de conclusie dat de statelijke cognitieve benadering die gehanteerd wordt in 
dit proefschrift een adequate verklaring vormt voor de totstandkoming van een 
gemeenschappelijk belang in EMU. De vele gevallen waarin een versterking van de 
bestaande voorkeuren werd gevonden, wijzen er namelijk op dat nieuwe informatie en 
veranderingen in de omgeving van de besluitvormers slechts verwerkt en opgenomen 
wordt als zij consistent zijn met reeds bestaande overtuigingen van de besluitvormer: 
een van de centrale premissen waarop de statelijke cognitieve theorie gestoeld is. Dit 
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mechanisme van versterking van de individuele voorkeuren verdient als aanjager van 
nationale voorkeursverandering dus verdere theoretische en empirische aandacht. 
Al met al wijzen de bevindingen van deze studie erop dat in het geval van 
EMU, de reeds bestaande overtuigingen van centrale besluitvormers, hun onvermogen te 
leren, evenals machtsevenwicht tussen centrale besluitvormers de belangrijkste variabelen zijn 
die bepalen of een gemeenschappelijk belang tussen Frankrijk en Duitsland tot stand 
komt. Zoals is aangetoond, waren in het geval van de mislukte poging om een 
gemeenschappelijk belang in EMU te vinden in de jaren '70, de essentiële factoren die 
succes belemmerde de blijvende sceptische houding van Pompidou en de Duitse 
financiële elite ten opzichte van EMU; het onvermogen van deze actoren te leren of 
worden overtuigd van een positievere houding ten opzichte van EMU; en het gebrek 
aan politieke macht van de voorstanders van EMU. Verder is het ook duidelijk 
geworden dat het succes van de plannen om een EMU op te richten in de jaren '90 te 
danken was aan de positieve houding van Kohl en Mitterrand ten opzichte van EMU; 
de — onder invloed van de revolutie in Oost-Europa — opgeleefde overtuiging van Kohl 
dat Duitse en Europese eenwording onlosmakelijk met elkaar verbonden zijn; en de 
wilskracht en macht die de mogelijkheid van een Duitse hereniging de Kanselier bood 
om de ordoliberale bezwaren van de Duitse financiële elite - die een overeenkomst 
over EMU jarenlang hadden belemmerd — naast zich neer te leggen. Al met al, is het 
essentiële verschil tussen de mislukte poging een gemeenschappelijk belang in EMU 
in de jaren '70 en het succes van de jaren '90 te vinden in de verschillen in de 
bestaande, en onveranderlijke voorkeuren van de centrale besluitvormers die betrokken 
waren bij de onderhandelingen over EMU. Deze conclusie bevestigt dat stelling die 
door statelijke cognitieve theorie naar voren wordt gebracht dat de bestaande 
voorkeuren van centrale besluitvormers hun toekomstige voorkeuren bepalen, en dat 
besluitvormers in hoge politieke posities in het algemeen niet in staat zijn te leren, 
zelfs niet wanneer zij geconfronteerd worden met een aardverschuiving zoals de val van 
de Berlijnse Muur. 
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Stellingen 
Bij het proefschrift Mapping the Road to Maastricht van Femke van Esch 
1 Dat traditionele IB theorieën geen doorwrochte visie op de totstandkoming en 
ontwikkeling van politieke voorkeuren hebben, resulteert er niet alleen in dat 
zij noch het falen van de Werner plannen, noch het uiteindelijke ontstaan van 
EMU kunnen verklaren, zij veronachtzamen daarmee ook één van de meest 
politieke en (dus) interessante fases in het Europese integratie proces 
2 Spreken over de Duitse of Franse voorkeur met betrekking tot Europese 
monetaire eenwording — zoals het liberaal intergouvernementalisme en 
identiteitsbenadenng van Risse et al doen — doet ten onrechte het idee 
ontstaan dat zoiets als een unitaire nationale voorkeur bestaat Haar 
ontstaansgeschiedenis toont zonder twijfel aan dat EMU altijd even zozeer een 
intra- als een /»/miationaal politiek strijdpunt is geweest 
3 De Bundesbank en koekiemonster zijn de enige actoren in dit proefschrift wiens 
identiteit werkelijk hun voorkeur impliceert, en visa versa 
4 De ontdekking van een correlatie zou aanleiding voor onderzoek moeten zijn, 
niet het eindresultaat Dit zou immers niet alleen ten goede komen aan onze 
wetenschappelijke kennis, het zou ook het gehalte 'goede verhalen' in 
wetenschappelijk publicaties omhoog brengen 
5 Nogmaals 'when you observe conflict, think deadlock' voordat je je bekommert 
om collectieve actie problemen Voor 'deadlock' heb je immers slechts één 
koppige Franse President nodig 
6 Kohl's interpretatie van zijn gesprek met Gorbachov aan de oevers van de Rijn 
bevestigt de waarde van het 'Thomas Theorema' dat stelt dat 'if men define 
situations as real, they are real in their consequences' Tegelijkertijd toont 
Mitterrand's reactie op de val van de Berlijnse Muur en de Duitse eenwording in 
het jaar daarna aan dat ook als men situaties niet als reëel ervaart, zij reële 
consequenties kunnen hebben 
7 Een'critical juncture'is als schoonheid 'in the eye of the beholder' Dat 
betekent niet dat zij, of haar consequenties wetenschappelijk niet verklaarbaar 
zouden zijn Het betekent slechts dat je kennis moet hebben van de 
preoccupaties van 'the beholder' 
8 De bevindingen in dit proefschrift zijn een prachtige illustratie van het gelijk 
van Deutsch toen hij stelde dat 'power is the ability to afford not to learn' 
9 Het werkelijke democratische deficit van de EMU ligt met in de beperkte 
mogelijkheden de ECB ter verantwoording te roepen, maar in het elitaire 
karakter van het traject dat leidde tot haar oprichting en het 'autisme' van de 
daarbij betrokken besluitvormers 
10 'Humans use the word impossible far too often' (vrij accuraat naar Seven-of-
Nine in Startrek Voyager) 
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